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Preface
The centenary of the beginning of the First World War was commemo-
rated with conferences and seminars around the world in 2014. Most
commentary examined the war from the point of view of the European
participants and their western allies. The role of the Ottoman Empire
in the war was also the subject of several scholarly meetings. The fifth
annual conference of the Leiden University Center for the Study of Islam
and Society (lucis) organized by Prof. Dr Erik Jan Zürcher added a
Leiden perspective to this topic.
The conference and the book that resulted from it fit lucis’s goals
very well. lucis aims to explore the diversity of Muslim societies through
high-quality, evidence-based research. By bringing together experts
from different backgrounds – including journalists, policy-makers,
teachers, activists and opinion leaders – we stimulate discussion, increase
knowledge and promote understanding of Islam as a religion, a political
system and a cultural practice. The examination of the use of religion
in the First World War aptly expands our understanding of Islam as a
system of norms embedded in society and expressed within very specific
historical circumstances.
The conference ‘Jihad and other uses of Islam in World War i.
Instrumentalization of religion by the Ottoman Empire, its allies and
its enemies’ took place in Leiden on 13–14 November, 2014. This
volume is based on the papers delivered at that conference. It appears
exactly a hundred years after the pamphlet published by the famous
Leiden professor Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje “Heilige Oorlog Made in
Germany” (Holy War Made in Germany), from which the conference
took its thematic cue.¹
The papers in this book show how the use of Islam by political powers
such as the Ottoman State and Germany affected the experience of
Muslim subjects of the Ottoman sultan, but also that of individual
Muslims serving in the German armies. It had an impact on the life of
contemporary scholars of Islam and the Middle East in Europe such as
SnouckHurgronje when they had to define their position vis-à-vis the call
for jihad initiated by the Ottomans against the allied forces. Examining
jihad as an instrument for military but also cultural goals also extends
the meaning of this instrument to domains not generally considered. At
times when the appeal and the fear for Muslim holy war, exactly because
of the universalist ambitions of jihad, are exploited everywhere in rather
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absolute terms, this book reminds us yet again that the motives behind
and the effects of this phenomenon are in fact very diverse.
We would like to thank Erik Jan Zürcher for his efforts in making
the conference a success and especially for his commitment to bringing
the results of the conference into print immediately afterwards. Our
colleagues from Leiden University Press are also warmly thanked for
their help in the publication process.
Petra M. Sijpesteijn
Director Leiden Centre for the Study of Islam and Society
Leiden, 19 October 2015
Note
 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, “Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany,” De Gids 79/1
(1915), 115–147.
Introduction
The Ottoman Jihad, the German Jihad
and the Sacralization of War
Erik-Jan Zürcher
In 2014–2015 Jihad was everywhere. When the Iraqi imam Ibrahim
Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri proclaimed himself “Caliph of all Muslims”
under the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in July 2014 in a sermon recorded
at the al-Nuri mosque in Mosul, he constantly referred to Jihad and
called on all Muslims to join his “Islamic State” (is). Later he announced
that he was leading a Jihad that would lead to the conquest of Rome and
Spain. When tens of thousands of volunteers joined the Islamic State
from the Middle East, but also from Europe, America and Australia,
these volunteers were called Mujahideen by themselves and Jihadis by
international media. Jihadi quickly became a household word, and even
a nickname, in the Western world, as in the case of the British Muslim
Muhammad Emwazi, who became known as “Jihadi John” when he
appeared in recordings showing the ritual slaughter of prisoners of the
Islamic State.
Of course, both Baghdadi’s proclamation of the Caliphate and
his declaration of Jihad were contested. Governments and religious
authorities throughout the Arabworld denounced Jihad as being contrary
to Sharia. They pointed out that a Jihad could not be directed against
other Muslims. In the West, political leaders like Prime Minister David
Cameron in the u.k. and President Barack Obama in the u.s. declared
(without any serious argument) that “Islam was a religion of peace” and
that is was “barbaric” and Baghdadi’s Jihad “unislamic.”
This kind of argument had also been a feature of the last time a Caliph
officially declared a Jihad. As it happened, this took place almost exactly
a century before al-Baghdadi climbed the stairs of the minbar of the
great mosque in Mosul. It is with that Jihad, the one proclaimed by the
Ottoman Sultan-Caliph Mehmed v Reshad in November 1914, that this
volume is concerned.
The Ottoman declaration of Jihad was controversial from the start.
The Ottoman Empire had concluded a secret defensive alliance with the
German Empire on 2 August 1914 and had mobilized shortly thereafter.
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Until late October the Ottoman political leadership had maintained an
armed neutrality, hoping that Germany would win the war before it
became necessary actually to join the fighting. After the German defeat
on the Marne in mid-September it was clear that the war on the western
front would not be won quickly and German pressure on the Ottomans
to join the war effort increased.¹ By late October the Young Turk leaders
in Constantinople gave in and an Ottoman naval squadron was ordered
to attack Russian naval installations in the Black Sea. Even though this
was a deliberate provocation designed to bring about war with Russia and
its allies, the Ottoman government officially maintained that it had been
under attack and that its navy surprised Russian ships that were mining
the northern entrance to the Bosphorus. This was a blatant lie, but the
war was presented to the Ottoman population as having been imposed
on a country committed to maintaining peace. This was important, and
not only in terms of propaganda. It was directly relevant to the nature of
a possible Jihad, as broad consensus had grown among Muslim scholars
that in an offensive Jihad, in other words: when the Islamic state was
trying to enlarge the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) at the expensive
of the Dar al-Harb (Abode of War), the duty to fight was a communal
one ( farz al-kifâya), which could be devolved on a part of the Islamic
community such as the army. If, on the other hand, the Islamic state was
under attack, fighting was seen as an individual duty ( farz al-‘ayn) and it
was incumbent on every single Muslim to make a contribution.²
A month after the naval attack that led to the Russian declaration of
war (followed by those of France, Britain, Serbia and Montenegro), the
Ottoman sultan proclaimed a Jihad. This proclamation was followed by a
supporting legal opinion, a fatwa, from the highest religious authority,
the Sheykh ul-Islam and by a proclamation to the army and navy by the
sultan and his war minister, Enver Pasha. In all of these statements, the
Jihad was justified with the argument that the Islamic state (the Ottoman
Empire) and the Muslim community had come under unprovoked
attack from Russia, France and Britain. The proclamation and the fatwa
primarily targeted the Muslim subjects of France, Britain and Russia in
their colonies, calling upon them to resist their oppressors. The fatwa
also defined joining the fight against the Islamic (Ottoman) state as a
grave sin that would carry the severest penalty in the hereafter for any
Muslim who did so.
Of course, the Jihad declaration caused debate within the Islamic
world. It was rejected by religious authorities in the different Entente
colonies and in British-occupied Egypt and either rejected or quietly
ignored by important players in the Ottoman periphery, such as the
Idrisids in Asir and the Hashemite Sharif of Mekka. It also immediately
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gave rise to a heated academic debate in Europe. The trigger of this
debate was the article, or rather manifesto, published by the famous
Leiden scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje in January 1915 and entitled
“Heilige Oorlog Made in Germany”³ (Holy War Made in Germany). As
Leon Buskens shows in this volume, the article was a vitriolic attack on
Snouck’s German colleagues (who before the war had also been close
friends), whom he accused of being the instigators of the Ottoman Jihad
proclamation. In Snouck’s eyes calling for Jihad was a totally irresponsible
appeal to an essentially mediaeval concept that threatened to undo the
attempts to bring Muslim peoples into the modern world by reconciling
their personal faith with the demands of the legal-rational state and
secular society. As we see in Buskens’s chapter, Snouck felt so deeply about
this issue because he had personally invested most of his professional life,
both as an academic and as a colonial policy advisor, in this programme.
Snouck’s article was immediately translated into English as “Holy War
Made in Germany” and gained wide currency in the countries of the
Entente as well as in the United States, and it has regained prominence
in academic debates in the last thirty years under the impact of the
publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 1978.⁴ A hundred years after
its first publication it is still being debated, and for that reason alone it
is very fitting that the Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam
and Society sponsored a two-day conference on Jihad in World War i
in November, 2014 and that Leiden University Press is publishing the
proceedings in 2015, the centenary of the appearance of “Heilige Oorlog
Made in Germany.”
Snouck’s main criticism of his German colleagues was that they had
allowed their nationalist fervour to override their academic integrity. The
dispute, as Buskens shows, was not about putting academic knowledge
to political use per se but about the kind of political use to which it
was put. In Snouck’s eyes, both the World War itself and the idea of
instrumentalizing religion for the war effort were abhorrent. The German
Islam scholars for their part were hurt and surprised by the attack by
their friend, as they saw patriotism as their first duty, something that
transcended academic considerations. They were German citizens first
and academics second, and saw nothing wrong in making their expertise
available for the war effort, just as Snouck himself had made his expertise
available to the Dutch colonial authorities in the East Indies.
If Snouck had been a citizen of one of the belligerent states rather
than an inhabitant of neutral Holland, he would probably have been less
surprised or incensed by the attempts to sacralize the war through the
proclamation of Jihad. Sacralization of war was everywhere in 1914–1915.
As Mehmet Beşikçi informs us in his chapter in this volume, there is
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a growing literature on the various uses of religion for mobilization
in Europe in World War i and the recent study by Philip Jenkins, The
Great and Holy War,⁵ has the issue as its central theme. For those of
us who have become used to seeing World War i primarily as a tragic,
useless and, if we are to believe Christopher Clark in his celebrated
Sleepwalkers,⁶ avoidable waste of human life, it comes as a surprise to
see that religious leaders in all of the belligerent countries embraced
and sacralized the war. The precise way in which this happened differed
from country to country. In Russia, the state and the official Orthodox
Church were deeply entwined, as were the Habsburg monarchy and the
Catholic Church. But in Great Britain, Germany, and even in the French
Third Republic with its militant laicism, the vast majority of religious
leaders identified with the war and proclaimed service to the fatherland
a religious duty. Only the Vatican under Pope Benedict xv consistently
advocated peace, but that was of course also the only institution not
functioning within a national or imperial state and the only one primarily
having supra-national status.
In Germany, the attitude of the leading religious figures, both in
the Lutheran Church and in academia, was an extreme example of
the sacralization of war. As Jenkins argues,⁷ this attitude should be
understood as a paradoxical legacy of the liberal theology that German
theologians and church historians had done more than anyone else
to develop in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
hallmarks of this theology had been textual criticism and historicism
which led to an understanding of the Bible as just one expression of God’s
plan, anchored in a specific time and place.While liberating inmanyways,
this understanding had also opened the door to an understanding of the
German nation as God’s new chosen people and of the Wilhelmine
empire as God’s kingdom on earth, with a civilizing and Christian
mission in this world. It is this legacy that explains why 29 German
church leaders and theology professors signed a manifesto in September
1914 (when the Battle of the Marne was still raging) that is in some
ways reminiscent of the Ottoman proclamation of Jihad two months
later. In this “Aufruf Deutscher Kirchenmänner und Professoren and
die evangelischen Christen im Ausland” (Call of German Ecclesiastic
Leaders and Professors to Evangelical Christians Abroad) which was
directed primarily at Anglo-Saxon Protestants, Germany was depicted
as a peaceful country that had come under unprovoked attack and a
Christian nation that had to defend itself against “Asiatic barbarism.”
Germany had every right to ask for God’s succour for its people and its
emperor. In other texts prominent theologians declared loyalty to the
throne to be as important as following the gospels.
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To sum up: sacralization of the war, both to legitimize it for public
opinion at home and abroad and to mobilize the population was
ubiquitous. Every belligerent state engaged in it, but the religio-patriotic
fervour was particularly strong among the Protestant German elite,
which may help to explain why Snouck’s German colleagues may have
had few qualms about supporting or even instigating the proclamation
of Jihad.
The Ottoman Jihad thus fits a wider pattern in which states appealed
to coreligionists at home and abroad to support their war effort, but as
the only Muslim power and indeed the only independent Islamic state
involved in the conflict, the position of the Ottomans was at the same
time unique, and the Ottoman efforts to sacralize their war also deserve
to be examined on their own. This is what this book attempts to do.
The structure of the collection is such that there are contributions on
the role of the Germans (including the controversy started by Snouck
Hurgronje), on that of the Ottomans (in terms both of the Jihad policy
and of its effects), and on that of their adversaries, both Arab and British.
In other words: the organizing principle is basically that of the different
actors in the conflict and this is intentional, as one of the aims of the
organizers of the conference (and the editor of this volume) has been to
give agency to Middle Eastern actors where the academic debate, perhaps
as a result of Snouck’s influence, has been focused almost exclusively on
the German role.
The chapter structure will be self-evident to the reader of the book. It
is, however, also possible to discern a number of recurrent themes that
transcend the actor-based approach that underlies it. In what follows
I should like to discuss four of these themes, by trying to answer four
questions on the basis of a “cross-reading” of the different chapters.
Was Snouck Right and Was the Jihad “Made in Germany”?
Thefirst theme obviously is the one that is directly connected with Snouck
Hurgronje’s famous manifesto: was the Jihad indeed a German invention,
or did it have authentic Ottoman roots? Different authors in this volume
seem to give different answers to this question, but I think they may not
necessarily be contradictory.
As Tilman Lüdke shows, some German politicians dreamed about
the effects of a German-inspired campaign to stir up the Muslims in the
colonial possessions of Britain and France to compensate for the relative
lack of success of German imperial expansion overseas. He quotes the
liberal political Friedrich Naumann, who as early as 1889 stated that in the
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case of a world war “the caliph of Constantinople will once more uplift
the standard of Holy War. The sick man will raise himself for the last
time to cry aloud to Egypt, to Sudan, to East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan
and India: ‘War against England!’”
This was when Bismarck was still at the helm of German foreign policy
and before the more aggressive and adventurist foreign policy of Emperor
Wilhelm ii had started. During the latter’s reign the idea seems to have
gained more currency. Max von Oppenheim (who would play a crucial
role in 1914) discussed Pan-Islamism with Sultan Abdülhamid during
his first travels in the Middle East in 1895 and the Kaiser very publicly
identified himself with the fantasies about Germany’s ability to mobilize
the Muslims during his 1898 visit to Damascus and Jerusalem. Famously,
he declared himself to be the friend of the 300 million Muslims of the
world during his visit to the mausoleum of Saladin in Damascus. By 1914
speculation about the possibilities of instrumentalizing the Muslims for
the German war effort was widespread enough for the German foreign
ministry to askOppenheim to come upwith amemorandumon the issue,
which he duly produced under the title of “Die Revolutionierung der
islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde” (Bringing about a Revolution in the
Muslim Territories of our Enemies), the document that would form the
basis for the work of the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Intelligence
Office for the East) and which is discussed in the contributions by Lüdke
and Gussone.
In Istanbul, meanwhile, the vice-commander in chief and warminister
Enver Pasha seems to have had doubts about the advisability of a Jihad
declaration in a situation in which the empire was so visibly linked to
European Christian allies, preferring a call by the Sultan to Muslims in
the colonies of the Entente instead, but his chief of the general staff, the
German General Bronsart von Schellendorf was strongly in favour.
All of this seems to support the thesis that the declaration of Jihad
was primarily the result of German policies. On the other hand we
learn from Mustafa Aksakal in his contribution that “the concept of
Jihad occupied a quotidian place in the Ottoman cultural register.” He
clearly demonstrates that Snouck was wrong when he supposed that Jihad
was essentially a mediaeval practice that had no place in the modern
Muslim world. The Ottoman government officially declared Jihad six
times between 1768 and 1922. Even though it is equally true, as Şükrü
Hanioğlu writes in his chapter, that the Ottomans seem largely to have
abandoned the practice after the Tanzimat – and accordingly refrained
from proclaiming a Jihad in 1853 (the Crimean War), 1877 (the Russo-
Turkish War), 1911 (the Italian invasion of Tripolitania) and 1912 (the
Balkan War) – Jihad remained an important and emotive concept that
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was widely used in exhortations to soldiers and press publications. Jihad
was part of the Ottoman political vernacular. The fact that the Ottomans
officially declared Jihad in six cases and refrained from doing so in
four others can perhaps be explained by their desire to gain European
support – this was evident in 1853 and 1877, and also in 1911–1912, but
not in the very short Greek war of 1897. There is little doubt, however,
that on a grassroots level, the concept played a role even in those wars
when Jihad was not officially declared.
Hanioğlu’s chapter seems to offer a way to reconcile the two positions.
He argues that, while on the one hand the Ottomans went along with the
unrealistic expectations of the Germans and declared a Jihad that aimed
at triggering uprisings in India, North Africa and Central Asia, on the
other hand they also promoted Jihad to achieve purely Ottoman policy
objectives, notably the galvanizing of theArab andKurdish populations of
the empire. In the case of the Arabs of southern Iraq, who had been going
over to the Shia in large numbers in the preceding decades, the carefully
tailored Ottoman Jihad campaign specifically aimed at this community
seems to have been quite successful. The leading Shi’i mujtahids of Najaf
and Kerbela all supported it emphatically and it caused the British serious
problems during their attempts to fan out northwards from occupied
Basra. In the Arab peninsula the Ottoman Jihad campaign was much less
successful, and remarkably the only major local player to support it was
also a Shi ‘i, the Zaydi Imam Yahya in the Yemen.
The conclusion would seem to be that on the one hand the Jihad
proclamation was the product of German strategic thinking, but on the
other hand an appeal to Jihad was indeed part of the existing “toolbox”
of the Ottoman state, even in the early twentieth century. Ottomans
and Germans both used it, but with different aims and expectations.
These different aims were closely connected to the different audiences
the proclamation, or rather proclamations, were aimed at.
Who Was the Proclamation of Jihad Aimed At?
As Oppenheim’s memorandum makes very clear, the Germans intended
the Jihad proclamation as a weapon against the Entente. The aim was
to incite Muslims in the colonies of France and Great Britain and in
the imperial possessions of Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia to
revolt, thereby forcing these countries to divert military resources from
the European fronts, or at the very least preventing them from bringing
colonial troops over to Europe. The strategic decisions of 1914, opposed
by General Otto Liman von Sanders (the head of the German military
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mission) but wholeheartedly supported by Bronsart von Schellendorf,
Enver and Cemal, can be understood only in this context. The incursion
of relatively small contingents of Ottoman troops into north western
Persia, the attempt to open up the road to the Caucasus by encircling
and defeating the Russian army at Sarıkamış in December and the
attack on the Suez Canal in February were all based on the premise
that these actions would encourage local Muslims to rise in revolt. The
concept of the Suez Canal campaign in particular was predicated on the
assumption of a simultaneous rising in Egypt. Logistically the movement
of 30.000 soldiers through the heart of the Sinai desert was an impressive
achievement, but it was clear from the start that this force was far too
weak to cross the canal and threaten the British position in Egypt on its
own.
At the same time ŞükrüHanioğlu’s andMehmet Beşikçi’s contributions
both show that the Jihad proclamation was also important for internal
use within the Ottoman Empire. As discussed earlier, Hanioğlu focuses
on the attempts to use Jihad rhetoric to rally the Shi’i Arabs of Iraq
and to counter Russian agitation among the Kurdish tribes. But of
course the vast majority of the Ottoman conscript army was raised
among the peasants of Anatolia, and Beşikçi demonstrates that the use of
religion, and particularly of a rhetoric of Jihad, was a military necessity
as “Islamic themes and symbols constituted a common language which
the Ottoman state could draw on when motivating the masses” at a
time when patriotism (Ottoman or Turkish) was still the preserve of an
educated elite.
The proclamation of the Jihad thus addressed different internal and
external audiences and the actual documents published in November
1914 reflect this. The original fatwa signed by 29 leading ulema stated
that it was the duty of every Muslim to defend the Islamic state that
was under attack, and the emphasis of the document is very much on
rallying the Muslim subjects of France, Britain and Russia. In the Sultan’s
proclamation to the army and navy, as one would expect, the emphasis is
on the need for the soldiers to be ready to sacrifice themselves in the
defence of Islam.
How Was the Message of Jihad Mediated?
Of course, proclaiming a Jihad in itself was not enough. The message
had to reach the population. In very different ways a number of the
contributions to this volume draw our attention to ways in which the
message of Jihad was mediated.
introduction 21
The start of the mediation process was the solemn proclamation of the
fatwa, first to a select group of high dignitaries by the Şeyhülislam (chief
of the ulema), and then to the population at large through a solemn
public reading at the Fatih mosque by the fetva emini (the keeper of the
fatwas), and to the army and navy through proclamations of the sultan
and the minister of war.
Public meetings were an important means of communication. As
Hanioğlu shows, the Shi’i clergy in Iraq used it very effectively to raise
the population. Nicole van Os produces evidence that in 1914 women
as well as men were involved in these public meetings, something that
would have been unthinkable ten years earlier.
The message was spread more widely through posters carrying a
simplified text of the fatwa in more everyday language than that of
the original. As we know also from other occasions (the constitutional
revolution of 1908, the boycotts of 1908, 1909 and 1912, the mobilizations
of 1912 and 1914) posters were an effective means of communication
even though the vast majority of the Ottoman population was illiterate.
Those who could read would explain the posters to those who could not.
Still, posters were an urban phenomenon and in the countryside where
80 per cent of the population lived, the state relied primarily on oral
communication by imams and village elders, as Mehmet Beşikçi shows
in this volume.
As everywhere else, in the Ottoman Empire too, World War i was
an era of censorship and propaganda. Journalism and literature were
harnessed to the war effort, even if they were of necessity less effective
tools than in societies with a high rate of literacy and large-circulation
newspapers and journals. Erol Köroğlu decribes how Islamic motifs, and
the theme of holy war, played a substantial role in the early phase of the
war (1914–1915) but became much less important later on, when hopes
of a successful Jihad had dwindled. In the poetry that Köroğlu reviews,
references to Islam and to Turkishness (and Turkish nationalism) were
closely entwined, and this is something of a recurrent theme in the
chapters of this book. In the Ottoman Empire of the early twentieth
century the concept of the “nation” in its modern European sense had
entered the vocabulary of the urban elite, but national identity was
primarily defined in religious terms.⁸ Religion thus became an ethnic
marker defining the boundaries of the nation. At the same time, the
instrumentalization of religion by the modernizing and centralizing
state (from Mahmud ii, through Abdülhamid ii to the Young Turks)
had led to a different form of nationalization of Islam. The Ottoman
Empire had always supported an official Islam that propagated ideas
about the interdependence of state and religion and turned these into
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a hegemonic state ideology, but with the growth of the modern and
centralized state in the late nineteenth century, state control over religion
had increased markedly and Islam had been turned into an effective tool
for legitimation and mobilization in the service of the empire.⁹
Of course, the German Jihad propaganda also relied on mediation.
The German propaganda effort coordinated by the Nachrichtenstelle
primarily worked through two sets of communities: Muslim prisoners
of war and political refugees from the Entente colonies. In his analysis
of the Halbmondlager (Half Moon Camp), the pow camp constructed
in Wünsdorf south of Berlin to hold Muslim prisoners of war from the
British and French armies, Martin Gussone shows to what lengths the
German authorities went to portray Germany as a friend of Islam and to
recruit Muslim pows as volunteers. The newspaper al-Jihad, produced by
the Nachrichtenstelle in a number of different languages, was distributed
here and at the sister camp in Zossen that was destined for Muslim pows
from the Tsarist army. The message was conveyed even more forcefully,
and dramatically, by the purpose-built and German-designed mosque
erected in the camp. Gussone shows that, in line with the worldwide
Jihadist ambitions of the German Empire, this mosque deliberately
incorporated stylistic elements from a range of Islamic civilizations. Its
programme of calligraphic inscriptions included belligerent texts like
Sura 47, verse 8 from the Koran, which, according to Gussone, “should
be interpreted as a call to the prisoners of war to join the Jihad.”
Refugees from the colonial possessions of the Entente were courted
in an effort to spread the message of Jihad, but they proved to be a
problematic asset for the Germans, not only because they worked in
relative isolation and the Entente was on high alert in countries like Egypt
and Algeria, but also because they were motivated by nationalism rather
than by any idea of a global Islamic movement led from Constantinople.
Their agendas coincided with that of the Germans and Ottomans only
in that they had shared enemies. Networks of agents were created in
North Africa, Central Asia and South Asia, but they were not strong
enough seriously to threaten the position of the Entente. After the war,
during his exile in Berlin, Enver Pasha would try to use these networks
to build his “General Revolutionary Organisation of the Muslim World”
(Umum Alemi İslam İhtilal Teşkilatı), but this attempt at creating a
“Green International” also failed.
Mediation was not by words, written or spoken, alone. As the
abovementioned example of the mosque in the Half Moon Camp in
Wünsdorf shows, architecture was also used to convey an ideological
message. Hans Theunissen shows how Cemal Pasha commissioned both
major restorations and new buildings in Damascus during his three
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years as governor of Syria (1914–1917). The building works had a triple
message: laying out a new broad and straight avenue that served as an
axis connecting the old city centre to the Hejaz railway station, with
modern buildings in “national” style, conveyed a message of modernity
and state power; restoring the main classical Ottoman building complex,
the Selimiye, emphasized the Ottoman character of Damascus and Syria;
the clearing of the area surrounding the Umayyad mosque and Saladin’s
mausoleum, as well as the plans for the refurbishment of the latter, linked
the Ottoman state of 1914 emphatically to a glorious Islamic past.
Was the Proclamation of Jihad a Failure?
It has become almost a commonplace in the historiography of the
Middle East in World War i to say that the German-inspired call to
Jihad was a complete failure, and it is an indisputable fact that neither
mass desertions of Muslim soldiers in the British, French and Russian
armies nor large-scale uprisings in their imperial possessions took place.
But the contributions to this volume show that this negative assessment
has to be nuanced.
As Hanioğlu, Aksakal and Beşikçi, and in a sense also van Os,
demonstrate, side by side with the German-inspired Jihad campaign
aimed at foreignMuslim populations, there was an authentically Ottoman
effort to mobilize and motivate the Ottoman population on the basis of
religious arguments and symbols, among which the concept of Jihad
was important. This kind of religiously based mobilization had a long
history and it was deeply embedded in the historical consciousness of
the Ottoman state and the Muslim parts of its population (over 80 per
cent by 1914). This Jihad was quite effective. Not only was it possible for
an emphatically Sunni state like the Ottoman Empire to gain the support
of the Shi’i minority, and for a Turkish-dominated state to motivate
other ethnic groups like Kurds, Arabs and Circassians, it also played a
considerable role in maintaining morale in the Ottoman army.
It is certainly true that enormous numbers of soldiers deserted from
the Ottoman army, specifically in 1917–1918, when conditions in the army
became almost unbearable. By 1918 the army was undermanned and
undersupplied, and faced with vastly superior British manpower and
equipment it could manage an orderly retreat at best. But ultimately,
the Ottoman Empire – just like Austro-Hungary – lost the war because
Germany lost the war, and the fact that its army, composed overwhelm-
ingly of illiterate Muslim villagers, managed to fight off the onslaught of
three of the world’s greatest powers for four years, shortly after it had
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been defeated by four small Balkan States in a matter of weeks, was a
sensational performance. The offensive actions at Sarıkamış and at the
Suez Canal were over-ambitious failures, but defensively the performance
at Gallipoli, Kut al-Amara and twice at Gaza was much better than
expected. That the Ottoman army proved so strong on the defensive
is something that cannot be understood without taking into account
the religious motivation of the soldiers, which contributed significantly
to maintaining morale. In other words: the Jihad, and more generally
reference to religion, certainly helped to mobilize and motivate Ottoman
society, and it could be argued that the authenticOttoman Jihad described
by Aksakal and Hanioğlu was a success and that, on the other hand, the
more ambitious German one was not.
The Arabs, both within the empire and outside, were the prime
target of the Ottoman-German Jihad propaganda, as millions of them
lived in the vulnerable borderlands of the empire in the south and
under French, Italian and British rule in close proximity to the empire.
How did they react? This is the question addressed primarily in the
contributions by Umar Ryad, Joshua Teitelbaum and Şükrü Hanioğlu
to this volume.
The remarkable success of the separate campaign targeting the Shi’is of
Iraq described by Hanioğlu has already been discussed above. Among the
Sunni Arabs of the Mashreq and the Arabian peninsula the propaganda
had less tangible results. It is true that in the more densely populated
and centrally controlled areas of Syria and Palestine the leading Arab
families generally stayed loyal to the Ottoman throne until the end, even
if some of their members favoured the idea of decentralization. But in
the borderlands of the empire, in the areas where the Ottomans had
less direct control and had to rely on persuasion and negotiation, the
results were less good. The major players of the Arabian peninsula, the
Rashidis in the Northern Najd, Ibn Saud to the south, the Hashemites
in Mekka, the Idrisids in Asir and Imam Yahya in Yemen all acted on
the basis of their own interests, with the Rashidis and Imam Yahya
supporting the Ottomans, Ibn Saud maintaining neutrality and the
Idrisids and Sharif Huseyn opting for collaboration with Britain. It was
the rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca that caused the Ottomans the most
headaches, and not just because of its military potential (which was
rather limited). As Joshua Teitelbaum shows, the Sharif with British
help established a propaganda campaign built on religious argument
and he stopped only just short of claiming the caliphate for himself (as
he would do in 1924). What rendered his argument effective was the
systematic distinction between the empire and caliphate on the one
hand and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress on the other,
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he depicting the latter as consisting of both unbelievers and Turkish
nationalists, who lacked legitimacy and had nothing to offer to Muslims
and Arabs.
The one instance where the Jihad, or at least strong religious motiva-
tion, may be said to have played a role in supporting the Ottoman war
effort in the Arab peninsula did not concern the Arabs. It was the defence
of Medina. The beleaguered Ottoman garrison managed to hold on to the
city even after it had become an isolated outpost, under the command
of a general, Fahrettin Pasha, who had publicly vowed to the Prophet
Muhammad that he would never desert him. The tenacity of the Ottoman
resistance at Medina, which actually extended beyond the armistice of
30 October 1918, certainly owed something to religious motivation. In
that sense it is an extreme example of the strong defensive performance
of the Ottoman army referred to above and of the effectiveness of the
“Ottoman” Jihad.
As far as the effect of the Jihad proclamation on Arabs outside the
empire is concerned, the position of one of the leading Arab intellectuals
of his age, Ahmed Rida, as analysed by Umar Ryad in this volume, is
illustrative. Rida was a Shi’i Muslim from southern Lebanon, who had
become a leading member of the movement for Arab cultural revival
with a reputation also in the larger Muslim world. In 1914 he lived in
Egypt, and winning over someone like Rida would have been essential
if the call for Jihad was to be effective among Arabs abroad. But he
was not won over. Essentially Rida saw the war as a power struggle
between European states whose conflict was imported into the Middle
East. He was not swayed by the Jihad propaganda and assessed the events
primarily, even almost exclusively, in terms of the chances they might
offer for the establishment of an independent Arab state. For this purpose,
he came to see the British as the best hope. Interestingly, his opinion on
both the Jihad and World War i in general seems to have come closest to
that of Snouck: he deplored the way the “civilised” world of Europe had
used its knowledge to produce mass violence and death and he saw the
Jihad proclamation as just a cynical cover-up for a materialistic war.
All in all there are plenty of reasons to assess the “German” Jihad
aimed at raising the global Muslim community, the Umma, against the
Entente a failure, but of course such an assessment profits from the
benefit of hindsight. In 1914 it was not at all clear that it could not work.
Oppenheim, who authored the key programmatic text of the German
Jihad effort, was not someone who had dreamt up these ideas in a
study in Berlin. He had lived in Egypt for 15 years before the war, so his
assessment that there was deep-rooted resentment against British rule
there was based on personal observation and countless conversations
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with Egyptians. He was mistaken in thinking the resentment could be
translated into active support for the Ottoman caliph, but the potential
for rebellion was certainly there, as the immediate post-war period would
show. The British took the danger seriously enough to deport quite a
few Egyptian nationalists and suspected Ottoman agents to Malta and
elsewhere.
In this respect, Ahmad al-Rawi’s discussion of John Buchan’s Green-
mantle is interesting, because it shows that as late as the first years of
World War i (the book appeared in 1916) a senior figure in British intelli-
gence actually shared the expectations of Max von Oppenheim as far as
the mobilizing potential of Islam was concerned. Buchan’s book is full
of references to a “great stirring in Islam” and the “dried grasses” that
“would catch fire if you used the flint and steel of their religion.” In an
indirect way he seems to express disagreement with Snouck Hurgronje.
Where Snouck starts his manifesto by reporting a conversation with a
progressive, intellectual Turkish gentleman who condemned religious
fanaticism and war (a Turkish equivalent of Ahmad Rida), Buchan’s
character Sir Walter, a senior British official, is made to say “The ordinary
man again will answer that Islam in Turkey is becoming a back number,
and that Krupp guns are the new gods. … … Yet – I don’t know. I don’t
quite believe in Islam becoming a back number. … … The Syrian army is
as fanatical as the hordes of the Mahdi.”
What this shows is that by 1914 fear of a worldwide Jihad was
widespread, and that therefore the German hope that it could be an
effective weapon did not seem so far-fetched. It was when the Ottomans
and Germans actively tried to play the Jihad card that it proved of
little practical value, at least in its southern borderlands and beyond
the borders. Perhaps it is true to say, as Sultan Abdülhamid did in his
memoirs (whose authenticity is doubtful), that “the threat of Jihad was
more powerful than Jihad itself.”
That is, of course, as true today as it was when the Sultan said it (if he
said it). The call for Jihad issued by the “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
has had some success. His Islamic State has conquered a number of
provincial towns in Syria and Iraq and one major city (Mosul). It has
been able to attract thousands of volunteers from all over the world,
volunteers who have quite often exercised extreme and demonstrative
violence, but, shocking as this may be, this is not what ultimately fuels
the fear of Jihad in the western world. It is the uncertainty about the
degree of support for the Jihad among the large Muslim communities in
European and American countries, the feeling of living on a volcano (a
metaphor used by al-Baghdadi himself), that creates fear and that makes
the call for Jihad effective. By the same token, a clear rejection of the
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Jihad by the large majority of the Muslims in the Western world would
show up Abu Bakr’s Jihad as an empty threat, just as much as the actual
proclamation of Jihad by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed v ultimately
deprived the Ottomans of a powerful weapon, the threat of a worldwide
Muslim rebellion, in World War i.
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1 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje,
“Holy War” and Colonial Concerns
Léon Buskens1
In memory of Christien Liefrinck-Snouck Hurgronje (1914–2014)
Introduction
In the January 1915 issue of the leading Dutch cultural journal De Gids
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) published an article under
the provocative title “Holy War made in Germany.” The article offered
a mixture of cynically worded scholarly analysis of great acuity, which
characterizes Snouck Hurgronje’s works, and vehement moral condem-
nation of the war craze. The author was by then one of the most respected
scholars on Islam in the Western world, president of the board of the
prestigious Encyclopaedia of Islam, and a professor at Leiden University.
He had become famous through his monograph on Mecca, based on
fieldwork in the Holy City, through his seminal studies on Islamic law
and his work as an adviser for Islamic affairs in the Dutch East Indies.
He held one of the oldest chairs in Arabic studies in Europe and assumed
his authority on policy matters of Islam and colonialism with gravitas.
Snouck Hurgronje considered the declaration of Jihad, “holy war”,
issued by the Ottoman government in November 1914 to be the work
of Germany, guided by its famous orientalist scholars in the field. He
condemned his friends’ and colleagues’ involvement in the war effort in
the strongest moral terms. The war itself was already an act of the utmost
barbarism, but the declaration of Jihad also sabotaged the colonial project
of civilizing the Muslim world, to which Snouck Hurgronje had given
his best forces. In his rejoinder to Becker in 1915 he explains his strong
condemnation of the orientalists’ involvement in the Jihad proclamation
by portraying himself as:
A Dutchman, who has intensively engaged himself during the best part
of his life in a practical and theoretical manner with the Islam problem,
and whose aim therein always has been the promotion of a friendly
rapprochement between the world of Islam and our world.²
30 jihad and islam in world war i
In the letters to his teacher and friend Theodor Nöldeke Snouck
Hurgronje continuously expressed his abhorrence of the war in an even
more personal way. He condemned it as an act of utter barbarism,
comparing the feuding Bedouin favourably to the warring parties, in that
they at least were more careful in shedding blood.³ He gave his friend
Nöldeke the happy news of his wife’s pregnancy saying:
May the new male or female world citizen be a harbinger of peace!⁴
Snouck Hurgronje was referring to the birth of his daughter, named
Christien after her father and a paternal aunt, which would take place on
17 December 1914, a few months after the war had erupted and when her
father had turned almost 58 years old. Christien would be the only child
born of the marriage of Snouck Hurgronje with a much younger Dutch
lady, although much later in life she would be happy to discover that
she had five half-brothers and half-sisters from her father’s two Islamic
marriages to women from West Java’s elite during his stay in the Dutch
East Indies between 1889 and 1906.
For Snouck Hurgronje the main culprit in the German fabrication
of Ottoman Jihad was his colleague and friend Carl Heinrich Becker
(1876–1933), at that time professor at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität in Bonn. Becker felt utterly insulted by Snouck Hurgronje’s
“unfair” attack. He published a reply in De Gids and several other articles
to defend himself and Germany.
Becker writes in a letter to his colleague Hartmann immediately
after receiving an off-print of Snouck Hurgronje’s article on 13 January
1915:
And that should still be supposed to be neutral. You might well have
concluded that the insinuation against me that I would have sacrificed
my scholarly conscience, exclusively rests on an insufficient knowledge
of German and on a misunderstanding caused by this. I am very sad.
And apart from that he is wrong; …⁵
And a few weeks later, on 6 February 1915, again to Hartmann:
But the more I have thought about the matter, the more painful Snouck’s
behaviour becomes to me. As a human being he has lost much in my
eyes.⁶
Before the war Becker was not only an esteemed colleague, but a friend,
who stayed at Snouck Hurgronje’s house while visiting Leiden. Their
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complicity as founders of a scholarship of contemporary Islam which
would be useful to society expressed itself in an extensive correspondence.
Their friendship was severely damaged by the polemic about the Ottoman
declaration of Jihad, as the break in their correspondence and the bitter
remarks of both gentlemen about each other in letters to other colleagues
show. The Great War not only destroyed an entire generation of young
men and considerable parts of Europe and brought an end to the great
Ottoman and Austrian empires and the brief German colonial episode,
but also profoundly affected the republic of letters by wounding old
friendships.
In this chapter I will explore this harsh polemic between colleagues
and friends. They argue not only about a proper understanding of the
rules of Islamic law on Jihad and the caliphate, and other scholarly
facts, but much more on moral issues. They do not question whether
an islamicist should be involved in the use of his scholarship in policy-
making.The application of Orientalist knowledge is self-evident, the issue
for them is what is the proper, moral, way to use it. Snouck Hurgronje
proclaims himself a defender of the pre-war academic internationalism,
promoting civilization at large, while Becker stresses the need to be a
good patriot first. In the end Snouck Hurgronje also claims his right
as a good patriot to defend Dutch colonial interests in the Indies. As
such the debate and their strong feelings reveal their convictions about
the social use of scholarship and the different ethical values that they
take into account, as well as the various interests to which they give
primacy.
My study concentrates on Snouck Hurgronje’s understanding of the
facts and the way he constructed his ethical judgement. I will not try to
establish whether he was right or wrong in his assessments and analyses,
since I am not a specialist on the history of the Ottoman Empire or on
the Great War. My concern is the history of Orientalist scholarship and
its relations with colonial and nationalist policy-making; thus I focus
on the role of scholars in the instrumentalization of Islam. Studying the
scholars’ involvement in the war effort enables me also to contribute to
bigger issues in what has become known as the “Orientalism” debate due
to Edward Said’s famous book. It is striking to see how much has been
written about the German involvement in the Ottoman Jihad declaration
and about this very polemic. The analyses of, and ethical judgements on,
these scholars by students of our time and their disagreements on this
reveal profound shifts in the self-understanding of scholars and their
role in society.
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Snouck Hurgronje’s Defusing of Dangerous Intellectual
Weapons Made in Germany⁷
Snouck Hurgronje opens his attack on the war craze with a report of a
conversation he had with “a Turk of a highly intellectual type” more than
ten years before. The gentleman severely condemned religious fanaticism
and wars motivated by political or economic interests, their destructive
powers worsened by technological progress. This ethnographic “view
from afar”, which immediately establishes the author’s authority by
autopsy, provides a strong critique of European culture on which Snouck
Hurgronje builds his argument. Taking a detour should bring Europeans
to reason, while the vignette at the same time proves that Snouck
Hurgronje is right in his analysis thatMuslims are capable of progress and
that the violence of the erupting war is imposed on them from outside
rather than being of their own making.
Snouck Hurgronje continues by expressing his own horror of the war
in strong terms. He and the “Turk” share the same ideals of “general
religious peace and freedom of thought”, which sets them apart from
both the supporters of the war and the traditional scholars of Islam,
the ‘ulama. Then follows an analysis of the doctrine of Jihad, a war
against unbelievers, the institution of the caliphate, and Ottoman rule
which demonstrate the author’s credentials as a first rank scholar of
Islam and a master of its languages. For Snouck Hurgronje the mixture
of religion and politics which rules the relations between Muslim and
unbelievers in classical Islamic law is a “mediaeval” phenomenon. More
“developed” Muslims, partly as a result of the beneficial influence of
colonialism, have started to question this medieval mixture of religion
and politics.⁸ He continues to show his understanding of Islamic history
and Arabic in his analysis of the Ottomans’ claim to the caliphate, which
he considers not well founded, but rather a “usurpation,” and which does
not mean much in practice.⁹ However, new means of communication
have created the opportunity to abuse the institution for “panislamic”
propaganda, which constitutes a menace to colonialism. The revolution
of the Young Turks of 1908 was a blessing in that it brought an end
to this medieval mixture of religion and politics, and they did not
want to interfere with Muslims living under non-Muslim rule.¹⁰ Due
to European pressure the Ottoman Empire was however forced to revive
“the fetish of the Caliphate” and Jihad.¹¹ Snouck Hurgronje continues
to argue that presenting any war of the Ottoman Empire as a holy
war can only be the product of foreign interference, since every war
in which the Ottomans were involved would be by definition a holy
war.¹²
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This observation leads Snouck Hurgronje to turn his critical eye
to recent German pamphlets which offer interpretations of Turkey’s
involvement in the war. He first discusses a brochure written by Hugo
Grothe, who is a specialist in economics and a scientific traveller, but
clearly lacks the philological credentials properly to understand what
is going on in the Ottoman Empire, as his limited knowledge of the
Turkish languages shows.¹³ Grothe contends that Germany can help
Turkey in rebuilding the country, but that it should support Germany
in its turn by proclaiming Jihad. Snouck Hurgronje claims that the
proclamation of a holy war against the enemies of Islam who occupy
the lands of the Muslims as has recently taken place in Istanbul, and
which characterizes the fighting of colonized Muslims at the sides of their
English, French and Russian masters against Germany and Austria
as “a great sin” has been “suggested by Grothe and his intellectual
kin.”¹⁴
Snouck Hurgronje describes the contents of this proclamation and the
following demonstration in a mixture of critical scholarly analysis and
caustic prose. For him this is only a theatre piece that the cynical elite
organized to harness the credulous common people to their own goals.
Then he turns his criticism to his “esteemed colleague” Carl Heinrich
Becker, who shares Grothe’s views on the relations between Germany
and Turkey and has also “been swept away by the incredible jihad-
craze, which at present seems to possess German statesmen.”¹⁵ In a
number of recent publications, especially in the pamphlet Deutschland
und der Islam published in the series Der Deutsche Krieg (1914), Becker
advocated Germany’s involvement with Turkey in modernizing the
country. These utterances are in stark contrast to the opinions of other
German scholars, notably the other founder of contemporary Islam
studies,MartinHartmann, professor in Berlin. Hartmann showed himself
highly critical of Ottoman rule, their “usurpation” of the caliphate, and
the extremely dangerous threat of a holy war, as many quotations chosen
by Snouck Hurgronje prove (277–279).
Becker’s recent opinions endorsing the caliph and Jihad are also in
contrast to his earlier analyses of Turkey, “expressed by him in former
times of quiet scientific work”, as Snouck Hurgronje documents amply.¹⁶
Snouck Hurgronje shows himself surprised and disgusted by the fact
that “… her best friend [Germany, lb] is exciting her [Turkey, lb] to
universal religious war, and presently turns over to her the Mohammedan
prisoners who fought against Germany, in order to submit them to a
politico-religious conversion cure.”¹⁷ He goes on to offer an explanation
for this astonishing error in sound judgment:
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We can only attribute all this to the lamentable upsetting of the balance,
even in the intellectual atmosphere, of what we used to call the civilized
world. For in normal times we know that the Germans are far too
sensible and logical to digest the enormous nonsense that a thing
which in general would be considered as a shame for mankind and a
catastrophe for Turkey can become good and commendable as soon as
Germany places herself behind or beside the Crescent.¹⁸
Snouck Hurgronje expects that German scholars will soon start to
condemn this “despicable game that is being played with the Caliphate
and the holy war.” He does not dare to foretell to what extent the call to
war will be successful among Muslims, but is not too worried for the
Dutch East Indies. The elite has been immunized “against this politico-
religious mixture of deceit and nonsense” by a “conscious educational
policy towards the native population which history has entrusted to
our care” in combination with “our centuries-old guarantee of complete
religious liberty for our Mohammedans.”¹⁹ The Dutch do not have to
worry too much about
… the peculiar sort of ‘intellectual weapons’ which now for the first
time are put into circulation with the trademark ‘made in Germany’.
Still, we keep hoping in the interest of humanity that Germany will
before long withdraw the new product from the market.²⁰
Snouck Hurgronje concludes his article in an authoritative style with
a paragraph of cultural critique which echoes the ethnographic open-
ing in which he presented his educated Turkish interlocutor criticizing
religious fanaticism. Snouck Hurgronje discusses once again the doc-
trine of Jihad, a “mediaeval” institution, which however forbids war
against fellow Muslims. This view offers an important lesson for his
times:
… the consideration of strife within the sphere of the community
as impious, provides an excellent foundation for the highest social
civilization and is rather humiliating for the modern world.²¹
He refers to Martin Hartmann as sharing his point of view, severely
condemning Christians who out of patriotism sin against God’s com-
mandments not to kill, but rather to love one’s neighbour. Snouck
Hurgronje sees it as the task of the colonizers to teach their Muslim
subjects to expand their view of community to all mankind and to teach
them how to live in peace with all mankind.
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To modern states which have Mohammedans as subjects, protégés, or
allies, the beautiful task is reserved of educating these and themselves at
the same time [emphasis added lb] to this high conception of human
society; rather than leading them back, for their own selfish interests
into the way of mediaeval religious hatred which they just were about
to leave.²²
Exchanges between Becker and Snouck Hurgronje
Snouck Hurgronje’s article made Becker very upset, as can be recon-
structed from the abundant exchange of letters between Snouck Hur-
gronje, Becker, Hartmann, Nöldeke and Goldziher. This correspondence,
and the ideal of scholarship and ethics that it translates, has been anal-
ysed by Christiaan Engberts.²³ Becker felt insulted by this attack on his
scholarly integrity and his ethics and betrayed by somebody whom he
considered to be a friend. He stopped writing to Snouck Hurgronje for
several months, but they communicated indirectly via their colleagues
Nöldeke and Hartmann. Hartmann initially reacted favourably to Snouck
Hurgronje in a letter, but soon took sides with Becker. Maybe his change
of opinion was also motivated by personal concerns, as he kept hoping
to improve his rather difficult situation at the Seminar für orientalische
Sprachen in Berlin.
Becker was outspoken in letters to Hartmann: Snouck Hurgronje
misunderstood him because of an inadequate knowledge of German.
But they themselves also made a mistake: they thought that Snouck
Hurgronje was “one of them”, but he turned out to betray them. Despite
his claims he is far from neutral. Becker decided to reply to Snouck
Hurgronje with an extensive article in a German periodical in February
1915. Snouck Hurgronje obtained the right to reply with an article in the
issue of 1 May 1915, to which a Schlusswort by Becker is added. Finally
Becker is also granted a rejoinder in De Gids, the Dutch cultural journal
which had published Snouck Hurgronje’s first article.
In his public reply Becker took up the issues that had already come up
in the private correspondence with his colleagues.²⁴ He presented Snouck
Hurgronje’s article as a Schmähschrift, “slander”, uncritically reproducing
the false allegations of Germany’s enemies England and France, in which
Bosheit, “malice” is his guiding principle. This already starts with the
title, which echoes the accusations on the issue published earlier, with
the same pun “made in Germany”, in The Times. Becker expresses his
surprise about this attack since he considers Snouck Hurgronje to be
an outstanding scholar, a “Master”, and somebody close to Germany
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through professional and personal ties. Despite the intense feeling of
hurt and disappointment Becker intends to reply in a scholarly way to all
the allegations.
In the first part of his article Becker summarizes Snouk Hurgronje’s
argument, stressing hismalice in the selection of quotations fromGerman
publications. He also demonstrates that Snouck Hurgronje’s allegation
that Becker has converted himself to a new view on the caliphate of the
Ottomans out of patriotism rests on a misunderstanding of German
syntax, implying a rather grave error on the part of the great Master who
was thought to be infallible until then.²⁵
In the second part Becker contrasts his realismwith the pacifist Utopia
which Snouck Hurgronje defends in his study, while holding on to the
theoretical views expounded in the medieval treatises on Islamic law
instead of accepting the realities of new ideas and practices as observed
in contemporary Muslim societies. Becker fully admits that Jihad in its
WorldWar i version is a new phenomenon, reflected also in the neologism
jihad akbar used as a title in the Ottoman publication of the five fatwas
which, like the theatrical proclamation, stresses the individual obligation
of the war,²⁶ but he does not see why Snouck Hurgronje wants to limit
the use of the term to the medieval understandings of the fiqh books.²⁷
The new understanding is a form of “Europeanisation” of the war, in line
with that of Turkey itself.²⁸ In this struggle for survival, Existenzkampf,
which Germany and Turkey share, all means are permitted, a view that
structures his entire reply. Besides this scholarly criticism of Snouck
Hurgronje’s limited understanding of new developments in Islam, and a
political defence of the use of this weapon in the war, he also exposes
Snouck Hurgronje’s serious lack of critical sense. In Becker’s view Snouck
Hurgronje uncritically accepts the allied slander on the German-Turkish
war effort.²⁹In the third and final part Becker explains and defends
Germany’s policy inmatters Islam and the Ottoman Empire. He discusses
the different views of the Ottomans’ claim to the caliphate, which the
British supported as long as it served their interests in maintaining order
in India. He contrasts his realism in accepting a political usage of the
caliphate and pan-islamism with Snouck Hurgronje’s critique of the
Ottoman claims to the caliphate, which Snouck Hurgronje grounds in
the “authentic” meaning of the institution as in the legal treatises of
medieval scholars.³⁰ Becker repeatedly explains why Holland does not
need to worry about possible damage to its interests in the Dutch East
Indies, while he subtly criticizes the earlier Dutch educational policy
in the colony in a footnote.³¹ Then he argues that the holy war was not
made in Germany, if only out of respect for its neighbours’ colonial
interests. Snouck Hurgronje underestimates the agency of the Turkish
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elite. Germany does not want to colonize Turkey either, but is a true
friend. Turkey has a future as an Islamic state, but in European style.³²
Becker demonstrates that he is also capable of formulating a strong
rhetorical ending in his last paragraph. He stresses the respect that all
Islam scholars, and especially those from Germany, feel for Snouck
Hurgronje, but argues that the latter’s article shows him to be a victim of
fanaticism, in the form of pacifism and do-goodism. Holland prides itself
on being in a position to repair the bonds of scholarly internationalism
through its neutrality. Unfortunately, the derailing of Snouck Hurgronje
has made the performance of this ideal and very real pacifism immensely
more difficult.³³
Snouck Hurgronje replied to Becker in the same periodical in May
1915.³⁴ His rejoinder is characterized by a surprisingly mild tone, and he
explicitly stresses the importance of friendship. He admits his mistake in
the understanding of Becker’s phrasing in German. But he maintains
his contention that Becker has changed his scholarly views for political
reasons, and continues to object to the primacy that Becker gives to
patriotism in his analysis of Ottoman institutions and policies. Snouck
Hurgronje contrasts this view with his own constancy of opinion and
his lifelong involvement in furthering peaceful relations, grounded in
30 years of personal relations with Muslims (290). He feels insulted
by the suggestion that he is uncritically following the propaganda of
the Allies (289), and stresses his deep academic knowledge (290). The
instrumentalization of the Jihad weapon is the undoing of his life’s work
aimed at creating peaceful relations between the world of Islam and the
West (291). He also maintains his conviction that Germany is not a good
ally for Turkey, and sticks to his criticism of Germany’s Islam policy and
its involvement in the Jihad proclamation. He concludes that as a patriot
he should also defend Dutch colonial interests in the East Indies. He
considers the use of the Jihad weapon to be a crime: it is an invitation to
murder for ill-willing fanatics and may cause considerable harm.
He ends his rejoinder in his well-known rhetorical style, by pro-
claiming the jihad akbar. Not according to the Ottoman understanding,
but to its authentic meaning, in the way that the prophet Muhammad
understood it, being a return to the virtues of self-control.
Becker has the last word in the same issue.³⁵ He appreciates the desire
for conciliation and goodwill expressed by Snouck Hurgronje. The debate
is not about scholarly issues, but rather about political views, aimed at
Germany’s Islam policy. Since they will not convince each other, there is
no need to continue. Becker keeps coming back to Snouck Hurgronje’s
cynical wording and sense of ridicule, which shows how deeply he has
been hurt by a man whom he respects greatly. He protests against the
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tarnishing of the emperor, and points out how much Snouck Hurgronje
shares with the press of the enemies because of his choice of language.
He also objects again to the fact that Snouck Hurgronje keeps insisting
on Becker’s “conversion” in scholarly interpretations.³⁶
The last part serves to demonstrate how much Snouck Hurgronje
himself has been motivated by national and personal concerns in his
condemnation of the use of the Jihad weapon. Snouck Hurgronje in his
rejoinder refers to his defence of Dutch interests in the East Indies,
but Becker turns this into the main motive that has structured his
condemnation of the war effort from the beginning.³⁷ He explains to
German readers Snouck Hurgronje’s beneficial influence in transforming
the harsh Dutch Islam policy into a humane and liberal one. However,
Snouck Hurgronje has been under constant attack for this from Christian
politicians. Claims to Jihad and pan-Islamism are a direct menace to this
ethical policy and to his own reputation. However, for Germany and
its ally Turkey the use of Jihad is entirely justified, which explains their
controversy.
Becker ends by seeking a consensus. He expresses the hope that the
revolt by Muslims against their colonial oppressors will in the long run
result in amore humane policy towards them being instigated by England
and France. In this way the war may contribute to the achievement of
a colonial Islam policy that Snouck Hurgronje has been advocating all
his life. Becker concludes that their disagreement is about method only.
He and Snouck Hurgronje ultimately strive towards the same goals: to
further the well-being of their countries and of the Asian peoples.³⁸
Contrary to their usual policy, but because of “international courtesy”,
the editors of De Gids, the Dutch periodical which published Snouck
Hurgronje’s initial article, offered Becker the opportunity to reply in
its second issue of 1915. Becker again stressed the political nature of
their disagreement, and the legitimacy of Germany and the Ottoman
Empire in using Jihad and pan-Islamism as weapons in the war. Germany
and Turkey share many interests and therefore fight together, not for
sentimental reasons. The holy war is, however, not of German making.
The article does not contain anything new compared to the contributions
discussed earlier. The editors explicitly mention that Snock Hurgronje
declined the offer to publish a rejoinder. He only asked for a mention
of his disagreement with Becker’s view that the Dutch government
had profoundly changed its Islam policy in the East Indies in recent
years. He underlined its consistency for centuries, to which religious
political parties started to protest, however, during the nineteenth century,
pretending that the government took too lenient an attitude towards
Islam.
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Further Development of the Polemic
Snouck Hurgronje apparently considered his criticism of the holy war
made in Germany so important that in January 1915 he had the article
included in the second edition of his essays on Dutch Islam policy aimed
at an audience of colonial administrators, Nederland en de Islâm.³⁹ In
the preface he corrects his misunderstanding of German syntax in his
critique of Becker’s views. He stresses his neutrality, but he also repeats
his anger and concern about the dangerous use of Islam in the war effort
in strong personal words.
Later in 1915 Richard Gottheil, a famous semiticist and Zionist activist,
had an English translation published in New York without the author’s
permission. During that same year Snouck Hurgronje would publish two
more articles on the holy war in a Dutch newspaper, explaining his views
to a general audience. In the years to come he would follow with great
interest the revolt in Arabia and the demise of the caliphate, expressing
his analyses in a series of articles in popular and scholarly publications.
In 1917 he drew attention to a semi-official explanation by the Committee
of National Defence of the Jihad declaration aimed at Muslims, and an
official correction issued by the Ottoman government limiting Jihad to
states with which Turkey was at war.⁴⁰
Becker also continued his scholarly involvement in the war by
publishing about Turkey and Islamic policy during and after the war.
He also contributed a series of necrologies of former students who fell
victim to the war effort. One of them was Erich Graefe, killed at the
Marne in 1914, who had published a scholarly analysis of the call to
Jihad of the Sanusiyya against the Italian colonizers of Tripolitania
in Becker’s journal Der Islam in 1912, which offers further context
to the present analysis. Becker had cherished high expectations of
this lamneted martyr for the Nation. In 1916 Becker was appointed
to the Ministry of Culture and designed a new policy to further the
academic study of foreign cultures and countries. After the war he
would obtain even more important political positions, culminating in
two appointments as a Minister of Culture. All this would keep him
from seriously continuing his scholarly work until his early death in
1933.
Snouck Hurgronje included the English translation, with minor
revisions, in 1923 in volume iii of his collected studies, published in
Germany, together with his other essays about the war and its aftermath.
It seems that Becker would have preferred to forget about the painful
polemic, but that he felt forced by Snouck Hurgronje’s decision to reprint
his articles to select his own publications on the issue for the second
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volume of his collected studies published in 1932, which was dedicated to
his teachers, among them Snouck Hurgronje.
Main Themes in the Debate
A number of themes dominate in Snouck Hurgronje’s analysis of
Germany’s involvement in the Ottoman proclamation of holy war.
Underlying his understanding of Germany prompting the Ottoman
government to proclaim Jihad is a general view of the evolution of human
societies. He constantly contrasts a medieval Muslim society, in which
religion and politics are fused and in which unbelievers are excluded
from the community on the basis of their non-adherence to Islam, with
a modern civilization characterized by a separation between religion and
politics and an inclusive view of humanity.The categories have not only an
analytical, but also a moral dimension: modern civilization is superior to
medieval barbarism. SnouckHurgronje understands colonialism not only
as an economic phenomenon serving the interests of the colonizers, but
also as a civilizing project which will benefit the colonized by introducing
them to modernity. His thinking is elitist, in that he stresses the gap
between the educated elite and the credulous common people, who
are liable to fanaticism. Education is the main tool to bring modernity
to the elite, who will understand the virtues of separating religion and
politics. Snouck Hurgronje criticizes the traditional Islamic scholars,
the ‘ulama, who want to stick to the medieval mixture of religion and
politics, embodied by the teachings of Islamic law. A modern educated
elite will replace them, and this will be a faithful collaborator in the
colonial project.
Snouck Hurgronje shares this contempt for political Islam with many
of his fellow scholars, notably Martin Hartmann. His view of the place
of Islamic law in a modern colonial society is linked to this judgement.
Islamic law should be limited to the sphere of private life. The colonial
authorities should guarantee freedom of religion to Muslims, allowing
them to practise rituals that do not conflict with public order, such as the
pilgrimage to Mekka. However, Islamic law does not have a place in the
ordering of public life. This stress on religious freedom and limiting Islam
to the private sphere entails a particular understanding of secularism
rooted in Dutch history.
This particular understanding of the history of human society and
the role of religion has strong implications for the ethics of scholarship.
A proper understanding of the way societies develop and the merits of
separating religion and politics prompts scholars to work for the common
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good by promoting world peace, education and progress. Scholars can
contribute to progress by endorsing the colonial project which brings
education, progress and peace to people still living in the Middle Ages,
such as Muslims fusing politics and religion. Snouck Hurgonje rejects
and despises the racism of many of the advocates of colonialism: all
people are capable of progress thanks to education. Scholars should
advocate such a humanistic approach to colonialism.
SnouckHurgronjewas, togetherwith Becker andHartmann, one of the
founders of the study of contemporary Muslim societies.⁴¹ These scholars
had all earned their credentials as serious philologists and historians,
demonstrating the required linguistic and analytical skills. Unlike many
of their colleagues they did not consider the study of contemporary Islam
beneath them. They consciously wanted to serve their countries and
the cause of the colonized and of world peace by making their scholarly
expertise available to the colonial administration. This project of applied
Islamic studies, shared with eminent orientalists in other European
countries and promoted in international congresses of Orientalism
and colonial sciences, became endangered by the German war policy
towards the Ottoman Empire which traded progress, secularism and
internationalism for narrow minded patriotism, ushering Muslims back
into the Middle Ages where religion and politics were fused.
For Snouck Hurgronje proper scholarship was epitomized by sound-
ness of knowledge and sharp analysis, combined with a moral sense of
engagement in society. His harsh judgement of Becker demonstrates his
belief in objective criteria for scholarship. Becker was both wrong in his
analysis, as implied by his sudden, entirely politically motivated change
of views on Turkey, and in his moral position-taking. His colleague
and friend had sacrificed scholarly truth to nationalist politics, thereby
endangering world peace, progress and the interests of both colonizing
and colonized people.
Although Snouck Hurgronje also sharply criticized other authors,
especially Grothe, Becker had to bear the brunt of his attack. I think we
may understand this as a compliment: of all the Germans involved in
the war effort he deemed only Becker to be satisfaktionsfähig, being at
the same intellectual level. Grothe was a mere economist and traveller,
whom he could not take too seriously given his lack of a good command
of the Turkish language, criticized in a footnote.⁴² Snouck Hurgronje
clearly expressed his hope that his German colleagues would understand
their error and repent, revoking the dangerous policy that they helped to
invent.⁴³ He counted on the support of Martin Hartmann, who shared
his opinion on the Ottoman empire and whom he considered to be the
foremost specialist on Turkey in Germany. Unfortunately Hartmann had,
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unlike the gentleman Becker, “an exceedingly lively temperament” which
led him to too exaggerated analyses and kept him from convincing his
colleagues.⁴⁴ It is amusing to see that his German colleagues in their letters
vented a similar opinion about the character of Snouck Hurgronje,⁴⁵ who
was, like Hartmann, also the son of a protestant minister, but socially
and financially much more successful.
In order to understand these themes properly it is useful to relate
them briefly to Snouck Hurgronje’s life and work.
Echoes of Snouck Hurgronje’s Personal Experiences⁴⁶
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje seems to many to be an arch orientalist
because of his mixing of scholarship, political activism and personal
interest, although Edward Said does not pay much attention to him in
Orientalism, perhaps also because he did not read German or Dutch.
This mixing is exactly what Snouck Hurgronje reproached his German
colleagues for in the essay under discussion. The stately mansion on the
Rapenburg, which he acquired in 1919 also to give lodgings to foreign
colleagues at a time when Leiden did not yet have proper hotels, showed
that his scholarly action did not leave him poor.⁴⁷
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje was the first legitimate child of the
second marriage of his father, a protestant minister who had left his
first wife for the much younger daughter of a fellow minister. His first
name Christiaan suggests that he had to make up for his father’s sin, as
perhaps did an elder sister with a similar first name who was born before
the father’s divorce had become official through the death of the first
spouse. After their father’s death he went to study theology at Leiden
University, while living with his widowed mother and sickly sisters. His
faith faltered and he showed more interest in a historical critical approach
to the origins of Islam, resulting in a doctoral thesis on the origins of the
pilgrimage ritual in Mecca. Thanks to his gift for languages and sharp
wit he soon became an outstanding specialist on Islamic law.
His lust for knowledge and adventure was such that he managed to
convince the Dutch government to send him on a mission to Arabia
in 1884–1885 to gather information about the Indonesian pilgrims in
Mekka. The government was worried about dangerous ideas they might
pick up on pan-Islamic ideals, which might lead to unrest in the colony.
Snouck Hurgronje was not satisfied with remaining in Jedda at the Dutch
consulate. He had himself circumcised, converted to Islam, adopting
the name ‘Abd al-Ghaffar, and moved to Mekka to stay with Indonesian
friends. There he gathered extensive information about history, Islamic
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scholarship, the Indonesian colony, but also mundane aspects of daily life,
partly thanks to his liaison with an Abyssinian slave woman whom he had
acquired. Snouck Hurgronje was a friend of the German scholar Julius
Euting, who had travelled earlier in Arabia with the Frenchman Charles
Huber, where they had discovered an important stela with inscriptions
from the pre-Islamic period, the so called “Teyma stela.” His endeavours
to recover the stela, which the earlier travellers had had to leave behind
as Huber had been murdered by a Bedouin, made him suspect in the eyes
of the French consul in Jedda, De Lostalot, who was trying to obtain the
stela for France. These suspicions were strengthened by the Algerian exile
Si Aziz who had offered his help both to the French consul to recover the
stela, and to Snouck Hurgronje to introduce him in Mekka. De Lostalot
circulated rumours about the presence of an unbeliever in Mekka, which
made the Ottoman governor order Snouck Hurgronje to leave the holy
city without delay.
Snouck Hurgronje was very close to his German colleagues from
the beginning of his scholarly career. He went to study with Theodor
Nöldeke in Strassburg in1880–1881 after obtaining his doctorate at
Leiden University, and maintained a lifelong correspondence with
him, Snouck Hurgronje writing in Dutch while Nöldeke replied in
German.⁴⁸ In the second half of the nineteenth century Germany was the
main model for Bildung in the Netherlands, and German an important
scholarly language. Snouck Hurgronje published mainly in Dutch and in
German, for example his two volume monograph on Mekka appeared in
German, and only the second volume on ethnography was translated
much later into English. Snouck Hurgronje’s network of colleagues was
extensive, covering the entire world, and he maintained it, like many of
his contemporaries, by writing letters and attending the international
Orientalists’ congresses. In this network German colleagues occupied a
privileged place.
His monograph on Mekka and the two accompanying volumes of
photographs brought him scholarly fame. He was not content with his
teaching positions at the University of Leiden and the Delft Institute
for Colonial Administrators and in 1889 eagerly accepted a position in
the Dutch East Indies as an adviser for Islamic affairs, where he would
stay until 1906. Snouck Hurgronje did extensive research on lived Islam
and collected many materials. He played a vital role in the “pacification”
of Aceh, advising the Dutch army on how to deal with the resistance
stirred up by Muslims scholars. His intelligence work led again to the
publication of several important scholarly monographs and numerous
articles. Towards the end of his stay he felt that his pleas for the promotion
of the interests of the native population were not always respected.
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In 1906 Snouck Hurgronje accepted the chair of Arabic and Islamic
studies at Leiden University, while keeping his position as an adviser
to the colonial government. As a professor in Leiden he was strongly
interested in educating members of the Indonesian elite in accordance
with his ideals about their vital role in the development of their country.
The first Indonesian to obtain a doctorate at Leiden University in 1913,
under Snouck Hurgronje’s guidance, was Hoesein Djajadiningrat, the
nephew of his faithful friend Raden Aboe Bakar with whom he had
shared a house in Mekka and who took care of his pregnant slave after he
had to leave in a hurry. In his insistence on the possibility of educating a
secular elite to bring the Muslim world to modernity we may hear echoes
of this recent success. Likewise his insistence on separating religion
and politics might refer to his personal convictions, which seem to be
related to an agnostic position. His negative views of the ‘ulama and
Jihad may partly be rooted in his experiences in the field during the
Aceh war. This extremely violent war, which Snouck Hurgonje witnessed
from nearby, may have fed his strongly articulated disgust of the war
craze.
The ideal of scholarship that permeates Snouck Hurgronje’s con-
demnation of Becker is clearly related to the few biographical elements
offered so far. Snouck Hurgronje was an outstanding scholar, who played
a decisive role in the creation of the study of Islam in Western academia.
In his scholarship he was cosmopolitan. He was an excellent fieldworker,
gifted in gathering information in the field with the help of faithful
informants and assistants, with whom he maintained correspondences
over decades. He also developed an extensive network of colleagues and
friends in Western academia, and was one of the leading figures in the
congresses of Orientalist scholars and in the creation of the oriental-
ist overview of Islam par excellence, the Encyclopaedia of Islam.⁴⁹ For
him this scholarship was an international activity, with which biases
on race or nationalism should not interfere. It was also knowledge that
should be applied, in the interests of both the colonizers and the col-
onized.
Snouck Hurgronje served his country, but he also wanted to eman-
cipate the Muslims and improve their lives. Together with his Leiden
neighbour, the legal scholar Cornelis van Vollenhoven, he was one of the
advocates of the so-called “ethical policy” that the Dutch government
should follow in the East Indies. This same ethical position led to a strong
condemnation of his German colleagues’ faulty scholarship and wrong
political choices during World War i.
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Scholarly War Efforts
Orientalist scholars were involved in the war effort on both sides in
various ways. They advised on policy towards Muslims in the colonies
and on the possible instrumentalization of Islam, as Snouck Hurgronje
and Becker did, worked in intelligence (as in the Nachrichtenstelle für den
Orient in Berlin), in producing propaganda (as the journal Der Dschihad
published for theMuslim prisoners of war in Berlin), in scholarly research
in the field or in the study, or directly participated in action on the
battlefield with their specialist skills (as translators, such as Hellmut
Ritter). So far I have found hardly any questioning of this involvement as
such. On the contrary, both Snouck Hurgronje and Becker, like many of
their contemporaries, considered the use of scholarship and the action of
scholars in the administration of Muslims to be one of the aims of their
work. Snouck Hurgronje and Carl Heinrich Becker were, together with
colleagues like Martin Hartmann and Alfred Le Chatelier, among the
founding fathers of the study of contemporary Islam which understood
itself as an applied science and actively sought to address the problems of
policy-making in colonialism and international relations. They justified
their scholarly work by its immediate relevance for society.
This wish to serve the nation by scholarship was strengthened by
feelings of patriotism which were quite strong on all sides during the
war. Snouck Hurgronje seems to have been among the rare exceptions to
prefer peace to action and to defend internationalism. Becker clearly
disapproves of his utopian pacifism, and attacks it as unworldly, and later
on presents it as serving his national and personal interests in colonial
policy in disguise. The scholarly Einsatz resulted in the massacre of many
promising scholars, such as the already mentioned Erich Graefe, about
whose fate Snouck Hurgronje enquires at Becker’s request in England
and France.⁵⁰ Hellmut Ritter was also among Becker’s young promoti in
action. In 1916 he sent out copies of his doctoral thesis to his colleagues
with the mention that he was “on campaign”, z.z. im Felde, and gave
as his address the Navy post office in Berlin, since he was serving as
an interpreter with the vi. Ottoman army in Baghdad. Fortunately he
survived the war. Perhaps he gathered something more than the texts of
war poetry that he published afterwards in his Mesopotamische Studien
(1919–1923). Well before World War ii he went to Istanbul and remained
there until 1949 (and returned there again from 1956 until 1969).
The proclamation of Jihad seems not to have had much success.
It hardly stirred any uprisings against the colonial masters, nor did it
help much to rally Muslims to the Ottoman cause. The Germans gave
privileged treatment to Muslim prisoners of war, also by offering them
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a mosque and periodicals full of propaganda about Jihad in the hope
that they would be willing to join forces with them, as has been amply
documented in recent studies.The fewwhowere eventually sent to Turkey
were very badly treated there. German scholars were not only involved in
providing them with reading materials, but also used the soldiers from
the French, British and Russian colonial empires as informants for their
linguistic, ethnomusicological and ethnographic studies. It is unclear to
what extent this served the war effort, but it led to detailed ethnographic
monographs afterwards, such as Sitte und Recht in Nordafrika by Ernst
Ubach and Ernst Rackow (and others), published in 1923.⁵¹
The intelligence office in Berlin created during the war, Nachricht-
enstelle für den Orient, seemed to be the place where the real brains
behind the German Islam policy were working, especially Max Freiherr
von Oppenheim and Karl-Emil Schabinger Freiherr von Schowingen.⁵²
The first had as a confidant the Tunisian mufti Shaykh Salih al-Sharif
al-Tunisi who stayed in Berlin; the latter translated his pamphlet Haqiqat
al-jihad into German, while Martin Hartmann provided a preface to that
text which presented the Jihad against the colonizers as an individual
obligation, fard al-‘ayn, for every Muslim.⁵³ Snouck Hurgronje ought
rather to have directed his wrath at Von Oppenheim and Schabinger, but
again he might not have deemed these men to be worthy of his scholarly
attention.
Even if the proclamation did not work out as planned, the colonizing
nations thought it wise to request the explicit loyalty of their Muslim
subjects. In London The Times published a series of declarations from
Muslims in India on 12 November 1914, while the Aga Khan had already
expressed his support on 4 November. The Russians had the mufti of the
Caucasus issue a fatwa against the Ottoman proclamation.⁵⁴ However,
The Times did not offer its readers the text of the five Ottoman fatwas, as
Becker added “the censor knows why.”⁵⁵
On the French side Louis Massignon voluntureed on the Dardanelles
battlefield and later joined the Sykes-Picot negotiations, where he met
T.E. Lawrence. Becker praises Massignon’s patriotism, and sends him
his regards through his correspondence with Snouck Hurgronje.⁵⁶ The
Revue du monde musulman published an impressive series of expressions
of loyalty from Muslim leaders, both in facsimile and in translation, from
North and West Africa under the title Le salut au drapeau. Témoignages
de loyalisme des musulmans français (1916). Already in December 1914 the
same journal published an issue under the title Les musulmans français
et la guerre. Adresses et témoignages de fidélité des chefs musulmans et
des personnages religieux. This issue opened with a reference to Snouck
Hurgronje’s highly critical article. It also contained a letter from the
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sultan of Morocco encouraging his Muslim subjects fighting in Europe
to defend France. For Becker the praise that Snouck Hurgronje obtained
from the French in for example Le Temps of 20 January 1915 demonstrated
once again that his scholarly analysis was in fact a support for the allied
cause, which made his claim to neutrality questionable.⁵⁷
Nachleben
The involvement of orientalist scholars in the war effort and the Ottoman
Jihad has become the subject of numerous historical studies from the
1980s onwards. The polemic between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker
has aroused special attention, and led to new polemics, such as between
Peter Heine (1984) and Ludmila Hanisch (1992). Recently (2014) Dietrich
Jung published an overview article with extensive references offering a
lesson for the area studies debate and for the understanding of the Arab
spring. Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch collected a series of case studies
on the German involvement in the Jihad (2014). Christiaan Engberts is
preparing a study on the ideals about the scholarly persona that he is
reconstructing from the correspondence that resulted from the clash
between the two scholars. For me two of the most enlightening studies
on the debate were the articles by Schwanitz (2003) and Hagen (2004).⁵⁸
In order to understand the German scholars’ involvement in the war
effort we also need a solid view of Germany’s Oriental policy, which was
an important part of her foreign policy.⁵⁹
It would be interesting to review this abundant body of literature. Its
sound historical research would clarify many of the issues raised by the
two protagonists. It would also nicely contrast the concerns and ethics of
scholars who thought they were serving their countries, the Muslims
and humanity at large by their applied Islam studies, with those scholars
of the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first
who have been ushered into post-colonial thinking by Edward Said.
However, all this falls outside the scope of this article, but remains a
desideratum for another occasion.
Conclusion: Orientalism as Cultural Critique
The clash between Snouck Hurgronje and Becker was not about their
actual involvement in society and politics as such, but about bad
scholarship, wrong decisions, dangerous policy and scholarly ethics.
The main question was not whether or not to use scholarship for
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policy matters, but how to use it properly. They disagreed about the
values that should guide scholars in their involvement and analysis.
For Becker, and for many of his German colleagues, as for their French
and British counterparts, patriotism was a supreme value, especially
in times of war. Snouck Hurgronje strongly condemned this choice.
For him the international dimension of orientalism, expressed in the
international congresses of orientalists in their publication projects such
as the Encyclopaedia of Islam, and in their networks of correspondence
and friendships, came first. He combined his cosmopolitan vision with
an endorsement of the colonial project aimed at civilizing Muslims and
thereby bringing them from the Middle Ages to modernity. Education of
an elite and the separation of religion and politics, implying religious
freedom for Muslims to practise their rituals, were important tools for
creating this modernity. This international project would contribute to
world peace and progress, for which he considered some elements from
the Islamic tradition more apt than Christianity. The war endangered
both his scholarly project of the study of contemporary Islam and
accompanying social aim of the modernization of Muslims, to which
Snouck Hurgronje had devoted his life.
Understood in thismannerOrientalism also offered a tool for criticism
of Western culture. Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly contrasted the Islamic
condemnation of war against co-religionists and of strife in general
as impious with the war craze that dominated his times. His article
was not only a defence of Dutch colonial interests, but much more an
expression of utter concern about the destruction of civilization and a
moral indignation about the barbarism of war, by a man who had seen
sufficient action himself.
The practice of orientalism as a cultural critique, in the tradition of
the Lettres persanes and the budging science of anthropology, did not yet
lead to a radical self-critique, questioning the relationship between the
production of knowledge and its social uses to exercise power. However,
its relativism could go together rather well with advocating a policy of
education and “ethical administration”, aimed at increasing the welfare of
“the natives”, as the engagement of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and
Cornelis van Vollenhoven shows. A more radical epistemological critique
would emerge only in the 1970s, through the work of scholars such as
Foucault, Rodinson and Said. Since then the polemic between Snouck
Hurgronje and Becker has served as a case for numerous analyses in
the wake of the Orientalism debate. The case under review may serve
as yet another reminder of the necessity of such constant self-criticism
and self-questioning. We are living again in times full of rhetorics about
the dangers of extremism, radicalization, pan-Islamism and Jihad, and
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scholars are engaged in the war effort as much as ever, this time also
dealing with “the enemy within.” It is striking to see that now, as 100 years
ago, the subject of Jihad is at the top of the research agenda. Perhaps the
Master from Leiden could teach us a grain of caution in our commitments
and opinions.
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2 The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad*
Mustafa Aksakal
Why did the Ottoman empire proclaim Jihad in November 1914 and
who was the proclamation’s genuine author? Did the impetus come from
Kaiser Wilhelm ii, the German emperor, whose faith in Jihad stemmed
from the desire to undermine Berlin’s rival empires, Britain, France,
and Russia, who all ruled over large Muslim populations? Or did the
proclamation originate with the Ottomans themselves and, perhaps more
specifically, with the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, the
menwho ruled the empire duringWorldWar i? In truth, the proclamation
had both German and Ottoman origins. In this chapter, I focus on the
latter, to examine Ottoman uses of Jihad both before and after November
1914.
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje’s The Holy War “Made in
Germany” (1915)
In 1915, one of the foremost European Islamicists, C. SnouckHurgronje, in
several publications denounced his German colleagues for inducing the
Ottoman government to issue aworld-wide call for holywar. In particular,
Snouck chastised his fellow scholars Martin Hartmann and Carl Heinrich
Becker for allowing political expediency to prevail over academic
integrity.¹ He charged them with resuscitating “a thoroughly mediaeval
institution, which even the Mohammedan world was outgrowing.”²
The German government, aided by its academics, “for their own selfish
interests [was leading the Ottomans back] into the ways of mediaeval
religious hatred which they were just about to leave.”³
Jihad in the Ottoman Register before 1914
The 19 November 1914 issue of the İslam Mecmuası (the journal of Islam),
published in Istanbul, carried a number of documents related to the
Ottoman proclamation of Jihad. It included the Jihad proclamation itself,
the call to Jihad by Sultan Mehmed Reșad v, the fatwas issued by the
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sheikhülislam authorizing the move, the statement by the top military
commander, Enver Pasha, and, finally, “a fewwords” of editorial comment
by the publication’s director, Halim Sabit.⁴
The Ottomans did not need German blandishments to convince them
of the advantages of issuing a Jihad declaration in 1914. By employing
Jihad the state was mobilizing the support of its Muslim subjects in a
time of war. This policy was aimed in particular at the empire’s Arab
inhabitants, whose leaders the British courted and whose allegiance
the state sought to secure.⁵ Contrary to what Entente propaganda was
wont to argue, the declaration stemmed neither from an Ottoman
desire for a global Muslim empire nor from a German gambit. The
state’s use of Jihad in 1914, moreover, was far from unprecedented.
Ottoman history shows us that the centralized state, along with its
religious authorities, military and political leaders, and – beginning
in the mid-nineteenth century with the emergence of the institutions
of mass society and its outlets – newspaper editors, journalists and
intellectuals, understood and employed the powerful ideological energies
that “Jihad” could mobilize. They also understood the dangers of such
an ideology. While Jihad had the potential to unify Muslims against
intruders, it could also, in their diplomatic relations, estrange the
Ottomans from the European powers and, at home, speed up the
disintegration of the multi-confessional empire by sparking hostilities
between its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Thus for much of the
nineteenth century the government in Istanbul sought to join the
European concert, not to fight it. It was not for nothing that the Ottomans’
understanding of international law included not only “holy war” but also
“holy peace.”⁶
The concept of Jihad occupied a quotidian place in the Ottoman
cultural register, and its motley everyday presence as well as the state’s
repeated use of Jihad-as-holy-war throughout the long nineteenth century
make it odd that the best-known Ottoman Jihad declaration – that
of November 1914 – has been largely understood as a “jihad made in
Germany.” Jihad was a prominent cultural concept, and usages of the
term “Jihad” spilled into a wide variety of meanings.The jolly seventeenth
century traveller and adventurer, Evliya Çelebi, for example, characterized
his patron’s most intimate marital moments devoted to “the propagation
of the species” as a “greater jihad.” His patron was the grand vezir, whose
wife, Kaya Sultan, was a strong-willed woman, we are to understand.⁷
During the years of the Crimean war (1853–1856), in another case, a
certain Ayşe travelled to Istanbul to join the “jihad” – never mind that
the state had not, and did not, issue a call to holy war during that war
against Russia. Ayşe’s initiative leaves us wondering about the meanings
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and function of Jihad, but it also demonstrates its evidently broad appeal.
Whether she intended to take up arms or perhaps was expressing her
willingness to serve as a field nurse remains unknown. She may also
have simply expected the state to reward her patriotism monetarily and
to send her home, which is how the episode ended.⁸ Even though the
documentation lacks detail, we can say at least that her case was not
unique; the same year a woman by the name of Nazıma presented similar
intentions.⁹
In the Ottoman world one did not even have to be Muslim to wage
“jihad.” When Maronite Christians in Mount Lebanon felt threatened
by the growing number of Protestant missionaries from the United
States in the 1820s, the Maronite patriarch saw his church fighting
a “struggle [original: jihād, m.a.] with all our power against those
Biblemen.”¹⁰ For the early Ottoman period, Linda Darling and Cemal
Kafadar have each emphasized the situational character and fluidity
of the ways in which the concept Jihad was employed. And they
have differentiated Jihad from gaza, two related but distinct categories
often simply rendered into English as “holy war.”¹¹ Both Darling and
Kafadar have shown that “holy” by no means meant “in line with
Islamic law” and that, perhaps counter to our modern expectations,
Christian corsairs – or an Armenian prince and a Greek princess, for
that matter – could be featured in epics and stories as warrior heroes
fighting shoulder to shoulder with Muslims.¹² Thus the meaning of
“jihad” went beyond any one legal-doctrinal definition and signified a
generic call for marshaling all-out effort in the face of great challenges.
Such a broad understanding explains why the new coins minted in the
crisis years under Sultan Mahmud ii (r. 1808–1839), for example, were
named “jihadiye” coins.¹³
In Arabic the word jihād connotes “striving.” The concept appears in
the Koran without a definitive explanation and thus over the centuries it
has been interpreted by scholars in various ways. Jihād has been defined
as the internal, entirely peaceful struggle carried on by the individual
believer striving to honour divine expectations and, at other times, as
external, violent warfare waged against non-Muslims.¹⁴ The internal,
peaceful form, moreover, has been referred to as “greater jihad,” whereas
the external, violent form has been referred to as “lesser jihad.”¹⁵ Thus the
fact that the Young Turk government of the Ottomans in 1914 declared
the war against Britain, France, and Russia (and Serbia and Montenegro)
a “greater jihad” (cihad-ı ekber) seems to betray, at first sight, a stunning
ignorance of classical Jihad doctrine on the part of the Ottoman leaders.¹⁶
Could the Young Turks and their German allies have got their Jihad so
wrong?
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The Ottoman Jihad in 1914
The Jihad proclamation was first deliberated upon, then prepared in the
form of five legal opinions or fetvas ( fatwā), endorsed by 29 religious
authorities, blessed formally by the sultan, received by the members of
the Ottoman chamber of deputies, presented in a closed ceremony to
political, military and religious dignitaries on 11 November, and then,
with great fanfare on 14 November, a Saturday, read out publicly by the
Custodian of the Fetva (Fetva Emini), Ali Haydar Efendi, to a large crowd
assembled outside the Mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror in the Fatih
neighbourhood of Istanbul, not far from the Haliç, the fabled Golden
Horn.¹⁷ All this took time and was not accomplished in a single day but
rather over the course of several weeks. There are still other “correct”
dates for the proclamation. Arnold Toynbee’s Islamic World since the
Peace Settlement puts the declaration on 23 November, the day on which,
as Toynbee notes not incorrectly, “the Sultan-Caliph” Mehmed v (Reşad)
“promulgated” the fetvas “signed by the Sheykhu’l-Islām,” the highest-
ranking religious dignitary.¹⁸ Gottfried Hagen, who has published a
collection of pan-Islamic pamphlets found at theUniversity ofHeidelberg,
has shown that the first publications of the fetva appeared as early
as 7 November.¹⁹ And, in fact, even earlier, on 3 November – thus
immediately after the Ottoman surprise attack on Russian Black Sea
ports on 30 October and the Russian declaration of war on 2 November –
İkdam, the large Istanbul daily and no friend of the ruling Union and
Progress regime, had urged that “the declaration of jihad against these
states who are the enemies of Islam” had become a “duty for allMuslims.”²⁰
What seems more plausible than Young Turk ignorance, however,
is the erasure of the line between the individual’s and the state’s efforts
in the age of anti-colonial mass movements and total war. The erasure
between the personal and the official, the internal and the external,
amounted to the “secularization of jihad”, to draw on Firoozeh Kashani-
Sabet’s description of the phenomenon in Iran.²¹ But if “jihad” became
secularized through its employment for secular, political ends, then the
reverse also became true and resulted in the “Islamization of politics”
or, put differently, the “politicization of Islam.”²² Both framings point
to a new type of convergence of politics and religion in the nineteenth
century. What was new was not the convergence itself but the extent
to which it was employed by the state in a new era of mass society
and universal conscription armies. In other words, a century so often
described as a century of secularization was, in fact, in the Ottoman case
just as in societies all across Europe, one in which religion became ever
more prominently a part of international conflict. İsmail Kara’s analysis
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and painstaking translation of excerpts from some 70 publications and
manuscripts appearing in the late Ottoman period clearly illustrate this
process.²³ Anti-colonial struggles, whether armed or not, became framed
as Jihad from Indonesia to western Africa.²⁴
During the period from 1768 to 1922, the state issued official Jihad
declarations on at least six occasions.²⁵ In 1773, the state declared Jihad
during the war against Russia that led to Russia’s annexation of the
northern Black Sea region.²⁶ And again in 1809 it did so against its own
Serbian population,²⁷ accompanied by eight banners to be “unfurled for
jihad.”²⁸ In 1829 the state declared Jihad against Russia for supporting the
Greek revolt: “[b]ecause the Russians have incited the Greek Orthodox
to wage war [against us] in pursuit of independence and because this war
has thus been caused by hostility towards the Islamic faith and therefore is
a religious struggle, jihad has become an obligation for all those between
the ages of twelve and seventy of the people of Islam.”²⁹ It did so again in
the one-month-long Greek-Ottoman war of 1897, a rare victory during
this long stretch of Ottoman defeats.³⁰ In 1914 the declaration was aimed
collectively against the Entente powers, Britain, France and Russia, and
their allies. And in 1919, religious leaders in Mustafa Kemal’s resistance
movement – hence technically not the Ottoman state – declared Jihad
against Greece, to mobilize support for Mustafa Kemal against both the
Greek armies in May 1919 and against the British-controlled government
in Istanbul.³¹
This type of accounting, however, focusing on declarations of war, is
inadequate because it omits the many other instances in which the state
employed the concept of Jihad. In mid-1821, for example, in the face of the
Greek uprising that led to an independent Greek state in 1832, the palace
sent out directives to officials in Istanbul and its vicinity “to call upon the
Muslims to bind their hearts together” and “to observe the 5 times daily
prayers,” reminding them that in the age of the Prophet Muhammad
“when sharī‘a was followed, jihād performed and the religious beliefs
were firm, … the Muslims were victorious.”³² In explaining why the
Ottomans had suffered so many military defeats since the eighteenth
century, the sultan’s court historian, delivering his sovereign’s imperial
decree in 1826, claimed that the Ottomans’ earlier victories had flowed
“from the virtue of the sword of jihad (seyf-i cihad sayesinde).”³³ The
army of Mehmed Ali, the governor of the province of Egypt, was known
as the Jihadiye. When in 1831 he sent his forces into Syria against those of
the sultan with the intention of capturing the Ottoman capital, Sultan
Mahmud ii had fetvas issued against the ambitious governor and his son,
the Jihadiye’s commander, declaring them “rebels.”³⁴ Sultan Mahmud ii’s
own troops – newly reorganized, all-Muslim, and renamed in 1826 –
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had marched under the banner of “The Trained Triumphant Soldiers of
the Prophet Muhammad.” During the Crimean war, even though the
state did not declare Jihad, as we have seen, the special taxes collected to
support that war were designated “jihad donation (iane-i cihadiye)” and
“jihad taxes (rüsumat-ı cihadiye).”³⁵ And throughout the uprisings across
the Balkans during the 1870s and the 1877–1878 war with Russia, the
state subsidized the publication of books on Jihad – although here, too,
because of its potential international consequences, it refrained from
declaring Jihad publicly.³⁶
What inspired these continued uses of religion by the state in the nine-
teenth century? Virginia Aksan suggests that this turn towards religion
in military and political affairs reflected a state policy of Islamization,
or re-Islamization – a “revival of religious fervor” necessitated by the
need “to recreate an [Islamic] ‘orthodoxy’ in the face of both Muslim
and non-Muslim challenges to legitimacy.”³⁷ Over the long nineteenth
century Ottoman elites employed an “image of Islam” in the manner
of an “invented tradition” by blending religion with resistance to Euro-
pean encroachments, often by depicting the Prophet Muhammad “as an
exemplar in war.”³⁸ Butrus Abu-Manneh has linked this development
to the ascendancy among the Ottoman elites of sufi mystics from the
Khalidiye branch of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order. The Khalidiye
had been moulded by the experience of British imperialism in India and
had abandoned previous quietism in order to achieve not only religious
but also “political regeneration.”³⁹ By the end of the nineteenth century,
cadets at the war college who missed prayers or did not fast during
Ramadan were receiving disciplinary demerits.⁴⁰ Maintaining those
practices was deemed necessary because “the survival of the Sublime
State depends on the preservation of the Islamic faith”, and all civil and
military members of the state had to understand “the sacredness of their
duty.”⁴¹
Already by 1826, the rhetoric used for the mobilization of the
army by military leaders and state bureaucrats increasingly cast non-
Muslims and non-Turks as “politically or militarily” unreliable.⁴² To
be sure, the vast, complex empire of the Ottomans did not adhere to
a single set of unidirectional policies or one consistent ideology in its
approach to the challenges of modernity. Far from it: internationally the
Sublime Porte sought to join the European concert, while domestically,
beginning in 1839 with the Tanzimat reforms (the “re-orderings”), it
put in place laws, and even granted semi-autonomous constitutions
in the attempt to hold Christian communities inside the Ottoman
imperial frame. But prevalent attitudes associated with Islam and Jihad
pushed the other way, and they played a central role in the way the state
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and its elites, and increasing segments of the Muslim public, defined
themselves. The Habsburg empire, also a multinational state, could
counter centrifugal pressures by coupling legally enforced religious
toleration with an emphatic association of the dynasty, culturally and
ceremonially, with the Catholicism to which the overwhelming majority
of its subjects belonged. In the Ottoman lands, religiously far more
heterogeneous, national cleavages were reinforced rather than undercut
by religious identities. The dilemmas of the multi-national state that
was also multi-confessional could not have been demonstrated more
starkly.
Those at the helm of the Ottoman state were well aware of the
self-destructive potential built into instrumentalizing Islam. Sultan
Abdülhamid ii (r. 1876–1909) sought to use jihad as a diplomatic lever,
not as an actual military policy; “the threat of cihad,” as one historian put
it, “was more effective than the call itself.”⁴³ Islam could be the sword that
united Muslim Ottomans from the Balkans to Arabia but it could at the
same time be the sword that sliced into the Ottoman body politic cutting
out Christians and Jews. In moments of violence against Christians the
state rushed to punish the alleged transgressors, often summarily without
adequate investigation, in the effort to calm European diplomats and,
gradually, European public opinion. Thus the commander on whose
watch inter-communal violence broke out in Lebanon in 1860 was put
to death alongside two aides.⁴⁴ Similarly, about 30 participants were
swiftly executed for the gruesome slaying of the German and French
consuls by a mob in Salonica in 1876, murders that had been prompted
by the conversion of a young Bulgarian woman to Islam and the woman’s
subsequent detention and concealment by her relatives. In the ensuing
chaos, according to reports, the ringleaders demanding the woman’s
release claimed that “the holy war is about to commence.”⁴⁵ In the
war against Russia in 1877, Sultan Abdülhamid ii decided it would be
prudent to refrain from an Ottoman Jihad declaration, a calculation that
did not prevent the sultan from receiving a Muslim delegation from
Russian Dagestan and explicitly blessing its Jihad declaration against
the Russian state with an imperial decree (a ferman).⁴⁶ His prudence
was certainly vindicated, as the Ottomans had the European powers on
their side at the Berlin Congress, which overturned much of Russia’s
military successes and the treaty it had imposed at San Stefano. Similar
calculations anticipating international support from the great powers
meant that the Ottomans not only did not declare Jihad during the
Crimean war or the Russian war of 1877–1878, as we have seen, but also
not, as we shall see, during the Italian war of 1911–1912 and the Balkan
wars of 1912 and 1913.⁴⁷ When in 1894, during large-scale massacres of
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Armenians, European papers reported that the Ottomans were engaged
in Jihad against their Christian subjects, the state took quick steps to
deny the charge.⁴⁸
In all its modern wars the military used Jihad in its conscription
and recruitment efforts, in the training and drilling of troops, and in its
efforts at rallying army and society behind the flag. In so doing, Sultan
Abdülhamid ii, for one, believed himself in good company. Shortly
after the “Bulgarian massacres” of 1876 that had so exercised European
opinion, the sultan complained that “We are accused in Europe of being
savages and fanatics … [Yet] unlike the Czar, I have abstained till now
from stirring up a crusade and profiting from religious fanaticism, but
the day may come when I can no longer curb the rights and indignation
of my people at seeing their co-religionists butchered in Bulgaria and
Armenia.”⁴⁹ By 1892, the day had come “In England, Russia and France
there are Bible Societies which become exceedingly rich through the
donations of rich and fanatical Christians who bequeath all their wealth
to them in their wills … Although the English, Russian and French
governments seem not to be involved in their activities, they secretly aid
and abet them in sending missionaries into darkest Africa. In this way
they spread their beliefs among the local population. By increasing the
numbers of their followers this religious influence is then transformed
into political leverage … Although it is obviously desirable to take
firm measures against them, if open opposition is brought to play the
Sublime Porte will suffer the vexing interventions of the three powers’
ambassadors. Thus the only way to fight against them is to increase
the Islamic population and spread the belief in the Holiest of Faiths.”⁵⁰
What did Abdülhamid ii mean by declaring his intention to “increase
the Islamic population”? Perhaps policies aimed at winning converts
in foreign lands. But the massacres of Armenians in the mid-1890s,
during which entire villages of terrified Christians sought safety in mass
conversion to Islam, suggests that one way the Muslim population could
be increased was by decreasing the Christian one.⁵¹
The military distributed publications to army chaplains, some written
by the chaplains themselves, others by officers, with stories intended
to fortify morale and impart lessons of courage and sacrifice. Typically
such stories were built around the ideal of Jihad in terms that conflated
religious and secular goals. In one such booklet Jihad meant “unity,
fulfilling shari’a law, contributing to the health of the nation, protecting
the dignity and glory of the state, building up the country, bringing
aid to the umma, [and] preserving the homeland.”⁵² In another, The
Virtues of the Champions of Islam (“Mujahideen”), Colonel Osman Senai
insisted on loyalty, discipline and purity of heart and purpose.⁵³ In Jihad
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is the Lord’s Command, published in 1910, the fictional Little Halil –
an Ottoman G.I. Joe – presents himself to the recruitment officer. The
officer, however, sends the recruit back home upon learning that Halil
has no one but an elderly mother and an unmarried sister, and that his
father had died after fighting in many a campaign. Halil, with much
gusto, objects to his rejection and explains that it had been his mother
herself who had sent him.⁵⁴ Thus the recruitment officer is portrayed as
compassionate, Halil and his family as eager for Jihad. Such publications,
written by officers, religious scholars⁵⁵ and by the Young Turk Committee
of Union and Progress that would unseat Abdülhamid ii in 1908/9 and
seize power in a coup in 1913,⁵⁶ cast further doubt on the assumption
that it took German machinations to produce the Jihad declaration of
1914.
When the Italians opened the bombardment of the Libyan coast in
early October 1911, a play by Mehmed Sezai entitled The Sacred Jihad,
or the Ottoman-Italian War in Tripoli was performed in Izmir/Smyrna
almost immediately.⁵⁷ “Jihad” played such an important role as a rallying
cry among both the regular units and the irregular local resistance in
the Italian-Ottoman war that even though the state issued no formal
call to holy war, both contemporary observers and subsequent scholars
have assumed it had.⁵⁸ A religious gloss on the conflict was encouraged
by both sides, as “the Catholic Church and the Pope blessed the Italian
fighters and praised God for helping them to replace the Crescent with
the Cross in Libya.”⁵⁹ It was not lost on Ottoman officers fighting in
Tripoli, including the empire’s future minister of war, Enver, that Italian
propaganda was aimed at exploiting ethnic differences and setting the
local Arab population against the “Turks.” Italian propaganda held out
a deal to Ottoman Arabs: “Let it not be hidden from you that Italy
(may Allah strengthen her!), in determining to occupy this land, aims at
serving your interests as well as ours, and at assuring our mutual welfare
by driving out the Turks … They have always despised you. We, on the
other hand, have studied your customs and your history. We know that
you keep your word, and that the Turks oppress you by taxation and
conscription. We respect your noble religion because we recognize its
merits, and we respect also your women. Woe unto him who will venture
to touch them! It is true that we belong to another faith, but we also
are People with a Book (Ahl el Kitab), and we practice justice and give
alms to the poor. We recognize the rights of all men, and especially of
the Arabs, about whom history records so many great things … There
is no doubt that with God’s help, we shall drive the Turks out of this
country.”⁶⁰ Those concerned with salvaging the empire hoped to counter
such challenges by employing Islam – and Jihad – to strengthen the
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bonds crucial for holding together the empire’s various parts. Thus, while
the Italians were appealing to Arab nationalism, the Ottomans knew that
they held the Islam card.
Since Italy had grabbed Libya with no casus belli other than a
determined desire for empire,⁶¹ the Ottomans expected the great powers
to rein in their Italian colleagues. In fact, not a few European observers
sympathized with the Ottomans and saw international law on their
side.⁶² Ottoman expectations of effective support, however, were bitterly
disappointed. It was in the Libyan war, with the Balkan inferno hard
on its heels, that the officers and leaders of 1914 cut their teeth; these
“Christian” aggressions were the crucible that imbued them with a deep
sense of violation and victimhood.⁶³ This generation embodied the lesson
that “our honor and our people’s dignity cannot be preserved by those
old books of international law, but only by war.”⁶⁴
It was this sense of victimization that could legitimize oppression of
Christians in the Ottoman empire. Between January and June 1914 the
state had ethnically “cleansed” – as the Russian ambassador quoted Talat
Bey, the Ottoman minister of interior, as saying – the coastal regions
around Izmir of their Greek Orthodox population.⁶⁵ From 1912 to 1924,
the percentage of non-Muslims in Ottoman Asia Minor plummeted
from roughly 20 per cent to less than 2 per cent.⁶⁶ Only a portion of this
reduction can be accounted for by the forced emigration in Spring 1914
of 200,000 Greeks or the 192,000 refugees that left Asia Minor after the
official exchange of populations agreement signed between Greece and
Turkey in 1923.⁶⁷ Nor can it be explained away by the food shortages and
disease that hit Christians and Muslims alike. The disgusted analysis of
the young political scientist Ahmed Emin (Yalman), a man who would
later become a famous Turkish journalist and writer, makes plain that
not all Turks supported these “religious” policies, policies Emin was
convinced were cynical at their core. But his dissent also demonstrates
the extent to which these policies had already begun to be implemented
among non-Turkish Muslims before the November declaration. From
his perch at Columbia University, young Emin assessed the latest period
in Ottoman history in his 1914 doctoral dissertation: “[r]eligion was used
as a basis of agitation to secure popularity … Phrases like “Ottomanism,”
and the “unity of all elements of population in Turkey without distinction
of creed and religion” were still cited; but the meaning given to them
was no longer the meeting of the different elements on a common and
neutral ground through mutual sacrifice as citizens of the Ottoman
empire possessing equal rights.”⁶⁸
Complicating the picture, Enver Pasha told Kaiser Wilhelm ii on 22
October 1914 that a declaration of Jihad would be imprudent since the
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Ottomans were in alliance with Christian powers. He offered instead
to have the sultan-caliph call on all Muslims under British, French and
Russian rule to rise up in rebellion.⁶⁹ Did Enver really oppose the Jihad
declaration? Certainly not. As we have seen, the Ottoman leadership, and
Enver himself, promoted the idea of Jihad to mobilize both soldiers and
civilians alike.With the stock of all the neutrals rising during the July crisis
and the first months of the war – after Germany had met with unexpected
resistance in Belgium and France, and Austria-Hungary in Serbia – Enver
was exploiting Wilhelm ii’s one-dimensional understanding of Jihad.
“Jihad” was not the magic wand of the German emperor’s imagination. It
was not a weapon that could be activated upon the signal of the Ottoman
sultan-caliph, the nominal head of all Muslims but in reality a ceremonial
head of state in 1914. As for the Ottomans, they had scored a major
diplomatic victory by signing an alliance with Germany, the great power
of their choice, on 2 August. They had used the July crisis to break out
of an international isolation which they believed was slowly strangling
them. Once they had signed the alliance, however, they strove to stay
out of the war while salvaging the alliance with Germany into the post-
war period, during which they hoped to reform the empire under the
relative international security that would be provided by the alliance with
Berlin. During the summer of 1914 and throughout the war, moreover,
the Ottomans were able to draw on enormous German military aid.⁷⁰
The Ottoman leadership had long embraced the idea of using Jihad to
mobilize the people for the state’s defence. As early as 7 August – three
days prior to the controversial arrival in Istanbul of the two German
warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, and three whole months prior
to the Jihad declaration – Enver wrote to Cavid Pasha at Fourth Army
Headquarters in Baghdad, “War with England is now within the realm of
possibilities. Contact … [the local Arab leaders]. Since such a war would
be a holy war [böyle bir harb mukaddes olacağına] … it will definitely
be pertinent to rally the Muslim population … in [neighboring] Iran
under Russian and English rule to revolution.”⁷¹ He added, “I invite
everyone to come to the state’s defense in this war” in which “Muslims
will rise up” and “end Christian rule over Muslim peoples.”⁷² Thus, in
their communications with Arab leaders, statesmen in Istanbul utilized
Islam to build up an image of brotherhood. “But should our enemies
wish to soil our land with their filthy feet,” Enver wrote to the regional
notable Nakibzade Talib Bey of Basra on 10 August, “I am convinced
that Islamic and Ottoman honor and strength will destroy them.”⁷³
This evidence does not mean that Berlin did not press hard for the
Jihad declaration in 1914. After all, the Kaiser’s faith in Jihad – or in “war
by revolution” – was long-standing, and it made perfect geo-strategic
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sense.⁷⁴ But the manifold presence of Jihad in Ottoman international and
domestic politics throughout the nineteenth century down to 1914, and
its presence in both popular and state publications and in the internal
correspondence among Ottoman officials, moreover, make a strong case
that Jihad would have been an important aspect of Ottoman warfare in
1914 without Wilhelm ii and the German orientalists.
The long general report that was read to the assembled members at
the 1916 annual congress of the Committee of Union and Progress – the
ruling party – also suggests that the Ottomans themselves hadmade Jihad
part and parcel of their warfare. The congress, presided over personally
by Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha and Minister of the Interior Talat Bey
and held in late September 1916 in the Nuruosmaniye neighborhood in
Istanbul, spoke about the current war as a “jihad.”⁷⁵ An official military
publication issued to village councils in the same yearmakes the following
points: “[t]hose of us between the ages of twenty and forty-five are
obligated to serve in our military whenever we are called to defend
our beloved homeland and our holy religion. To answer this call and
rush immediately to the recruiting station is for us religion and honor.
Being called into the military is one of God’s commands. If they are
needed [for the defence] of the state during wartime those over the age
of forty-five will also be called [to service]. All able-bodied Muslims
are obligated by their religion to participate in jihad. On the battlefield
we must remember how the Prophet and his comrades fought wars
for their faith and honor.”⁷⁶ In 1916, the state was only too aware that
casting the enemies as Christians often led to the breakdown of stable
relations between Muslim and Christian populations within the empire.
In this particular publication the author, Major Mehmed Şükrü, an army
recruiting officer in Zonguldak on the Black Sea, addressed directly
the role of non-Muslims. Even though fighting on behalf of the state
was a religious duty, non-Muslims should be full participants in this
struggle to save the state: “[o]ur Christian and Jewish friends are also the
children of this homeland. Together with us they, too, are obligated to
fight against the enemy for the defense of our homeland, that is to say,
for their mother, and to spill their blood and to kill and be killed on this
journey. And so just as Muslims, Christians, and Jews harvest the fields
together and make a living, in wartime they must fire cannons and rifles,
throw bombs, and wield swords together.”⁷⁷
In the nineteenth century the call to Jihad was a common node
around which Muslims organized their resistance against European
(and, in the Philippines, u.s.) domination. From Indonesia to India
and to Iran, all around the Ottomans religiously-driven revitalization
and resistance movements had been mobilizing for decades. Ottoman
the ottoman proclamation of jihad 65
rulers were certainly circumspect in employing this tactic themselves,
because for much of the nineteenth century Ottoman governments had
sought to become members of the European state system. When they
did embrace Jihad, however, they did so primarily for domestic reasons,
to mobilize the loyalty of a majority-Muslim society behind an Islamic
empire. Had the Jihad indeed been “made in Germany” it is unlikely that
publications intended to foster morale and cultivate an Islamic Ottoman
identity would have continued all throughout the war even after its global
impact, in which Kaiser Wilhelm ii had put so much faith, had proven so
negligible. And yet, a steady stream of publications appeared unabated
down to 1918.⁷⁸ The author of Holy Jihad is a Religious Duty (Cihad-ı
Mukaddes Farzdır), like Ahmed Emin, read Jihad as a domestic, wartime
policy of social mobilization although, unlike Ahmed Emin, he gave it a
positive rather than a negative report card: “[p]eople of Islam! Whatever
your nationality, whatever your language, the Lord has declared all of us
brothers and sisters.”⁷⁹
Conclusion
Jihad had many faces. It could be a key component in forging an alliance
with a non-Muslim European power such as Germany and be employed
against other non-Muslim European powers at the same time. It could
be an ideology hostile to non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire and, at
other times, explicitly include non-Muslims in the Ottoman fold. Jihad
could be evoked against Muslims as well as Christians. The Ottoman
leadership thought of Jihad instrumentally, using it wherever they thought
it would benefit the interests of the state. These contradictions point to
the malleability of Jihad in Ottoman life of which the 1914 declaration
was one episode in a history of many.
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3 (Not) Using Political Islam
The German Empire and Its Failed Propaganda Campaign in
the Near and Middle East, 1914–1918 and Beyond
Tilman Lüdke
Introduction
The defeat of Nazi Germany in World War ii brought to an end what
Bloch has termed the imperial phase of German history (1871–1945).¹
There is an ongoing debate whether Germany’s imperial policies were
carefully planned or rather opportunist in nature. Archival evidence
strongly suggests the latter, particularly where German policies in
the Near and Middle East are concerned. Yet there were also authors
suggesting the existence of a sinister German imperial project, aiming
at the establishment of direct or indirect German control over the
region’s peoples and resources. Events in and around World War i are
frequently quoted to support this view: the German-Ottoman alliance
was concluded between unequal partners; clearly the weaker party was
the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian genocide is often referred to as
a kind of test-run for the Holocaust. There is also the suggestion that
German policies between 1914 and 1945 were marked by continuity;
German military and political decision-makers in 1939 merely took
out of the drawers the blueprints of 1914 that had been deposited in
those drawers in 1918. Moreover, these German policies were, in turn,
presumably the blueprints for all kinds of inhuman, brutal, anti-western
and anti-semitic sentiments and the behaviour of Muslims up to the
present.²
The myth that Germany pursued a deliberate and structured Near and
Middle East policy with clearly defined ends is surprisingly resilient. Like
every myth it contains several grains of truth. After 1890 Germany did
indeed wish to create an empire of its own; and after 1898 the Germans
did consider the Middle East as a promising region in which to set up an
informal empire in alliance with the supposedly moribund Ottoman
Empire.³ To that purpose, German capital was used to push forward the
so-called “Baghdad Railway”, and to prepare the ground for a German
imperial project entailing German settlers in Anatolia (which was soon
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scrapped for want of the ability to achieve it).⁴ Germany’s colonial rivals
were greatly concerned with the strategic implications of these policies:
with the BagdadRailway extended towardsKuwait (its originally intended
terminus) German soldiers could be transported to the Persian Gulf in
less than a week: a march on British-held India would then be facilitated.
Given the nineteenth century history of British obsessions with the “Great
Game” and a Russian threat to India, this was a renewed Imperial scare.
The good relations Germany enjoyed with the Ottoman government
seemed to facilitate such policies even more.⁵
These ambitious schemes notwithstanding, Germany rather saw itself
frustrated in its imperial undertakings before 1914. German imperial
possessions did not seem to amount to much (but in strictly territorial
terms were by nomeans unimpressive), yet Germanmilitary and political
decision-makers realized quite clearly that territory or population
was not the backbone of empire: it was infrastructure. The British
Empire might have been a patchwork of possessions of various sizes
the world over, but Britain had not only the Royal Navy, but also the
infrastructure to keep it operational. Germany possessed no such thing.
By 1909, it was tacitly acknowledged that the Germans had lost the
naval arms race, and no degree of technological superiority could
obscure the fact that any German battle-cruiser far from home would
eventually have to surrender for lack of fuel. Even for the most patriotic
German an uncomfortable realization had dawned by 1914: Germany
was weak, not strong, and surrounded by potentially hostile powers
(a hostility German policies before 1914 had done nothing to ward
off).⁶ A potential German ally in the Middle East was thus regarded as
valuable.
The German-Ottoman Alliance
When representatives of the Ottoman and German Empires put their
signatures to the treaty of alliance on 2 August 1914, two very strange
partners were united. Germany was a heavily industrialized European
Great Power. The Ottoman Empire was a predominantly agrarian empire
with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, which suffered
from several problems of long duration. First, an increasing number of
non-Muslims in the Empire tried to break away from imperial control
and desired to set up their own national states. By 1914, several such
groups had already succeeded in doing so. A Greek national state became
independent in 1832, a Serbian and Romanian state in 1878. At the time
of the revolution of 1908 Bulgaria, having enjoyed de facto independence
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since 1877, proclaimed full independence. Yet one should not be too
hasty in judging the internal political climate within the empire, as more
recent research has revealed. While there were doubtless separatists in
every group, and even in the Muslim community there were some who
were opposed to the ongoing preservation of a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious mode of life, the majority of Muslims and non-Muslims seem to
have preserved good mutual relations.⁷ Thus it appears that the fears of
internal disintegration, which in all likelihood played a prominent part
in the eventual decision of the Committee of Union and Progress (cup)
to create a Muslim national state rather than preserve a multi-ethnic
empire, were probably exaggerated.
Internal disintegration thus seems to have been less of a problem.
Colonial encroachment by the European powers, on the other hand, was
an on-going and real threat to the Empire’s survival.⁸ Finding a protector
against this encroachment consequently seemed of vital importance to
the Ottoman government. Much has been written about the internal
workings of alliances, yet while it is by now firmly established that very
few alliances or ententes are “cordial” in nature, it is unusual for an
ally to turn on another.⁹ Thus, if the impression can be created that the
security of one ally (in this case the Ottoman Empire) is of importance –
or even of vital importance – to the other (in this case Germany), the
preconditions for an alliance are laid.
This was the military dimension of the German-Ottoman alliance.
Germany might have been a strong industrial and military power, but it
was located in the centre of Europe. Its choice of allies in the decades
before the war had been as deficient as its general foreign policy: where
Bismarck left a Germany with secure ties to all powers except France
(thus practically guaranteeing an equilibrium and peace in Europe) in
1890, by 1914 Germany was allied with Austria, suffering from a weak
industry and internal strife between its many nationalities, and Italy,
the weakest of all the European industrial powers and politically highly
unreliable due to its manifold political clashes with Austria. In addition,
the almost criminal negligence or incompetence of Germany’s political
elite caused most of Bismarck’s security architecture to be dismantled.
In 1914 Germany faced a two-front war with weak allies.¹⁰ An alliance
with the Ottoman Empire was an interesting proposition: the Ottomans
might attack Russia from the south and thus subject the “Russian steam
roller” to the same problems as Germany – a two-front war. Thus one of
the reasons why Emperor Wilhelm ii overruled the initial objections
of German military and political decision-makers to the alliance was
the German monarch’s conviction “that the Empire could do something
against Russia.”¹¹
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Yet, in German eyes, the real Ottoman secret weapon was something
else: Islam. Since the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans had added
“caliph” to their long list of titles. For 300 years after the conquest of
Egypt (1516–1517), little political use had been made of this title.¹² But
whenOttoman sultanAbdülhamit ii came to power the caliphate began to
be used as anOttoman diplomatic weapon – sometimes with considerable
success, which doubtless fuelled German imagination.
The belief that Islam possessed a mobilizing potential for Muslims
when it came to combatting colonizing powers was, in itself, neither naïve
nor unfounded. The French in Algeria were the first to experience this
phenomenon: in the absence of anything akin to Algerian nationalism,
‘Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir¹³ referred to Algeria as “Dar al-Islam”, which
Muslims were called upon to defend against the infidel invaders. Similar
situations occurred during the entire nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries: examples include the Indian “mutiny” of 1857–1858 as well
as the Mahdiyya in the Sudan (1881–1898), the protracted resistance of
Mullah ‘Abdallah Hassan in Somalia against British, French and Italian
colonization or the anti-Italian struggle of the Sanusiya Sufi-Order in
Tripolitania.
Moreover, the substitution of “Islam” for “nationalism” had another
effect: Europeans were increasingly led to believe that what motivated
Muslims most was “Islam”, in the sense of a universal religion rather
than particularist nationalism. Thus the idea that pan-Islam existed,
and that Muslims were prepared to fight for what Europeans perceived
to be “Islam”, and that such readiness to fight might be harnessed in
the service of one of the warring camps seemingly was not entirely
unfounded. Put to a reality check, however, such notions very quickly
proved erroneous.
Perceptions of Islam
In the context of this chapter I shall not focus on “Islam” itself, but rather
on the perception of Islam by the European powers in 1914, and on the
meaning of “Islam” as a socio-political factor in Muslim societies. The
basic question is: as what could Islam be perceived in 1914? Was it a
universal religion? Was it a set of social and political values? Was it a
militant ideology? And, secondly, which element in Islam was the more
important: the universal global idea of the umma, which in principle ruled
out the fact that Muslims could become nationalists, or local/regional
culture, language, perhaps ethnicity, whichmadeMuslims feel themselves
to be inhabitants of their home regions first, and members of the umma
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second? It seems impossible to do these crucial questions justice in a short
chapter; what one may do, however, is to analyse briefly how Europeans
saw Islam by the outbreak of World War i.¹⁴
While Europeans regarded Islam mainly as a form of aberrant religion
(from the Christian point of view) during the Middle Ages and the Early
Modern Age, they became more interested in the social and political
aspects of Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁵
By the early twentieth century, onemight argue that Islam had established
itself firmly on the research agendas of European scholars. True, the
number of “Orientalists” was small and their impact limited, but every
European country by the outbreak of war in 1914 had a small number
of specialist scholars at its disposal.¹⁶ Their ranks were swollen by career
diplomats, administrators and politicians, who had often served in
colonies with substantial Muslim populations; and, last but not least,
there were the eccentrics: dilettantes dealing with “the Orient” in the
most varied ways. Some of them, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt in Britain,
became lifelong advocates of the rights of the colonized populations,
and thorns in the flesh of colonial and colonizing politicians; some
developed ingenuous, not altogether well-founded theories of how the
colonized Muslims might be used for the interests of one European
Great Power against its rivals. One of the most noteworthy examples
of the latter kind was German baron Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who
may with some justification claim to be the most influential individual
in bringing about the German pan-Islamic Propaganda during World
War i.
No serious Orientalist could ever be accused of having misconceived
Islam as one monolithic body. They were very well aware that “Islam”,
even if regarded only as a religion, was deeply fragmented. The rather
obvious split between Sunnis and Shi’ites was complemented by the
existence of a multitude of other religious movements, some only in the
widest sense “Islamic.” The differences in the socio-cultural expressions
of Islam were also duly noted: to name but a few examples, there was
the state Islam of the Ottoman Empire, headed by the sultan-caliph;
there was the academic-legal Islam of Al-Azhar university in Cairo; there
were, on the opposite end of the scale, Muslim brotherhoods in more
remote areas of the world, for example all over Africa. These were usually
treated with some contempt – German Orientalists cursorily brushed off
African Islam as “Negerislam”, Black Islam, in the sense of a third- or
fourth-rate Islam of no concern to Orientalists and colonial powers alike.
But it was especially these highly de-centralized Muslim brotherhoods
who had demonstrated their militant potential at several occasions: in
Algeria, in Libya, the Sudan, Somalia, etc.¹⁷ “Islam” obviously could, and
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did, make Muslims fight.¹⁸ Muslim resistance, without exception, had
eventually been overcome, sometimes at a hefty price, but the crucial
question remained: would it be possible to unite all Muslims in a revolt
against colonialism per se, regardless of where and under what rule these
Muslims lived? The Germans believed, or rather allowed themselves to
be persuaded, that such a possibility did exist.¹⁹
They were not the only ones. Harold Nicolson, permanent under-
secretary in the British Foreign Office, warned his superiors in 1911 of the
dangers of Ottoman pan-Islamic propaganda: “[t]his would only assist
towards the creation of a power which, I think, in the not too far distant
future – should it become thoroughly consolidated and established –
would be a very serious menace to us and also to Russia … Germany
is fortunate in being able to view with comparative indifference the
growth of the great Mussulman [sic] military power, she having no
Mussulman [sic] subjects herself, and a union between her and Turkey
would be one of the gravest dangers to the equilibrium between Europe
and Asia.”²⁰
It was exactly this special German situation – her apparent status as
a non-colonizer (Nicolson omitted the considerable concern German
colonial administrators and missionaries expressed about anti-colonial
Islamic activities in practically all German colonial territories) – and
her emerging rivalry with Britain which had led German politicians
and diplomats to cotton on to the potential appeal of a German-led
Islamic propaganda campaign. As early as in 1889 the liberal Friedrich
Naumann had prophesied that in case of a world war “the caliph of
Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of Holy War. The
sick man will rise himself for the last time to cry aloud to Egypt, to
the Sudan, to East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan and India: “War against
England!” It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his
bed when he utters this cry!”²¹ Naumann’s views were echoed by Fritz
Bronsart von Schellendorf, who was to become chief of the general staff
of the Ottoman Army in 1914, and most importantly Max Freiherr
von Oppenheim. Although at the margins of the German political
establishment, the baron managed to persuade the German government
to set up an elaborate apparatus for conducting pan-Islamic propaganda
from 1914 to 1918.
With the benefit of hindsight it can be argued that this propaganda
campaign failed: yet what were the reasons for this failure? Was the
central mistake that the pan-Islam the Germans had been appealing to
did not exist? Had the Germans, perhaps, been attributing too much
importance to Muslims’ identity as Muslims, disregarding the great
differences between Muslim societies?
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Pan-Islam vs. Muslim Nationalism: Reality or Chimera?
The erroneous German view of Ottoman “Muslim policy” could be
explained by what the Western powers must have viewed as the stirrings
of globalMuslim solidarity in the face of colonial encroachment.Muslims
did fight when their independence was threatened: this had been amply
proved in the cases of Algeria, the Sudan, the Caucasus, Libya, to name
but a few. Yet even so a sober analysis of these localized conflicts pitching
Muslims against Western colonizers could give the Western powers
reason to be cautiously optimistic. Muslims had often held off colonial
conquest for years, if not decades, yet they had ultimately been defeated.
On the other hand the Western powers were aware that Muslims
could not accept such defeats as permanent. “Islam” was, after all, seen as
a “fanatical religion”; it exhorted its adherents to conduct permanent
holy war against the infidels, and particularly so where the infidels had
conquered territories regarded as Dar al-Islam. Consequently, Muslim
colonial populations were regarded with a great deal of apprehension.
Even if they seemed to acquiesce in colonial control, there might be
smouldering resentment, which the right call to Jihad at the right time
under the right conditions could blow up into an open conflagration.
Localized revolts or resistance movements might be overcome; a global
Muslim Jihad against the colonial powers might not. As has already
been pointed out, regardless of the rather disdainful views of Western
Orientalists about the very existence of pan-Islam, politicians feared it
greatly – that is to say, politicians of those powers which had colonial
possessions to lose. The Germans, on the other hand, began to ponder
the idea of using this “Muslim weapon” in case of need.
Pan-Islam, in principle, is a tautological expression. One of the very
foundations of Islam is the idea of the umma, the world-wide community
of all Muslims, which is supposed to have a deeper meaning than any
particular ethnic, cultural or political identities. Pan-Islam, however,
is a useful term to describe the political consequences of this feeling
of solidarity and belonging together of Muslims. Pan-Islam centred,
of course, on the figure of the caliph, and it is partly this orientation
which must be seen as one of the central weaknesses of pan-Islam as a
movement.
It might be argued that, amongst all Islamic institutions and legal
terms, the caliphate is one of the worst-defined. Its very origins were
an act of improvization. After the death of the prophet two systems of
succession were pitched against each other: that of election of the most
dignified member of the community against that of family relationship
with the prophet. The two positions eventually translated into Sunna and
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Shi’a. The first caliph, Abu Bakr, came into office through an election, but
this was not recognized by part of the community (which became the
Shi’a). In later centuries all sorts of caliphal oddities could be observed:
there could be more than one caliph (in the tenth century there was
a Sunni caliph at Baghdad, a Shi’ite caliph at Cairo and a rival Sunni
caliph at Cordoba). Caliphs also could be powerless figureheads, their
spiritual influence notwithstanding. It might be argued that the Mongols
abolished the caliphate for the first time, killing the Abbasid caliph of
Baghdad in 1258 (thus in effect abolishing it 666 years before the Turkish
Grand National Assembly). According to (official) Ottoman legend, in
1517 Ottoman sultan Selim i was proclaimed caliph by the last member
of the Abbasid dynasty in Cairo. Becoming caliph meant a great increase
of prestige for the Ottoman sultans.²² There is beautifully preserved
diplomatic correspondence, for example, with the Indian Mughals:²³
externally they are oozing politeness, if not deference, to the addressee,
yet on the other hand Ottoman correspondence is often full of subtle
insults, such as depictions of an Indian Mughal seeking protection from
the superior Ottoman sultan-caliph. It is generally acknowledged that
the Ottoman sultan was accorded a particularly exalted position, as far
as Muslim rulers were concerned, from the sixteenth century onwards.
Yet being caliph and interested in maintaining one’s credibility as the
world’smost powerfulMuslim ruler could also turn out to be troublesome
and expensive.²⁴ Consequently, from the mid-sixteenth century on the
Ottomans used their title of caliph rather sparingly. It was not until the
long rule of sultan Abdülhamid ii that Ottoman pan-Islamic activity
was pursued with renewed vigour. Abülhamid ii was perhaps not the
first to use the “Muslim weapon” against colonial encroachment, but
certainly the Muslim ruler who used it with the greatest effect. Not
only was he able to instil in Indian Muslims loyalty to the Ottoman
sultanate – amongst other things evidenced by hutba being read in his
name in Indian mosques – but he was even able to demonstrate his
pan-Islamic powers to colonial powers: the sultan could, if he saw fit,
exert his influence on behalf of the colonial powers, and make sure that
their Muslim subjects were quiet and obedient. The opposite, however,
also held true: although never tried in practice, a call of the Ottoman
sultan for Jihad could have potentially devastating consequences for
the colonial powers. It was therefore in their interest not to treat the
Ottoman Empire aggressively. This seemingly obvious conclusion was
arrived at by all the colonial powers, notably Britain – and also by their
potential rivals, notably Germany.
The Germans, then – and particularly diplomat cum dilettante-
Orientalist Max Freiherr von Oppenheim – had it all pat. It sounded
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too good to be true: ally Germany with the caliph; have the caliph
declare Jihad; see the Muslims rising in revolt in droves, and see
the enemies of Germany reeling from the pan-Islamic conflagration.
And, of course, see Germany profit handsomely from these develop-
ments.
It was too good to be true. Muslims did indeed feel solidarity with the
Ottoman Empire during World War i; but Muslim nationalists very soon
made it overly clear that their main interest was the independence of their
home countries from all outside powers – including the Ottomans. Yet
the deep rifts between different interpretations of Islam had never been
overcome. During the First World War many, if not most, Muslims in the
Ottoman Empire and outside it realized that this was not their war; they
feared the deprivations and ravages of war, saw it as entirely unnecessary
and did their best to preserve their neutrality. Muslims thus were not
“fanatical masses”, but rather coolly pragmatic. The lack of fanaticism was
one of the most important reasons for the abject failure of the German
pan-Islamic propaganda campaign. Yet how had the German – and not
only German, but Western – misreading of the possible behaviour of
Muslims come about?
The possible answer lies in two arguments: first, Muslims acted by
and large pragmatically and not ideologically. Second, the Committee of
Union and Progress had by 1914 already squandered a good deal of its
Muslim credentials, the gravest of which was to reduce the sultan-caliph
to little more than a figurehead.
Political Errors: The Young Turks and the Sultan-Caliph
Although Kansu has argued to the contrary, the revolution of 1908
was not particularly revolutionary.²⁵ A long period of autocratic rule
came to an end; but it has to be noted that the constitution of 1876
was reinstated, not created, at that time. There certainly was no regime
change and more importantly, little desire for such. The sultan complied
with the wishes of his loyal people, was duly celebrated with enraptured
cries of “Padişahimiz çok yaşa (Long live our sultan!)”, and seemed,
for the time being, to have avoided the worst as regards his own
person. Abdülhamid remained sultan-caliph. Matters came to a head
less than a year later, when the attempted counter-revolution of 31
March 1909 failed. Abdülhamid was deposed and sent into internal
exile.²⁶
At the time it seemed the obvious course to take for the Committee
of Union and Progress. Abdülhamid, it appeared, was an incorrigible
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autocrat; as long as he remained sultan the revolution and its achieve-
ments could not be safe, and consequently only by removing him could
such safety be gained. Yet, on the other hand, it gradually dawned on
the Young Turks that in doing so they had committed a grave political
error: in the revolution of 1908 they had converted an autocratic into a
constitutional monarchy. This did not clash with Islamic law. However, as
the monarch in question also happened to claim the caliphate with some
reason, the Young Turks had created the legal novelty of a constitutional
caliph, which most Muslims regarded as impossible. Finally, in 1909,
they had deposed the caliph, although, in terms of Islamic law, no charge
could be brought against him. The caliphate was not abolished, but it was
an open secret that sultan-caliph Mehmet V. Reshat was under the firm
control of the Ottoman government (if not directly the Young Turks),
and that both the sultanate and the caliphate had been seriously reduced
in power.
For the leading political force of what claimed to be a Muslim empire,
the Young Turks indeed had behaved strangely, if not to a certain extent
suicidally.²⁷ For a long time this course of action has been explained by the
Young Turks’ disregard for Islam, making them appear to be predecessors
of Kemalist laïcism. However, now an alternative interpretation seems
possible: the Young Turks, in their majority, did not discard Islam as
an important socio-politic element, yet they strove to reform Islam, a
reformationwhichwould see a national Islam–or aMuslimnationalism–
prevail over the umma-based pan-Islam espoused during the reign of
Abdülhamid.
The Reformation of Islam
Today some Muslim scholars, as well as many Western observers of
Islam critical of its supposed incompatibility with modernity, West-
ern values, democracy and the rule of (secular) law, point to the need
for a reformation of Islam. Yet it might be argued that such a refor-
mation has already taken place, namely in and after World War i; and
“reformation” is a term used intentionally, for this Islamic reformation
did indeed have striking similarities to the European reformation of
Christianity.
Two dimensions of this reformation have to be distinguished. On
the one hand, there is the issue of religious reform. Luther initially
had no intention to offer a fundamentally different interpretation of
Catholic Christianity (and even less so did Henry viii of England).
But, as it turned out, “reformation” would soon turn into a move away
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from fundamental Catholic doctrines, and particularly the leadership
of the pope. The accusation that I use here supposedly uncritically
Christian developments as a parallel for developments in nineteenth
century Islam might be countered by the fact that, for instance, Jamal
al-Din al-Afghani pointed out that Islam in fact needed a reformation –
with himself as a Martin Luther.²⁸ Yet the reformation of Islam was not
transforming into a theological process of modernization, but into one
of nationalization – which had also been an integral part of the European
Christian reformation.
This phenomenon, transferred to the Muslim world, is what, for want
of a better term, I would call the reformation of Islam.Muslim nationalists
in the making realized that Islam was not opposed to nationalism,
but on the contrary could serve as a vital social glue to form national
communities. It was to serve the state and to be under state supervision;
and the formation of national states of Muslims was not in contradiction
to the concept of the umma: Muslims simply would have to develop a
dual personality. On the one hand, as Muslims, they could continue to be
part of the umma; on the other hand, as nationals, their loyalty was due
to their nation and national state. It might be argued that these Muslim
nationalists thus, many years before Clifford Geertz, had discovered that
“Islam” might be a universal concept, but had a deeply different character
depending on the ethnicity, place of residence and culture of Muslims all
over the world.²⁹ World War i would see this new doctrine of “national
Islam” being put into practice.³⁰
Rather than identifying nationalism as a danger to the idea of a
Muslim ‘umma, intellectuals and politicians were beginning to regard
nationalism as a helpful tool for the defence or acquisition of political
independence for the Muslim community.³¹ It would not be wrong
to argue that this symbiosis of Islam and nationalism was that which
motivated most (eventually successful) anti-colonial movements in all
parts of theMuslimworld:many of the anti-colonial thinkers and political
leaders adhered to concepts originating in Europe, such as nationalism
and even socialism, but none of them rejected the mobilizing power of
religion.³²
This topic is arguably far too vast to be done justice to within the
context of a chapter of an edited volume; yet suffice it to say that European
powers, including the Germans, were well aware of it by the outbreak of
World War i. Rebekka Habermas has demonstrated that a lively debate
on Islam, on its “positive” and “negative” aspects – always within the
framework of German colonialism – existed at the very latest by around
1900.³³
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The Proclamation of Jihad-i Ekber: Disappointment
Although the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded on 2 August
1914 – the day war broke out in Europe – the Ottoman government
successfully procrastinated about entering the war. It was not until the
end of October that theOttoman fleet – greatly reinforced by twoGerman
cruisers having sought sanctuary in the Golden Horn and later been
acquired by the Ottoman navy – was ordered to attack Russian harbours
and shipping in the Black Sea. The inevitable Russian declaration of war
was followed soon afterwards by similar declarations by Britain and
France: the Ottoman Empire was at war. Two weeks later the event the
Germans set such great stock by occurred: “Jihad-i Ekber (the greatest
of all jihads)” was proclaimed in front of the Fatih Sultan Mehmet
mosque in Istanbul. Eyewitnesses reported an enthusiastic reaction by
the local Muslim populace. However, soon afterwards reports by German
diplomats from the Ottoman provinces painted a less rosy picture: most
Ottoman Muslims reacted with indifference to the proclamation. There
was no indication at all of a global Muslim uprising on behalf of the
Ottoman sultan-caliph. Clearly the proclamation and the lustre of the
caliphate had been insufficient to produce the (German-)desired results.
Max von Oppenheim was undeterred: if an Ottoman proclamation failed
to produce a Jihad, a protracted German propaganda campaign would in
due course lead to success. The practical outcome of this thinking was
the “Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Intelligence Office for the East)”,
an institution with the predominant task of carrying out pan-Islamic
propaganda.
German Propaganda Operations: The Intelligence Office for the
East (IOfE)
German officialdom was initially reluctant to accept Oppenheim’s pro-
posals and also quite unwilling to bear the considerable (expected) cost
of the IOfE. Oppenheim’s rather dubious personality, which led the
German establishment to regard him more as a dandy than a diplo-
mat, also might have been a reason for the lack of official enthusiasm
for the IOfE. The baron’s views about pan-Islam were by no means
unanimously accepted. They were based on the information he had
obtained through intensive contacts with an older generation of Egyp-
tian or other Middle Eastern elites, not through intensive study and
detached observation or analysis.³⁴ Oppenheim also had an inclina-
tion to exaggerate and invent, which both his official superiors and the
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German Orientalists, who claimed the monopoly of qualified knowl-
edge of Middle Eastern affairs, often frowned upon. Thus both the
baron and the IOfE remained on the fringes of the Foreign Office
and did not get the attention they thought they deserved. In all likeli-
hood Oppenheim’s propaganda institutions, the IOfE and from April
1915 his “Nachrichtenstelle der Kaiserlich Deutschen Botschaft (Intelli-
gence Office of the Imperial German Embassy)” in Istanbul, represented
attempts to incorporate Oppenheim into the establishment, from which
he felt excluded.³⁵
The IOfE, which the baron founded in September 1914, was initially
paid for by Oppenheim himself; only in 1915 was the organization
properly funded by the Foreign Office. At first it did not even get
proper accommodation. Lack of office space necessitated its move
from the Foreign Office building in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, to
the Reichskolonialamt (Imperial Colonial Office), and eventually to
a spacious flat in the Tauentzienstrasse.³⁶ The IOfE began its existence as
an organization short of both manpower and funds. In the beginning
it set out to produce propaganda material, notably war reports about
the situation on the Western Front, and a propaganda newspaper for
Muslim pows under the title al-Jihad; later both the personnel and
tasks to be performed expanded continuously, often taxing the IOfE
staff ’s stamina to breaking point. This reflected the German official
attitude, which regarded pan-Islamic propaganda as an interesting and
potentially worthwhile experiment, but remained nevertheless focused
on theWestern Front.Thewar in theMiddle East was regarded as Turkey’s
business. Yet the differences in German and Ottoman interests in the
Middle East, which were soon to emerge, made a central organization of
German and Ottoman propaganda impossible and strongly contributed
to its ultimate failure.
The personnel of the IOfE consisted of academics, diplomats, busi-
nessmen and missionaries, many of whom had practical experience of
work in the Near and Middle East. In spite of official scepticism and
their own doubts about the existence or appeal of pan-Islam before
the war, a considerable number of German Orientalists served in the
IOfE. As a later commentator noted, “The facility with which sincere
and dextrous hands may shape cases on either side of a controversy,
leaves no doubt that, in the future, the propagandist may count upon
a battalion of honest professors to rewrite history, to serve the exigencies
of the moment, and to provide the material for him to scatter hither
and yon.”³⁷ The institution was structured into sections, each headed
by a German and encompassing both German and Middle Eastern
personnel.
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Internal Organisation of the IOfE
i, 1: Arabic Section, German personnel:
– Professor Eugen Mittwoch, director (became director of IOfE 03/16–
11/18)
– Dragoman Pröbster (served as vice-consul and dragoman in Morocco
before the war)
– Dragoman Schabinger (Oppenheim’s successor as director of IOfE
03/15–02/16)
– Apprentice Dragoman Schröder
– Dr. Ruth Buka
– Dr. Curt Prüfer (became the leading German intelligence agent in
Syria and Palestine)
i, 2: Arabic Section, Arab Personnel:
– Dr. Ahmad Vali (Egyptian, lecturer at Faculty of Oriental Languages,
Berlin University)
– Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi (Tunisian, also a member of Teşkilat-i
Mahsusa, the Unionist Secret Service led by Enver Pasha)
– Shaykh ’Abd al-’Aziz Shawish (Egyptian, famous pan-Islamic radical,
also a member of tm)
– Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat (Egyptian doctor, nationalist radical in
exile in Switzerland)
– 1st lieutenant Rabah Bou Kabouya (formerly of the French army,
wrote propaganda leaflets under the namen of Al-Hajj ’Abdallah)
– Two grandsons of the famous Algerian independence fighter ’Abd
al-Qadir
ii, 1: Persian section, German Personnel:
– Professor Oskar Mann, director (died in 1915)
– Dr. Sebastian Beck (succeeded Mann in 1915, later professor in Faculty
of Oriental Languages, Berlin University)
ii, 2: Persian Section, Iranian Personnel:
– ’Asadullah Khan Hidayah
– Takizade, a Persion constitutionalist
– Kazemzade (Hidayah, Takizade and Kazemzade formed Persian
Committee in Berlin)
iii, 1: Turkish Section, German Personnel:
– Professor Martin Hartmann, director
– Dr. Walter Lehmann
– Dr. Gotthard Jäschke
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iii, 2: Turkish Section, Turkish Personnel:
– Halil Halid Bey (former Ottoman consul-general in Bombay)
– Selaheddin (Ottoman naval commander, working as translator)
– Dr. Saadi (journalist, sacked for reasons of “unreliability and homo-
sexuality”)
iv, 1: Indian Section, German Personnel:
– Ferdinand Grätsch, director (missionary)
– Dr. Helmut von Glasenapp
– Ernst Neuenhofer (businessman)
– Mr. Walter (missionary)
iv, 2: Indian Section, Indian Personnel:
– 18 members of the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin, among
whom were:
– Har Dayal (famous Hindu revolutionary)
– Virendranath Chattophadhyaya (also acted as German agent in the
Balkans)
v: Chinese Section:
– Dr. Herbert Müller
vi: Russian Section:
– Harald Cosack
– Georgian and Tataric members (most importantly Georgian National
Committee active in the final months of the war)
Further Members:
– Heinrich Jacoby (businessman, director of “Persian Carpet Company”,
representative of IOfE in Switzerland until 1918, organized contacts
with Egyptian nationalists in Geneva)
– Dr. Willy Haas (replaced Jacoby in 1918)
– Friedrich Perzynski (specialist and dealer in oriental art, became the
editor-in-chief of the “Neuer Orient (New Orient)”, the periodical
publication of the IOfE)³⁸
The institution was organized as a “Kollegiatsbehörde (democratic
institution)”, which had no hierarchy. If Oppenheim had designed it
that way in the expectation that the expertise of different backgrounds
and careers could be put to best use, the result was quite the opposite.
According to Oppenheim’s successor, consul Schabinger, the absence of
a hierarchy meant that decisions could only be made when consensus
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between the members existed. This was, however, rarely the case. The
director of the IOfE had only one, quite powerful, tool in order to
ensure compliance: most of the members of the IOfE were of military
age and could be threatened to be put at the disposal of the military
authorities.This rather cynical instrument appears to have been necessary
to provide at least some leadership, which was lacking in the initial
months of the existence of the IOfE. Schabinger was arguably better
suited to provide such leadership than Oppenheim; he was used to the
hierarchical system of the diplomatic service and an authoritarian and
energetic personality. While the consul sometimes trod on the toes of
his subordinates, especially the oriental employees of the IOfE, many of
whom were extremely sensitive with regard to protocol and personal
honour, Schabinger’s task fully justified a tough stance; it was left to him
to forge an efficient organization after Oppenheim’s departure for Istanbul
in March 1915. Schabinger was often exasperated with the academics,
as “they were not at all used to doing regular and punctual work.”³⁹
Such tensions between a professional civil servant on the one hand and
academics on the other was probably inevitable; the frequent clashes
between Schabinger and oriental employees of the IOfE or frequent
contributors, such as the Egyptians Dr. Ahmad Vali and Dr. Muhammad
Mansur Rifat, likewisemight largely be ascribed to differences originating
in cultural attitudes rather than to personal malice on either of the two
sides.
The German staff members of the IOfE were also quite frequently
at loggerheads with each other or otherwise dissatisfied with the state
of affairs, as indicated by a lengthy report by Dr. Max Adler, who from
September 1914 onwards was in charge of the pow newspaper Al-Jihad
and of despatching periodical war reports. The report was written in
response to harsh criticisms from the Foreign Office accusing the IOfE
of ineffectual work and the production of useless material. Dr. Adler
fully concurred. He proposed the transfer of responsibility for the war
reports to local consulates in the Middle East, which were better suited
to producing up-to-date material than the IOfE. Thus local attitudes
and expectations could also be taken into account. The pow newspaper
had two problems: only a fraction of the prisoners was literate, and the
rather makeshift nature of the newspaper made the prisoners regard
it with the greatest suspicion. Instead of Al-Jihad, he argued, Turkish
newspapers should be used and read out by literate prisoners. Dr. Adler
also complained that German members of the IOfE had not consulted
him regarding the publication of suitable “oriental” articles in the German
press. The organization for the supply of news to the Middle East also
was sadly deficient, as was the sifting through the foreign press, especially
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of the Entente states. Through such neglect a most valuable propaganda
tool, namely to prove the Entente’s enmity towards Islam from its own
press, was ignored. Under such circumstances Dr. Adler declared himself
unable to continue his work for the institution and he left on 1 June
1915.⁴⁰
AlthoughOppenheim had designed the IOfE as an institution for both
the gathering of intelligence and using this information for propaganda
purposes, the second activity increasingly became the mainstay of the
IOfE.⁴¹ The first task was gradually assumed by the national committees,
with whom Oppenheim had inaugurated contacts from August 1914.
Initially these consisted of an Indian Committee (“Indian Independence
Committee”, hereafter iic, in Berlin) and the “Young Egyptians” (in
Geneva). The Young Egyptians were particularly useful for their ability
to communicate with Egypt from neutral Switzerland. Later the IOfE
came to cooperate with a Georgian and a Persian Committee. In 1915
Director Jacoby of the Persian Carpet Company Ltd. began to work with
the Egyptian nationalists in Geneva, most intensively with Muhammad
Farid and Muhammad Fahmy, the latter being the successor of Mustafa
Kamil as leader of the Egyptian Hizb al-Watan. Jacoby seems to have
been a charming and efficient character, and his work with the Egyptians
in general yielded good results.⁴² In Berlin relations between Schabinger
and “oriental” members of the institution or the nationalist committees
were often strained, usually due more to differences of aims pursued
by the Germans and the nationalists than to personal disagreements.⁴³
The Germans had a basically rational and logical attitude as far as the
formulation of policies for the Entente colonies was concerned, which
might be summed up as “win the war first, squabble about the spoils
later.” The nationalist committees naturally put their own goals, foremost
the independence of their countries, above those of Germany or the
Ottoman Empire. None of them wanted a German Egypt or India, and
the majority of Egyptians, although desirous of getting rid of the British,
opposed a reincorporation of their country into the Ottoman Empire
as an ordinary province. The leader of the Young Egyptian committee
bluntly expressed this view by saying that “we would rather have British
than Turkish rule.”⁴⁴
There were also deep rifts between rival factions of Egyptian nation-
alists. In their attempts to support all factions and Ottoman aspirations
at the same time the Germans merely wasted their energy. In the case of
the Egyptians, Khedive Abbas Hilmi desired to be reinstated as viceroy,
but had a rival for his claim in Ottoman Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim Pasha.
There was also little love lost between Abbas Hilmi and Enver Pasha, who
suspected the Khedive of being ready to refrain from hostile acts against
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the British in exchange for access to his enormous wealth in Egypt, in
which Enver was probably correct. Once told that the Ottoman army
would conquer the country for Turkey and not for Abbas Hilmi the Khe-
dive swiftly lost interest and even tried his hand at counter-propaganda
in Egypt. Frightened by an attempt on his life, which he blamed on the
cup, he went first to Vienna and later to Switzerland. While Enver and
Sa’id Halim were probably glad to be rid of the Khedive the Germans
continued to regard him as vital to the outbreak of a popular rebellion.
Thus, although the Egyptian nationalists were ready to act without the
Khedive’s support, the Germans thought this to be impossible.
While most of the Egyptian nationalists were of a fairly conservative
upper class background the Indian Independence Committee consisted
of avowedly radical revolutionaries. They had been marginalized by the
course of moderation then adopted by the Indian national congress. The
radicals were also deeply divided over the policies to pursue in order to
achieve Indian independence. The result was frequent back-stabbing, the
Indian revolutionaries often acting as if the “opponents” were not the
British but other members of the committee. Under these circumstances
success for Ottoman propaganda in India was most unlikely. In fact
the only success scored by the iic (as alleged by Schabinger, and not
corroborated by other sources) was the acquisition of information which
played a role in the torpedoing and sinking by a German submarine of
the armoured cruiser hms Hampshire, on which Lord Kitchener travelled
to Russia in 1916.⁴⁵
In their recruitment of propaganda agents the Germans exhibited
the same almost pathological mistrust as when dealing with potential
intelligence agents. This attitude became more problematic as the
Germans were not exactly spoilt for choice. The number of individuals
who could carry out such work in the Near East was small, and there
were no professional agents. The majority of volunteers for propaganda
work failed to overcome the distrust of the German authorities and the
IOfE.
Caution was in some cases justified, in regard to both individuals
and proposed operations, and as to what the IOfE could hope to achieve
generally. Schabinger reported to the ForeignOffice on 5 February 1916 his
misgivings about the plan to incite the Afghan army to march on India,
then under consideration by the German military and civilian leadership.
Schabinger believed that most probably the invading Afghans would be
opposed both by the British and by a large part of the Indian population;
worse, the Japanese might be tempted to invade India, which they had
coveted for a long time.⁴⁶ The result could only be a conflagration in
India which would prolong, and not shorten, the war. Britain could not
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be expected to make peace with her enemies in Europe in order to retain
an unstable colony it might lose for good within a short time. Schabinger
instead proposed to have the Afghans march on Russian Central Asia
and Iran, where they could join the Turkish army.⁴⁷
The IOfE’s propagandist successes, on the whole, were modest, if not
disappointing. In a report of summer 1916 Schabinger listed rising anxiety
of the French and the British about the loyalty of their Muslim troops and
the colonies as among the most important successes. Defectors were few
in number. In one case the British replaced Indian troops on the Western
Front with British troops, due to the presence of Shaykh Salih al-Sharif
al-Tunisi, who had called for Holy War from the German trenches with
the aid of a megaphone.⁴⁸ British and French recruitment in the colonies
seems to have become more and more difficult in the course of the war,
but this may rather be ascribed to news from the front which described
the atrocious living and fighting conditions, and less to pan-Islamic
propaganda from the IOfE.
Schabinger’s conclusion was surprising, although possibly accurate:
the real fruits of the propaganda could be reaped only after the end
of the war (which Schabinger still expected to be won by Germany
in 1916).⁴⁹ Oppenheim himself was a trifle less modest. Although he
admitted that his revolutionary propaganda did not yield the expected
results (revolts in India), he maintained that the propaganda had
occasionally been reason for great anxiety for the British and had served
to keep them from sending additional troops to the Western Front.
The cooperation with the IOfE, in the baron’s opinion, nevertheless
had done the Indian nationalists no end of good. “The revolutionary
propaganda was a failure. But I always said that the Indian nationalists
would advance in their quest for national independence, and that
truly happened.”⁵⁰ While World War i certainly was a watershed in
British–Indian relations and inaugurated the end of British rule in the
subcontinent the results of the work of the iic and the IOfE could only
be called negligible.
Conclusion
World War i was a crucial event in the history of the modern world,
and also in the history of the modern Middle East. It saw the end of
an era: after an existence of more than 600 years (the longest-lived
Muslim empire ever) the Ottoman period in the Middle East ended in
the aftermath of Ottoman defeat. In five turbulent years after the end of
the war Turkey emerged as a national republican state, while Iran and
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Afghanistan saw the rise of authoritarian, modernizing monarchies. A
large part of the remainder of the Middle East was put under mandatory
rule by Britain and France.
There are two possible narratives to describe World War i and its
aftermath in the Middle East. The first is that of an empire fighting its
last struggle for survival. The Ottoman government set out to defend and
reinforce the “sick man on the Bosporus”; in order to do so, it secured
an alliance with Germany and fought – ultimately unsuccessfully – on
nine different fronts. Defeat at the end of the war put paid to the idea of
Ottoman survival. Abandoning the Ottoman idea as finished, the Turkish
nationalists under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk then rallied
their forces, defeated the invaders of Anatolia and founded a national
state.The alternative narrative sees the policy of the Ottoman government
in a different light. It goes along with the idea that the Committee of
Union and Progress did indeed wish to save the empire from defeat
and dismemberment, but had already given up hope of securing strong
internal cohesion. The war was consequently fought on two fronts:
an exterior one, which aimed at defending the empire against Entente
invasion, and an interior one, in which population groups suspected of
disloyalty were earmarked for expulsion, if not physical eradication. The
most prominent group experiencing this policy during the war was the
Armenians (Assyrians were also affected), yet documents have surfaced
which give reason to believe that Greeks and Jews might have been
destined for the same fate, had the end of the war not intervened. The
Young Turks thus showed comparatively little interest in defending the
empire as it was, but performed important actions allowing the Turkish
nationalists to complete their work after the war.
Both “battles”, in spite of all differences, were fought in the name of
Islam. Yet the striking difference – and this was never properly understood
by the German allies of the Ottomans – was the nature and character of
the Islam in question: Islam as a propaganda tool to exhort Ottoman
and non-Ottoman Muslims to fight for the defence of the Ottoman
Empire was a classical Islam, the age-honoured concept of Muslims being
requested to defend dar al-Islam against the forces of dar al-harb. The
Islam of the second narrative, one might argue, was a reformed Islam:
an Islam that served the interest of the nation, could be put under state
control and was mainly a social glue to hold together the body politic of
an emerging nation.
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4 Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad
The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents
in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army
Mehmet Beşikçi
Introduction
Discussions on the Ottoman proclamation of the Great Jihad (Cihad-ı
Ekber) in World War i usually focus only on its repercussions on the
Muslim communities living outside Anatolia and tend to take Anatolian
Muslims for granted. In fact, the Ottoman Jihad propaganda had a
very important Anatolian dimension as well.¹ From its declaration of
general mobilization on 2 August 1914 through to the end of the war,
the Ottoman government constantly had recourse to the Jihad rhetoric
to justify its mobilization effort in Anatolia, especially in the field of
military recruitment. It put it about that Islam was under attack by the
infidel enemy and that therefore it was incumbent upon every Muslim to
join the fight against that enemy.
The instrumentalization of religion was a widespread phenomenon
in European countries during World War i, and every belligerent
state used religious motifs in one way or another to mobilize greater
support for its war cause.² But, as this chapter argues, the Ottoman
case had one distinctive characteristic in this respect: The rhetoric
of Jihad was a military necessity; it was the only mobilizing theme
that could justify the conscription system which constituted the basis
of Ottoman manpower mobilization.³ In this sense, this chapter also
suggests that, regardless of a proclamation of an official Jihad at a specific
date for a grand politico-military objective, a less ambitious and motley,
or more ordinary and quotidian form of Jihad rhetoric was already
embedded in the Ottoman discourse aiming to justify military service
and mobilization. If the sultan-caliph had not proclaimed an official
“Great Jihad” on 14 November 1914, the Ottoman state would still have
needed, and resorted to, the Jihad rhetoric to legitimize its domestic
mobilization of manpower. As will be discussed in detail below, this
Jihad rhetoric was not invented with the Ottoman entry into World
War i; it was already there, almost as an everyday phenomenon in the
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state’s repeated uses of Jihad, perhaps since the beginning of Ottoman
conscription in the early nineteenth century, as the centralizing state
“understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that jihad
could mobilize.”⁴ But the extent of the mobilization in World War i
pushed the Ottoman state to intensify the Jihad rhetoric by employing
new religious propaganda motifs and tools and revitalizing those that
already existed. This chapter sheds light on these motifs and tools by
arguing that in the transmission of Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral
methods of propaganda were as important as printed words and images,
and imams, both in mosques and in the army, were the main agents of
this transmission.
Jihad Rhetoric as a Military Necessity
A rhetoric of Jihad as a military necessity involved two main aspects.
The first is related to the socio-cultural identity of the Ottoman army.
At the threshold of, and during, World War i the Ottoman military was
overwhelmingly a Muslim institution and the majority of the enlisted
men were peasants from Anatolia. Attempts had been made after the
1908 Revolution to include non-Muslim Ottomans in the military; with
changes made to the conscription laws in 1909 and especially in 1914,
more non-Muslims were conscripted.⁵ But more inclusion did not mean
equality. Especially after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–
1913, the performance of non-Muslim soldiers in the Ottoman army was
severely questioned by various Ottoman commanders and nationalist
Young Turk circles, many of whom claimed that non-Muslim soldiers’
reluctance to fight and desertions constituted a main factor bringing
about the Ottoman defeat.⁶ As the idea of Ottomanism began to die
away and Turkish nationalism quickly arose after the Balkan defeat, the
suspicion about the reliability of non-Muslims increased. Thereafter,
whereas the enlistment of non-Muslim Ottomans continued, they were
treated in a discriminating way and usually employed in unarmed labour
battalions.⁷ The defeat at Sarıkamış in the early phase of World War i on
the Caucasus front turned this discrimination into a more widespread
and standard practice, especially for Ottoman Armenians.⁸ Moreover,
the inclusion of non-Muslims did not change the Islamic ideological
character of the Ottomanmilitary, nor did it change the everyday symbols
and soldiers’ subculture. In fact, except for occasional reference to a
vague Ottoman brotherhood,⁹ the discourse of military service served to
re-Islamize the Ottoman identity rather than create a secular Ottoman
citizenry.
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Because of the rural background of the serving men, Islamic themes
and symbols constituted a common language which the Ottoman
state could draw on when motivating the masses. Islamic discourse
offered a cognitive framework which was actually the only common
ground on which the elitist nationalist perspective of the urban Young
Turks could meet rural Muslim masses. Patriotic messages were not
entirely ineffective, but they were meaningful only as long as they
were communicated within a religious envelope.¹⁰ Islamic discourse
in its popular form was the only available language by which the two
parties could understand each other. As Erik-Jan Zürcher has stated,
“most of the empire’s soldiers hailed from Anatolia” and, therefore,
when the need to mobilize the population in times of war emerged,
“appealing to the religious worldview of the peasant population of
Anatolia made good sense.”¹¹ And, no less importantly, it was also the
only language that could be used for the mobilization of non-Turkish
Muslim peoples of Anatolia, such as the Kurds, the Circassians and the
Laz people.
The second aspect of the military necessity is related to morale, or the
need to convince soldiers to remain in service and continue fighting until
the end of the war. World War i was a prolonged conflict of attrition.
Therefore, maintaining soldiers’ endurance and morale was as important
as recruiting them. Religious motifs seem to have played an important
role in increasing the endurance level of the troops, especially in coping
with the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the battlefield, as
Alexander Watson has observed in the cases of the British and German
armies during World War i.¹² Research has shown that the Ottoman
conscription system had always suffered from a legitimacy crisis from its
beginning; avoiding military service in the form of desertion had been a
chronic problem since the beginning of the system.¹³ The problem of
desertion became much more widespread during World War i. As will
be shown below, the Jihad rhetoric, it was hoped, would also be useful in
preventing desertions.
Jihad Pamphlets and Religious Books for the Soldier
Against this background, it is not surprising that the number of propa-
ganda pamphlets that were devoted to explaining Jihad to the Anatolian
masses increased remarkably with the declaration of Ottoman mobi-
lization.¹⁴ Such pamphlets were written in simple language or, to use a
description by an author of such a pamphlet, “in a language that every-
body could understand”.¹⁵ Citing relevant verses from the Koran and
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the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, they almost invariably described
military service as a binding religious duty ( farż-ı ‘ayn) for all Muslims.¹⁶
Sometimes the very title of the pamphlet directly stated this religious
duty, as in the case of an anonymous text the title of which is “The Holy
Jihad is a Binding Religious Duty”.¹⁷
In Islam, the term “farż-ı ‘ayn” implies that when the Muslim
community is under attack, that is, when the Muslim community needs
to defend itself against an infidel enemy, joining the Jihad becomes an
individual obligation for each member of the Muslim community.¹⁸
Therefore, such pamphlets often needed to emphasize the point that the
Ottoman Empire as the representative of the world’s Muslim community
was on the defensive in this war as it was attacked by the wicked Christian
powers of Europe, such as Britain, France and Russia. As a continuation of
this line of argument, these propaganda pamphlets frequently mentioned
the 126t verse of Nahl sura of the Koran¹⁹ and claimed that it was the
right of the Ottomans to wage war against the attacking infidels with the
same kinds of weapons and methods (mukabele-i bilmisl).²⁰
Another considerable point that the Jihad pamphlets frequently
stressed is that whereas serving in the military and fighting on the
battlefield was incumbent upon eligible men, the other sections of society
also could and should serve the war effort in various ways. Since the
mobilization order initially involved recruiting men between the ages of
20 and 45, a Jihad pamphlet claimed that those who were younger than
20 and older than 45 were also included in the Jihad duty, to which each
one was supposed to contribute “as much as his strength and power”
would allow.²¹ In congruence with the totalizing nature of warfare during
World War i, the author argued by citing the 60t verse²² of the al-
Anfal sura of the Koran that the Muslim community was religiously
held responsible for a total mobilization involving not only military
preparation, but also economic and technological readiness for war.²³
The role of Muslim women was also stressed in this respect. The Jihad
pamphlets frequently stated that when they were needed to help the
fighting men, Muslim women were also supposed to participate in the
jihad effort by doing such jobs as sewing uniforms, knitting socks and
preparing bandages for the troops. Such jobs were defined as the religious
duties of women.²⁴
While most of these Jihad pamphlets were written in the format
of a short prose item, there are also examples that were published as
collections of poems, which are quite short, simple and easy for soldiers
to memorize.²⁵ Some of these Jihad pamphlets were published and
distributed free of charge by the National Defence League (Müdafaa-i
Milliye Cemiyeti), a semi-voluntary association which had organic ties
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with the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter, cup) government
and contributed to its war policies with various activities including
propaganda.²⁶
Similarly, a dramatic increase occurred during the war in the number
of religious manuals/pamphlets which were usually published under the
title of “religion book for the soldier” (askere din kitabı). Again written
in simple language, such religious manuals were meant to have a double
function. On the one hand, they were written to provideOttomanMuslim
soldiers with a basic religious (Islamic and Sunni) education. On the
other hand, they aimed to remind potential draftees, enlisted men and
also officers why military service was also a religious duty and why a
good Muslim also needed to be a good soldier and vice versa. Apparently,
one of the main reasons for a remarkable increase in this literature on the
eve of and during World War i was the need to strengthen and reinforce
the soldiers’ morale which had been constantly eroded due to almost
continuous Ottoman wars and defeats.²⁷ Indeed, whereas the practice of
using religious manuals as a tool of both education and propaganda in
the Ottoman army goes as far back as the establishment of a modern
army during the reign of Mahmud ii, their number remarkably increased
on the eve of and during World War i.²⁸ Those which were written after
the Ottoman entry into World War i put more specific emphasis on the
necessity to join the Jihad and obey the conscription.
On the other hand, it should be added that, rather than being an
individual intellectual production on the part of the Ottoman ulema,
these manuals were usually directly commissioned from their authors
by the cup government and the War Ministry. So, if the practice of
religious education and propaganda in the Ottoman army opened up a
new space to be filled by an Islamic discourse, this space was under the
supervision of the authorities. Therefore, if Ottoman Muslim soldiers
were to be educated in terms of religion, this education was expected to
be given within the official version of Islam, namely according to the
religious approach that was regarded as “correct” by the Ottoman state.
In this sense, the government preferred to work with those religious
figures which it considered to be practising the “correct” version of Islam
and regarded as “trustworthy.” Members of the ulema such as Ömer
Fevzi, Üryanizade Ali Vahid or İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, who were chosen to
write such manuals, came from the religious circles that were close to
the cup government; they either already had organic ties with the cup
government or, if they did not have such overt political engagements,
still supported the government’s war effort during World War i.²⁹
These religion books for the soldier invariably emphasized that Islam
required all Muslims to be good soldiers and that obeying the call to arms
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was not only a religious but also a moral obligation. One such manual
simply stated that “only those who do not withhold from sacrificing their
lives and souls for their fatherland can go to heaven”; then it continued
to explain that a Muslim man would be interrogated in the next life
about how well he performed his military service, just as he would be
interrogated about his performance of prayer and fast.³⁰ Another religion
book for the soldier equated service for the fatherland with the true faith
and claimed that any Muslim who betrays his fatherland also betrays his
religion.³¹ Such manuals described evasion of service and desertion as
great sins to be punished severely in the next life. They also repeatedly
stressed that Muslims should go to war willingly and enthusiastically
since this was among the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.
Oral Propaganda
There is no doubt that printed words and images became extremely
important propaganda tools duringWorldWar i, and the Jihad pamphlets
and religion books for the soldier that have been mentioned above
constituted a significant element in Ottoman wartime propaganda. But
the print propaganda also posed a major challenge in the Ottoman
case. First of all, there was the problem of illiteracy. The literacy rate of
Ottoman society did not exceed 10 per cent in 1914 and it did not get
any better during the war years.³² Moreover, even this low literacy rate
was mainly an urban phenomenon; the Ottoman peasant soldiers were
almost entirely illiterate.³³ Then, how could propaganda messages that
were contained in such publications as Jihad pamphlets or religion books
for the soldier reach their target audience in an overwhelmingly illiterate
society? Secondly, there was the problem of poor infrastructure. One of
the infrastructural aspects that differentiated the Ottoman Empire from
other belligerents in World War i was its very low level of development
in terms of the means of communications and transportation.³⁴ Then, by
what means could the mobilizing Jihad rhetoric be conveyed to the rural
masses?
Before discussing the consequences of these problems and questions,
we first need to approach the concept of propaganda from a multi-
dimensional perspective. The phenomenon of modern propaganda is
usually understood as the written and published word and image,³⁵
conveyed through modern means of communications, which Benedict
Anderson defined as “print capitalism.”³⁶ It is true that Ottoman print
capitalism had been on the rise since the reign of Abdülhamid ii
(1876–1909), and a noteworthy increase occurred in the number of
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published newspapers and periodicals in the Second Constitutional Era
(1908–1918).³⁷ Yet, this increase was still far from being a considerable
transformation in the infrastructure, especially as regards its effect
on provincial Anatolia. The poor infrastructure of modern media
technologies in the Ottoman context has led some scholars to conclude
that Ottoman propaganda in World War i failed (and it was even doomed
to fail), especially in comparison with those in European countries.³⁸
In fact, the approach that confines the phenomenon of propaganda in
World War i within the limits of printed word, and image tends to be
technologically determinist. This approach underestimates, for example,
the importance of oral methods that constituted a significant element
of wartime propaganda. Oral propaganda methods, both modern and
“traditional”, were as important and widely used as print propaganda
in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the repertoire of Ottoman wartime
propaganda was actually much wider than assumed, which included such
oral means as sermons, religious memorial services (mevlid), religious
advice, folk songs and even rumours. As is obvious, religious oralmethods
of propaganda were numerous, and they provided a fertile ground for
the transmission of the jihad propaganda.
However, enlarging the scope of our approach to wartime propaganda
still leaves an important question unanswered: how could these oral
methods resonate with the rural masses and enlisted men? In this
respect, the role of the lesser ulema, namely the middle- and low-ranking
religious functionaries such as prayer leaders (imams), was critical in
communicating the religious motifs of Ottoman Jihad propaganda to its
target audience. It was not only the imams of village and town mosques
across Anatolia, who acted as leaders of religious practices in their own
local Muslim communities, but also the imams who were employed
in the Ottoman army who played an important intermediary role in
convincing people to support the Ottoman mobilization for war.
Imams and Their Sermons
In fact, the use of sermons and the preachings of the lesser ulema as a
political tool for shaping public opinion expanded considerably right
after the 1908 Revolution. The new Young Turk regime quickly realized
the potential of this tool in mobilizing greater political support in a
society where the rate of literacy was so low.³⁹ The political power of
the period also wanted to use sermons and preaching as a tool to define
“the correct form of religion” according to its own perspective.⁴⁰ In
its programmes of 1908, 1909 and 1911, the cup had already attributed
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considerable importance to organizing and carrying out “admonitions,
sermons, and religious guidance” (“vaaz, hutbe ve irşad”) in order to gain
more legitimacy in society.⁴¹ The cup’s club of Şehzadebaşı in İstanbul
established a committee of ulema members, including such religious
figures as Ömer Adil, Musa Kazım, Abdürreşid İbrahim, Manastırlı
İsmail Hakkı, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi.⁴² This committee issued various
popular publications, the most prominent of which was the series called
“religious admonitions” (mevaiz-i diniye).⁴³ Moreover, in order both
to provide sufficient and proper training for prospective imams and
preachers and to fill the vacancies in village and town mosques, two new
schools (Medresetü’l Vaizin and Medresetü’l Eimme ve’l Huteba) were
established in 1913.⁴⁴
Another aspect of the instrumentalization of sermons and preaching
for political purposes on the eve of World War i was the debate on the
simplification of Friday sermons in terms of both their content and
language. Friday sermons had traditionally been delivered in Arabic
in the mosques across the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ But the desire to make
them have a greater effect on the Muslim people was accompanied by
the wish to make them also more understandable for them. This debate
involved opinions ranging from a radical view arguing that sermons
must be delivered entirely in Turkish to an opposing point of view
arguing that they should remain in Arabic. Responding to such demands,
the office of the shaykh ül-Islam avoided making a radical change, but
could also not entirely disregard the demands for simplification. As
a consequence, the office proposed a solution halfway between the
two extremes, and established a post of “pulpit preacher” (kürsü şeyhi)
in the Friday mosques, who would provide the congregation with an
interpretation of the sermon in Turkish. And, in practice, Friday sermons
in Anatolia in this period began to include Turkish statements to varying
degrees.⁴⁶
On the other hand, it should also be noted that the relationship of
religious functionaries with the Young Turk regime was not always
trouble-free, especially where the issue of military service was concerned.
For example, when in 1909 a new conscription regulation stipulated that
medrese students who had not passed their exams on time were no longer
exempt from military service, considerable discontent developed among
religious circles.⁴⁷ But their relationship with the government generally
became more cooperative on the eve of World War i, basically due to
two main factors. Firstly, whereas their traditional exemption status
was restricted, the new conscription law of 1914 clarified ambiguities
and made it certain that, along with certified imams, those who were
uncertified but had permanent jobs in village mosques would also be
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exempt.⁴⁸ Secondly, the financial situation of imams was improved with
rises in their salaries and additional posts of employment in 1914.⁴⁹
Religious propaganda activities that were carried out by imams on the
Ottoman home front (namely in the civilian sphere) have been relatively
well documented. For example, immediately after the declaration of
the Great Jihad Friday sermons in mosques throughout the empire
emphasized the duty of all Muslims to join the war effort.⁵⁰ The imams
who were employed in mosques in the provinces and villages were
assigned the task of providing oral presentations about the Jihad fatwa
for the illiterate.⁵¹ Religious memorial services that were devoted to
those who died on the battlefield began to be performed in mosques
from the early days of the war. Invitations to these religious services
were usually publicized in newspapers.⁵² Their purpose was usually
described as “praying for the permanent victory and success of our army
and navy.”⁵³
Imams were the main performers of such propaganda activities
through mosques. Sermons supporting the Ottoman war cause began to
be delivered regularly as part of an organized programme. In İstanbul
and various provincial centres, the National Defence League organized
many such sermons for propaganda purposes at mosques on the eve of
the war. These sermons were delivered in a series not only on Fridays
but also on other days of the week. At least one day a week was usually
reserved for women. For such sermons, the imams were specifically
assigned the task to “preach to, advise and encourage” (vaaz, nasihat ve
teşvikât) those attending.⁵⁴ The imams who were selected for this task
were members of a committee of the ulema that was constituted within
the office of the shaykh ül-Islam; the committee oversaw that the imams
selected were properly preaching to the people about their religious duty
in the war.⁵⁵
Village imams were influential outside mosques as well. They were
prominent figures in organizing military recruitment at the village level.
The mobilization procedure in 1914 required all eligible men in a village
to get ready at the same time, gathering in the village square. Then the
imam, together with the village headman (muhtar), was in charge of
overseeing this gathering process and then escorting the group to the
nearest town’s recruiting office.⁵⁶
Army Imams
On the other hand, authorities regarded the role of army imams as equally
important in terms of maintaining enlisted men’s endurance and morale
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throughout the war. The personnel structure of the Ottoman army had
permanent posts for religious functionaries who were supposed to act
like army chaplains. In fact, the practice of employing imams in the
military as religious educators and motivators of the troops began as
early as the military reforms of Selim iii (r. 1789–1807); then it became a
more standardized practice after Mahmud ii (r. 1808–1839) abolished
the Janissaries and established a Western style standing army (Mansure
Ordusu).⁵⁷ Attempts at military modernization in the Ottoman Empire
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not aim
to exclude religion from the military sphere; on the contrary, routine
religious obligations were observed, even during fighting. From the state
authority’s point of view, as in many other European modernization
projects of the time, military modernization and religion were definitely
not mutually exclusive, as long as the state itself defined the correct form
of religion and that form served to legitimize the state.
When the Ottoman army underwent a major reorganization after
the Balkan defeat in 1913 to create a more efficient army structure,⁵⁸ the
system of army imams was also revised. In parallel with the increasing
number of units and personnel, a new organization and salary structure
was set up to provide appointments and training for imams who would
serve in the Ottoman battalions and regiments. In the new arrangement,
each battalion was to have a permanent imam in its personnel – hence
the popular name in Turkish, “battalion imams” (tabur imamları) – and
battalion imams in a regiment would be supervised by the regimental
imam, who was also called “regimental mufti” (alay müftüsü). After the
declaration of mobilization on 2 August 1914, the size of the Ottoman
army increased remarkably, and accordingly the need for army imams
also increased. To match this increasing demand, additional posts were
introduced to bring about more standardization.⁵⁹
What exactly was the job description of army imams? Their job was
actually quite varied, since they were expected not only to lead prayers,
recite the Koran and perform other Islamic rituals, but also to promote
troopmorale during the war. A battalion imamwas primarily supposed to
provide the troops with basic religious education.This seems to have been
taken seriously by Ottoman commanders. For example, Vasfi (Sarısözen),
who served in the Ottoman army as a reserve officer during the war,
notes in his memoirs that when Vehip (Kaçı) Pasha, the commander
of the Third Army after February 1915, came to Kelkit (today a district
of Gümüşhane) to inspect a military unit stationed there, he examined
soldiers’ religious knowledge and, as he saw their poor level of religious
education, ordered the battalion imam to be imprisoned temporarily
with only basic rations.⁶⁰ Moreover, a good battalion imam was also
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supposed to arouse the troops’ fighting enthusiasm not only with his
preaching, but also by setting an example such as the one observed by
Erich R. Prigge, a German officer who served as an aide-de-camp of the
commander of the Fifth Army, Liman von Sanders, in Gallipoli; he notes
in his diaries a scene, in which a battalion imam was the first one getting
out of the trench to start a fight against the landing enemy forces.⁶¹ Again
in Gallipoli, the commander of the 19t division Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)
gave an order on 15 May 1915 which demanded that battalion imams be
placed in the front row during combat to encourage the fighting spirit of
soldiers.⁶²
The help of army imams was particularly useful at difficult times such
as when desertions increased or discipline dissolved on the battlefront.
Especially in the second half of the war, the Ottoman army suffered from
increased desertion rates. Almost 17 per cent of all the men enlisted
(approximately 500,000) deserted.⁶³ In trying to prevent desertions,
Ottoman military authorities frequently assigned battalion imams to
preach to soldiers against desertion.⁶⁴ Such preaching usually exalted
martyrdom and being a holy warrior (şehitlik ve gazilik); by reciting
relevant verses from the Koran (especially the al-Anfal sura, verses 15–
16)⁶⁵ and mentioning the deeds of Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁶ These sermons
also emphasized that desertion was a great sin forbidden by Islam. In
1918, the Ottoman War Ministry even needed to organize a special
series of sermons against desertion, performed by a group of mobile
imams sent from Istanbul to the battlefronts. Troops were obliged to
attend these sermons which usually took place in front of the whole
regiment.⁶⁷
The army imams worked to confirm and justify the official military
discipline in religious terms. They also aimed to create ethical pressure
on those who were not enthusiastic fighters. For example, as part of
the punishment for desertion, battalion imams refused to administer
burial services for those soldiers who committed suicide.⁶⁸ There is
also evidence that commanders sometimes asked battalion imams to
preach against self-mutilation, which was another way of avoiding
service.⁶⁹
As for the deserters who never showed up for duty or, having already
escaped service, roamed the countryside, imams were also useful for the
official attempts to convince them to rejoin the forces. For this purpose,
Ottoman authorities sometimes formed groups of intermediaries who
would talk to deserters in their vicinity, advising them to surrender to
the authorities. Such groups were called “advisory commissions” (heyet-i
nasiha), which usually included local imams, as well as local notables
and government officials.⁷⁰
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Was Jihad Rhetoric Really Effective?
How effective were the religious motifs for the Ottoman mobilization
of manpower in World War i? Was the Jihad rhetoric’s target audience,
namely the Muslim rural masses, really convinced and moved by it?
While it is difficult to give an accurate answer to such questions, we can
approach them on two levels. The first is the individual level, namely the
war experiences of individual soldiers as expressed in their documents,
namely their memoirs and diaries. Of course, though their number has
fortunately increased in recent years, such texts of individual experiences
are not as many in the Ottoman case as they are in European countries,
mainly because Ottoman enlisted men were overwhelmingly illiterate.⁷¹
Regarding the reception of Islamic religious motifs in general and the
Jihad rhetoric in particular, the available documents mostly reveal an
ambivalent attitude on the part of Ottoman soldiers. While one can argue
that at a general level Ottoman soldiers became more religious in the face
of the hardships of war, the reception of religious propaganda conveyed
through imams was not uniform. For example, Private Emin (Çöl),
who served both on the Gallipoli and Sinai-Palestine fronts throughout
the war, notes in his memoirs that when he was in Gallipoli he was
frankly moved by the dedication of an imam sent from Istanbul to
preach to his regiment.⁷² Military authorities also sometimes observed
the extensiveness of such attitude, as in the case of the 30t Division
headquarters on the Caucasus front, which reported on 10 October 1914
that the sermons delivered by battalion imams had positive effects on the
troops’ morale.⁷³ Moreover, turning to religion and praying regularly also
seem to have been common among Ottoman pows. For example, Private
Hüseyin Fehmi (Genişol), who was held captive by the British on the
Iraq/Mesopotamia front and imprisoned in the Bellary camp in India,
observes in his diary that most Ottoman pows in the camp started to
pray regularly, respected imams and attended religious rituals en masse.⁷⁴
In such examples, one can observe that, as was the case with soldiers
in European armies, there was a tendency among Ottoman soldiers to
turn to religion during World War i. But it is obvious from soldiers’ own
documents that this “religiosity” did not amount to running to their
deaths because of some blind acceptance of martyrdom; it was rather an
indication of their belief that God’s mercy would allow them to return to
their homes alive.
On the other hand, not every soldier was so easily inclined to be
moved by the Jihad rhetoric and army imams’ sermons. For example,
the reserve officer Süleyman Nuri, who served on the Gallipoli and
Caucasus fronts and then deserted, saw the army imams as nothing but
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the mouthpiece of the corrupt cup government. For him, their sermons
only served to cover up the meaningless war, in which the Ottoman
soldier was sent to his death in vain.⁷⁵ Moreover, it is also important
to note that not all army imams were uniform in their acceptance of
the authorities’ attitudes and messages. Sometimes the army imams
themselves could be critical of certain practices in the army, as in the
case of Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, a medrese teacher who joined the army
as a volunteer and became a battalion prayer leader. For example, he
condemned the harsh treatment of enlisted men by officers, such as by
beating, as one of the main factors that undermined the morale and
cohesion of Ottoman troops.⁷⁶
A similar dual, or ambivalent, situation can also be observed at the
general level. On the one hand, the Ottoman state was able to mobilize
some threemillionmen andmanaged to keep its armies on the battlefront
until the last days of the war; compared to its failure in mobilization
during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, this was a remarkable success.⁷⁷
Based on this fact, it is possible to argue that the Ottoman religious
propaganda inWorldWar i was actually effective in terms of mobilization
of manpower, which in turn contributed to the increased vigour of the
army. But on the other hand, one can also say that, as mentioned earlier,
neither severe penal laws nor references to the jihad rhetoric against
avoiding military service could prevent desertion from becoming a major
problem. However, it should not be forgotten that, in either case, religious
propaganda constituted only one factor among many.
Jihad and Anatolian Alevis
The main religious references of the Jihad rhetoric came from the
Sunni tradition, but Anatolia was also the home of the non-Sunni Alevi
population. How did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda target the Anatolian
Alevis in general and the Alevi enlisted men in the army in particular?
How did they react to such propaganda? While the case of the Alevis in
the Ottoman mobilization still remains an understudied subject, it is
certain that there were no permanent posts in theOttoman army for Alevi
religious functionaries, nor were there any signs that any such religious
men were employed temporarily by the Ottoman military during World
War i.
Available evidence suggests that a practical way of communicating
the Jihad rhetoric to the potential and serving Alevi enlisted men was
to get help from the Bektashi order. In fact, the Bektashi order had many
followers and supporters among the Young Turks; some even claimed that
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Enver and Talat pashas were followers of the order.⁷⁸ It is certain that such
close ties facilitated political cooperation between two groups. In 1915,
with the “wish and consent” of Enver Pasha, the Bektashi order formed
a volunteer regiment (Bektaşi Alayı or Mücahidin-i Bektaşiye) under the
leadership of Çelebi Cemaleddin Efendi, the sheikh of the Hacı Bektaş
Lodge during the war.⁷⁹ While accurate numbers are lacking, estimates
of the number of men that the Bektashi volunteer regiment recruited,
mostly from the Alevi population, included many as 7,000 men.⁸⁰ But
besides recruiting volunteers, the order was also expected to ensure
the support of the Alevis for the war effort and increase the morale of
Alevi enlisted men in the army. Unlike the non-combatant character and
mostly logistical services of the the Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion that was
established for similar purposes,⁸¹ the Bektaşi Regiment was also used
as a combatant militia force on the Gallipoli and the Caucasus fronts.⁸²
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the Ottoman Jihad rhetoric as a military
necessity in justifying conscription and large-scale mobilization of
manpower during World War i. It has argued that the Jihad rhetoric had
a very important domestic dimension in that it targeted the Anatolian
Muslim masses, which constituted the backbone of the Ottoman army,
no less than it targeted Muslims living outside Anatolia. Jihad as a
rhetoric justifying military service actually existed before World War i;
therefore, wartime uses of Jihad were not necessarily connected with the
proclamation of the Great Jihad on 11 November 1914, but that declaration
certainly intensified such uses. As has been shown, in transmitting the
Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral methods of religious propaganda were
as important as and, perhaps, more extensive than, print propaganda.
Imams were the main agents of this transmission, and the chapter has
shed light particularly on the army imams, hitherto an understudied
subject in the history of Ottoman World War i.
Did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda leave a legacy for Republican
Turkey? As concluding remarks, this study can give only some speculative
answers to this question, leaving the floor open for further discussions
and prospective research on the subject. First of all, one can suggest that
the enormous amount of energy invested by the wartime government
in religious propaganda to communicate with the Anatolian popula-
tion further reinforced the already existing Islamic language in Turkish
nationalism, facilitating the association of Turkishness with being Mus-
lim. This is at least visible in the continuation of justifying conscription
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in Islamic terms in the republican era, even when the state became
militantly secular. Secondly, when the state got extensively engaged in
religious propaganda during World War i, it also attained a larger space
of intervention in the realm of religion, as a result of which it produced a
religious discourse according to its own definition of “correct” Islam. It
can be speculated that this increase in the state’s power of intervention in
the realm of religion, which further increased during the mobilization
of the National Struggle (1919–1922) of the Ankara government, was
inherited by the republican state.
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5 Ottoman Jihad or Jihads
The Ottoman Shīʿī Jihad, the Successful One
M. Şükrü Hanioğlu
In his provocative Holy War Made in Germany, the Dutch orientalist
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje maintained that the Ottoman grand Jihad
declared in November 1914 was a German invention aimed at stirring up
Muslims under Allied rule.¹ Hurgronje further claimed that German
orientalists and public intellectuals such as Carl Heinrich Becker, Hugo
Grothe and Martin Hartmann, who had previously derided and ridiculed
Jihad as a medieval institution and a threat to the civilized world,
reinterpreted it after the July crisis to serve the interests of German
war aims.²
Kaiser Wilhelm ii’s late nineteenth century manifestations of friend-
ship with the Muslim world and Max von Oppenheim’s infamous
Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischenGebiete unserer
Feinde (Memorandum Concerning the Fomenting of Revolutions in the
Islamic Territories of Our Enemies) penned in October 1914³ made many
contemporary observers believe that the Ottoman grand jihād wasmerely
an implementation of the German plans prepared before the Ottoman
entry into the Great War. Likewise, on 21 October 1914, Friedrich Bron-
sart von Schellendorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Ottoman Field
Troops, stated that one of the major expectations of Germany from the
Ottoman Empire was a declaration of Jihad after the Ottoman entry into
the war.⁴
Indeed, the Kaiser approached the Ottoman Minister of War Enver
Pasha on 22 October, a week before the bombardment of the Russian
Black Sea ports, and inquired about the possibility of a declaration of
Jihad in the wake of Ottoman entry into the Great War.⁵
There is no doubt that the German war planners wished to use a
Jihad declared by the Ottoman Caliph to its fullest extent to incite the
substantial Muslim populations under Allied rule to rebel. In fact, the
establishment of the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient under the auspices
of the German Foreign Ministry and Oppenheim’s appointment as the
director of that body reveal that the Germans desired to make the most
of the Ottoman Jihad.⁶ This bureau published a journal called al-Jihād in
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a number of languages, including Arabic, Tatar and Russian, on a regular
basis between 1915 and 1918 and produced a host of leaflets and appeals
to be distributed in India, Afghanistan, North Africa and Central Asia.⁷
It should be stressed; however, that “official jihad” had become an
almost forgotten tool of propaganda after the Tanzimat was initiated
in 1839. Having changed its official ideology and become an empire
of Ottoman citizens regardless of religion and ethnicity, the empire
refrained from declaring a holy war against Christian powers during
several subsequent conflicts.
Similarly the leaders of theOttomanCommittee ofUnion andProgress
decided not to declare an official Jihad against Italy, although they
characterized the resistance in Tripoli of Barbary exclusively in Islamic
terms. Furthermore, the Balkan states’ declaration of Holy War against
the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and their “cross against crescent” rhetoric
did not prompt a similar response from Istanbul.⁸ Instead, the Ottoman
sultan advised his troops, including battalions of Christian soldiers who
wore crosses on their collars, to defend the fatherland like their forefathers
who had shed their blood to accomplish that goal.⁹ Unlike the Balkan
leaders, the Ottoman Minister of War asked his troops “to protect those
sites considered sacred by different races.”¹⁰
Thus the immediate declaration of Jihad in the Great War seemed to
be a departure from post-Tanzimat Ottoman policy. Furthermore, the
Ottomans’ declaration of Jihad while allied with the Christian powers of
Germany and Austria-Hungary was legalistically problematic. Pointing
to this issue, the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha told the Kaiser
that the Ottoman declaration of Jihad would be imprudent and that
instead the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph as the commander of the faithful
should simply ask the Muslims under British, French, or Russian rule to
rebel.¹¹
All of this leads one to assume that the Ottoman declaration of Jihad
was nothing other than a cynical act carried out for the sake of appeasing
the German empire and its ruler who had unrealistic expectations from
his weak eastern ally. While there is some truth in this thesis, the fact
is that the Ottoman leadership did view Jihad as a tool that might help
advance Ottoman strategic plans and prevent backstabbing by unreliable
Muslim elements of the empire.
Therefore, while the Germans unrealistically expected major uprisings
in India, North Africa and Central Asia to follow from the declaration of
Jihad, theOttoman leadership had four relativelymore realistic objectives:
first and foremost, using the weapon of an independent Jihad in the first
front that had opened even before the Ottoman declaration of global
Jihad; second, galvanizing the Muslim populations in Arabia against
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Allied encroachments and preventing local leaders from changing sides;
third, receiving better support in the areas heavily inhabited by the Kurds
who had become a major target of Russian policies aimed at winning
them over; and, finally, benefiting from the Jihad in special operations in
Iran and Azarbaijan.¹²
Thus, instead of an asset to be projected into faraway lands such as
India and Central Asia the Ottoman war planners considered Jihad a
strategic weapon that would assist them in defending their empire. For
the Ottoman leaders the most important service of the Jihad would be
on the Iraqi front that opened immediately following the Ottoman entry
into the Great War. The Ottoman leaders knew that the impact of the
declaration of Jihad in Arabia would be minimal.
The Ottoman authorities rightly assumed that the local rulers who
had been won over by the Ottomans, such as the Zaydī leader Imām
Yahyā
˙
Hamid al-Dīn in Yemen and Saʿūd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz of Ha’il, would
fight the war on the Ottoman side. On the other hand, the Ottoman
leaders knew that the declaration of Jihad would not affect Abd al-Azīz
ibn al-Saʿūd’s decision to collaborate with the Entente powers despite
the deal cut immediately before the war that made him the hereditary
Ottoman governor of Najd.¹³ Likewise, Mu
˙
hammad ʿAlī al-Idrisī, who
had turned down all Ottoman offers and established a de facto Sufi state
in ‘Asīr, would not pay any heed to such a declaration.¹⁴ As for Sharif
˙
Husayn, he would pursue his ambitious plans regardless of the Ottoman
religious propaganda.¹⁵
The intensified British naval activity in Ottoman territorial waters and
the Royal Navy’s virtual blockade of the entrance to the Shatt al ‘Arab
that started before the Ottoman entry into in the Great War¹⁶ had been
an unambiguous signal of where the first front in the Middle East would
be opened. The British also brought a brigade from India and kept it
in Bahrain as an expeditionary force. As expected, two days after the
opening of hostilities, the British captured Fao, whence they marched
on Basra. Faced with only sporadic Ottoman resistance, the British
expeditionary force quickly captured the town of Basra on 22 November,
and the remaining Ottoman troops hastily retreated northwards to form
a new line of defence.¹⁷
For theOttomanwar planners, who viewed Jihad as a strategicweapon,
the effect of a holy war would be first tested on the Iraqi front that had
opened in Basra. Optimally, this should be in the form of an independent
Jihad since the Sunnī Hanafī Ottoman centre could not rally the heavily
Shīʿī population directly. Hoping for an independent Jihad in southern
Iraq, Ottoman war planners crafted the declaration of global Jihad with
care. They feared that an Ottoman declaration of Jihad justified in strict
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Sunnī terminology would jeopardize a jihad led by Shīʿī mujtahids
(jurisconsults) in the shrine cities of Iraq. It should be remembered that
Shīʿī mujtahids acting on their own had issued a call for Jihad against the
Allies a few days before the official Ottoman declaration of holy war.
Hence, the original collection of Ottoman fatwās issued by the
Şeyhülislâm Ürgüblü Hayri Efendi made just a single reference to the
Caliphate, an institution that the Shīʿīs did not recognize.¹⁸ Nonetheless
the Ottoman authorities did not circulate these fatwās in southern Iraq,
being aware that turning this undertaking into a Sunnī holy war would
jeopardize the prospects of the Shīʿī Jihad in Iraq. Likewise the more
detailed scholarly appeal for Jihad that appeared in the original fatwās
circulated throughout the empire. In this collection, the text referred to
the Ottoman administration as the Islamic government and the sultan
as the sultan of the Muslims without making frequent and clear-cut
references to the Caliph.¹⁹
Two weeks after the Şeyhülislâm issued the declaration of the grand
Jihad, the Ottoman cabinet issued its first own decree regarding the
holy war on 25 November. That ruling stated that the fatwās and orders
issued by mujtahids regarding the Jihad would be cabled from Najaf
and Karbala free of charge and the related expenses would be met by
the Ministry of the Interior’s special funds.²⁰ The cabinet decision did
not mention that this Jihad was independent of the Ottoman global
Jihad. Indeed, the Shīʿī mujtahids shaped the first Jihad experiment in the
Ottoman Empire through a wide range of fatwās issued in its support.
This was a different Jihad from the global Jihad.²¹ In effect, the Ottoman
war planners launched two Jihads upon their entry into the Great War: a
Sunnī Jihad which would provide minimal help to the Ottomans but
would, however, appease the Germans; and a Shīʿī Jihad which would
yield important strategic advantages. In fact, this was themajor successful
Ottoman Jihad initiative during the Great War.
The Ottoman decision to launch a Shīʿī Jihad did not come out of
the blue in 1914. It was a result of the historical rapprochement between
the Ottoman centre and its Shīʿī subjects in Iraq after the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908.
The rapid expansion of Shīʿīsm in southern Iraq at the turn of the
twentieth century was one of the major concerns of the Ottoman
government under Abdülhamid ii.²² The ascendancy of the Usūlī school
of Shīʿīte jurisprudence advocating for the primacy of the ‘ulamā’ as
interpreters of Islamic law and Imāmī traditions had been a source of
annoyance for the Hamidian regime. The sultan, wishing to counteract
the expansion of Shīʿīsm and the Iranian missionary activities, sent
Sunnī ‘ulamā’ to the region and launched extensive campaigns of Sunnī
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propaganda.²³ In addition he made overtures to the Shīʿīte mujtahids to
win them over to the cause of pan-Islamism.²⁴ The results, however, were
disappointing. By the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Shīʿītes had
gained a considerable majority in the region due to the mass conversion
of tribesmen,much to the dismay of theOttoman centre, and the attempts
to persuade the Shīʿīte mujtahids to support Ottoman Panislamism did
not produce any tangible results.²⁵
The reinstatement of the constitutional regime in the wake of the
Young Turk Revolution dramatically changed the relationship between
the Ottoman centre and the region. Seizing the opportunity, the Shīʿīs
launched a major educational reform programme by opening a number
of schools and madrasas and started publishing al-Ilm, a major Shīʿī
scholarly journal, in 1910.²⁶ The new regime also facilitated a debate





Husayn Na’inī and Muhammad
˙
Husayn Kashīf al-Ghīta.
The Committee of Union and Progress likewise gave strong support to
the ideal of Sunnī-Shīʿīte cooperation. It also worked with local political
leaders such as Nakibzâde Talib Bey, who negotiated the most delicate
deals with other Arab leaders, such as ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd, on behalf
of the Ottoman government.²⁷
In 1910 the cup backed a mujtahid initiative led by Mu
˙
hammad Kāzim
Khurāsānī and other major Shīʿīte religious leaders. They issued a strong
fatwā stating that “it is obligatory upon all Muslims to unite in order
to defend the Islamic lands and to guard all the Ottoman and Iranian
territories against the foreigners and their attacks.We remind all Muslims
of the brotherhood by which God has joined the believers. We also call
upon them to protect the noble Islamic banner.”²⁸ This fatwā issued
against Russians was the first major joint Sunnī-Shīʿī religious initiative
in the region. The Sunnī ‘ulamā’ of Baghdad and prominent religious




dā gave their enthusiastic support
to the initiative. In 1911 the same mujtahids and others joined them
in issuing a stronger fatwā against the Italian aggression in Tripoli of
Barbary and Benghazi. They invited all Muslims to participate in a Jihad
against the Italian invaders.²⁹
Whereas the Ottoman centre opted not to declare a Jihad against
the Italians, the Shīʿīte mujtahids’ calls for holy war turned southern
Iraq into a hotbed of anti-Italian activity during the war over Tripoli of
Barbary.³⁰TheCommittee of Union and Progress and theOttoman centre
viewed this development as the emergence of an invaluable resource to
be exploited in future conflicts. They did not have to wait too long.
The government in Istanbul launched a major propaganda offensive
after the declaration of the Ottoman global Jihd. The Ottoman consulate
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in Jakarta became the centre for disseminating the Jihad material to the
Muslim communities in the large geographic area of South and Southeast
Asia.³¹ Copies of the Ottoman Jihad fatwās in Turkish, Arabic, Persian,
Urdu and Tatar were smuggled in substantial numbers into India and
Central Asia to satisfy the Germans, who nurtured great expectations for
the reception of the holy war.³²
Obviously this was not the Ottoman priority. For the Ottoman war
planners the most important Jihad was not the Sunnī but the Shīʿī one.
For the Ottoman government this independent Jihad was not merely an
issue of propaganda aimed at inciting Muslims in different parts of the
world but a crucial means of defence.
The small Ottoman garrison in Basra consisted of 8,000 ill-trained
recruits and reservists who could not resist the well-equipped and
combat-ready British expeditionary force of 15,000 troops sent from
India.³³ The Ottoman authorities, therefore, approached the leading
mujtahids in the shrine cities and Baghdad to invite them to support the
war efforts of the Islamic state. They received affirmative responses from
all.³⁴
A day before the official declaration of the Ottoman global Jihad, a
major meeting attended by all leading mujtahids of the shrine cities,
ulama, local shaykhs and tribal leaders was held in Najaf. The mujtahids
and ulama told the audience of 40,000 (a figure provided by the Ottoman
sub-governor of Najaf) in passionate Islamic language that they should
participate in the Jihad. The organizers and the Ottoman sub-governor
decided to organize at once a militia force of 5,000 to 6,000 men to be
followed later by new volunteer reinforcements.³⁵ On 11 November, the
government instructed the Ottoman governor in Baghdad to distribute
all Jihad fatwās and orders issued by mujtahids in shrine cities free of
charge.³⁶Themujtahids churned out a plethora of fatwās in a short period
of time, and the local Ottoman telegraph offices sent copies of these
fatwās to every town in the region. These fatwās helped the Ottoman
authorities enormously in recruiting militia and strengthening the local
resistance against the advancing British. In the meantime, the Ottoman
Minister of War Enver Pasha dispatched Süleyman Askerî, the director of
the Special Organization, to Iraq with the hope of creating a strong local
resistance movement similar to that which had taken place in Benghazi
two years earlier.³⁷
Most of the fatwās issued by the leading ‘ulamā’ were in Arabic,
although a number of fatwās were written in Persian. The Ottoman
government additionally instructed local administrators to collect
fatwās or opinions from all leading mujtahids so that the impact
would be stronger. Leading Shīʿī mujtahids, including Abd al-
˙
Husayn
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Asad Allāh, Abd al-
˙
Husayn al-Yas, ʿAlī al-Nakhjawānī, ʿAlī Rafīsh,
Ismāʿīl al-Sadr (the grandfather of Musa al-Sadr of Lebanon), Mahdī al-
Khurāsānī, Mu
˙
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al-Nakhjawānī al-Īrānī al-Muhājir, provided a large number fatwās and
opinions calling upon Muslims for a Jihad against the Allies.³⁸ Also a
joint fatwa signed by 23 leading mujtahids rallied the Shīʿī population
against the Allied invasion.³⁹
Not surprisingly, these fatwās did not make any reference to the
fatwā collection used in the Ottoman declaration of global Jihad. Just
as the Ottoman material refrained from employing distinctly Sunnī
language, the fatwās issued by the leading mujtahids avoided obvious
Shīʿī references. When after the Allied declarations of war Ottoman
officials approached the leading mujtahids for fatwās, they posed the
question in non-sectarian terms as well:
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
The request at hand for a fatwa, from the learned ʿulamāʾ, [concerns]
what scholars of the faith and those who make clear the provisions of
the Sharīʿa of the chief of the messengers (upon him be the blessings of
the Lord of the Worlds) is in this legal matter. For the seven countries,
Russia, England, France, Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, have
declared war today on the Sublime Islamic Ottoman State … and from
all directions, by land and by sea, have attacked the Islamic lands (al-
mamālik al-Islamiyya), and have taken to plundering their possessions,
killing their men, taking captive their women, and destroying (hadm)
the lands of the Muslims. Is it therefore the obligation of all Muslims
(al-taklīf ʿalā ʿumūm al-muslimīn), of every madhhab, milla, and
˙
tarīqa,
to repel the unbelievers (kuffār) from the Islamic lands, and to fight
[them] and to confront [them], or not?
And if one is able to go forth, to fight, and to give of one’s wealth,
but stays quiet in one’s house, what is God’s judgment (
˙
hukm), in a
clear and explicit way? Please provide an explanation to the first part
of this question, adorned and stamped with the noble seal (al-khātim
al-sharīf).
Provide us with a fatwa, that God may reward you.⁴⁰
The responses given to this inquiry likewise avoided any overt Shīʿī refer-









that “With the attack of the unbelievers (kuffār) on the lands of the
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Muslims it is obligatory (wājib) – when there is ability (qudra) – upon the
Muslims at large so capable (al-mutamakkanīn min ʿāmmat al-muslimīm)
to defend against them (difāʿuhum), when there does not exist a sufficient
number (man bihi al-kifāya) already.”⁴¹
Some authorities even maintained that all Islamic sects were in agree-
ment that the Muslims should fight against Christian encroachments. It
is interesting that those mujtahids refrained from making any references
to the Ottoman alliance with Christian powers in these responses, and
presented the war as one between Islam and Christianity.
For example, Shaykh al-Sharīʿa al-A
˙
sfahānī commented that:
The Islamic sects (madhāhib) today consist of the Sunnī sects, Imāmism,
Ismāʿīlism, Zaydīsm, Wahhābism, and the Khārijites. All the ʿulamāʾ of
these sects are in agreement and consensus that, with the attack of the
kuffār against the lands of the Muslims, and their engaging in killing
their men and robbing their property and raising the work of kufr and
forsaking the word of Islam and the truth … that it is obligatory upon
every capable Muslim to expend his effort and what ability he has to
repel the kuffār and the mushrikīn attacking the lands of Islam and to
break his advance … to expend their efforts to subdue them and free
themselves from the agony of the hereafter, not to fail to achieve what
is within reach, not to be pleased with shirking this … one of them
with his property, a second with his soul, a third by using weapons,
a fourth by using standing and honor, a fifth by employing wile and
deliberation, a sixth by using arms and archery. Thus did God say:
‘Make ready for them whatever force and strings of horses you can,
to terrify thereby the enemy of God and your enemy’ [q. 8:60]. And
all that we have said is with respect to those Muslims of the groups
enumerated [above]. Each one of them constitutes an element of force
and a part of preparations.
O brother believers, o Muslim peoples: Awaken from your sleep, you
are woken by guns and cannons and the religion of war. Be not pleased
that the word of taw
˙
hīd be replaced by talthīth [“the trinity”], calls to
prayer (ādhān) by church bells (nāqūs); [be not pleased that] your men
become the servants and slaves of the kuffār, and your women and
children prisoners and slave girls for the most wicked among them,
belonging to one hand and the next. Fight the kuffār with cheerful face,
with bodies raised and unsheathed from their clothes, with stomachs
empty of food, such that you do not extend your hands to the kuffār
seeking their charity you lose your honor. Maintain your honor, honor
yourselves [lit., make your faces white] before the Prophet so that your
independence remains forever and ever, God willing.⁴²
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By responding favourably to the Ottoman request and depicting the
Alliedwar as aChristian crusade against Islam, the leading Shīʿīmujtahids
helped the Ottoman centre to resist the initial attack in southern Iraq,
much to the dismay of the British war planners.⁴³ The local militia and
volunteer units responding to the calls of mujtahids facilitated the orderly
retreat of the Ottoman regular forces. In addition the fatwās issued by the
local religious authorities prevented any manifestations of anti-Ottoman
and Arab nationalist sentiments.
Upon strong urging by the Ottoman authorities, the leading mujtahids
also depicted the Ottoman state as the defender of the entire Muslim










It is not hidden from anyone that the European states, and especially
England, Russia, and France, have from the earliest days always been
transgressing and encroaching upon the Islamic territories (mamālik),
such that they have violated most of the Islamic territories. And they
have no intention in these transgressions (taʿaddiyāt) but the erasure of
the religion (ma
˙
hw al-dīn), God forbid! In recent times their objectives
have been made clear. They have attacked the territories of the Sublime
Ottoman Empire (mamālik al-dawla al-ʿaliyya al-ʿuthmāniyya), may
God strengthen it to give victory to Islam, and the long hand of
transgression is on the verge of reaching the two holy sanctuaries
(al-
˙
haramayn al-sharīfayn) and the shrines of the virtuous imāms
(mashāhid al-aʾimma al-
˙
tāhirīn), peace be upon them. They have
attacked the Islamic lands, their inhabitants, their honor, and their
possessions.
Thus it is obligatory (yajibu) upon the tribes living on the war fronts
(thughūr), and upon all able Muslims – should there not be a sufficient
number among them [the tribes] to protect the borders – to protect
their borders and defend the territory of Islam (bay
˙
dat al-Islām) such
as they can. God is He who provides victory, aid, and support to the
Muslims.⁴⁴
With the exception of a reference to the “virtuous imāms” the fatwā
lacked an exclusive Shīʿīte tone, and presented the struggle as one led
by the Ottoman empire in defence of the Islamic world.⁴⁵ Likewise,
Mu
˙
hammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī’s fatwa painted a threat to the entire Muslim
community:
The attacks of the aggressing enemies have approached the holy places
(
˙
huram) of God, the holy places of His messenger, and the shrines of
126 jihad and islam in world war i
the virtuous imāms, God’s blessings be upon them all. These [people]
desire to shed, by means of their aggression, the blood of the Muslims
and disgrace the sanctity of their religion. The danger has escalated,
God forbid, to the lands of the Muslims, their places of worship, their
senses, and their minds. Thus it is obligatory upon all the tribes living
on the war fronts, and upon all Muslims, to protect their war fronts
and their borders and to defend the territory of Islam howsoever they
can. God is He who provides victory and aid. Fear you God, fear you
God in this, O Muslims (maʿāshir al-muslimīn). Peace be upon you,
and God’s mercy and blessings.⁴⁶
As compared to the official Ottoman fatwā collection initially issued
by the Şeyülislâm and followed by many leading Sunnī ‘ulamā’, these
documents adopted a decisively passionate tone and rhetoric and
consequently had a deeper effect on the targeted audiences. In fact,
the Shīʿīte Jihad, carefully crafted by mujtahids in Iraq, was the most
successful one for the Ottomans. The only comparable Jihd initiative
was the one launched in the Yemen with the help of another non-Sunnī
religious authority, Imām Yahyā, who had signed a contract commonly
known as the Da’’an Treaty with the Ottomans in 1911.⁴⁷ Imām Yahyā
called on his Zaydī followers for Jihad and the Ottomans made most of it
in their fight against the British. The region composed of Yemen, Aden
and ‘Asīr was a much smaller theatre of war, however.⁴⁸
By contrast, the Ottoman Sunnī or global Jihad did not provide any
tangible results. Unlike their German allies, the Ottoman war planners
regarded the issue as a strategic one. They thought that the Sunnī Jihad
would help them rally the Kurds in central and northern Iraq and Iran
against the enemy. For this Jihad, the Ottomans used translations of the
original Ottoman Jihad fatwās. Various Ottoman authorities maintained
during the early stages of war that a large number of irregular Kurdish
units including those in Iran responded favourably to the Ottoman Sunnī
Jihad and joined the war effort.⁴⁹ The Kurdish affirmative response to the
Ottoman call for Jihad was, of course, too little to meet the expectations.
Interestingly enough no major Sunnī Arab leader in Arabia followed
suit. On 23 November the Ottoman authorities sent a message to ‘Abd
al-‘Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd asking him to help the Ottoman Jihad and refrain
from any clashes with Saʿūd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, the emīr of the House
of Rashīd in Ha’īl.⁵⁰ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd, who had cut a deal with
the Ottoman government immediately before the Great War, had no
such desire to cooperate with this request, however. In fact, a rather
long fatwa issued by Shaykh Sulaymān ibn Si
˙
hmān on 22 June 1915
provides an insight regarding the Wahhābī reaction to the Ottoman
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Jihad. The following question was put before Shaykh Sulaymān ibn
Si
˙
hmān, a leading Wahhābī religious authority and a scholar who had
major influence over ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd: “What is your opinion,
may God magnify your virtue, concerning the Turkish state and the
Christians, may God curse them all? Which of them is greater in unbelief
and which of the two is it preferred to support over the other? Provide us
with a fatwā that you may be recompensed. May God grant you Paradise.
Amen.”⁵¹
The main points of his response were as follows:
There is no doubt that those apostate Turkish forces (al-ʿasākir al-
Turkiyya) and others are greater in unbelief than the Jews and the
Christians, as one learns from the Shaykh al-Islam’s [Ibn Taymiyya’s]
words and as he explained the matter in the case of the Nu
˙
sayrīs. It is
known that they [the Turkish forces] feign Islam,make the proclamation
of faith, offer the Friday and congregational prayers, and appoint qā
˙
dīs
when they overcome a territory. Nonetheless the Shaykh al-Islam’s [Ibn
Taymiyya’s] words apply in their case, as you can see, and as the Shaykh
al-Islam Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb also made clear in the tenth
level of what he said concerning God’s words, “The places of worship
belong to God; so call not, along with God, upon anyone” [q. 72.18].
As for which of the two groups [the Turkish state or the Christians]
it is preferred to support over the other, Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya






h, concerning God’s words …
“The Romans have been vanquished in the nearer part of the land;
and, after their vanquishing, they shall be the victors in a few years.
To God belongs the command before and after, and on that day the
believers shall rejoice in God’s help; God helps whomsoever He will
…” [q. 30:1–5] … If you understand this, then it ought to become clear
to you that these Turks [in the current day], even if they make the
proclamation of faith, are more severe in unbelief [than the Christians]
on account of their apostasy from Islam, and greater in harm against
the Muslims than the Christians, as the Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya
explained.
However, seeing as the Christians have gotten the upper hand over the
Turks in our day, and that they are the nearer enemy, then should they
[the Christians] provide those before them [the Turks] security and make
it possible for them [to persist] in their affairs, then their [the Christians’]
fame has ascended and their harm to the people of Islam has expanded.
What we were seeking, and what we were asking and beseeching God
for, was that He confound the both of them as parties set against one
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another; that He cause the one to taste the might and strength of the
other; that He tie down the one with the other; that He not setup for
them a standard and bring them into mutual allegiance against Islam;
that He prolong hostilities between them; that He set the people of Islam
in security and wellbeing against the evil of the both of them; and that He
give victory to the religion and its Prophet and its Book and its believing
servants.⁵²
Wahhābī scholars also took issue with the fact that the Ottomans had
an alliance with the German empire, and were under the influence of
this Christian power.⁵³ Despite these strong criticisms of the Ottomans
for cooperating with the Christian Germans, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Saʿūd




hammad ʿAlī al-Idrisī, who had established a Sufī state in ‘Asīr
with the help of the Italians and the British, responded to the Ottoman
Jihad in a similar vein;⁵⁵ he too signed a treaty with the British in April
1915.⁵⁶ Likewise, even before the declaration of the Ottoman grand Jihad
Sharif
˙
Husayn promised the British, who had been requested to abstain
from holy war, that he “would take, of his good will, no measure of
Turkish interest.” He reiterated his unequivocal promise in November
1914 and dispelled the deep British fear of “the Holy Cities endorsing
the Holy War.”⁵⁷ Unlike the Shīʿī mujtahids, Sharif
˙
Husayn maintained
that the alliance of the Ottoman empire with Christian powers and the
German aggression made the declaration of a genuine Muslim Jihad
impossible.⁵⁸ Interestingly, when Sharif
˙
Husayn initiated the Arab Revolt
against Istanbul in 1916, the leading Shīʿī mujtahids issued fatwās in
support of the Ottoman state.⁵⁹
In conclusion, while the Ottoman Shīʿī Jihad was a success, the
Sunnī/global one was a failure for both Berlin and Istanbul. The accom-
plishment on the Shīʿī front prompted the Germans to continue their
efforts in this regard.⁶⁰ Likewise the Ottoman authorities used the Shīʿī
card against the Allies until their loss of Mesopotamia. Many scholars
of Islam found it surprising that a state possessing the Caliphate received
strong support from Shīʿī mujtahids and the Zaydī leadership while
Sunnī leaders paid almost no heed to its calls. Indeed, from a religious
viewpoint this was an astounding development. For those who under-
stood the bitter power struggle in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
empire, including many Ottoman war planners, however, this result was
a predictable one.
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Figure 5.1 Telegram sent by the Ottoman governor of Najaf and Karbala to the
Interior Ministry in Istanbul (in Turkish).
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Figure 5.2 Telegram from Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi, one of the leading Shi’I
religious authorities in Iraq (in Arabic).
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6 Propaganda or Culture War
Jihad, Islam, and Nationalism in Turkish
Literature during World War i
Erol Köroğlu
During the period of the jealously guarded absolute power of the cup,
from the Bab-ı âli (Sublime Porte) Raid of 23 January 1913 until the defeat
in 1918, the government banned the publication of even the slightest
opposition in newspapers and periodicals. In particular, the outbreak of
war in 1914 in Europe and the declaration of a general mobilization in the
Ottoman Empire brought about the introduction of military censorship.
With the introduction on 7 August 1914 of a temporary law, the existing
censorship became even stricter.
Actually, the regime had planned an even stricter censorship than the
one they implemented. Kâzım Karabekir, who at the time was Chief of
Intelligence at the Office of the General Staff, included in his memoirs
of the war an event related to the introduction of censorship. He had
a meeting on 3 August 1914 with İsmail Canbulat, an Under-Secretary
in the Interior Ministry and one of the most eminent members of
the cup, who said that, with the exception of Tanin which was the
mouthpiece of the government, all newspapers would be closed to prevent
them from publishing anti-war views. Karabekir opposed this move
and said that it would destroy the credibility both of Tanin and of the
constitutional system and would also be in conflict with the principle
of “armed neutrality”. He later complained to Enver Pasha about this
proposal. Enver accepted his views and prevented the newspapers from
being shut down.¹
Nevertheless, the official censorship regulation introduced a few days
later was also very strict and all-encompassing. According to this new
regulation, no new newspapers or press agencies were to be founded;
newspapers could not publish additional editions; all newspapers were to
be distributed only after having been taken to the censorship room at the
Istanbul Post Office, where they were to be checked and stamped as being
“in accordance with regulations” and finally signed by the censorship
official and censorship officer on duty; and no telegrams were to be sent
in languages other than Turkish, Arabic or French.²
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Despite the censorship, the period between the outbreak of the war in
Europe and theOttoman empire’s entry as an ally of Germany andAustro-
Hungary contained a very fierce and aggressive Ottoman propaganda
effort aimed at Ottoman public opinion in order to prepare it for the
ultimate result of entry into the war. The Turkist movement in particular
was sliding very quickly towards Turanism and becoming immersed in
warmongering and propaganda of a Turanist and pan-Islamist nature
in the months of August–November 1914. There is evidence that the
Turkist movement did not begin this activity spontaneously or in an
uncoordinated fashion, but as a result of a concerted effort arising
from a single centre and was operating systematically, following precise
orders.
A short cautionary notice was published at the end of the 71st issue of
Türk Yurdu, the famous Turkist magazine, on 6 August 1914. According
to this notice, due to the political situation the Türk Yurdu, published
once every fifteen days, would henceforth be published monthly, while
the weekly Türk Sözü would be published once every fifteen days.³
Notwithstanding this, the next issue of the Türk Yurdu appeared only
four and a half months later, on 10 December 1914, with no explanation
regarding the delay, while Türk Sözü would never again be published. If
this delay were the result of paper shortages or other similar difficulties,
it would most certainly have been explained in the next issue. Kâzım
Karabekir interpreted this interruption in the following way: “[t]his
means that for some reason the Türk Yurdu preferred to keep silent
throughout the general mobilization. In this way Tanin newspaper was
reinforced with some of the journalists of the Türk Yurdu.”⁴
Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, in the chapter of his memoirs titled “Summer of
1914”, observes how the political leadership and the cultural sphere were
pursuing the same aims. “It was generally felt that we were Germany’s
ally and that we would end up entering the war.” He also mentions a
conversation he had with Celâl Sahir. According to Celâl Sahir, who was a
latecomer to the cup but nevertheless very close to both Talât Pasha and
Ziya Gökalp, the Ottoman State should have conquered Egypt and the
Caucasus to get closer to both the Islamic and Turkish worlds, because
if it did not, the state would inevitably fall apart. The real aim of this
operation would have been of an economic nature, because by then the
Ottoman treasury was incapable of finding enough foreign loans even to
pay its outstanding debts. In this way it would have gained control of
Egypt’s cotton and of Baku’s oil, putting an end to its difficulties. Yahya
Kemal was aware that in reality the source of these words was not Celâl
Sahir and that they were just words “put out to convince people of the
need to enter the war”.
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According to Yahya Kemal, in those days there were two approaches,
one negative and the other positive. According to the negative approach
there was no possibility of trusting the Allied Powers and of opening
the Straits because this would have meant giving too much latitude to
Russia.The positive approach, on the other hand, was the one put forward
by Celâl Sahir and was also very frequently heard. Enver Pasha used
this approach to justify an offensive war. According to Yahya Kemal,
all subsequent disasters were the result of this logic, because if the war
had been organized as a defensive one the results would have been very
different. He concludes by saying, “In those days, when it was like having
been left with one horse and three shoes, the conquest of the Caucasus
and of Egypt was the most popular currency.”⁵
Poetical Propaganda during the Mobilization
At that time, Kâzım Karabekir was an officer of the general staff and,
like Yahya Kemal, a nationalist who thought that precedence should not
be given to Turan or to an Islamic union, but to Anatolia.⁶ Karabekir
underlined the fact that the blame for the Ottoman Empire’s entry into
the war as a result of Turanist and pan-Islamist dreams lay on the Turkists
operating in the cultural sphere, and he devoted a large part of his Birinci
Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik? to the subject of war propaganda during the
period of mobilization. According to Karabekir, in those days the press
repeated these points: Germany’s victory is a sure thing; Muslims should
not lose an opportunity to become free; the Islamic world is awaiting the
orders of its Caliph to revolt; it is impossible for the Balkan nations of
Romania, Greece and Bulgaria to enter the war against Germany; there
is no harmony among the Allied Powers and the moment the Ottomans
enter the war revolts by the Turks of Russia and by the Muslims in
other parts of the world will put Russia and Britain into a wretched
condition.⁷
As early as 8 August, Ziya Gökalp was claiming, in his poem “Kızıl
Destan” (Red Epic) published in Tanin, “The lands of the enemy will be
ruined! / Turkey will grow and become Turan!”⁸ This rather provocative
poem was presented by the newspaper with the words “Our readers
should keep in mind that ‘Gökalp Beyefendi’ will continue following the
events muddling Europe and describing and analysing them with such
national language and a national philosophy”.⁹ In his book, Karabekir
includes an extract from a long poem entitled “Türkün Yolu” (The Path
of the Turk) published in Donanma Mecmuası (Magazine of the Navy),
dated 19 October 1914:
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Carefully look and perceive you will
Of the longing spirit of Algeria, Morocco
India, Tunisia, Zanzibar, Java, the Caucasus
There is the love of the Turk
Happily and without awe he will go
He will demolish mountains even if of steel they are
If his resolution you don’t know, learn you will
The Turk’s path is the one leading to the “True homeland”.¹⁰
Let us concentrate a little more in detail on Ziya Gökalp’s “Kızıl Destan.”
When it was first published in Tanin, it was presented as a commentary
on the war in Europe and it began with the epigraph, “The lands of
the enemy will be in ruin! / Turkey will grow and become Turan!” This
epigraph reflects the main underlying idea of the poem, made up of 24
stanzas of five lines each. Gökalp begins by spurring Turks to cooperate in
the recently declared general mobilization, as early as the first stanza and
defines the war as a “moment of heroism”. The poem can be interpreted
as a reflection of a sly happiness. The Ottoman Empire had just signed
an alliance with Germany, but had not yet entered the war. When seen
from this point of view, it is clear that Gökalp, remembering all the pain
of the Balkan War, was happy about the slaughter in Europe, which he
considered to be the main reason for the bad situation in which the
Ottoman Empire found itself: “The land of civilisation will be red blood!
/ Each of its regions will be a new Balkan!”¹¹
Gökalp tried to recount the reasons for the war in poetic fashion and
went back a few years before the war, concluding that everything was due
to the hostility of “the Cross” towards Islam. It was because of this enmity
that the Libyan and Balkan wars had started, but in the end the Christian
countries had started quarrelling among themselves. In the midst of this
confusion, the Serbian nationalist Princip killed the Austro-Hungarian
crown prince and his wife, putting Serbia and the German world on a
collision course. Gökalp interpreted phase by phase the events leading
to war and made clear that he supported Germany, while at the same
time showing how all this affected the Turks: “The Hungarian said: Don’t
think that I want to stay, / I would like to let loose my horse, / I would
like to avenge the Turks / The Altay lands will become a great country /
The Sultan will be the sovereign of Turan!”¹²
Even if it was not clearly stated, in this poem it is Germany that is
right and Gökalp has the German Kaiser speak as if he were a Muslim:
“The Kaiser has declared to the soldiery and population: / Let your heart
reunite in chain! / Trampling the enemy is like praying, / Faith will be the
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guide of my army! / The All-Compassionate will protect us!”¹³ The last
stanza of the poem looks as if it had been written expressly for Muslims:
“The Englishman has imprisoned Sultan Osman, / With it hostage he
will hold India, Amman! / Islam has recognised its enemy, / Soon there
will be happiness: / It will be the Quran, which takes its revenge!”¹⁴
This poem, which was written when the Ottoman empire was still
neutral, shows clearly the attitude of the cup and of the writers close to it.
Their goal was to enter the war as an ally of Germany as soon as possible.
Germany’s early victories were the main factors used to convince the
people that there would be a quick victory, as a result of which not only
would the lost territories be regained, but, thanks to Russia’s defeat, the
Turan union would also be achieved. Thus while Gökalp was on the
one hand commenting on the war in an “impartial” way saying, “they
will fight among each other growing weaker and this will give us an
advantage”, on the other, he was implying “let’s enter the war as soon as
possible so that we can get the maximum benefit”.
Tevfik Fikret as a (False?) Propagandist of Jihad
There are other examples of this propaganda literature and I will discuss
some of them below but before that I would like to concentrate on two
important poems about the war and declaration of Jihad by Tevfik Fikret
(1867–1915), who was undisputedly the most important and famous poet
of that period. Tevfik Fikret, whowould die during the first year of thewar,
on 19 August 1915, was anti-cup and vehemently against the participation
of the Ottoman empire in the war. After the Ottoman Empire’s entry
into war and consequent declaration of Jihad, the poet published a poem
entitled “Fetâvâ-yı Şerîfe’den Sonra: Sancak-ı Şerîf Huzurunda” (After
the sacred fatwa: in the presence of the sacred banner), in the 1227t
issue of Servet-i Fünun, dated 27 Teşrinisani 1330/10 December 1914. The
poem starts with the note, Müfti’ül-enâm Hazretlerine ithaf olunmuştur
(Dedicated to the holy mufti/şeyhülislam of the Koran) and it is stated
that it is recounted by a pious warrior. This “pious warrior” repeats over
and over again throughout the poem that in the name of religion he is
ready to face any difficulty and also to die. The poem ends with an almost
masochistic note:
As difficulties oppress me, my joy and calm increase;
Towards my God
I am always favourably disposed, in submission and forbearing
Whether I die or live, I am happy in any case!¹⁵
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Those who do not know the relationship between Tevfik Fikret and
the cup and the way he wrote poems criticizing them may think that this
is a simple poem of religious propaganda. Actually, those who know the
literary environment of those days will also know that Fikret was against
both religion and the cup and notice immediately how, contrary to
appearances, this poem was ironic and satirical. In an astute manoeuvre,
Fikret had managed to write a poem of opposition that would not have
damaged him and that would not have been censored. Probably the
Unionists were angered by this poem, but there was nothing they could
do.
Yet this is just one way of explaining the situation. When we produce a
close reading of the poem, we feel the exaggeration, but it becomes harder
to look at it as a satire, although the pompous style of the title, the subtitle
and the dedication supports this interpretation. The poet also gives the
completion date at the end of the poem in an unconventional way, in the
Hijri calendar, as “aşrü muharrem’il-harâm 1333”, in order to exaggerate
the level of religiosity. Yet Tevfik Fikret does another important thing and
uses a pious Muslim warrior as his poetical voice/persona all through
the poem. We listen to this persona’s voice as if he is in front of the
şeyhülislam when he is announcing the sacred fatwa of Jihad. He accepts
the fatwa and contemplates it. Therefore, the whole poem turns into an
interior monologue of this warrior and we develop empathy towards
him, through seeing his emotions and psychological mood.
The Muslim warrior accepts the ceremonial banner that was present
during the announcement of the fatwa as the banner owned by the
prophet, and he sees it as the last hope of millions. Even its light hissing
sound in the wind is heard as the harbinger of a holy victory. Although
the real colour of the banner is pale, its blessed sacredness will illuminate
everything with red and green lights. The poetic voice calls the banner
“wave of consolation” and begs it to flow towards the martyrs in order
to wake up the sleeping Muslim world. He also calls on the sword of
holy war to shed blood and kill the enemies of Islam. The warrior sees
the black conscience of the Western civilization as an abyss that will be
filled only by death. The Western civilization is a vengeful and poisonous
dragon that will burn the resigned and calm Muslim warrior, but every
drop of his blood will damn the dragon. The warrior hallucinates about
angelic wings and horses that will carry the already dead souls to help
him. The warrior will be thankful to Allah and ready for Jihad. He gave
up his belongings and hopes for the sake of religion, and now he will
walk unwaveringly even if volcanoes fall on him. Now, God’s help (avn-i
Hüda) is his torch and the prophet’s banner is his shelter, and it means
eternal conservation and salvation for him. The angels will save him from
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the enemies. And in this way, the poem ends: “As difficulties oppress me,
my joy and calm increase; / Towards my God / I am always favourably
disposed, in submission and forbearing / Whether I die or live, I am
happy in any case!”
For a public figure such as Tevfik Fikret who was known as a strict
opponent of religion, the poetic voice of that poem was undoubt-
edly a fanatic and the poet openly displayed his stance through the
abovementioned features such as its exaggerated title and subtitle and
unconventional hijri dates. Yet it is not easy to see the poem as a mere
ridicule because the persona displays an honest and integrated person-
ality all over the poem. It seems that the poet tried to understand and
poetically represent a certain way of thinking. Tevfik Fikret was not
mocking the pious warrior here although he emphasized the futility of
this warrior’s belief in holy war. The poet used certain words in the poem
and they were taken from both the Jihad fatwa and the sultan’s royal
declaration to the army and navy about that fatwa.
This last feature of the poem in particular makes us think about the
possibility of Tevfik Fikret’s writing this poem as a propaganda poem.
We do not have any information on this issue, but the propaganda effort
of the government was very ambitious and persistent at that time. Of
course, it is a speculation but perhaps he wrote and published this poem
in order to get rid of governmental pressure. He used the very vocabulary
of the propaganda effort but he framed the poem in such an exaggerated
way that the government was not able to use it for further propaganda
efforts.
Tevfik Fikret as an Anti-War Poet
Tevfik Fikret wrote a second and long, 153 line poem entitled “Harb-i
Mukaddes” (holy war), but he did not or could not publish it before
his death in 1915. This second poem is the ultimate opposite of “in the
presence of the sacred banner”. Perhaps he wrote it not to be published
but to clear his conscience because he had written and published the
former poem. The latter poem seems like a long melodramatic oratory.
It starts with a cry due to the ongoing war’s distress: “Alas! The fire of
war hasn’t burnt out yet / We are ruined day by day because of war’s
suffering / It is better to die at once with the zeal of victory, / Actually all
earth moulded with human blood.”¹⁶ Then he curses all national leaders
who rush all humanity into war. But then he directs his rage against
the Ottoman warlords and their supporters: “O, these nonsense-writers
talking about the guarding religion / As if the blood [that spilt] in Balkan
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[Wars] were insufficient, / Now encourage the people with hell, / Telling
Allah’s and his prophet’s order / Encourage the millions to the war with
Kuran and the prophet’s sayings / Turn everybody into bloody earth.”¹⁷
After this introduction, Fikret tells of all those martyrs who died in
vain and left their orphans in misery. He mentions the Russian front and
the Sarıkamış Battle, saying that “his corpse is not in the paradise but on
the Caucasus plains” (Cennette değil lâşesi Kafkas ovasında), and then he
describes in detail how soldiers died painfully and in horrible ways. All
the same, the war is not limited to ultimately bloody but small battlefields.
Home fronts are more awful due to the war-created misery and poverty.
While every family is in mourning, the wives of martyrs have to be
prostitutes. Fikret describes in detail the rise of prostitution and points
to the state as the encouraging and responsible agent of this situation.
The misery on the home front is not limited to the widows but also
to the mothers of martyrs. They become beggars. Fikret concludes the
poem by cursing the entire war: “Damn you! Damn you! O, ‘holy war’, /
You tarnished all creatures / Damn you, damn you! O, tragedy of war, /
You’re a blow to humanity, o, effort of war! …”¹⁸
The main difference between “After the Sacred Fatwa” and “Holy
War” is undoubtedly their approach to the war: the former is implicit,
cautious and ironic, but the latter is explicit, righteous and furious. Fikret
constructs his anti-war attitude in “Holy War” through direct observation
and detailed illustrations. Yet in the first poem he uses a persona that is
totally different from himself and he tries to understand and construct a
pious warrior’s psychology. He does this in order to show the illusions of
Muslims and pro-Jihad people, but in the end the psychological portrayal
of the warrior is very akin to the literary depictions of heroes by pro-war
writers. The very words in particular he borrowed from the fatwa and
the royal declaration create ambiguity in the interpretation of the poem.
Was it propaganda or criticism? We may also say that it was criticism
disguised as propaganda.
Typical Jihad Propaganda Texts
I would like to quote the piece Mehmed Akif wrote in his long poem,
“Berlin Hatıraları” (memoirs of Berlin), which he started to write when
he was in Germany as a special agent sent by the Ottoman state in order
to make pan-Islamic propaganda for the Muslim prisoners of war in
Germany. At the end of this poem, he is anxious about the Allied raid
on Gallipoli and the Ottoman soldier replies and soothes him with an
absolute self-confidence:
propaganda or culture war 143
– Don’t be afraid!
Even hell we would stop on our chests;
This is God’s way, there is no returning!
Not a single stone of the private quarters of our families will fall!
Unless the last soldier at war is martyred.
If this great crowd in front of us should attack us viciously;
If armies should arise from the seas, navies rain from the clouds;
If where we are volcanoes,
Should erupt and a bitter red wind should envelop the horizons;
Isn’t there a single faith on our front;
A common joy, sadness, aim, conscience;
Haven’t we all got a single heart in our breasts … It won’t surrender!
Even if the world should fall down, this front would resist!
In the same way the craziness of humanity falls to pieces on the
horizon,
When trying to overwhelm God,
In the same way that illusions fighting the light of truth;
Are after sparks of ardour forgotten,
Thus the Doomsday in front of us will be assembled.
Soon this front will be relieved …¹⁹
As is seen in this piece, the heroic voice in this poem and Tevfik Fikret’s
pious warrior are not very far from each other. Yet Fikret evaluates this
heroism as an illusion while Akif unhesitatingly thinks of it as heroism.
Yet there is one more important difference between them. Mehmet
Akif gives us a very sharp narrative full of original expressions and
imagination. Therefore, his poetic approach is more akin to Fikret’s
“Holy War” poem. The literary approach, however, is very different
in propaganda literature in general, in which schematic concepts and
phrases chosen by the political authorities are passed on to literary writers
to be used in their propaganda pieces. Therefore, we see the repetition of
similar elements in propaganda literature. Is there a typical literary text
making Jihad propaganda that will help us understand the mechanism?
Yes, we can look at a certain theatrical play, written by Muhyiddin Baha
[Pars], Halife Ordusu Mısır ve Kafkasya’da (The Caliph’s Army in Egypt
and the Caucausus). It was published in Bursa in Rumi 1331 (1915–1916).
The completion date at the end of the play is given as “21 Haziran sene
1331” (3 July 1915).²⁰
This didactic and schematic play opens with Turkish university
students discussing the outbreak of war in Europe. All of them will
be reserve officers when the general mobilization is declared. One of
those students worries about the calamities that the war will cause and
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the ultimate annihilation of Western civilization. His friends, however,
evaluate it as a divine opportunity for revenge and think that “the war that
burns Europe will illuminate Asia.”²¹ Then they chide their friend who is
worried for Europe, asking “will we abandon our enslaved brothers in
India, Egypt, Iran, and the Caucausus and instead of them, will we worry
about the ones who enslaved them? Shall we have pity on the oppressor
instead of the oppressed? …”²² Meanwhile, the play refers often and in a
similar vein to an important injury of Ottoman public opinion, i.e. the
defeat in the Balkan Wars. A character, for instance, compares the new
war and the Balkan: “Don’t mention that damned war to us! … We didn’t
do it; it is not the war of youth but senility, not the war of a nation but
treachery. This new war will be fought by Muhammed’s umma, Oguz
Khan’s nation; and history is full of this umma’s, this nation’s heroism.”²³
The attitude of integrating Islam umma and the Turkish nation, which
is evident in the above passage, will continually be repeated all through
the play, and Turk and Islam will be mentioned as synonyms or identical
twins as if there is no conflict or problem between them. Actually this
attitude had been invented even before the war by the late Ottoman
Turkists such as Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp tried to theorize it and worked
hard to show it as natural. Gökalp was the ideologist of the party and had
the overall responsibility for cultural affairs. His “Millet ve Vatan” article
published in the 67t issue of Türk Yurdu dated 28 May 1914 was the last
part of his “Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak” (Turkification,
Islamization, Modernization) series. At the end of this article Gökalp
comes back to the fatherland concept and puts forward the example
of intersecting groups. There are two nations: the one deriving from
nationhood and the other deriving from religion.
There is, in fact, a homeland of Islam, which is the beloved land of all
Muslims. The other one is the national home, which, for Turks, is what
we call Turan. The Ottoman territories are that portion of Islamdom that
has remained independent. A portion of these is the home of the Turks,
and is at the same time a portion of Turan. Another portion of them
is the homeland of the Arabs, which is again a part of the great Arab
fatherland. The fact that the Turks have a special love for the home of the
Turks, Turan, does not necessitate that they forget the Ottoman land
which is a small Muslim homeland, or the great land of all Muslims. For
national, political and international ideals are different things and all are
sacred ideals.²⁴
We see lots of formulations in this play which are congruent with
Gökalp’s flexible definition. One of the young students/reserve officers,
for instance, says “that great ruler who thought that even the entire
world would not be enough for one sultan [Selim ii] first decided to
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gather the complete Islamic universe under the banner of the Caliphate.
Tomorrow the Muslims of three continents who will run to fight under
the flag of jihad will impose the great principle of Islamic unity of which
Sultan Selim first laid the foundations …”²⁵ The play progresses, always
mentioning the umma and the nation together. All Muslims all over the
world wait for the banner of the Caliph: Turks, Circassians and Georgians
in the Caucasus; Arabs in Egypt; and (Muslim) Hindus in India …
The third act of the play takes place at the Russian Front. We see
that the Russian officers are not only fighting against the Turkish army
but also dealing with the Muslims in their own army: “[t]hose issued
fatwas sparked the Islamic hearts. Neither threats nor banishment, not
even death is enough to extinguish the flames of enmity in the Muslim
hearts.”²⁶ Indeed the Muslim soldiers in the Tsarist army join the Turkish
army and they together devastate Russians. The next act opens with a
scene near the Suez Canal in which British agents try to bribe an Arab
shaykh against the Ottomans. But the shaykh and his men insultingly
kick the British out because they are ignited after the fatwa of Jihad. After
the British, Turkish officers visit the shaykh and he openly pledges his
alliance to the Caliph and his decision to join the Ottoman army. We also
see Indian Muslims in the British army in Suez, who prepare to unite
with the Ottoman army in the subsequent act. British forces also have
the same experience that the Russians had against the Ottoman army.
An Ottoman officer cries at the end of the play, “Come on soldiers, come
on co-religionists, come on every individual of the Caliph’s army, the
success of Islam is in front of you, go forward, always go forward …”²⁷
The Relationship of Religion and Nationalism in Ziya Gökalp’s
Poetry
I argued in my dissertation and in two books in Turkish and English that
I prepared from that dissertation that the Ottoman war propaganda effort
was inefficient during World War i due to some material conditions.²⁸
Turkish intellectuals who did not produce sufficient propaganda were
encouraged by Ziya Gökalp to produce cultural material focusing on
Turkish national identity. I can claim here that the same applies to the
Jihad propaganda. Although we can find other propaganda works like
Muhyiddin Baha’s play, it is really hard to discover original literary
and propagandistic texts. Therefore it will be better for us to focus
on Gökalp’s literary production on this issue, as we did above during
the discussion of his “Red Epic” poem. Gökalp had actually published
poems connecting religion ad nationalism since the first Balkan War. His
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poems on the religion-nationalism connection were published in dailies
and magazines between 1913 and 1918. He published his first poetry
compilation, Kızılelma (Red Apple), in 1914 and the poems he wrote
and published after that date were compiled into a second book, Yeni
Hayat (New Life) in 1918. Due to his changing ideological proclivities
and political agenda, his first book is more agitative and propagandist,
while the second book is composed of cooler poems that aim at defining
and organizing national life.
Gökalp’s first poem in Kızılelma about Islam and Turkism is “Polvan
Veli”, a 16-quatrain narrative poem in which an epic and heroic fairy tale
is told. The ruler of India sends the most famous wrestler of the country,
Devpençe (giant paw), to Turkistan to challenge and defeat the Turkish
wrestler Polvan Veli. The Khwarezm Khan in Khiva is not a Muslim
and does not like the Muslim Polvan Veli’s Islamization of the people.
Therefore he sees this match as an opportunity to get rid of Polvan Veli
and announces that the defeated wrestler will be executed. Devpençe,
on the other hand, is also a Muslim and Polvan Veli learns this in the
mosque where Devpençe’s mother is praying for her son’s success. Polvan
Veli decides to lose the match in order to save a co-religionist. Yet, an
accident happens during the wrestling and Polvan Veli saves the khan’s
life. Because of this incident, the khan and all the Turan people become
Muslim.
Gökalp had formerly published this poem in Halka Doğru (towards
the people) magazine in 11 April 1913. There are specific phrases in the
poem such as “Muhammad’s lion”, “Muslim hero”, “warrior” (mücahit)
and “divine guidance” (ilahi irşat). Although the poem does not contain
explicit Jihad propaganda, it seems like an early harbinger of Jihad
propaganda due to its affirmation of Turks’ early convertion to Islam,
thus associating Islam with Turkish nationalism. Obviously, Gökalp
uses the religion and nationalism connection as an agitation tool that
will resonate easily with public opinion due to the Balkan War’s social
psychological depression. Similarly, his poem “Asker Duası” (soldier’s
pray) which was first published in Halka Doğru in 16 May 1913 is a typical
example of this situation. We see a praying soldier in this poem who
wishes for the wellbeing of his fatherland and religion. His road is gaza
(holy war) and the ultimate destination is martyrdom; his banner is
tawhid (tevhid, oneness) and his flag is the crescent. We can infer from
this relatively early poem why Islam and Turkish-ness become synoyms
in subsequent Jihad propaganda.
Themerging of religion and nationalismwas sealed byGökalp after the
outbreak of the war in Europe in his “Tawhid” poem. He first published
this poem in Tanin on 14 August 1914 and declared that no dissent would
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be tolerated in this new period: “There cannot be several souls in the
country, / or more than one conscience, / a beloved cannot be shared,
/ there is no God but God! // There is an exuberance of bodies, / but
hearts are united, / there is no individual but society! / there is no God
but God!”²⁹
Actually Gökalp predicts the proclamation of Jihad in “Türkün
Tekbiri” (The Turk’s Allahu Akbar) which was published even before the
above poem, on 9August 1914, and threemonths before the proclamation:
God’s will,
Sprang from the people,
We proclaimed the jihad,
God is great …
We obeyed the banner,
Came to the far,
to the old country,





Praises to God …³⁰ (p. 60)
It seems that the proclamation of Jihad was discussed in cup quarters and
this dream was merged with the Turan ideal, yet there was no mention
of Egypt’s conquest at that time.
Beside this and other similar poems, the most detailed poem about
Jihad from this period was the “Red Epic” that was discussed above.
Actually, Gökalp’s use of the word Jihad stopped after these poems.
The poems he compiled in 1918’s Yeni Hayat were the poems that were
written and published after 1915. His poem entitled “Religion”, which
was published in Tanin on 20 January 1915 under the title of “Religion
according to a Turk”, is a typical example of how Gökalp and other
Turkists thought of religion: “My religion is neither hope nor fear; / I
worship my God because of love! / Without a fear of paradise or hell, I
do my duty”³¹ This is the opening quatraine of the poem and we see here
that religion was only a social glue in Gökalp’s solidarist nationalism. He
demotes the complex nature of religion into a simple emotion of affection.
Here, religion is only a tool for creating social affection and harmony in
the future nation-state’s “new” national life. We know that Gökalp and
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other Turkists developed and inseminated this interpretation towards
Islam mainly in Islam periodical and advocated the construction of the
specific Turkish version of secularism through legal regulations until
1918. Hence, the great number of poems about religion in Gökalp’s Yeni
Hayat. Those poems were prescriptive texts proclaiming how religion
should be.
Yeni Hayat’s poem most related to the idea of Jihad is “Union of Islam”
(İslâm İttihadı) (p. 129). Gökalp publishes this poem for first time in this
book and it is an argumentative, essay-like poem like most of the poems
in the book. He opens the poem with a definition of what a caliph is
not: the caliph is not a sovereign-pope, neither a pope who acts like a
ruler, nor a Dalai Lama, nor the Tsar who rules his country’s church with
power. The caliph is the ruler of an imaginary state that embraces all
Muslims. There are independent khans but they are all affliated with
the caliph. He is de jure the sultan of all Islamic sultans and de facto
the sultan of the Turkish country. For an Islamic unification, first every
Muslim state should gain its own independence, then it should obey
the orders of the caliph in order to form a political unity. If this is not
possible at the present time, the caliph should put this dream aside and
improve his own country. “We need to establish at first the foundation of
a contemporary [he means modern here] state”, he says and concludes
the poem indicating the necessity of being strong in the international
sphere in order to be effective. Therefore unity of Islam is a far away
dream and the caliphate is only a de jure position. Obviously this is not
important for Gökalp, as the most important things for him are the
nation and nationality. As a result, he minimizes the importance of the
power of religion for the sake of the construction of national life. Islam is
nothing more than a useful vehicle for Turkish nationalism after that
time and it would never be an autonomous power. Thus, it becomes
easier to understand why the issue of Jihad proclamation was abandoned
easily in literature and in the areas of propaganda.
It seems that the issue of Islamic unification and Jihad were used as
levers in order to get the support of their ally Germany. It was abandoned
after a while, even long before the Arab Revolt. Similarly, it was used
in order to agitate Ottoman citizens during the period between August
and November 1914, when public opinion was being prepared for the
war. Obviously, Turkist elites did not think very differently from Tevfik
Fikret about the usefulness of the Jihad idea, but they were not direct and
honest like him. The only person who approached this issue seriously was
the literary leader of Islamists in Istanbul, Mehmet Akif. His approach,
however, was more traditional, deeper or perhaps more authentically
religious than the Turkists’. He was interested in the brotherhood of
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umma. We see an idealism of Islamic umma in Mehmet Akif ’s poems,
which is very realistic. Even when he was part of the Jihad propaganda
mechanism during his official visit to Germany to make propaganda
for the Muslim prisoners of war in German camps, he was far from
romanticism and exaggeration. His “Islamic brotherhood” approach
would be passed on to the national struggle movement in Anatolia after
the defeat in the First World War. Yet this war would also end eventually
and Islam’s agitative effect would be redundant. This deep-rooted Islamic
brotherhood propaganda, just like the Jihad propaganda that stormed the
country for a short while, would be abandoned by the new nation-state’s
elites and the establishment of a new secular state would start.
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7 Gendering Jihad
Ottoman Muslim Women and War
during the Early Twentieth Century*
Nicole van Os
Women may go out to serve the community in a number of situations,
the most important being:
) Jihad (by appointment) – if the enemy is attacking her country and
the men are not enough to protect it and the imams give a fatwa
for it, as the blessed women of Iraq and Chechnya did, with great
sadness, if the men are absent even [sic] they are present.¹
Introduction
In November 1914 the fatwas issued by the Shaykh ül Islam Hayri
Efendi, in which Muslims were called upon to take up arms against
those who attacked Islam, who seized and looted Muslim countries and
who made the Muslim populations captive, were read to an audience of
allegedly almost 100,000 Muslims at the Fatih Mosque in Istanbul.
In the very first of these fatwas it becomes clear who should get
engaged in the struggle against the attackers: “all Muslims, … young
and old, cavalry and infantry, … Muslims from anywhere”. Their
contribution to the struggle, moreover, should be not just “financial”
but also “physical.”² Whom did he mean when referring to “all Muslims,
young and old”? Did he include Muslim women? The words “cavalry
and infantry” rather point at the contrary. This is confirmed in the
address to the army and navy a few days after these fatwas by Sultan
Mehmet Reşat v. He addressed in particular those serving in his army
and his navy, addressing them as his “heroic soldiers” (kahraman
askerlerim) and his “soldier-sons” (asker evladlarım).³ His address,
moreover, was followed by a text from the military commander, Enver
Pasha.⁴
A week later in the same periodical in which the texts of the
fatwas and the other texts were published. However, Shaykh Salih Şerif
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Tunusi explicitly included women in an article published in a dia-
lectic form of questions and answers:
q – What is the extent of jihad when enemies like these attack us?
a – For all Muslims; male, female … non-breadwinner, breadwinner …
infantry, cavalry … for all believers jihad becomes a duty applicable
to all (farz-ı ayn) when our enemies such as the French, English, and
Russian attack us like that from all sides.⁵
But what did he expect women to do? What were Ottoman Muslim
women expected to do when the call for Jihad was issued in November
1914? Were they to contribute physically or financially? Or were there
other ways in which they could and should contribute? The sources
are rather silent regarding this. At the time the Jihad was declared
hardly any women’s periodicals appeared. Authors in other periodicals or
newspapers did not seem interested in posing, let alone, answering these
questions. Why not? Why was the need to discuss the role of women in
Jihad not felt? And if this need was not felt, how did men and women
know what women could and should do? What did they do during World
War i? Howwere these activities justified even if theymeant transgressing
the existing gender divisions?
Presents for the Soldiers
While women in general were not supposed to be part of the military
force as such, Ottoman Muslim women were explicitly called upon to
contribute to the military effort as civilians as early as the 1870s, when
the Ottoman Empire was fighting off insurgents in the Balkan provinces
and Russia.
A few months after the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina
broke out in July 1875 and Ottoman soldiers were sent to quash it, an
anonymous author made a direct appeal to Ottoman (Muslim) women
in the Thessalonian women’s periodical Ayine:
Our soldiers are struggling in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sacrificing their
lives to defend us and our homeland against the enemies. Although our
soldiers, thanks to the kindness of our Sultan, have more than sufficient
drinks, food and clothing at their disposal and do not need anything
else, it occurred to us that we also should send a present in the name of
the fatherland (vatan) from here to feel good and to show that we love
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our soldiers as our beloved ones, because we saw in the newspapers
that in Istanbul some are collecting and donating ‘woollen jackets’
(hırka), others ‘flannel undershirts’ (fanila) and ‘short bodied coats’
(nimten), that is, ‘heavy outer shirts’ (mintan) and we felt it would be
appropriate if we would, within the limits of our possibilities, also do
such a thing.⁶
The wording chosen in this appeal seems to stress the rather secular
character of the donations. The readers were asked to “send a present in
the name of the fatherland” to soldiers who did not need anything. As
such the donations were explicitly dissociated from the Islamic context
of zakat (alms) and sadaka (voluntary alms) and turned into hediye
(presents) and iane (donations). In this way it became possible to address
not only the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but also the non-
Muslims and ask them to contribute.
A few days after Serbia declared war on 1 July 1876 the French daily
Stamboul called upon women to join forces and collect money and goods
for war victims with a reference to “the miracles of devotion which we
have been able to admire in the other capitals of Europe.”⁷ That same
day, the Ottoman Turkish newspaper Vakit (Time) published an article
praising Armenian women in Erenköy, because they had founded an
organization to produce surgical materials and night- and underwear for
the sick and wounded.⁸ A day later, the same newspaper called upon
Ottoman Muslim women not to fall behind “our Christian compatriots,”
(hıristiyan vatandaşlarımız) and to establish an organization with five or
ten women.⁹ A few days later the newspapers announced to its readers
that such a committee had indeed be formed in Istanbul.¹⁰ Subsequently
women in Thessalonica were called upon not to stay behind, and the
establishing of a committee under the presidency of the wife of the
governor of Thessalonica was announced.¹¹
The (very) short Greek-Ottoman war of 1897 was another occasion on
which Ottoman Muslim women became actively involved in fundraising
to support not only war orphans, but also wounded soldiers and their
families. A “Donation Committee of Ottoman Ladies” (Muhadderat-ı
Osmaniye İane Komisyonu) was formed under the presidency of the
daughter of the Grand Vezir.¹² For several weeks, lists containing the
names of generous donors, male and female, and the amounts of their
donations to the committee were published in the “Ladies’ Gazette”
(Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete).¹³ Women belonging to families from the
ruling elites, national or local, thus became instrumental in involving
Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim, in campaigns to the benefit
of the Ottoman military.
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The committees mentioned above seem to have been short-lived. The
Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 opened the way to the establishment
of longer lasting organizations. Immediately after the Young Turk Revo-
lution Ottoman women, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, in cities such
as Istanbul, Edirne and Thessalonica became engaged in associational
work to support the soldier-heroes of the revolution. They had, in their
eyes, been maltreated under the old regime and continued to defend
the Ottoman Empire, not only against the traditional forces who staged
a counter-revolution in April 1909, but also against the continuously
imminent external threats. Ottoman women contributed together with
men by donating money and goods to the many local, neighbourhood-
based charitable organizations (cemiyet-i hayriye) that were established
in Istanbul,¹⁴ while women also established all-female committees and
organizations. Through these committees and organizations women
donated in particular all sorts of textiles: warm underwear, socks and
padded vests and other clothes against the winter cold; bedding, dressing
materials and shirts for the wounded soldiers.
Women of all creeds participated in these organizations and commit-
tees. An organization founded in Edirne in December 1908 by Emine
Semiye, daughter of Cevdet Pasha, Hizmet-i Nisvan Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi
(Women’s Service Charitable Organization), for example, consisted of
ten Muslim members and six non-Muslim members. Muslim as well as
Christian women generously donated to the organization padded vests
for the Ottoman soldiers.¹⁵ During the war against Italy (September
1911–October 1912) existing women’s organizations in, for example, Thes-
salonica turned their charitable work from supporting schoolgirls and
poor families to donating bedding, dressings and clothing to soldiers.¹⁶
In the aftermath of the counter-revolution of April 1909, to mention
one more example, the Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi (Ottoman
Women’s Charitable Organization) was one of the first organizations
founded explicitly by 30 women from prominent Ottoman and foreign
families in Istanbul with the aim of improving the situation of Ottoman
soldiers by focusing on the improvement of the situation in hospitals.¹⁷
These activities in general did not raise questions regarding impropri-
ety. The Ottoman (Muslim) women donating these goods belonged to
the families of civil servants and bureaucrats and purchased the goods
they donated or produced them themselves within the confines of their
homes. The goods were not handed to the soldiers directly, but through
intermediaries. Initially newspapers that functioned as propaganda plat-
forms carried out this function, but soon organizations such as the Red
Crescent, which was founded in April 1911, took over the coordinating
role. The army and its soldiers, therefore, remained at a comfortable
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distance and demanded no direct involvement from the women, although
some would have liked this to be different. “Unlike our brave foremothers
we cannot fight on the battlefield; we are deprived of the honour to
fight our enemies face to face” complained the ardent nationalist Nezihe
Muhlis in a letter to the daily Tercüman-ı Hakikat (Interpreter of the
Truth), which was reproduced on the bulletin board of the Ottoman
Fleet Organization during the Tripolitanian War.¹⁸
The Balkan Wars, however, brought war and the soldiers literally
closer to women in the main urban areas of Thessalonica and Istanbul.
Balkan Wars
During the first years after the Young Turk Revolution tension between
the Ottoman Empire and its Balkan neighbours had been building up
slowly bur irreversibly. Immediately after 1908 Bulgaria had been con-
fronted with an economic boycott, because it had declared independence
and annexed the previously autonomous province of East Rumelia. Goods
from Austria-Hungary were also boycotted, because it had annexed
Bosnia-Herzegovina. These boycotts were followed by another one as a
result of the crises around Crete. This boycott of 1910–1911 was actually
directed against Greece, but also affected relations between the Ottoman
Muslims and the Ottoman Greek Orthodox (Rum).¹⁹
The popular press proved to be instrumental in both creating public
awareness and calling upon that public to take action. During these
boycotts, the popular press published numerous calls from both the
editors but also the public to participate in them. Both boycotts found
a large public response. Since women’s periodicals formed an intrinsic
part of that popular press from the last quarter of the nineteenth century
onwards, and since women constituted a considerable part of the public
that was addressed, women also actively participated in the discussions:
female authors actively called upon their readers to refrain from buying
boycotted wares.
The boycotts contributed to the rising political tension which even-
tually led to the Balkan Wars. On 2 October 1912, Greece, Serbia,
Montenegro and Bulgaria, which had joined forces in the Balkan League,
demanded that the Ottomans implement reforms in Macedonia to,
amongst other aims, improve the situation of the non-Muslim population
in that province. The ultimatum evoked the reaction of the Ottoman
public in Istanbul.
On 4October 1912 ameeting took place at the Hippodrome in Istanbul
(Sultan Ahmet) where war was demanded. Although the majority of
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Figure 7.1 “Another picture of the war manifestations at Sultan Ahmet,” Servet-i
Fünun, 1114, 27 Eylül 1328 (10 October 1912), 508
the participants were male, women were certainly not absent, as some
photographs published in Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Science) show. A
few days later on 8 October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out. It ended
formally on 20 May 1913, to be followed immediately by the Second
Balkan War which broke out on 16 June 1913 and lasted until 18 July 1913.
During these wars women’s voices were not absent in the press. They
were, together with men, publicly debating what to do.
So, for example, Mehmed Ubeydullah in an article in Türk Yurdu
(Turkish Home) argued that the religious traditions (hadith) included
many examples of women who had actively participated in war. Taking
part in war was, he stated, a communal duty which, if observed by some,
would absolve the others who did not observe it ( farz-ı kifaye). For
children, women, the blind and other “impaired” people, however, it was
neither necessary (vacib), nor proper (caiz) to participate in war. On the
other hand, if the enemy attacked, he wrote, taking part in the war became
an individual duty applicable to all ( farz-ı ayn). In such a case a woman
did not even have to ask permission from her husband to participate
in the war according to his interpretation of the religious laws relating to
this subject. Since the Balkan War had started with the Ottomans being
attacked, Ottoman women had to take up their duty in his view.²⁰
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What exactly it was they should do he did not say. Beyond discussion,
however, was the idea that Ottoman Muslim women had to make a
contribution to the war in one way or another. By this time, the Ottoman
Red Crescent had established its women’s central committee, Hilal-i
AhmerHanımlar Heyet-iMerkeziyesi.²¹This committee would in due time
play a pivotal role in the war-time activities of Ottoman women together
with the Müdafaa-i Milliye Osmanlı Hanımlar Heyeti (Ottoman Women’s
Committee for National Defence), the women’s branch of the Müdafaa-i
Milliye Cemiyeti (National Defence Organization). This organization had
been founded at the instigation of the cup following the coup of January
1913.²² Abdullah Cevdet, at the time cited its aims briefly as “[to] collect
donations, register volunteers, enlighten the minds of the people.”²³ As
such the organization served as a well-lubricated propaganda machine,
reaching into the farthest corners of the Empire, consciously trying
also to involve the not always compliant non-Muslim population and
women.²⁴ Within a few weeks after its establishment local women’s
branches had been set up not only in various parts of Istanbul, such as
Beşiktaş,²⁵ and Makriköy,²⁶ but also in Bursa,²⁷ Trabzon,²⁸ Ankara,²⁹
Diyarbekir³⁰ and Izmir.³¹ Women in these branches organized patriotic
meetings with female speakers and collected money and goods. The
Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti and the Red Crescent cooperated closely and
seem to have worked out a division of labour between them: the former
supported in particular the soldiers in the field and their families, the
latter those who were wounded or ill. Both organizations turned into the
major coordinating institutions for those women who, during the Balkan
Wars and later during World War i, increasingly became involved in the
“industry” of war donations as individuals and in organizations.
While the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti and its women’s branches were
established relatively late to play a major role during the BalkanWars, this
was not the case for the Women’s Centre of the Red Crescent. Within a
few days after the First BalkanWar erupted, it actively called uponwomen
to sew underwear for the wounded soldiers, distributed cloth to this aim
and also provided patterns which women could use. The materials could
be picked up from the Red Crescent Headquarters, but the sewing was
supposed to take place in the private homes of the women.³²
TheHilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti received 30 per cent of themoney collected
by the Makriköy İane-i Harbiye Komisyonu (Makriköy War Donations’
Committee), which had been founded immediately after the start of the
Balkan Wars³³ and which had a separate women’s branch, the Makriköy
İane-i Harbiye Kadınlar Komisyonu (Makriköy War Donations Women’s
Committee) presided over by Fehime Nüzhet, a well-known author and
speaker at patriotic rallies.³⁴
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Women and women’s organizations not only actively participated in
producing linen and bandages for the Red Crescent, but they also opened
and equipped hospitals for wounded soldiers brought in from the front
lines. The Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti (Organization for the Advancement of
Women), for example, opened a small hospital with 100 beds, which it
kept going for two months.³⁵ The members of the Kadıköy Donanma-yı
Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Hanımlar Şubesi (Kadıköy Ladies’ Branch of
the National Support for the Ottoman Fleet) spent close to 1,000 lira
of the money they collected on establishing a hospital with 100 beds at
the building of the Osmanlı İttihad Mektebi (Ottoman Union School) in
Haydarpasha, while the Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi equipped
a ward with 300 beds at the Şişli Etfal Hastanesi (Şişli Children’s Hospital)
and donated the wherewithall for 100 beds to the hospital in the Taşkışla
barracks.³⁶ According to Messadet Bedir-Khan, women opened in total
12 hospitals during the Balkan Wars including the hospital of the Teali-i
Nisvan Cemiyeti, a hospital at a former school in Haydarpasha, plus one
in Erenköy with 60 beds and one in Kadırga with 200 beds. The figures
she gives may be exaggerated, though. Her statement that more than
5,000 “Musulmanes” had worked as sick attendants during the Balkan
Wars certainly was.³⁷
Between the end of 1908 and October 1912, several initiatives were
taken by the military authorities at the Gülhane military hospital to
educate Ottoman women to become sick attendants in order to employ
them at military hospitals. While a limited number of Ottoman women
indeed attended these early courses, it remains unclear whether any
Muslim women were amongst them. Moreover, the women attending
seem to have used their newly required knowledge not to nurse strange
men in hospitals, but to take care of the sick and ill at home in a more
professional way. By the time the Balkan states had mobilized for war
and the declaration of war was imminent, the Red Crescent took a first
initiative to provide courses for sick attendants.
Having seen the not wholly successful efforts of the Gülhane hospital,
Dr. Besim Ömer Pasha, who also had been involved in the foundation of
the Red Crescent and its women’s centre, started to try to convince the
Board of the Red Crescent of the need to establish a so-called hastahane-
mektebi (hospital with training facilities) where male and female sick
attendants could be trained. Although the Board did not allow him
to build new premises to that end, he was allocated some space at the
Kadırga hospital to set up such a hospital-school to train ten women.
These women would be sent to families in need of sick attendants and
thus not employed at hospitals.³⁸ The classes were announced in the
newspapers and both men and women were invited to apply.³⁹ The school
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was closed down, however, before it could even get started, because the
premises were needed for the wounded soldiers from the Balkan Wars.
The Kadırga hospital, however, was one of the few hospitals where
nine Muslim women were able to work as hospital attendants during the
Balkan Wars; four of them Tatar women students from Russia who had
initially come to the Ottoman Empire to work as volunteers to support
the Red Crescent and “to wake up their Ottoman Muslim sisters.”⁴⁰
The reason this particular hospital seems to have been one of the
first to employ Muslim sick attendants was probably that it used to be a
maternity ward which was also used for educating midwives who, during
their first year, also had to take courses in nursing. Obviously the women
working there stayed on when the birth clinic was turned into an actual
hospital with male patients due to the war.
The work of the women in this hospital must have inspired Besim
Ömer to undertake another effort to organize professional education
for nurses. In February 1913 women were once more invited by the
Hilal-i Ahmer to apply to attend a six month course. The women had to
be healthy and between 25 and 35 years of age, able to read and write
(without a specification of what language) and prepared to serve for
at least five years with the Hilal-i Ahmer. They would receive food and
clothes and a small payment if they attended the courses for six months
and participated in the practical exercises.⁴¹ How many women applied
remains unclear.
The lack of interest in these courses did not mean that there were no
female sick attendants and nurses in Ottoman hospitals. Several sources
refer to a clear majority of foreign women working as volunteers.⁴² At the
Kandilli hospital, for example, founded at the palace of Celâleddin Bey⁴³
with a capacity of 50 beds, not Ottoman women, but two soeurs, and a
few English and French women worked as volunteers.⁴⁴ Although the
total number of professional sick attendants remained limited and the
majority of them were probably foreign or non-Muslim, some “Turkish
andMuslim”women seem to haveworked as volunteers during the Balkan
Wars at the hospitals in Istanbul.⁴⁵ Servet-i Fünun, for example, published
photographs of Muslim women at work at Gülhane and Haydarpasha
hospitals during the BalkanWars, referred to as hanımlarımız (our ladies)
and les dames turques (the Turkish ladies) in the captions in Ottoman
Turkish and French, respectively.⁴⁶
Moreover, it is not always clear from the sources whether the women
involved in caring for the wounded were Ottoman or foreign, Muslim or
non-Muslim. We know that some of the members of the Teali-i Nisvan
Cemiyeti were actively involved in working at the hospital founded by the
organization.⁴⁷ Some of the members of the Osmanlı Kadınlar Cemiyet-i
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Figure 7.2 “A room at the Gülhane hospital where one sees Turkish women as
nurses for the first time” [Une salle de l’hôpital de Kulhané oú on voit pour la
première fois les dames turques en infirmières], Servet-i Fünun, no. 1118, (25
Teşrinievvel 1328/7 November 1912)
Hayriyesi also actively participated in the nursing of a total of 300
wounded soldiers and 60 wounded officers for a period of six months
during the Balkan Wars.⁴⁸ It remains unknown, though, whether the
members of these organizations working as sick attendants included
Muslim women or not.
Ottoman Muslim Women and the Declaration of Jihad
By the time the Jihad was declared in November 1914, Ottoman women,
Muslim and non-Muslim, had been involved in activities supporting
the military and soldiers for many, many years. There was no need to
ask whether they should or should not participate in the war effort and
there was little discussion on what they should do. Despite the occasional
reference inOttoman periodicals and newspapers of the period to women
battling side by side with men in history and contemporaneously, taking
up weapons and fighting in the forefront was not what was expected
from Ottoman women.
The women’s periodical Kadınlar Dünyası (Women’s World) of
19 December 1914, however, did carry a picture of women in military
gendering jihad 163
Figure 7.3 “If the Fatherland wants it, women can become soldiers
too” [Vatan isteyince kadın da asker olur], Kadınlar Dünyası, 155, 6
Kanunuevvel 1330 (19 December 1914), frontpage. The women in the
picture rather look like British female volunteers from the Voluntary
Aid Detachment. Their uniforms have been Ottomanized by adding
badges with a star and crescent.
dress on its cover. The outfit of the women, who look very much like
women belonging to the British Voluntary Aid Detachment, an agency
sending off female volunteers, had been Ottomanized by the addition
of badges with a star and crescent (Fig. 7.3). A few months earlier, in
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July 1914, the periodical had featured an article on women and military
service. In this article, the editors of the Kadınlar Dünyası referred to the
women in the early days of Islam who participated in battles like men,
while they also reminded their readers of Kara Fatma (Black Fatma),
who “hiding her gender, succeeded in getting the rank of captain due
to her courage and effort” in the Crimean War.⁴⁹ An unknown author
writing in Türk Yurdu, moreover, referred to the Turkish past of the
Ottomans: “[a]ccording to Turkish customs, women take part in war
and battle side by side with the ruler.”⁵⁰ It is indeed not unlikely that at
least some Ottoman (Muslim) women got involved in fighting. Women,
often cross-dressing to hide their gender, are known to have participated
in battles in many places and eras.⁵¹ Some female warriors are known
to have fought alongside Ottoman soldiers in the various wars of the
nineteenth century.⁵² Other women actively participated in the struggles
to oust the foreign forces which had occupied parts of Anatolia after the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War i.⁵³
While the women active during the nineteenth century and those
fighting during theWar of Independence have taken their place in Turkish
(and Kurdish) historiography, the period of World War i proves to be a
blind spot. Both Kadınlar Dünyası and Welt des Islams, for example, refer
to an article fromTanin according towhich a group of 100women – partly
with and partly without weapons – took to the battlefield in Erzurum.⁵⁴
Further research may reveal more on women who actively took up their
weapons to fight the enemy.
Despite the picture of the female volunteers and the reference to the
women in Erzurum, the editors of Kadınlar Dünyası do not seem to have
favoured women’s active participation on the battlefield. In the first edi-
torial in December 1914 after a break of four months due to the shortage
of paper, Ulviye Mevlan, the publisher of the periodical, made this clear.
Although, “Ottoman women will and can fulfill their duty to the father-
land including taking up the weapons”, she wrote, “today our brave sons,
our hero soldiers do not want their women, their mothers, their sisters
to take up weapons.” While she claimed that the most important duty
of women in these days was to give birth to children to create a stronger
army, she also made clear that “women’s duties will become more serious,
thousands of women will feel the compulsion and the need to work either
for the Red Crescent or – not counting as [working] at the front, but
in reality not less dangerous than it – the services. … There is no doubt
women will play a large role.”⁵⁵ Thus, just before the periodical stopped
appearing, the editors sent a telegraph to Enver Pasha to inform him
that he could count on their active support.⁵⁶ What did these and other
Ottoman women do? They simply did what they had been doing before.
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Figure 7.4 Women of the Hilal-i Ahmer Hanımlar Heyet-i Merkeziyesi at work,
Servet-i Fünun, 28 Mayıs 1331 (10 June 1915), 68
The scale of their activities changed, though. World War i, with its
wholesale mobilization, increased the need for military uniforms even
more. No longer could textiles or uniforms be imported. The Ottoman
army had to fall back on the resources in its own country in order to equip
its soldiers.⁵⁷ The efforts to develop local industries were not enough
and the authorities called upon the population of the Ottoman Empire
to contribute through the mediation of the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti
and the Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti and its Kadınlar Merkezi. The appeal
was not made in vain: the newspapers reported daily about the generous
and patriotic gifts from citizens all over the empire and several women’s
organizations which had been founded with different aims turned their
activities to production for the army.
A returning phenomenonwas the campaigns for “winter presents.”The
first onewas launched by the Istanbul governorshipwith an advertisement
on 15 September 1914.⁵⁸ A few days later the Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti
Kadınlar Merkezi issued a declaration asking the public to donate “winter
presents” in casu clothing like warm underwear, vests, socks and gloves.⁵⁹
While the girls and women at its Hilal-i Ahmer Hanımlar Darüssınaası
(Red Crescent Ladies’ Crafsworkhome) turned from producing fine
needlework to sewing winter clothes and knitting socks, The Red
Crescent’s Women’s Centre also called upon its members repeatedly to
come to its home to participate in the work or to do so at home.⁶⁰
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Moreover, it successfully called upon women all over the country to
establish local women’s branches of the Red Crescent and to set to work.
In quite a few towns in Anatolia the wives of local governors or other
high bureaucrats established such branches and presided over them.⁶¹
The “winter present” campaign was highly successful: the Müdafaa-
i Milliye Cemiyeti, which collected the goods and distributed them,
reported regularly that it received large numbers of gifts from towns all
over the empire.⁶² Subsequently, the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti renewed
the invitation to the Ottoman public to donate “winter presents” for
soldiers during the Gallipoli Campaign, at the end of the summer of 1915
with a new winter coming up.⁶³
Besides the women of the Red Crescent and the National Defence
Organization several women’s organizations answered these calls and
also set to work. In October 1914, the Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti organized
a concert combined with lectures whose “yield [was] meant for the
purchase of warm underwear for the army.”⁶⁴ The women of the Türk
Kadınları Biçki Yurdu co-operated closely with the Defence Organization.
Its pupils and alumnae produced tens of thousands of pieces of underwear
for the army. They were partly produced from materials delivered by the
Defence Organization. To be able to deal with the demand, they even
invited women who wanted to participate in sewing to come and work at
their workshops for a salary.⁶⁵
The girls and women working at the workshops of the organization
which had been founded to stimulate the consumption of locally
produced goods, the Mamulat-ı Dahiliye İstihlaki Kadınlar Cemiyet-i
Hayriyesi, and those who worked for the organization in their own homes
were set to work and produced more than 100,000 pairs of socks and
other pieces for the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti instead of fancy dresses
for Ottoman ladies.⁶⁶ A photograph taken in one of the organization’s
workshops shows the women working on navy caps.⁶⁷
This organization also decided to set up its own hospital close to its
shop and workshop in old Istanbul, which was financed by the incomes
generated by the shop and workshops. In the end the total number of
beds at this hospital was 150. The organization, moreover, donated a field
hospital with 300 beds and necessities.⁶⁸ In May 1916 the hospital was
closed for unclear reasons. Subsequently, the organization assisted in
the opening of another hospital, Zapyon Askeri Hastahanesi (Zapyon
Military Hospital), by providing a fully equipped hospital ward with 150
beds.⁶⁹
Other organizations also took hospitals under their wing.The Osmanlı
Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi continued its work at the Şişli Etfal Has-
tanesi, but also worked for the former Russian hospital in Nişantaşı,
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Figure 7.5 Women at work at one of the workshops of the Mamulat-ı Dahiliye
İstihlaki Kadınlar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi. “Women’s fate and women’s work: Letter
of a young Turkish woman from Constantinopel,” Die Islamische Welt, i, 7, 1917,
380–383.
which had been turned into the Pangaltı Military Hospital to nurse
wounded soldiers brought in from Çanakkale.⁷⁰ The supplies for the
hospital were partly obtained through the Mecruhin-i Gaza-ı Asakir-i
Osmaniye İane Komisyonu (Committee for Donations to the Wounded
Ottoman Gazi Soldiers) which was founded under the auspices of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the battles in Çanakkale had started and
wounded soldiers had started to pour into Istanbul.⁷¹This Committee was
not only central to the collection and allocation of money and supplies
donated from abroad, but also seems to have served as an intermediary
to order materials from especially Austria-Hungary until this was no
longer possible in September 1916.⁷²
This committee also sent several articles including bales of cloth to be
turned into bedding to the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti Kadıköy Merkezi
Hanımlar Şubesi (Women’s Branch of the Kadıköy Centre of the National
Defence Organization)⁷³ which was closely involved with the “Botter”
Hospital in Kadıköy,⁷⁴ as we learn from the correspondence between
women from the organization including its president, Reşide Bekir, the
widow of the famous confectioner Hacı Bekirzade Muhittin, and the
committee.⁷⁵
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While many of the goods produced by the women reached the soldiers
and the wounded in the hospitals through intermediary organizations,
the newspapers also reported on individual women from the Istanbul
elite and women’s organizations who visited the soldiers in the hospitals
to bring them more luxury products such as chocolate, oranges and
cigarettes. Before World War i this was rare, but the upsurge of patriotism
due to the influx of wounded men from Çanakkale seems to have been
the major drive behind women’s taking this step, including those for
whom seclusion had been rather strict until then: women of the Ottoman
imperial dynasty. The very visibility of war brought home took women
even a step further beyond the traditional gender borders: an increasing
number of Ottoman Muslim took the courses offered by the Red Crescent
to become sick attendants over the years and actuallyworked as volunteers
or paid staff in the hospitals in Istanbul and beyond.
Only a few months after the Balkan Wars had ended, in February 1914,
the Red Crescent announced the start of a course for nursing aids which
would consist of 18 lessons of two hours each on Fridays and Sundays.⁷⁶
Between 40 and 50 women participated in the course and at the end of
the five month course 27 women successfully took the exam. These 27
women, who were all wives and daughters of prominent Ottoman officials
and Muslim, received their certificate during a ceremony in the presence
of the First Kadın of the Sultan, of Naciye Sultan, granddaughter of Sultan
Abdülmecid and the wife of Enver Pasha, and her mother and other
palace women.⁷⁷ In his speech at the ceremony Besim Ömer stressed the
importance of the event and pointed out that these women served as
examples to counter any social resistance the professional nursing school
the Hilal-i Ahmer wanted to establish might generate.⁷⁸
Understanding that the involvement of Ottoman Muslim women in
the nursing of wounded males would mean a serious transgression of
existing gender norms for which it would not be easy to create public
support, the Red Crescent made conscious efforts to massage public
opinion into accepting this shift. Firstly, it continued to organize courses
for women belonging to the Ottoman establishment who wanted to
serve as voluntary nursing aids. Secondly, it launched a strong public
campaign through regular dispatches of announcements, messages and
communiqués to the newspapers, themany public lectures of BesimÖmer
and other members of the Hilal-i Ahmer, the publication of photographs
and articles in popular magazines such as Servet-i Fünun by popular
authors like Fatma Aliye, and the “vulgarization of the work of the Red
Crescent through illustrated post cards.”⁷⁹ Meanwhile, Besim Ömer in
particular continued to try to establish schools for those who wanted to
work as volunteers, but also for professional sick attendants and nurses.
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Figure 7.6 Fifteen Ottoman Muslim trained nursing aids leaving for the front wearing their travel
outfit. Servet-i Fünun, 31 Mayıs/May 1917, front page
170 jihad and islam in world war i
Despite the continuation of the training of professional sick attendants
cummidwives at Kadırga hospital,⁸⁰ the new courses opening in Istanbul⁸¹
and the founding of schools in Edirne,⁸² Izmir⁸³ and Erzurum, the Hilal-i
Ahmer Cemiyeti Kadınlar Merkezi and Besim Ömer felt that the process
of setting up a proper network of nursing schools within the Ottoman
empire was lagging behind what they had hoped for. Only at the very end
of World War i did Besim Ömer succeed in convincing the Board of the
Red Crescent to allocate money and a building to found such a school.
Still, his diligent work was not left without result: during World War i
a considerable, but still limited,⁸⁴ number of Ottoman (Muslim) women
worked as voluntary nursing aids or professional sick attendants in
the hospitals, initially mostly in the hospitals in Istanbul, but later also
elsewhere in hospitals in the towns of Anatolia and in field hospitals
right behind the front. It is not just the propaganda publications with
their photographs that bear evidence of this, but also the long lists of
the names of women working in the hospitals available in the archives
of the Turkish Red Crescent and the registers containing the names of
those who received a Red Crescent medal.⁸⁵ These registers also show
that the socio-economic background of the women involved in nursing
changed. While the women working in the hospitals during the first
years of World War i seem to have been volunteers belonging to families
of the middle and higher level bureaucracy, the women receiving medals
in the later years seem to have been working to earn their living. These
hospitals offered impoverished women the opportunity to earn a meagre
income and, more importantly, a meal and, sometimes, also housing:
important benefits for women affected by the war.⁸⁶
Conclusion
By the time the Jihad was declared in November 1914, men (and women)
in the Ottoman empire had got used to women’s active participation in
society. As Selma Rıza wrote to those present at the 1914 Conference of
the International Council of Women in Rome, Ottoman women, during
the Balkan Wars:
ha[d] unfolded all the energy, accumulated since long years, to come to
the aid of their compatriots and to take their place in public and social
life. … Their attitude has been so dignified and measured at this start
that even the most severe and retrograde spirits cannot find anything
to reproach them; they have, on the contrary, almost been forced to
recognize the importance of the feminine role in society.⁸⁷
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The question, therefore, was not whether they should contribute to the
war effort. They had been doing so for many, many years. Nor was there
much discussion on what they should do. Over those years, the range
of their activities had been growing slowly but steadily: from simply
donating money and goods in a rather anonymous way, to a more active
involvement in the organization of donation campaigns and the actual
establishment of women’s organizations to the explicit aim of supporting
soldiers and their families. Most of this work could be and was done from
within all-female environments such as the private homes of women or
special locations assigned to them. The public space Selma Rıza referred
to was, in general, an all-female public space guaranteeing the “dignified”
and “measured” attitude which the “retrograde spirits” could hardly
disapprove of. Even the work as nursing aids mostly took place within
the confines of private homes.
Only during World War i did Ottoman Muslim women have to step
out of these all-female environments. Not to become soldiers. Certainly,
rhetoric regarding female soldiers was occasionally used.This rhetoric did
not serve, however, to encourage women to become soldiers themselves.
Rather it was used as a metaphor to show how women had shown their
patriotic love in other times and places and to justify the activities of
women during World War i. These activities such as their work as nursing
aids, after all, more than before meant a transgression of the existing
gender borders. At the same time this work, in which women took
a caring role and as such actually confirmed their femininity rather
than belied it, remained more within these borders than if women
actually had become soldiers. Their Jihad was not a Jihad of armed
struggle, but rather a Jihad of supporting the armed struggle fought by
men.
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8 Architectural Jihad
The “Halbmondlager” Mosque of Wünsdorf
as an Instrument of Propaganda
Martin Gussone
In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architec-
tural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammed-
ans of the camp. … The photographs represent how successful the
Germans were in their propaganda.¹
During World War i two camps for Muslim prisoners of war were
established in Wünsdorf and Zossen about 50km south of Berlin: the
Halbmondlager and the Weinberglager. In the Halbmondlager a mosque
was built and a cemetery for the prisoners was located in the nearby
village of Zehrensdorf. (Fig. 8.1) These efforts were not an end in itself,
but were part of the Jihad concept of the German Intelligence Office for
the East (NfO = Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient). This project intended to
persuade Muslim prisoners of war to change sides and join the Ottoman–
German Alliance against the British and French Entente.
Based on contemporary photos, plans and archival material this
chapter presents an analysis of the history of the two camps and the
mosque, interpreting them as the materialization of Germany’s Jihad
propaganda. The incorporation of the mosque into the Jihad concept
will be demonstrated by the stylistic analysis of its architectural and
epigraphic programme. A brief outline of the propaganda in the camps
and an evaluation of its results complement this overview.²
Special Camps for Muslim Prisoners of War as Part of a Jihad
Concept
Soon after the beginning of the war the number of prisoners reached
an unexpectedly high number.³ Among them were Muslims, because
auxiliary troops from the Indian and African colonies were fight-
ing on the side of the British and the French, whereas the Russians
employed troops from the Crimea, Kazan and the Caucasus.⁴ Ger-
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Figure 8.1 Map of the area south of Berlin where the camps were located, based on topographic
map, ‘Truppenübungsplatz Zossen’, M 1:100.000, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, Berlin 1936
architectural jihad 181
man propaganda criticized this deployment of non-European soldiers,
using racist arguments and chauvinist caricatures and slogans such
as “Circus of the peoples of our enemies” (= ‘Völkerzirkus unserer
Feinde’).⁵
At the same time, however, the German side planned to use the
Muslim prisoners to serve its military and political ends.⁶ In this context
prisoners from North Africa and India were valued more highly than the
prisoners who fought on the side of the Russians.⁷
Just before Turkey’s entry into the war, in September 1914, a group of
selected Muslim prisoners of war was transported to Istanbul, exposing
them as extras in the staging of the declaration of the “Holy War”.⁸
At about that time, in autumn 1914, the renowned archaeologist and
expert on the Near East, Max von Oppenheim, developed the concept
of gathering the Muslim prisoners of war in a special camp,⁹ where
they would be demonstratively well treated, instead of “releasing” (=
deporting) them in great numbers to Turkey as originally planned.¹⁰ The
underlying idea was to stir up the prisoners of war and to initiate a Jihad,
together with the Ottoman Empire, which would be coordinated by the
Intelligence Office for the East.¹¹
The “special treatment” of the Muslim prisoners of war as “guests”
of the German Emperor Wilhelm ii was a propagandistic means to
win sympathy and support for the Central Powers. It referred to the
emperor’s well-known journeys to the “Orient”, his good relationswith the
Ottoman sultan, and his notorious Damascene promise of friendship to
the “300 million Mohammedans” (= “300 Millionen Muhammedaner”).¹²
Moreover, it was intended to motivate Muslim combatants fighting on
the side of the Entente to change sides. Finally, the programme aimed at
incitement to rebellion and turmoil in the English and French colonies
(= “Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde”),¹³ in order
to keep in the colonies forces that were actually needed in European
theatres of war.
For the African/French and Indian/British prisoners of war the so-
called Halbmondlager was erected close to the military facilities of
Wünsdorf about 50km south of Berlin. The Asian/Russian Muslim
prisoners of war were kept in the Weinberglager, near Zossen, situated
approx. 6km to the northeast. Allegedly the camps were built “according
to specified guidelines”, and their planning principles were to comply
with the “character of modern settlements.”¹⁴ In addition, a cemetery for
the deceased inmates of the camps was located in the nearby village of
Zehrensdorf.¹⁵
In its finished condition the Halbmondlager included 50 barracks and
associated outbuildings for 4,000 prisoners. The prisoners were housed
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Figure 8.2a Prisoners of war at Wünsdorf during prayer (Der Große Krieg in
Bildern, 1915, 10 and 17)
Figure 8.2b Plan of the ‘Halbmondlager’ at Wünsdorf, with the mosque in the
middle (section of topographic map 3846, M 1: 25.000, 1920)
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separately, divided “by sects [i.e. religion] and nationalities” in three
distinct areas. According to functional zoning criteria the meeting place
and the mosque with the central bath house were located at the centre of
the camp. The main façade of the mosque was orientated to the south,
aligned with the camp entrance.
The Weinberglager was planned to keep 12,000 prisoners. It included
12 fenced areas with barracks and utilities separated by open spaces, and
three separate special areas. Each of the 12 basic units corresponded to a
battalion of 1,000 men being divided into four barracks and outbuildings.
The three special areas contained washing and bathing facilities with
12 tents, hospital and sick-bay. The entrance was on the west side; the
quarters for the guards and food storage were situated to the south, as in
the case of the Halbmondlager.
The analysis of the layout of both camps and their ratio of occupancy
shows clearly that whereas the camps share similar structures, their
design differs significantly in details. Both camps were divided into
sections for battalions of about 1,000 men, each section being provided
with supply facilities. But whereas the Weinberglager was planned for
a dense occupation with a factor of 60m² camp area per prisoner, the
Halbmondlager had a factor of approximately 103m² camp area per pris-
oner. Moreover, the occupancy rate of the barracks, which was regarded
as the standard of quality,¹⁶ was much higher in the Weinberglager with
200–250 prisoners per barracks, than in the Halbmondlager with 80
inmates per barracks. In addition, it appears that the sanitary facilities in
the Halbmondlager were more generously proportioned than those in
the Weinberglager.
The comparison of the two camps shows that the abovementioned
“planning guidelines” were interpreted differently. Obviously the
demands for the layout of the two camps were measured using double
standards. The Weinberglager, initially occupied by diverse nationalities
with mixed religious affiliation and later mainly designated for Russian
Muslim prisoners, represented the “second class” standard solution,
whereas the Halbmondlager was a privileged flagship facility, intended to
demonstrate the good treatment of Muslim prisoners of war.
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Figure 8.3a Picture of the Weinberg Camp during World War i (Field service
postcard 1917, archive author)
Figure 8.3b Plan of the former Weinberg Camp superimposed on a map of the
area (based on section of topographic map 3746, M 1: 25.000, and plan
of prisoner camp, after August Gärtner, “Einrichtung und Hygiene der
Kriegsgefangenenlager,” in Wilhem Hoffmann, ed., Hygiene. Handbuch der
ärztlichen Erfahrungen im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 7, Leipzig: Barth, 1922, Fig. 50
architectural jihad 185
The Design of the Wünsdorf Mosque – Architecture as Means of
Propaganda
The Wünsdorf mosque is the first mosque in Germany that was planned
for religious functions and use, and that was erected with architectural
ambitions. Although the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries already
saw the creation of several “follies” situated in landscape gardens and
described as “Mosque” or “Moorish Temple”, these structures served as
fancy buildings or staffage architecture and had no religious function.¹⁷
Apart from that it is very likely that existing premises were fitted for
religious use for Muslims who stayed for some time in Germany as the
members of Ottoman embassies (since 1763) or prisoners of war (e.g. 1735
or 1870–1871).¹⁸ In the case of the Wünsdorf Mosque, however, different
prerequisites had to be fulfilled. Particular care was given to its design,
which was deemed to be of particular importance as “the mosque should
not be a construct of fantasy, that agrees with European taste, but may
offend the religious sensibilities of the indigenous.”¹⁹
From the outset the erection of a mosque was part of Max von
Oppenheim’s propaganda concept. He suggested in his memorandum
“Exploitation of Muslim prisoners of war” (= “Benutzung der kriegsge-
fangenen Muhammedaner”, dated 2 October 1914):
One should build a small mosque for them. It will be easy to erect
a cheap timber construction and facilities to perform their religious
obligations (washings)”, furthermore “an appropriate ‘Muhammadan’
clergy (prayer leader) has to be provided for them.²⁰
In his memorandum von Oppenheim possibly incorporated initiatives of
Ottoman representatives as similar proposals had also been communi-
cated by Freiherr von Wangenheim, German ambassador in Istanbul. He
reported in early December 1914 that the Shaykh ül-Islam had expressed
the wish that a mosque for worship should be provided for the Muslim
prisoners of war in Germany.²¹ Soon afterwards, at the end of December
1914, the Foreign Office, the Vice General Staff and the War Ministry
reached an agreement to build a mosque and, after further negotia-
tions, that the funds should be provided by the War Ministry and the
General Staff.²² In the first half of January, the design for the mosque
was developed and sent to the Vice General Staff, together with a cost
estimate, following a meeting in the War Ministry on 17 January, as
mentioned by Rudolf Nadolny, who served as representative of the For-
eign Office at the Vice General Staff and became director of its political
section.²³
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It seems that several variants for the layout of the mosque were
designed. On 20 February 1915 two drafts with cost estimates of 20,000
and 80,000 Marks are discussed. The lower cost alternative was deemed
sufficient to erect an appropriate building.²⁴ Therefore the construction
had to be inexpensive and to comply with the provisional character of
the building. At the same time, a proper and dignified appearance was to
be achieved:
For the design [of the mosque] an architectural expression has to be
found, to satisfy – as far as possible – the senses and imagination of the
Muhammadan believers.²⁵
One month later, on 18 March 1915, a new draft for the mosque was
presented, which had been designed by the construction department
of the War Ministry (in consultation with the Vice General Staff)
in a sort of “peer review” process: The original design was made by
“governmental builder” Erich Richter (title: “Regierungsbaumeister”)
and revised (“expanded and complemented”) by “privy senior building
counsellor” August Schultze (title: “Geheimer Oberbaurat”).²⁶
The cost was estimated at 45,000 Marks, which corresponds to an
average of the first estimates, mentioned above, and exactly to the actual
construction costs.²⁷
For the design expert advice was obtained from the Tunisian propa-
gandist Salih al-Sharif, who was engaged by the Sublime Porte, as well as
from Max von Oppenheim. They submitted detailed proposals for the
construction and furnishing of the mosque that took into account both
functional and ritual aspects.²⁸
Salih al-Sharif proposed rules for the prisoners of war camps which
comprised, among others, precise rules for the use of the planned
mosque.²⁹ The idea to build a mosque for each group of the “French,
Russian and Indian Mohammedans, to respond to their specific cul-
tural characteristics”, which was also taken up and supported by von
Oppenheim, probably came from Salih al-Sharif.³⁰
This was not realized, presumably for reasons of cost. Instead, two
tent barracks were converted into a prayer room in the Weinberglager of
Zossen and a minaret was erected in August 1915.³¹
The converted barracks, however, had no specific characteristics of
Islamic architecture and should be regarded as purely functional buildings
without architectural ambition. After all, it is difficult to know to what
extent the architectural design of the mosque was influenced by Max
von Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif, but it is very likely that they were
responsible for its spatial and functional programme.
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Figure 8.4 Full colour perspective drawing of the Wünsdorf mosque
(Alexander Backhaus, Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland. Gegen 250 Wirk-
lichkeitsaufnahmen aus deutschen Gefangenenlagern mit einer Erläuterung
von Prof. Dr. Backhaus, Siegen, Leipzig and Berlin: Montanus, 1915, frontispiece)
Finally the mosque was erected within five weeks in summer 1915
as a timber-frame construction by the company Stiebitz & Köpchen
from Berlin-Charlottenburg,³² but prisoners of the camps were probably
also involved in the building process, as was usual for the erection of
barracks.³³
The mosque was inaugurated on 13 July 1915, at the beginning of
Ramadan. The event was celebrated with speeches, religious ceremonies
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Figure 8.5 Plan and elevations of the mosque (A. Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus für
Kriegsgefangene in Wünsdorf, Prov. Brandenburg,” Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung 36 (25), 1916,
p. 178, Fig. 1–4
and prayers and dignified by the presence of the Ottoman ambassador,
several generals and representatives of the General Staff. The opening
itself, though, was supposed to take place with just a small number of
German representatives.³⁴
Subsequently the event was discussed extensively in German newspa-
pers highlighting the good treatment of the prisoners: “nearly as guests
of the German people” (= “fast als Gäste des deutschen Volkes”).³⁵
Originally it was intended by Rudolf Nadolny³⁶ and the Intelligence
Office for the East that the construction cost should be funded at least
partly by Emperor (Kaiser) Wilhelm ii,³⁷ in order to present the mosque
as a gift from the German Kaiser to the Muslims.³⁸ It is difficult to know
whether Wilhelm ii actually saw the design of the mosque, but at least
he knew and initially supported Oppenheim’s memorandum to make
architectural jihad 189
use of the Muslim prisoners of war, which was one precondition to the
establishment of the Intelligence Office for the East and the establishment
of the Halbmondlager.³⁹ As the construction of a mosque in the planned
Muslim prisoners’ campwas already proposed at that time, it is very likely
that the plans concerning the mosque were also known and approved by
Wilhelm ii The funding from his private purse, however, failed because
of the resistance of the treasury. Instead, the mosque’s construction was
financed from the regular budget of the military administration of the
prison camps.⁴⁰ Regardless of these facts the myth of the “sponsoring” of
the mosque by the Kaiser was circulated and lived on.⁴¹ Thus the diplo-
matic efforts and the construction of legends led to the intended result in
terms of popular perception and later reception. Wilhelm ii was regarded
if not as the factual principal of the Wünsdorf Mosque, at least as the
ideal or implied sponsor. This rather obscure relation corresponds to the
assessment of the mosque as a propagandistic means that was developed
in a “tug of war” between the various offices and bureaucratic apparatuses.
The design of the Wünsdorf Mosque is a collage compiled from a
number of models. Parts of its elements served functional purposes,
whereas other “modules” were probably intended to reflect the heteroge-
neous origins of its inmates, thus resembling a historistic “Mosque-model
kit.”⁴²
Prior to the iconographical analysis of the various elements of the
mosque it seems appropriate to point out that the fancy constructions
of exoticism are characterized by a certain degree of vagueness or
fuzziness.⁴³ Similarly, the Wünsdorf Mosque seems also to refer to a
number of models and diagnostic stylistic features of Islamic Art. On a
closer look at the construction in detail, however, the structure rather
turns out to be a purely Prussian functional building.
The most important model for the Wünsdorf Mosque is the Dome of
the Rock in Jerusalem, even though its layout shows clear deviations.
This is to say that it is not an exact copy, but a free adaptation. Thus,
the Dome of the Rock is a solitaire,⁴⁴ whereas the Wünsdorf Mosque
is not freestanding, but a composite of various structures. The Dome
of the Rock was the model for the core structure with the prayer room;
the other parts of the building follow different models. A vestibule with
additional functional rooms extends the core structure to the south, with
a minaret rising on the eastern wing of the vestibule. To the north is
placed a courtyard with ablution facilities. The ensemble is completed by
a bathhouse which is situated on the northern edge of the courtyard. The
bathhouse appears to be a subordinate annex. Actually it was built before
the mosque und represents the origin of the entire structure, which is
proven by a photograph of it before the mosque was built.⁴⁵ Next to the
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Figure 8.6 “Greetings from Jerusalem” – the Dome of the Rock (postcard Kalil
Michel and fils, Bethlehem, ca. 1900, archive author)
orientation towards Mekka it defined the orientation and placement of
the mosque.
The common features of the Dome of the Rock and the core structure
of the Wünsdorf Mosque are essentially structural, which is clearly
recognizable in the ground plan and in sectional views: both show a
basilical cross section with a central dome-vaulted room surrounded by
one or two lower ambulatories, which are accessible by four entrances
that are aligned with the cardinal directions.
The interior of the Wünsdorf Mosque is composed of a central domed
space and an ambulatory. Compared to the Dome of the Rock, however,
the size ratio of the central space and the ambulatory differs significantly
and the role of these two elements is reversed. Whereas in the Dome
of the Rock the central, domed space is occupied by the sacred rock
and remains inaccessible, in Wünsdorf it serves as central prayer room.
The ambulatory, on the other hand, which in Wünsdorf is blocked by
the minbar and the mihrab, lost its “original function” for the ritual
circumambulation of the sacred rock at the temple mound in Jerusalem
and became a kind of aisle.
The mihrab plays only a subordinate role in the spatial concept of
the Dome of the Rock; in Wünsdorf it is the central focal point of the
prayer room, together with the minbar. Formal details of the mihrab and
the minbar resemble Ayyubid or Mamluk furnishings. A comparative
example can be found at the Aqsa-Mosque in Jerusalem – in close
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Figure 8.7 Plan of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (after Anton Springer and
Joseph Neuwirth, Das Mittelalter, Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte 2, Leipzig:
Seemann, 1909, Fig. 96)
proximity to the Dome of the Rock. The basic shape of the Wünsdorf
minbar, however, rather evokes the interior fittings of German classicist-
protestant churches.
The row of arcades serving as a connecting link between the Dome
of the Rock and the surrounding area of the Temple mount was probably
used asmodel for theWünsdorfMosque as well.The combination of these
arcades and the Dome of the Rock was a popular motif on contemporary
photographs, where the arcades appear to fuse with theDome of the Rock.
This corresponds to the situation at the Wünsdorf Mosque, where they
served as amodel for the vestibule in front of the domed central structure.
Even if the details of the origins and background of the construction of
the Dome of the Rock are debated and controversial,⁴⁶ its importance for
the architectural history of Islam is beyond doubt: the Dome of the Rock
“is not only the oldest surviving major monument of Islam, but in all
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Figure 8.8 Entrance of German Emperor Wilhelm ii into Jerusalem, 1898
(Memorial postcard, Palästina-Kaiser-Reise 1898, no. 18. Hermann Vogel,
Kunsthandlung Leipzig, archive author)
probability also the first Islamic monument, by which an aesthetic work
of rank should be created”: a building of exceptional beauty, significance
and perfection.⁴⁷ Equally beyond doubt is its religious significance to
Islam, as this “time-honored rock [is considered] as the most sacred
place on earth next to the Ka’aba” in Mekka.⁴⁸ It is in keeping with this
essential significance of the Dome of the Rock that it was chosen as the
perfect model for the Wünsdorf mosque. The Dome of the Rock is – next
to the Ka’aba and the mosque of Medina – the one Islamic sacral building
of universal importance for the overwhelming majority of Muslims⁴⁹
and – due to its singular layout and freestanding placement on the temple
mound – it has a very strong visual significance.
The Dome of the Rock is not only a Muslim sanctuary, but was also
associated with and revered by Christians as the location of Solomon’s
temple and Templum Domini since its occupation by the crusaders.⁵⁰
Its relevance for the German (European) audience at the end of the
nineteenth century is indicated by the sheer volume of travel literature
on the Middle East which increased dramatically after the 1870s.⁵¹ These
books were mainly written by Christian authors as a combination of
tourist travel guide and “pilgrimage manual”, with extensive descriptions
of the “Holy Places.” In the present context this is of interest, as it testifies
to the long-lasting Christian appropriation of Jerusalem and the Dome
of the Rock, which continued well into the early twentieth century.
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Figure 8.9 The Kaiser‘s visit to the Dome of the Rock, 1898 (Ernst von Mirbach,
Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898, Berlin: Mittler,
1899, p. 248A)
One of the most prominent pilgrims to Jerusalem was Emperor
Wilhelm ii (the Kaiser), who made the “pilgrimage to the Holy Land” in
1898with an extensive sightseeing programme.The tour of the “Holy sites”
included a visit to the temple mound and the Dome of The Rock, which
earned particular appreciation and high esteem from the emperor.⁵²
His voyage on the occasion of the inauguration of the Church of the
Redeemer in Jerusalem was part of the complex ecclesiastical policy of
the Hohenzollern dynasty⁵³ and was closely connected with Prussian
political and economic interests in the “Orient:”⁵⁴ This became apparent
when the emperor showed demonstrative friendliness towards the
Ottoman empire and theMuslims, claiming friendship withj “300million
Mohammedans”,⁵⁵ in combination with allusions to the crusades by the
use of symbols of medieval crusader states and references to emperor
Friedrich ii.⁵⁶ Illustrated reports of this voyage repeatedly show the
Dome of the Rock⁵⁷ as a kind of visual mediator that endows the new
Prussian buildings in Jerusalem with a superior sense of mission.
Further enhanced by the legend of the emperor’s present to the Mus-
lims, the Wünsdorf Mosque appears to have become part of the imperial
self-image, which evokes the Dome of the Rock not just as a sign of his
closeness to the Muslim world and a souvenir of his pilgrimage, but also
as an idealized allusion to the medieval crusader states. This is not to say
that in designing the Wünsdorf Mosque it was intended to refer to this
complex ideological background. Given the mass distribution of illus-
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Figure 8.10 German album commemorating the German emperor‘s visit to
Palestine in 1898 (Ludwig Schneller, Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land,
Leipzig: Wallmann, 1899, front cover)
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Figure 8.11 Contemporary cartoon mocking the emperor as “Cook’s Crusader”
(a reference to the tour operator Thomas Cook), postcard based on sketch in
Punch, 15 October 1898 (archive author)
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trated pilgrim guides andmemory-books of the pilgrimage ofWilhelm ii,
however, it seems reasonable to conclude that for the contemporary
beholder the latent content of these visual triggers was clear enough.
Apart from the Dome of the Rock the design of the Wünsdorf mosque
shows several references to prominent examples of Islamic architecture
which combine clear regional references with politically motivated
associations.⁵⁸
Thus, the decoration of the triple-arched entrance façade with its
sebka design (a decorative pattern derived from intertwining arcs) clearly
refers to Andalusian models. Most prominent examples are the Alhambra
of Granada or the Giralda and the Alcazar in Seville. These examples
stand for the sphere of west Islamic architecture, which at that time was
known to a wide audience in Germany and used extensively as a model
by designers via pattern books.
The walls of the side wings of the mosque are organized horizontally
by alternating coloured bands in red and grey. The standard model for
this type of surface design was Mamluk architecture, in particular the
tomb mosques in the necropolises of Cairo. The most famous prototype
from this group is the Qaitbay Mosque which was one of the icons of
nineteenth century Orientalism.
Another detail that points to this direction is the combination of
turret-like substructure and minaret, despite the latter being clearly
inspired by Ottoman models. Since around 1900 the outer appearance of
Ottoman mosques with a domed central structure and round, pointed
minaret had come to represent the stereotype model of the mosque. In
this case, however, it should probably also be understood as a reference
to the allied Ottoman empire.
Finally, the ogee arches of the forecourt are a characteristic feature
of Indo-Islamic architecture of the Mughal period, which had already
entered nineteenth century oriental revival architecture, but still kept its
Indian provenance, even if its appearance at the Wünsdorf Mosque is
just a vague hint.
To sum up, it is obvious that the Wünsdorf Mosque is a compilation
of a number of elements and models from different regions and periods
of the Islamic World that were known from the art-historical survey
literature. The stylistic eclecticism of the Wünsdorf Mosque with its many
unrelated details conforms formally with the late period of Historicism,
while its design mirrors the state of research of Islamic art history in
Germany and its preferences. The citation of Islamic architecture from
al-Andalus and Cairo should probably embrace the prisoners of war
coming from the French colonies, while the faint memory of Mughal
architecture was a reference to the Indian prisoners. According to the
architectural jihad 197
Figure 8.12 The different stylistic features of the mosque that refer to different
traditions in Islamic architecture (Martin Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer
‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ǧihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” Beiträge zur
Islamischen Kunst und Archäologie (BIKA) 2, 2010, Fig. 4–12
lesser regard for the Russian prisoners of war from the Crimea, Kazan
and the Caucasus, it seems to be consistent that the Wünsdorf Mosque
did not show any references to this region or to Central Asia.⁵⁹
Thus the formation of details and the choice of regional models are
not arbitrary but rather determined by geo-political considerations,
although they obviously reflect more the ideas and projections of their
German builders than what the prisoners from those countries might
have perceived as a correspondence to their “domestic architecture.”
Inscriptions and Epigraphic Programme
The Wünsdorf Mosque was decorated with inscriptions, the majority of
which were located inside the prayer room.The analysis of the integration
of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the concept of propaganda surrounding the
Halbmondlager is complemented by the reading of the inscriptions and a
partial reconstruction of its epigraphic programme.
The function of the inscriptions can be seen from various perspectives.
On the one hand inscriptions with religious significance or information
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Figure 8.13 Map showing the origin of the architectural references used in the mosque as well as
the geographical origins of the Muslim prisoners of war, based on map in Leo Frobenius and Hugo
von Freytag-Loringhoven, eds, Deutschlands Gegner im Weltkriege, Berlin-Grunewald: Klemm,
[1925], suppl.; other images s. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’,” 2010,
Fig. 5–11
on builders, etc., belong to the usual decorative programme of Islamic
religious buildings.⁶⁰ On the other, the graphical appearance of Arabic
writing supports the “Islamic” or at least “Oriental” character of a building
or object designed for European viewers – as various pseudo-arabic
script-like decorations testify, which found their ways into European
art.⁶¹
For the target group of the Wünsdorf Mosque, the Muslim prisoners
of war, Arabic writing conveyed religious content as it represented their
sacred language⁶² – no matter whether the person in question was
literate or illiterate. For the literate viewer the symbolic meaning of the
writing was complemented by its semantic function. But in most cases
inscriptions are not to be read, but estimated by their inherent symbolic
value, thus being understandable for illiterate or non-Arabs as well. As
Ettinghausen stressed:
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Figure 8.14a Picture of the mosque’s interior showing some of the inscriptions
(Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 1915, 10, 16.2)
An inscription in impressive Arabic letters, the vehicle of the Koran,
had the most sacred and solemn connotations and made the viewer
conscious of being a member of the umma, the community of Muslims.
Thus writing can have a symbolic meaning.⁶³
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Figure 8.14b Plan of the mosque showing which part is depicted in the
photographs of the interior (Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 1915, 10, 16.2)
Unfortunately it is not possible to reconstruct the entire inscription
programme since – to the best of my knowledge – not all areas were
recorded photographically.⁶⁴ Those parts that were recorded comprise
the area of the mihrab and minbar in the south of the mosque and about
a quarter of the interior between the eastern and the southern exits.
The remaining 3/4 of the interior space – and the inscriptions that were
presumably placed in this part – is not documented.
The painting of the mosque’s interior was done by the court painter
André of Potsdam.⁶⁵ It is highly probable that he was also responsible for
the implementation of the inscription, which was probably predesigned
by Max von Oppenheim and/or Salih al-Sharif.⁶⁶ From details of the
design it is very obvious that the inscriptions were not written by an Arab
calligrapher.⁶⁷ Rather they were, as can be seen from their execution,
copied by someone from a template (not written), who could not write
Arabic and did not know the criteria by which Arabic calligraphy is
judged.
The Arabic characters appear not fluently and written, but rather stiff
and constructed. This lack of understanding or ability is also visible in
the disproportion of the characters to each other and the inaccurate and
incorrect execution of individual letters.⁶⁸ The division and separation of
individual components of the inscription on separate lunettes can be
regarded as atypical; otherwise rather compression and entanglement
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Figure 8.15a Inscription of the Muslim creed (shahada) (Staatliche Museen zu
Berlin, Museum Europäischer Kulturen, vii 27498). Detail, whole image s.
Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’,” 2010, Fig. 13
Figure 8.15b Inscription of the invocation of God (basmala) (Staatliche Museen
zu Berlin, Museum Europäischer Kulturen, vii 27498). Detail, whole image s.
Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’,” 2010, Fig. 13 2010,
Fig. 15
of individual characters can be observed in calligraphic realizations of
religious formulas.⁶⁹
The inscription above the entrance in the northern courtyard is
not readable. Only the hexagram which frames the inscription can be
discerned.⁷⁰ According to Islamic folklore, the hexagram is the seal of
King Solomon and is used to ward off demons, which have to obey him.⁷¹
The most prominent position was held by the large-scale inscription
with “Quran verses in yellowish tint on green bottom artistically
framed” divided between the 16 lunettes above the openings towards the
ambulatory.⁷² Altogether eight of them are documented. They contain
a fragment of the shahada, the Islamic confession of faith, which thus
occupied half of the lunettes. The content of the remaining half can not
be reconstructed without further photographic records.
In the inscription on the mihrab we can read the basmala – one
of the most important religious formulas in Islam, which is therefore
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also most commonly used in calligraphy and building inscriptions –
intertwined with spiral tendrils in a similar manner as the inscriptions in
the lunettes.⁷³
In addition, rectangular panels were placed above the four exits.
Their inscriptions on a light background were rather plain, lacking
ornamental decoration and calligraphic ambition.⁷⁴ Above the southern
entrance the panel on the right hand side shows a two-line greeting and
blessing formula.⁷⁵ Above the eastern entrance, a part of a two-line text
is preserved, which can be recognized as the 8th (7) Verse of Sura 47,
“Mohammad”:⁷⁶ “O believers, if you help God,| He will help you, | and
confirm your feet.”⁷⁷
The analysis of the recognizable inscriptions makes a strong argument
that they were placed according to a preconceived programme. The
writing is no pseudo-script, but readable and it is very likely that
the decision for a certain text was not arbitrary, but was meant to
communicate a specific, comprehensible message to its reader.⁷⁸ The
choice of texts and symbols – the hexagram as Seal of Solomon, the
shahada and basmala as well as a greeting and blessing formula give
rise to the assumption that the substantive claim and the complexity of
the inscription programme were rather limited. Most components as
shahada and basmala can also be found in many other buildings, so that
we may see them as the “lowest common denominator”.
This corresponds to the observation that the stylistic appearance of the
mosque was designed to be of universal validity (with regional priorities).
In this sense the inscriptions had also to be limited to the most essential
formulas and concepts of faith, to be generally comprehensible and easily
recognized by all Muslim prisoners of war – nomatter whether they came
from North Africa or India or whether they were educated or illiterate.
Considering that the sophisticated propaganda which was compiled for
them in the prisoners’ magazine al-Jihad by the academic agitators⁷⁹
was inaccessible to the majority of the prisoners of war who came from
simple, uneducated backgrounds, an elaborate inscription programme
with subtle meanings would have been useless anyway. In this respect
the selection of the inscriptions does not appear to be random, but very
specifically focused on the (probably) simple needs of Muslim prisoners
of war of the Halbmondlager.
There is, however, one exception to this general assertion. The Koranic
quotation of sura 47 “Mohammad”, verse 8 (7) is more specific and mean-
ingful. This sura, whose other verses have to be considered as well, was
also called War (“Der Krieg”) as Max Henning pointed out.⁸⁰ It is inter-
preted in this sense in comments to Rückerts’ transmission, in which this
sura was characterized as “a thundering sermon for battle” (= “donnernde
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Kampfpredigt”)⁸¹ containing “a clear declaration of war, to those who
oppose the mission of Muhammad.”⁸² This was obviously transferable
to war opponents of the Ottoman–German Alliance. Moreover, it was
in accordance with Ottoman Jihad-preaching and should be interpreted
as a call to the prisoners of war to join the Jihad.⁸³
The link to contemporary Jihad literature can be established in the
person of Salih al-Sharif, already mentioned above as responsible –
together with vonOppenheim – for the functional concept of themosque.
In his book Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg⁸⁴ (The Truth about the
religious war) he explains the nature and meaning of Jihad to a German
audience.⁸⁵ He addresses the final question: what the duties of the warrior
on the path of God may be. He enumerates ten duties and supports his
argument by references to the Koran. First comes “Valour” (Tapferkeit),
second “Trust in God” (Vertrauen auf Gott) is designated: “the belief
that he will fulfill well his promise to let us win, when we stand up to the
enemy and follow his orders and fully comply with the means by which
the overcoming of the enemy is brought about in accordance with our
power …”⁸⁶ By explaining this second duty he refers to the Koran and to
sura 47, as shown above, the one which was also written above the exit to
the east inside the mosque: ‘as God told (47, 8): If you help God, he will
help you, and confirm your feet.’⁸⁷
It seems very likely, that this coincidence is not accidental, but proves
the integration of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the Jihad concept of the
Intelligence Office for the East with epigraphic means.
Actors
Several actors were involved in the further development of the propa-
ganda concept and its implementation in the prisoners of war camps
in Wünsdorf and Zossen, but their cooperation was not always pro-
ductive. There was a conflict of responsibilities between the military
and the civilian spheres: as described above, the concept of a camp for
Muslim prisoners of war and the related propaganda was initiated by von
Oppenheim and further developed by civilian experts for the Middle
East at the Intelligence Office for the East (NfO), which was assigned to
the Foreign Office. On the other hand, the War Ministry and the General
Staff, clearly associated with the military sphere, represented on site by
the camp commanders, were responsible for the maintenance and the
organization of the camps.⁸⁸
Initially propaganda in the camps was supposed to be disseminated
mainly by indigenous propagandists. These propagandists were con-
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nected with the NfO, but subordinate to the camp commander, who
was responsible for the propaganda in the camps.⁸⁹ But also in this case
the civilian and military sides had differing ideas about the propagan-
distic approach and the treatment of the prisoners of war, so mutual
mistrust and quarrelling about questions of authority were inevitable.⁹⁰
This difficult situation was additionally complicated by differing percep-
tions of the treatment of the Muslim prisoners by the Ottoman-German
allies.⁹¹
Finally, an important but very heterogeneous group of actors were the
prisoners of war themselves. However, they appear only rarely as active
individuals, but were mainly depicted as anonymous types, on which
racist stereotypes were projected.⁹²
Propaganda with and in the Prison Camps⁹³
Basically, the propaganda was motivated by various considerations. In
addition to the propaganda writings aimed at the Islamic world, the
Halbmondlager and its mosque were also intended to demonstrate to the
European opponents the exemplary treatment of prisoners of war by the
German side.⁹⁴
The supply of prisoners of war in World War i was not just a logistical
problem. The general treatment of prisoners of war was still insufficiently
regulated by international law, which led to reciprocal recriminations
of “inhumane treatment of prisoners of war” by the opponents.⁹⁵
Against this background picture postcards as well as descriptions
and illustrations in books and magazines should demonstrate “reality
footage from German prison camps” (= “Wirklichkeitsaufnahmen aus
deutschen Gefangenenlagern”),⁹⁶ which suggested above all normality,
fair treatment of the prisoners and friendly behaviour of the prison
staff, and the adequate supply and free exercise of religion in the
camps.
Apart from the propaganda directed towards foreign recipients, the
internal perspective, i.e. objectives oriented to the German audience,
should be considered. It has been argued that one goal of the dissemina-
tion of images of “exotic prisoners of war” was the intention to present
German superiority over the variety “of the peoples of his enemies.”⁹⁷
However, the presentation of the mosque in conjunction with informa-
tion campaigns about Islam and the proclamation of the friendship of
the Kaiser to the Muslim world can also be seen as a promotion for the
acceptance of the Ottoman–German Alliance within Germany.⁹⁸ This is
of particular importance for an assessment of how the mosque and its
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Figure 8.16 Propaganda depicting the benevolent attitude of German officers in
the camps (Doegen, Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in
Deutschland, Kriegsgefangene Völker 1, Berlin: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1921,
Pl. 5.2)
architectural form were perceived and “read”, and inevitably entails a
consideration of the respective reception requirements of the different
target groups.
After initial secrecy considerations photos and reports of the prisoners
were produced in large numbers and disseminated widely.⁹⁹ The distribu-
tion was carried out by postcards, by reports in the general propaganda
newspapers with appropriate visual material and by the agencies of the
Intelligence Office for the East abroad.¹⁰⁰ Visits of high-ranking Ottoman
politicians and journalists were also part of the propaganda.¹⁰¹ However,
the main focus of the propaganda, which began in February 1915, was
targeted at the inmates of the prisoner of war camps. The correspondence
of the prisoners with their relatives was intended also to enhance the
propaganda effect in their homelands which were considered as an “area
to be revolutionized” (= “Revolutionierungsgebiet”).
The underlying idea was developed by Max von Oppenheim with his
Intelligence Office for the East, and later modified by Rudolf Nadolny. The
aim was to win the prisoners for military use in the “Orient.”¹⁰² Another
general objective was to bring about sympathy for Germany among the
prisoners, so that they would return to their homelands as Germany’s
“followers.”¹⁰³ To achieve these goals, various means of propaganda
were used: “a. religious influence; b. Guidance and education through
meetings and lectures, lessons, groups trips to the capital, etc.; c. good
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treatment, supply and clothing.”¹⁰⁴ Thus the living conditions in the
camps ought to be subordinated to the objectives of the propaganda.
The Muslim prisoners of war were enabled to pray and were supplied
with food according to their religious rules. Furthermore, the special
treatment also affected the labour of the prisoners that was to be done
without compromising the propaganda.¹⁰⁵
However, since the implementation of the propaganda was directed
and supervised by the camp commanders and the military supervisory
staff, it was militarized after a short time, and the originally rather
idealistic goals and approach soon focused on pragmatic and military
goals, as Gerhard Höpp has stressed.¹⁰⁶ To this end, a combination of
political education and religious instruction was carried out in the camps.
The lectures about history, geography and economy were politically
biased, intending to agitate: “to plant hatred against the oppressors
of the Muslim peoples, aiming at the liberation of North Africa.”¹⁰⁷
The propaganda efforts were supplemented by newspapers in several
languages, some of them suggestively named al-Jihad.¹⁰⁸ For educational
purposes libraries with selected books in the languages of the prisoners
of war were installed. Also drill took up a lot of time, even if, due to
the lack of training staff, they still used the French regulations and
commands.¹⁰⁹
As a consequence of these efforts in September 1915 about 800
volunteers were registered in the Halbmondlager and about 1,000
volunteers in the Weinberglager.¹¹⁰ Earlier considerations to integrate the
Muslim Jihad volunteers into German troop contingents were dismissed.
Instead, they were supposed to become part of the Ottoman army. In
October 1915, negotiations with the Ottoman authorities resulted in an
agreement regarding the equipping and use of the Muslim prisoners of
war. Between February 1916 and April 1917 several units of Jihadists were
transported to Turkey. Gerhard Höpp counted a total of 1,100 Tatars,
1,084 Arab and 49 Indian prisoners of war who were formally enlisted as
volunteers in the Ottoman army.¹¹¹ A small number of volunteers were
engaged as translators or for special missions to promote Jihad in other
regions such as Persia or Afghanistan.¹¹²
That is to say that the German propaganda strategy was partly
successful in recruiting volunteers, although this was probably motivated
rather by better conditions for the Jihad volunteers in the prison camps
than by the persuasiveness of the propagandists and their credibility.¹¹³
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Failure and/or Success of the Jihad Concept and Its Related
Propaganda
It is commonly assumed that the recruitment of Muslim prisoners of war
in the Zossen and Wünsdorf camps to fight a HolyWar failed. One reason
for this was the structural deficits of the general Jihad strategy.¹¹⁴ Apart
from that, it was probably illusory to expect that the assignment of the
Muslim prisoners of war might have a decisive effect – even if we assume
that the prisoners of war “just escaped from a bloody battlefield” – might
have been motivated to join another war campaign, as Höpp has pointed
out.¹¹⁵
Additionally – especially with regard to the French prisoners of war –
reprisals against their relatives were feared. Furthermore, the Muslim
prisoners of war who had served in the French or British army expected
a loss of pension claims if they changed sides.¹¹⁶
But most decisive were probably fundamentally different views and
a “lack of coordination between the military and civilian authorities”
on the German side about the design of their Jihad propaganda and
its implementation.¹¹⁷ From the beginning there were differences and
conflicts over authority. Thus, for instance, the Foreign Office and the
NfO supported the massive dissemination of information about the
Halbmondlager – as they expected from its construction alone a positive
propaganda effect. On the other hand, the General Staff and the War
Ministry referred to security concerns and the need for secrecy with
respect to militarily relevant information, arguing against extensive
publishing activities.¹¹⁸ Finally, the belief that propaganda concerning
the Halbmondlager would be beneficial won out, but the permanent
controversies were not productive.
A further reason for complications was rivalries between the various
indigenous agitators, and the fact that their suitability and loyalty were
appreciated differently by the military (camp commander and personal)
and the civilian protagonists (NfO, aa).¹¹⁹ Already in the summer of
1915 the camp commander tried to engage mainly German agitators
for the propaganda on site. He considered appointing “Merchants, who
were familiar with the Arab customs and the … colloquial language”,
so that “they should act enlightening through lectures” – but of course
“in close consultation with the Commandant”, etc.¹²⁰ The assignment
of indigenous propagandists as well as the influence of the NfO was,
however, to be pushed back, if not even eliminated.¹²¹
More discrepancies arose from the intention of the Ottoman side to
acquire more influence on the propaganda in the camps. One example is
the appointment of the successor to Imam Ibrāhīm in the Weinberglager
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in the spring of 1916 by Ottoman authorities without consultation with
the German Foreign Office.¹²² Another reason for irritation had been
visits by high-ranking Ottoman politicians, expressing views about the
propaganda work that did not always correspond to the ideas of the
German War Ministry.¹²³
The disagreement between the Ottoman–German Alliance partners
in terms of Jihad propaganda became more visible when Jihad volunteers
were to be sent to the Ottoman empire. Thus, the Ottoman Minister of
War, Enver Pasha, suggested omitting the swearing in of Jihad volunteers.
Moreover, the Ottoman offer to settle in the Ottoman empire craftsmen
from among the Muslim prisoners of war who did not want to participate
in the war led to irritation on the part of the German War Office, as this
would undermine its Jihad propaganda.¹²⁴
Lastly, the Ottomans used the Jihad volunteers mainly at the Iraqi
front where they were expected to write enthusiastic letters to their
fellow jihadists still remaining in Wünsdorf and Zossen describing
their successful inclusion in the Ottoman army and the weakness of
the British enemy. In fact, however, there was a lot of dissatisfaction
due to inadequate accommodation, subsistence and poor treatment
by the Ottoman officers, which led to insubordination and deser-
tion.¹²⁵
As the Ottoman authorities anyway preferred settlers and workers
instead of soldiers, the Jihad propaganda was ended at the end of 1916;
protests by the French and Russian governments against the recruitment
of Jihad volunteers probably played no decisive role.¹²⁶
The deportation of Muslim prisoners of war to Turkey as settlers was
also delayed. Instead, the Muslim prisoners of war were now increasingly
used – because of a general shortage of labour forces – outside the camps
for work in factories and in agriculture, which probably mainly affected
the Weinberglager. Moreover, the occupancy of the Halbmondlager was
reduced by the fact that African and Indian prisoners of war were
transferred to Romania in March 1917 because they could not bear
the climate in Wünsdorf and suffered heavy losses.¹²⁷
Thus Jihad propaganda in the Muslim prisoner of war camps of
Wünsdorf and Zossen was effectively achieved only from February 1915
until December 1916. It appears evident that themilitary goals of the Jihad
concept and its related propaganda focused on the prisoners failed, but it
has to be concluded, however, that there were nevertheless some notable
effects, if we may judge the success of propaganda as being influential
and disseminating disinformation.
In this regard the report by Conrad Hoffmann, an American ymca
secretary, is of interest:
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Figure 8.17 Military drill in front of the mosque at Wünsdorf (Conrad
Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany, New York: Association Press, 1920,
256A)
In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architec-
tural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammed-
ans of the camp. Every detail of equipment had been carefully copied,
including the courtyard with its marble footbaths, the colored lights of
the mosque, prayer rugs, and all.
The photographs represent how successful the Germans were in
their propaganda. [Emphasis mine]
I was told that some 15,000 Mohammedans from these camps were
thus recruited, disciplined, goosenstepped, equipped with German
uniforms, and sent to Macedonia and Palestine to supplement the
German and Turkish armies there.
When I visited the camp for Russian Mohammedans I saw several
companies of these men who had volunteered, return to the camp
in full dress parade order. At the head were the German officers
on horseback, followed by a band, and after them row on row of
well-disciplined Russians now transformed into efficient German
troops.¹²⁸
It can therefore be concluded that the propaganda was not successful
enough “to create usable troops” of military significance, let alone to win
the Great War, but was highly influential in posing a severe threat to the
colonial empires of France and Great Britain.¹²⁹
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It is clear that the initial ambitious concept of Jihad propaganda was
already condemned to failure by the conflicting objectives and the lack of
agreement between the parties involved as well as by the uncoordinated
processes of realization. Moreover, it has to be concluded that there was
no coherent German Jihad concept that was implemented consistently.
Rather there existed a heterogeneous network of diverse interests and
ambitions which mutually disabled and weakened each other.
However, the Wünsdorf Mosque with its strong visual impact seems
to have fulfilled at least its pretended purpose: to express the friendship of
the German Reich to the Muslim peoples’ (= “das Freundschaftsverhältnis
des Deutschen Reiches zu den islamitischen Völkern zum Ausdruck zu
bringen”)¹³⁰ by providing the long lasting myth of German friendship
towards the Muslims with an iconographic condensation of the German
stirring up of the Muslim prisoners of war.
Aftermath
Following the end of World War i the two camps were closed and the
remaining prisoners largely repatriated. Until the early 1920s predomi-
nantly former Russian prisoners of war still remained.TheHalbmondlager
was used until the mid-1920s, when the last Muslim residents left Wüns-
dorf due to the economic crisis.¹³¹ The mosque was still visited on high
holidays from Berlin. In around 1930, the mosque was demolished after
the building had allegedly fallen into disrepair due to lack of care and the
Turkish embassy had expressed no interest in its further preservation.¹³²
It is likely that after the more conveniently located mosque in Berlin-
Wilmersdorf was inaugurated in April 1925¹³³ there was no need to main-
tain the Wünsdorf mosque any more. At the beginning of the 1930s bar-
racks and garages for tanks were built in the area of the formerHalbmond-
lager, in the area of the former Weinberglager a settlement was located.¹³⁴
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 Mirbach, Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898, 1899, p. 204;
cf. Richter, Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms ii. 1898, 1997, p. 139.
 Mirbach, Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898, 1899;
Ludwig Schneller, Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land, Leipzig: Wallmann, 1899;
cf. Gorka-Reimus, Der Traum vom Orient, 2005, p. 55.
 Schneller, Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land 1899, p. 196.
 Here only a short overview is given. For a more detailed analysis with further
reading see Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen
Ğihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” 2010.
 Regarding Russia’s “Orient” see David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian
Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration,
Cambridge: Yale University Press, 2010; Patty Wageman, Inessa Kouteinikova
and Olga Atroschenko, eds, Russia’s Unknown Orient, Rotterdam: nai Publishers,
2010.
 Erica Cruikshank Dodd and Shereen Khairallah, The Image of the Word. A Study
of Quranic Verses in Islamic Architecture, Beirut: American University, 1981.
 For the use of pseudo-arabic in Renaissance art see Rosamond E. Mack, Bazaar
to Piazza: Islamic Trade and Italian Art. 1300–1600, Berkeley: University of
California, 2001.
 Sheila Blair, Islamic calligraphy, Edinburgh: University Press, 2006, esp. pp. 3–40.
 Richard Ettinghausen, “Arabic Epigraphy: Communication or Symbolic Affirma-
tion?,” in D.K. Kouymjian, ed., Near Eastern Numismatics: Studies in Honor of
George C. Miles, Beirut, 1974, p. 280.
 See smb-pk mek, viii-eu-27498; equals Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches
Bethaus,” 1916, p. 179, Fig. 6, cf. Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg,1998, p. 123,
Fig. 63; in both cases the inscriptions are nearly unreadable by image scale and
raster. See also Der Große Krieg in Bildern 10, 1915, p. 36, cf. Höpp, Muslime in der
Mark, 1997, p. 195, Abb. 34. See also: smb-pk mek, viii-eu-27499, cf. Gussone,
“Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Ğihad-Propaganda
und Orientalismus,” 2010, Fig. 13–15.
 Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus,” 1916, p. 180.
 As explained above, Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif were responsible for the
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functional concept of the Wünsdorf Mosque. In this regard they are also very
likely to be the originators of the epigraphic programme which linked the mosque
with the Jihad propaganda.
 For the reading and translation of the inscriptions and discussions about their
importance for the construction I would like to thank particularly Martina
Müller-Wiener and Daniel Redlinger. All possible errors are mine.
 For example at the tambour the ligatures mīm
˙
hāʾ and dāl are wrong in lunette 3
‘Mu
˙
hammad’; on the panel above the exit to the south in each case by the words
illā und allāh the alif is written as lām, courtesy M. Müller-Wiener Bonn/Berlin.
 See Ernst Kühnel, Islamische Schriftkunst, Monographien künstlerischer Schrift
9, Berlin and Leipzig: Heintze & Blanckertz, 1942, pp. 55 and 84; cf. Blair,
Islamic calligraphy, 2006. The isolated depiction of short writings in the lunettes
corresponds to plates in Ottoman mosques; Cornelius Gurlitt, Die Baukunst
Konstantinopels. 1. Textband (1907), 2.1. Tafelband (1910), 2.2. Tafelband (1912),
Berlin: Wasmuth, 1907–1912, t 2.1, p. 19.f.; later often depicted in popular standard
works.
 Postcard: “Halbmond-Lager in Wünsdorf-Zossen. Vorhof der Moschee,” cf. Gerhard
Kaiser and Bernd Herrmann, Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt. Die Geschichte der
geheimen Kommandozentralen in Wünsdorf und Umgebung, Berlin: Links, 2007
(4), p. 42; at the entrances of the south and west no inscriptions are visible (see
Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg, 1998, pp. 120–123, Fig. 60–62), and at the
eastern entrance they are not to be expected due to symmetry.
 Cf. ei, ix: 822b, sulaymn b. dwd, cd-rom Edition v. 1.0, Leiden 1999.
 Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus,” 1916, p. 180. The fields are numbered
consecutively starting at the pulpit counterclockwise. Visible are fields 16 and
those from 1 to 5. The panels 16 and 4 show only spiral tendrils without writing.
In lunettes 1 to 3 and 5, we read: [f1] “illā [f2] allāh [f3] mu
˙
hammad [f5] rasūl”.
For panels 15 and 6 one can therefore reconstruct as the beginning and end
of this section the inscription: [f15] “lā ilāha [f16] – [f1] illā [f2] allāh [f3]
mu
˙
hammad [f4] – [f5] rasūl [f6] allāh”. Corresponding to Sura 37:35: “There
is no God but God” and Sura 48: p. 29, “Muhammad is the Messenger of God.”
The prefix “ashhadu an” – “I believe [that]” is often skipped in inscriptions, cf.
Kühnel, Islamische Schriftkunst, 1942.
 Of this inscription the eastern half is clearly visible: smb-pk mek, viii-eu-27499;
Schultze, “Ein mohammedanisches Bethaus,” 1916, p. 179, Abb. 6; cf. Kahleyss,
Muslime in Brandenburg, 1998, 123, Photo 63; Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997,
p. 195, Abb. 34. The end of the formula “ar-Rahman ar-Rahim” is recognizable
and can be supplemented by “Bismillah” to the complete basmala Cf. ei, i:1084a,
basmala, cd-rom Edition v. 1.0, Leiden 1999 (“Im Namen des barmherzigen
und gnädigen Gottes” after Rudi Paret, Der Koran. Digitale Bibliothek 46, Berlin:
Directmedia [cd-rom], 2004).
 The panels on the exits to the east and the south can be seen on the abovemen-
tioned photo of the interior.The two corresponding exits to the north and the west
are likely to have been provided with similar panels. smb-pk mek, viii-eu-27498;
equal to Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg, 1998, p. 123, Fig. 63, for readability
see above.
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 Above can be read “as-Salam …” below “wa … rahmatu,” which can be
supplemented to the greeting and blessing formula “as-Salam [ʾalaikum] wa








tabbit aqdāmakum”: For the reading
of the texts and Koranic assignment I would like to thank Ibrahim Salman
(Tartus/Berlin).
 German version used: Paret,DerKoran, 2004. Common in 1915 was the translation
of Max Henning, Der Koran, Leipzig: Reclam, 1901 (8. [7.]: “Oh ihr, die glaubt,
wenn ihr Allah helft, wird er euch helfen und eure Füße festigen”: cf. Max Henning
(translator), Ernst Werner and Kurt Rudolph, eds, Der Koran. Leipzig: Reclam,
1968, p. 437) or a recourse to the classic transmission of Friedrich Rückert 1888
(p. 8/7: “Ihr die da glaubet, steht ihr Gott bei, | So steht er euch bei | Und festigt eure
Tritte,” after Friedrich Rückert (translator), Hartmut Bobzin and Wolfdietrich
Fischer, eds, Der Koran in der Übersetzung, Würzburg: Ergon, 1995, p. 376).
English interpretation: “O believers, if you help God, | He will help you, | and
confirm your feet,” after Arthur John Arberry (translator), The Koran interpreted,
London: Allen & Unwin and New York: Macmillan, 1955.
 Cf. Dodd and Khairallah, The Image of the Word, 1981, p. 71.
 Höpp, Fremde Erfahrungen, 1996, p. 103; Bragulla, Die Nachrichtenstelle für den
Orient, 2007, p. 84.
 Henning, Der Koran, 1901, 238, note. 2, cf. Henning, Werner and Rudolph, Der
Koran, 1980, p. 437.
 Rückert, Der Koran, 1888 (1980), p. 526.
 Rückert, Bobzin and Fischer, Der Koran in der Übersetzung, 1995, p. 544.
 “4. Und wenn ihr die Ungläubigen trefft, dann herunter mit dem Haupt, bis ihr ein
Gemetzel unter ihnen angerichtet habt; dann schnüret die Bande. 5. … Und hätte
Allah gewollt, wahrlich er hätte selber Rache genommen; jedoch wollte er die einen
von euch durch die anderen prüfen.” (“4. When you meet the unbelievers, smite
their necks, then, when you have made wide slaughter among them, tie fast the
bonds; 5. … He would have avenged Himself upon them; but that He may try some
of you by means of others.”), German: Henning, Der Koran, 1901, p. 238; English
interpretation: Arberry, The Koran interpreted, 1955; commentary: cf. Henning,
Werner and Rudolph, Der Koran, 1968, p. 436.
 Karl E. Schabinger (trans.), Schaich Salih Aschscharif Attunisi, Haqiqat Aldschi-
had, Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg, Berlin: Reimer, 1915; cf. Bragulla,
Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 2007, pp. 64–70, see also Schabinger, Welt-
geschichtliche Mosaiksplitter, 1967, pp. 108–114.
 Cf. Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany’,” 2003, pp. 13–16.
 “{D}er Glaube daran, dass er sein Versprechen, uns siegen zu lassen, durchaus
erfüllen wird, wenn wir dem Feinde standhalten und seine Befehle befolgen
und die Mittel vollkommen beachten, durch die die Überwindung des Feindes
herbeigeführt wird, nach Maßgabe unserer Kraft; …”
 “… wie Gott gesagt (47,8): wenn ihr Gott beisteht, so steht er euch bei und stellt
euch fest auf die Füße”. Schabinger (trans.), Aschscharif Attunisi, 1915, pp. 10–12.
English interpretation after Arberry, The Koran interpreted, 1955.
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 Doegen, Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland, 1921;
Gärtner, “Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager,” 1922.
 Cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 70.
 See Schabinger, Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter, 1967; Nadolny and Wollstein,
Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches, 1985; cf.
Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 69 and 74–75.
 Cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 79–85.
 Britta Lange, “Ein Archiv von Stimmen. Kriegsgefangene unter ethnografischer
Beobachtung,” in Nikolaus Wegmann, Harun Maye and Cornelius Reiber, eds,
Original/Ton. Zur Mediengeschichte des O-Tons, Konstanz: Universitätsverlag,
2007, pp. 317–341; Franziska Roy, Heike Liebau and Ravi Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram
Singh und der Kaiser. Indische Kriegsgefangene in deutschen Propagandalagern,
1914–1918, Heidelberg: Draupadi, 2014.
 This section about the propaganda in the prison camps, based on the seminal
work ofGerhardHöpp and expanded by results of recent research, was integrated
in this chapter to contextualize the architectural record.
 Backhaus, Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland, 1915; cf. Kahleyss, Muslime
in Brandenburg, 1998; Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, 2005; Bragulla, Die
Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 2007, pp. 17 and 39; Margot Kahleyss, “Indische
Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg – Fotografien als Quellenmaterial,” in Roy,
Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 233–261.
 Traceable in dozens of memoirs of former prisoners of war (of each side), blam-
ing the prison conditions as insufferable and the enemy prison staff as barbaric:
see, for example, Carl P. Dennett, Prisoners of the Great War. Authoritative
Statement of Conditions in the Prison Camps of Germany, Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1919; cf. Heather Jones, Violence against Prisoners of War in the First
World War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, with further example
cases. Thus it was urgently necessary for German propaganda to counteract
this by publishing “official”, apologetic reports depicting the fair treatment of
the prisoners; for the German side see Doegen, Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung
und Schicksal in Deutschland, 1921, pp. 2–4; Backhaus, Die Kriegsgefangenen in
Deutschland, 1915, pp. 5 and 24; regarding the mechanisms of war propaganda
in World War i see Troy Paddock, World War i and Propaganda, Leiden: Brill,
2014. Summarizing: Kenneth Steuer, The American ymca and Prisoner of War
Diplomacy with the Central Powers during the First World War, New York, ny:
Columbia University Press, 2009; Kenneth Steuer, “German Propaganda and
Prisoners of War in World War i,” in Troy Paddock, ed., Propaganda in World
War i, 2011.
 Backhaus, Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland, 1915.
 Frobenius,DerVölkerzirkus unserer Feinde, 1916; Backhaus,Die Kriegsgefangenen
in Deutschland, 1915, pp. 6 and 22.
 Bragulla, Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 2007, p. 18.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 69. Regarding the use of photography
as medium for propaganda see Ludger Derenthal and Stefanie Klamm, eds,
Fotografie im 1. Weltkrieg, Leipzig: Seemann, 2014.
 For an overview about images of the camps see Kahleyss, Muslime in Branden-
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burg, 1998; cf. Margot Kahleyss, “Indische Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg –
Fotografien als Quellenmaterial,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram
Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 233–261; for a permanent exhibition of related
material: see Garnisonsmuseum Wünsdorf (http://www.buecherstadt.com/de/
museen-kunst/), February 2015. Regarding the agencies abroad see Lüdke, Jihad
Made in Germany, 2005.
 Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 17, 1916, pp. 36–37.
 Oppenheim 1914 (“Revolutionierung”).
 Oppenheim 1914 (Organisation der Behandlung), pa-aa, r 21245-2, f. 74
(69).
 “a. religiöse Beeinflussung; b. Belehrung und Unterweisung durch Besprechungen
und Vorträge, Unterricht, gruppenweise Ausflüge in die Reichshauptstadt usw.; c.
gute Behandlung, Beköstigung und Bekleidung”: Nadolny 1914; “Beeinflussung
der mohammedanischen Gefangenen,” January 1915, pa-aa.
 pa-aa, r 21245, f. 131; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 39–41. 69–71.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 70.
 Abuʾl-Arabi, pa-aa, r 21247, f. 103; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 72.
 Höpp, Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg, 1994,
pp. 8–13; Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 101–112; Liebau, “Hindostan,” in
Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014.
 pa-aa, r 21244, f. 103, cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 40.
 pa-aa, r 21250, f. 186–189; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 79.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 83, verweist auf pa-aa, r 21253–pa-
aa, r 21256; cf. Heike Liebau, “Hindostan. Eine Zeitung für südasiatische
Kriegsgefangene in Deutschland 1915–1918,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds,
Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 261–285.
 Kreutzer, Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser, 2012; Heike Liebau, “Das Deutsche
Auswärtige Amt, Indische Emigranten, und propagandistische Bestrebungen
unter den südasiatischen Kriegsgefangenen im “Halbmondlager”,” in Roy, Libau
and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp., pp. 137.
 S. Ahuja, “Vergessene Konfrontationen. Südasiatische Soldaten in deutscher
Kriegsgefangenschaft 1915–1918,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh
und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 59–61; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 89; see
also Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany, 1920, p. 83.
 Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, 2005, pp. 186–197; Kreutzer, Dschihad für den
deutschen Kaiser, 2012, pp. 167–169.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 89.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 89; Liebau, “Das Deutsche Auswärtige
Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014,
pp. 139–140.
 The conflicts between the military and civilian/political spheres also affected the
activities abroad, clearly to be seen by comparison of the respective protagonists’
memoirs. For example Nadolny and Wollstein, Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines
Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches, 1985, pp. 85–106; vs. Gerold von Gleich, Vom
Balkan nach Bagdad: militärisch-politische Erinnerungen an den Orient, Berlin:
Scherl, 1921; cf. HansWerner Neulen, Feldgrau in Jerusalem: das Levantekorps des
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kaiserlichen Deutschland, München: Universitas, 1991, pp. 201–212; cf. Kreutzer,
Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser, 2012, pp. 143–145.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 69; cf. Brigitte Hamann, Der Erste Weltkrieg.
Wahrheit und Lüge in Bildern und Texten, München and Zürich: Piper, 2004;
Anton Holzer, “Die Schlacht der Bilder. Fotografie, Propaganda, Krieg,” in
Ludger Derenthal and Stefanie Klamm, eds, Fotografie im 1. Weltkrieg, 2014,
pp. 32–34.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 74–75, pa-aa, r 21250–r 21252; Liebau,
“Das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram
Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 131–134.
 “[I]n Frage kämen z. B. Kaufleute, die Dank ihrer Bildung und ihrer wirklichen
Vertrautheit mit arabischen Sitten und der in Marokko, Algerien, Tunesien
gesprochenenUmgangssprache die Garantie böten, dass sie in ständiger Fühlung
mit der Kommandantur unter den hiesigen Gefangenen aufklärend wirken
und durch Vorträge über aktuelle, geschichtliche, geographische, handels- und
kolonisationspolitische Themata wirklich nützliche Arbeit leisten könnten,”
Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 75–76, pa-aa, r 21250.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 76; Liebau, “Das Deutsche Auswärtige
Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014,
pp. 131–134.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 76–77, pa-aa, r 21258.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 73–74; Höpp, “Frontenwechsel: Muslimis-
che Deserteure,” 2000, p. 312. This is to be seen in the context of the complex
relation between the German-Ottoman allies, being also a recurrent issue in
the memoirs mentioned above: see, for example, Gleich, Vom Balkan nach
Bagdad, 1921, in accordance with the German point of view; in contrast Joseph
Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen
an die Türkei aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges, Zürich: Amalthea, 1928, critical
about the attitude of superiority demonstrated by German officers; cf. Neulen,
Feldgrau in Jerusalem, 1991, pp. 181–189; Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, 2005,
pp. 140–149; Kreutzer, Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser, 2012, pp. 112–117.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 80–81.
 See reports of the German consul in Aleppo, pa-aa, r 21255, and of the German
ambassador in Istanbul, pa-aa, r 21256; also comments on this topic in several
memoirs, for example Gleich, Vom Balkan nach Bagdad, 1921, pp. 138–139; cf.
Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 83–84.
 pa-aa, r 21261, f. 25; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 84–86.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 50–51 and 85; Liebau, “Das Deutsche
Auswärtige Amt,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds, Soldat Ram Singh und der
Kaiser, 2014, p. 137; Richard Kuba, “Ein Ethnologe auf dem Kriegspfad. Leo
Frobenius und der Erste Weltkrieg,” in Benedikt Burkard and Céline Lebret, eds,
Gefangene Bilder. Wissenschaft und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, Schriften
des Historischen Museums Frankfurt am Main 35, Petersberg: Imhof, 2014,
pp. 102–117.
 Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany, 1920, p. 82, to be regarded as
critical observer, is citing wrong information (“gift of the Kaiser”) or strongly
architectural jihad 221
exaggerated (“15.000 volunteers”). Apart from errors such as the incorrect
spelling “Wunstorf ” (or mix-up with the town near Hannover), it is apparent
that he is replicating disinformation, thus – as an example – confirming
unintentionally that German propaganda efforts were to a certain degree
successful. The impact of disinformation seems to have been effective until
recently, cf. Steuer, The American ymca and Prisoner of War Diplomacy, 2009,
ch. 11.
 Meynier, Les Algériens dans l’Armée française, 1914–1918, 2000, pp. 38 and 52,
stated for 1915 Maghrebian “Germanophilie” and a receptivity towards German
propaganda, but considered an ability of the French military leadership (from
1916 onwards) to keep the North African soldiers loyal. Höpp, Muslime in der
Mark, 1997, p. 89, argues that better conditions forMuslim soldiers on the French
side, enabling religious practice, were “direct reactions” to the special treatment
of Muslim prisoners in German prison camps. Concerning the “Indian” (South
Asian) prisoners, Ahuja, “Vergessene Konfrontationen. Südasiatische Soldaten
in deutscher Kriegsgefangenschaft 1915–1918,” in Roy, Libau and Ahuja, eds,
Soldat Ram Singh und der Kaiser, 2014, pp. 48–51, describes almost a propaganda
competition between the German and British sides. The perceived danger of
colonial troops changing sides is also visible in its harsh criticism by British
propaganda, s. To-make-men-traitors 1918.
 Nadolny, “Entwurf für die Immediatseingabe an Wilhelm ii,” 27 March 1915,
pa-aa r 2144.
 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 139–147; cf. Kaiser and Herrmann, Vom
Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt, 2007, pp. 63–65.
 For discussion about the moving or demolition of the mosque between 1924 and
1929 see pa-aa – r 78240/r 78421, cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 150.
 Manfred Backhausen, ed., Die Lahore-Ahmadiyya-Bewegung in Europa, Wemb-
ley uk: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Lahore Publications, 2008, pp. 56–64.
 Hans Georg Kampe, Wünsdorf. Geburts- und Entwicklungsstätte der deutschen
Panzertruppen, Militärgeschichtliche Blätter. Hönow: Meißler, 1997, pp. 12–25;
Kaiser and Herrmann, Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt, 2007, pp. 48–50 and
71–76.

9 War, Propaganda and Architecture
Cemal Pasha’s Restoration of Islamic Architecture
in Damascus during World War i
Hans Theunissen
In the following I am sending a few notes on the German survey
of Damascus. The copy I am sending, from which the accompa-
nying plan is taken, was torn down on the last day of the German
occupation, from the wall of a German official’s room, and with his
permission.
Those who knew Damascus before the war will recognize that great
alterations have taken place …¹
With these words James Hanauer begins his short article in which he
reports on the changes in the urban fabric and built environment of
Damascus during World War i when Ahmed Cemal Pasha (1872–1922),
Ottoman Minister of the Navy, was stationed in Syria as governor-
general and commander of the 4th Army. Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria
in December 1914 and left in December 1917.² During his three-year stay
he ruled Syria in an authoritarian way and his “reign of terror” alienated
the local population from Ottoman rule.³ Cemal Pasha’s policies were
directed at strengthening Ottoman state power in Syria and increasing
the sense of Ottomanness among the local population. Hoping to become
the founder of a modern and developed Ottoman Syria, he embarked
upon ambitious plans of urban modernization in the main cities of
Greater Syria such as Beirut, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Aleppo and Damascus. His
modernization project comprised the widening of existing streets, the
building of new roads both between cities as well as within urban centres,
and the construction of public parks, ponds, fountains and various public
buildings ranging from state offices, schools, banks and post offices to
hotels.⁴ In the beginning of 1916 Minister of War Enver Pasha sent the
Swiss architect and director of the German Fine Arts Academy in Rome,
Maximilian Zürcher (1868–1926), to Damascus. Zürcher became Cemal
Pasha’s architectural consultant and was responsible for the planning
and designing of various projects,⁵ most of which were never realized.⁶
In his dedication in a copy of Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina
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Figure 9.1 Hanauer’s German plan of wartime Damascus. Courtesy of the Palestine Exploration
Fund, London.
und Westarabien Cemal Pasha refers to this period of cooperation with
Zürcher as an “era of serious works.”⁷
Another part of Cemal Pasha’s ambitious plans consisted of the
restoration of selected pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Islamic monuments.
Among the projects were the restoration of the citadels of Jerusalem,
Aleppo and Damascus, clearing the Noble Santuary in Jerusalem of
detrimental additions, the restoration of the AqsaMosque, the restoration
of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya and the
‘sanitization’ of the environment of the Great (Umayyad) Mosque and
the tomb of Salah al-Din in Damascus. In the same period the Ottomans
also undertook the restoration of the Holy Mosque in Mekka.⁸ These
restoration activities in the Arab provinces of theOttoman Empiremainly
focused on symbols of state power (citadels) and religious architecture
(mosques and tombs) and aimed at heightening the government’s profile
in the Arab provinces and at gaining Muslim support for the Empire
during World War i.
Cemal Pasha’s interest also extended to pre-Islamic antiquities. On
1 November 1916 he had a meeting with the German archaeologist
Theodor Wiegand (1864–1936) who served in the German army in
Syria. During this meeting Cemal Pasha expressed his wish to place
the monuments of Syria under special supervision provided he could
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Figure 9.2 Cemal Pasha’s dedication in Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina
und Westarabien: ‘A mon ami M. Zürcher! Souvenir de l’époque de travaux
serieux! Klosters: le 28.9.19. A. Djémal.’ Courtesy of Erik-Jan Zürcher, Leiden.
find the right person for that task. The German consul Julius Loytvet-
Hardegg immediately suggested that Wiegand was the most suitable
man for that job. Subsequently Cemal Pasha appointed Wiegand as
Inspector-General for the Antiquities of Syria and Palestine and head
of the Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für Syrien und
Palästina (German-Turkish Monument Protection Unit).⁹ In his intro-
duction to Alte Denkmäler aus Syrien, Palästina und Westarabien
Cemal Pasha lists the goals he wanted to achieve with his initiative:
creating a reliable inspection service, preventing the construction of
detrimental new buildings inside and in the direct environment of
ancient structures, cleaning ruins, prohibiting the local population
from using ruins as building materials, providing better access to ruins
and accomodation for visitors, and collecting antiquities.¹⁰ The clear-
ing of “detrimental buildings” and the demolition of residential and
religious architecture for the widening of streets or the construction
of new roads turned out to be one of Cemal Pasha’s most problem-
atic policies because it implied expropriations of private property for
high prices and led to opposition, court cases and, last but not least,
resentment towards the Ottoman authorities and Cemal Pasha in par-
ticular.¹¹ Although his urban policies were also directed at gaining
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popular sympathy, Cemal Pasha’s modus operandi merely fuelled the
melt-down of Arab support for the Ottomans.
In recent years Cemal Pasha’s rule in Syria has attracted the attention
of a number of scholars who usually also deal with aspects of his urban
policies. Kayalı (1998) only summarizes his urban policies, but clearly
links these to the state’s policy to assert central authority.¹² Hudson (2008)
argues that Cemal Pasha’s “program of architectural and archaeological
patronage was central to his attempts to re-mobilize much-depreciated
Islamic capital to consolidate his control over Muslim Damascus and
muster popular support for the failing empire.”¹³ However, she mainly
focuses on the Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für Syrien
und Palästina. Consequently German specialists such as Wiegand play a
dominant role in her discussion of Cemal Pasha’s urban works.¹⁴ The
most recent discussion of Cemal Pasha’s programme of public works
is presented by Çiçek (2014) who argues that urban modernization
and restoration were aimed at strengthening Ottoman state authority
(and diminishing foreign influence) and at creating loyal citizens by
investing in the infrastructure and thus (economic) development of
Greater Syria.¹⁵ Çiçek focuses on modernization and restoration but,
unlike Hudson, does not pay attention to the religious-propagandistic
dimension of Cemal Pasha’s wartime urban works. None of these three
authors deals with Cemal Pasha’s projects in detail, and as a consequence
their discussion is limited to general overviews which pay little attention
to World War i as the context of Cemal Pasha’s urban works and
their religious-propagandistic function in times of war. Moreover, the
role of the Germans is often over-emphasized, whereas the role the
Ottomans themselves played is almost invisible. In this chapter I provide
a complementary point of view by focusing on three specific projects in
more detail: the renovation of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa
al-Salimiyya, the “sanitization” of the area around the Great (Umayyad)
Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din, and the construction of the Cemal
Pasha Boulevard. I will present chronological reconstructions of the
projects, try to determine what their goals were and describe what kind
of works were carried out. I argue that all three projects formed part of
a programme of Ottomanization and pan-Islamic propaganda which
aimed to strengthen Ottoman state authority in Syria and gain popular
support among the Muslim population for the empire in times of war.
This programme materialized in various urban works which emphasized
a shared Islamic past and a joint Muslim goal during the war, and paved
the way for a (planned but unrealized) common future under Ottoman
rule after the war.
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Figure 9.3 The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya
Complex shortly after World War i (from a postcard in the collection of the
author).
The Second Conqueror of Egypt
On 11 May 1916 Cemal Pasha obtained the sum of 6,000 lira¹⁶ from the
Ministry of Pious Foundations for the restoration of the most prominent
sultanic complex built in Ottoman Damascus.¹⁷ The document dealing
with the finances for the restoration refers to the mosque of the complex
as the Selimiye and the hospice and dervish lodge as the Süleymaniye.
In reality we are dealing with a large multi-functional complex which
consists of two main components: the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and
the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. The Takiyya (mosque-hospice complex)
was constructed on the orders of Sultan Süleyman (1520–1566) in the
years 1554/55–1558/59 and consisted at that time of a mosque, ablution
pool, guest rooms, a hospice (composed of a kitchen, bakery, refectory
and pantry), caravanserais with stables, and latrines. The complex
was designed by chief royal architect Sinan. With the complex Sultan
Süleyman visually confirmed the consolidation of Ottoman political
power in Syria after his father’s conquest of the region in 1516.The adjacent
madrasa complex reached completion in 1566/67, early in the reign of
Süleyman’s successor Selim ii (1566–1574) and consists of a religious
school with a prayer hall-classroom and rooms for staff and students,
and a shopping arcade. By the end of the sixteenth century the complex
was enlarged with a dervish convent.¹⁸ However, in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries the construction of the complex was generally
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Figure 9.4 The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya
Complex in the second half of the nineteenth century (from a postcard in the
collection of the author).
attributed to Sultan Selim i (1512–1520), who had conquered Damascus in
1516 and Egypt in 1517. Consequently the complex was usually refered to
as the Takiyya or Mosque of Selim.¹⁹ According to Wiegand Cemal Pasha
expressed his admiration for Selim i, the conqueror of Egypt, “by restoring
the buildings of this sultan in Syria.”²⁰ Cemal Pasha considered Selim i as
his role model and he had the ambition to capture Egypt as Selim i had
done 400 years before. In a telegram dated 19 January 1915 Enver Pasha
wrote to Cemal Pasha “God willing I shall be able greet you as the Second
Conqueror of Egypt.”²¹ However, all Cemal Pasha’s efforts to reconquer
Egypt from the hands of the “imperialist” British failed. Nevertheless this
did not stop him from restoring the complex.There were apparently more
reasons for Cemal Pasha than just his personal admiration for Selim i.
Originally the complex played an important role in the yearly hajj. The
buildings were located in the meadows along the Barada river to the west
of Damascus intramuros. In this area named “al-Marj al-Akhdar” or “Gök
Meydan” (Green or Sky Blue Hippodrome) pilgrims would assemble
before embarking on the last part of their journey to Mekka. During the
hajj season the complex offered various facilities (such as lodging and
food) to certain groups of pilgrims (for instance dervishes). The complex
thus also articulated the role of Damascus as an important station on the
Ottoman hajj route and the role of the Ottoman dynasty as guardians of
the Holy Cities and defenders of the hajj.²² In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries parts of the complex were used as a Naqshbandi
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dervish lodge,²³ a religious school²⁴ and a refuge for the destitute.²⁵
By the beginning of World War i the complex seems to have been in
a run-down state; at least that is what German and Ottoman sources
indicate. The German officer Hans von Kiesling labelled the complex
dilapidated.²⁶ Mehmed Nihad Bey (1880–1945), the Ottoman architect in
charge of the restoration, was even more gloomy. In his memoirs he gives
an extensive (and almost apologetic) description of the neglected state of
the complex. He also writes that no part of the complex still retained
its original function.²⁷ The sad state of the buildings and loss of proper
function no doubt formed additional reasons for Cemal Pasha to initiate
a meticulous (and costly) renovation. The complex was by far the most
prestigious Ottoman monument in Damascus and its run-down state
must – in the eyes of Cemal Pasha – have been symptomatic of the lack of
state authority in Syria. If the empire wanted to reassert central authority
it should also take responsibility for its most emblematic monuments.
As such the project was also the result of the ongoing discussion about
“national heritage.”²⁸ Islamic architectural landmarks in particular played
an important role in this discussion as a means to “raise consciousness of
the value of the Islamic past.”²⁹ Cemal Pasha also explicitly refered to
this goal in his meeting with Wiegand.³⁰
The restoration of the complex was a symbolic act which aimed
at reaffirming the vigour of the state, raising its visibility and thereby
strengthening its authority. Moreover, it is likely that Cemal Pasha would
have ensured that after the renovation the complex would have regained
functions in accordance with its high status, for instance as part of a
religious university,³¹ and in line with urban developments in the close
vicinity. The area around the complex had from the late nineteenth
century onwards developed into a cluster of medical and educational
institutions including the Medical Institute and Gureba Hospital, the
Pedagogical Academy and the Council for Education. Not surprisingly
this cluster in 1923 merged into the Syrian University.³² The various
religious functions of the complex throughout history attested to the
long-standing Ottoman role as champions of Sunni Islam and thus also
supported the claim to the caliphate, which from a late Ottoman point
of view had passed to the Ottomans as the result of the conquests of
Selim i. Renovating the complex thus also aimed at the reaffirmation of
Ottoman religious authority inDamascus and the realignment of the local
population with the religious standards and religious and educational
practices of the modern Ottoman state. As such the project was also the
outcome of a pan-Islamic propaganda programme which tried to gain
support for the state and to increase the sense of Ottomanness among
the local population based on Sunni Muslim solidarity.
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Figure 9.5 The Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya
Complex shortly after World War i. The building behind the Takiyya is the
Gureba Hospital (from a postcard in the collection of the author).
Mehmed Nihad Bey had come to Medina in the spring of 1915 for the
construction of the new Islamic University (“Medrese-i Külliye”) in that
city. A year later in Damascus hemet Cemal Pasha, who asked him to take
charge of the restoration of the Takiyya-Madrasa complex. Subsequently
he was appointed Head Architect for Syria in April 1916 by theMinistry of
Pious Foundations. In the same period Cemal Pasha secured the funding
for the project from the same ministry. Mehmed Nihad Bey arrived
in Damascus in the summer of 1916 and the project must have started
shortly thereafter. The deplorable state of the complex necessitated a
comprehensive renovation. The complex was first cleaned and cleared
of added constructions. Thereafter began the renovation of the walls,
domes, arches, windows and doors.³³ The more delicate restoration work
included renewing the gypsum plaster windows with coloured glass and
the tilework of the complex. According to Mehmed Nihad Bey some of
“the valuable tiles had been stolen.”³⁴ However, the rather cryptic sentence
in his memoirs that he “had the broken tiles removed and again inserted
into their place”³⁵ does not really enlighten us about the work done. The
tilework no doubt formed one of the most important decorative features
of the complex and gave it an unquestionably Ottoman visual identity.³⁶
Necipoğlu gives the following description of the tilework of the Takiyya
al-Sulaymaniyya:
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Figure 9.6 The Madrasa al-Salimiyya during the renovation: Damascus – The
dervish lodge of Sultan Selim (Şām – Sul
˙
tān Selīm dergāhı). Courtesy of
Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Berlin.
Figure 9.7 The Madrasa al-Salimiyya during the renovation: Damascus – The




kapusı). Courtesy of Wolf-Dieter Lemke, Berlin.
Arched lunettes with underglaze-painted tile revetments decorating the
porticoes of the guest-houses and the hospice visually unify the central
courtyard … The window lunettes are decorated with underglaze-
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painted tiles of uniform design in white, sage green, cobalt blue,
turquoise, and a pale red that tries in vain to approximate the intense
tomato red of Iznik. Lacking naturalistic flowers, the designs are
dominated by palmettes, rosettes, and saz leaves. The local workshop
that produced them in the late 1550s seems to have been associated with
Süleyman’s renovation of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem with tile
revetments. According to Mustafa ‘Ali and the signature of a Persian
tilemaker, ‘Abdullah Tabrizi, the renovation project was completed in
1551–1552. Perhaps the potters moved to Damascus after the conclusion
of work at the Haram (briefly resumed in 1561–1562), establishing a local
industry that catered to the needs of late-sixteenth century Ottoman
monuments in the city. In terms of their colour scheme and patterns, the
locally produced tiles of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya are less innovative
than those made in İznik for the sultan’s mosque complex at the capital.
They nevertheless introduced to Damascus a novel mode of decoration
associated with Ottoman visual culture.³⁷
Although the tile lunettes on the façades of the mosque, the guest-house,
and the hospice do indeed contribute to the visual coherence of the
various buildings around the courtyard, Necipoğlu’s observation that
“the window lunettes are decorated with underglaze-painted tiles of
uniform design in white, sage green, cobalt blue, turquoise, and a pale
red” is not correct. There are in fact four distinctly different sub-groups of
designs which use various colour palettes, and this remarkable diversity –
when understood correctly – reveals a fascinating history which begins
in the second half of the sixteenth century and ends with Cemal Pasha’s
renovation project.³⁸
The 12³⁹ guest rooms of the Takiyya – six on each side of the courtyard –
have entrances and windows crowned with tile lunettes in two slightly
different designs. The designs of the lunettes above the entrances are all
the same (Type 1a), as are those above the windows (Type 1b). The tile
revetments above the entrances use the colours cobalt blue, turquoise,
green, black, white and aubergine purple. The tile revetments above the
windows use the same colours but slightly less aubergine purple. This
regular distribution of tile lunettes with a specific design and colour
scheme either above an entrance or a window is unusual for sixteenth-
century Damascus. The tile lunettes of the Zawiyya al-Sa’diyya (Zawiyya
Sa’d al-Din al-Jabawi) (1560s), the Derviş Pasha Mosque (1571–1574/75)
and the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque (1586–1591) are in fact almost all
different from each other and not distributed in any kind of regular
sequence. Some colours used on the tile lunettes of the guest rooms also
vary substantially in tone and saturation. The greens range from bright to
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Figure 9.8 Tile lunette Type 1a. Photograph by the author.
Figure 9.9 Tile lunette Type 1b. Photograph by the author.
very dark, the turquoises from azure blue to a more green turquoise and
the aubergine purples from a deep purple to almost black. In addition,
most tile lunettes of the guest rooms do not exactly fit in the available
space. Sometimes parts of the borders have been cut off to fit the tiles in
the available space; in other cases additional tile strips have been inserted
to fill empty spaces.
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Figure 9.10 Tile lunette Type 3. Photograph by the author.
Two other tile lunettes on the façade of the mosque have an identical
design (Type 2) which is a variation of those of the guest rooms (Type 1).
However, these tiles are not glazed and as a consequence the pigments
are discoloured and faded.
The courtyard façade of the hospice shows by far the greatest variety
in tile patterns. Of the 11 tile lunettes six panels above the windows have
the same design and colours as the lunettes above the windows of the
guest rooms (Type 1b). Two other lunettes above entrances have a design
that resembles those of the lunettes of the guest rooms, though it is not
identical (Type 3). Interestingly, the designs of these two lunettes are
painted in a more refined manner than those on the tile panels of Type 1.
The tiles of these two lunettes are also smaller than those of the other
lunettes. Moreover, these two lunettes use less black (and more cobalt
blue), a light green, only a little pale aubergine purple, and the turquoise
is often discoloured (turned grey). One of these lunettes shows traces of
a rather clumsy later restoration. However these two tile panels, unlike
most of the other tile lunettes, fit perfectly into the available space.
Another tile panel above the main entrance of the hospice uses the
same design as that of the lunettes above the entrances of the guest rooms
(Type 1a), but is painted in a different colour palette. Apart from cobalt
blue, green, turquoise, aubergine purple, white and black (only for thin
lines) this lunette also uses a thick, dull red slip which tries to imitate
the bright tomato red of İznik. A slightly different design but with the
same colours is also used for the nine tile lunettes⁴⁰ in the interior of
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Figure 9.11 Tile lunette Type 1c (with red) in the interior of the mosque.
Photograph by the author.
the mosque (Type 1c). In addition the tile lunettes in the interior of the
mosque have a wide aubergine purple border, whereas the tile panel
above the entrance of the hospice only has a very narrow aubergine
purple border. This wide border was necessary because the tile makers
used approximately the same design (in dimensions) as outside, but
because the lunettes in the interior were of a slightly different shape and
higher (five tiles in stead of four tiles) they added a wide border in order
to bridge the difference in shape and height. The use of a thick red slip
is intriguing because sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Damascene
tilemakers never used this colour (but used aubergine purple instead)
because they could not master the production of tomato red, unlike
their contemporary colleagues in İznik.⁴¹ The rare tiles with tomato red
in buildings in Damascus are all imports from İznik. However, the tile
lunettes with red in the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya do not resemble İznik
tiles from the second half of the sixteenth century in either design, style
or colours. Interestingly, the patterns of the tile panels often have more
in common with cuerda seca tile lunettes produced in Istanbul in the
first half of the sixteenth century.
The last sub-group consists of two tile lunettes above windows (Type
4). One of these two lunettes is partially preserved and consists of only five
tiles. The second lunette is complete and decorated with a cartouche with
the calligraphed text of (part of) an invocation in Arabic: Verily, there is




ًّاقَحًّاقَحَُّهللاَّال ) surrounded by an intricate pattern
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Figure 9.12 Tile lunette Type 4. Photograph by the author.
consisting of mainly arabesques, rosettes and palmettes. The second,
partially preserved panel is decorated with similar motifs but has a wide
border with rosettes. The colours used on these two panels are mainly
dark cobalt blue, light blue (more azure than turquoise), white, black,
green and aubergine purple. Interestingly, the design of these two tile
lunettes bears a close resemblance to the designs of the tile lunettes of the
Zawiyya al-Sa’diyya which was renovated by Lala Mustafa Pasha,⁴² when
he was governor-general of Damascus in the years 1563–1567/68,⁴³ and the
tile lunette above the entrance in the interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya
which was completed in the same period, in 1566/67.⁴⁴ Chronologically
speaking the Zawiya al-Sa’diyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya were the first
(still existing) buildings in Damascus decorated with tile revetments
after the completion of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya (1558/59).⁴⁵
The adjacent Madrasa al-Salimiyya, which was completed in 1566/67,
is also decorated with tile revetments. Necipoğlu, however, does not give a
description of this tilework. The tiles are used on the entrance façade and
in the interior of the prayer hall-classroom. The windows and entrances
of the rooms around the courtyard do not have any tile decoration, unlike
the guest rooms of the Takiyya. The spandrels above the entrance are
inlaidwith tiles decoratedwith a pattern of palmettes, rosettes, arabesques
and saz leaves in cobalt blue, green, turquoise, black, white and aubergine
purple. Both the design and the colours used closely resemble those of
the tile lunettes of the Takiyya (Types 1–3). One important difference,
however, is that turquoise blue has been used only for details. The main
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Figure 9.13 Tile lunette in the Zawiyya al-Sa’diyya. Photograph by the author.
Figure 9.14 Tile lunette in the interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph
by the author.
colours are cobalt blue and green. The white upper wall of the entrance
façade has a tile border decorated with palmettes and arabesques in cobalt
blue, green, black and white. The background of most tiles is a warm
white; some tiles, however, have a blue-ish white background. This same
border is also used in the interior as a separation between the lower tiled
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Figure 9.15 The entrance façade of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by
the author.
walls and the (nowadays) undecorated white upper walls. Here too we see
tiles with two different nuances of white as background. The lower walls
of the prayer hall-classroom are decorated with tile panels. Originally
there must have been 12 tile panels. However, two panels are no longer
extant.⁴⁶The panels consist of two types of repeatingmodular tiles: border
tiles which combine a border motif of palmettes and arabesques with a
surface filling repetative pattern of cartouches filled with arabesques, and
stylized, curving tendrils which emanate from palmettes and rosettes and
end in saz leaves. The design is painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise
and black on a white background. The second type of tile is decorated
with only these last motifs. Once laid together these tiles form panels
with larger repetitive patterns. Not all tiles have the same colours. The
background of part of the tiles is a warm ivory white, whereas other
tiles have a cold bright white background. The cobalt blue on these last
tiles is a thick blue slip; the cobalt blue on the ivory white coloured tiles,
however, has no relief. The greens sometimes have different nuances and
the turquoise on the ivory white tiles is sometimes discoloured just as in
the two tile lunettes of Type 3 in the Takiyya. The mihrab is also tiled
with five vertical rows of identical tiles with a pattern of cartouches with
palmettes and arabesques surrounded by Chinese cloud band motifs and
borders with palmettes and arabesques. The design is painted in cobalt
blue, green, turquoise and black on a white background. Once again some
tiles have a soft white background, whereas other tiles have a bright white
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Figure 9.16 The interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the
author.
background. Some of these last tiles also have some details of the Chinese
cloud bands painted in cobalt blue. The cobalt blue on these tiles is also
a blue slip. The spandrels above the mihrab are inlaid with tiles with a
decoration of palmettes, rosettes, arabesques and saz leaves similar to the
design on the spandrels on the façade of the building. Above the entrance
in the north wall is a tile lunette with a design which – as mentioned
before – resembles the designs of the two slightly earlier tile lunettes of
Type 4 in the Takiyya and the tile lunettes of the contemporary Zawiyya
al-Sa’diyya. (Figs 9.12–14) The design is painted in cobalt blue, green,
turquoise, black and white. When compared with the tile lunettes in
the Takiyya and the Zawiyya al-Sa’diyya this tile panel uses more green.
On some tiles the turquoise is discoloured. Above the cupboards in
the middle of the west and east walls are two other tile lunettes with
an identical design painted in cobalt blue, green, turquoise, aubergine
purple, black and white. Both the design and the colours used closely
resemble those of the tiles of the spandrel on the façade of the building
and the tile lunettes of the Takiyya (Types 1–3). One important difference
from the Takiyya tile lunettes, however, is that – as on the spandrel tiles –
turquoise blue has been used only for details. The location of these two
tile lunettes is unusual because in a sixteenth-century Damascene context
tile lunettes were mainly used to accentuate entrances and windows,
not cupboards. Two wall cupboards in the interior of the mosque of the
Takiyya are also crowned with tile lunettes, but these complement the
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Figure 9.17 Original (sixteenth-century) and copied (1916–1918) tiles in the
interior of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. Photograph by the author.
tile lunettes above the windows in this building. However, none of the
windows in the madrasa is crowned with tile lunettes; only the entrance
in the north wall. Therefore this specific combination in the madrasa is
unusual.
On the basis of this formal analysis some conclusions can be drawn.
It seems likely that we are dealing with tiles from two distinctly different
periods: the 1550s–1560s and the years 1916–1918. Only four tile lunettes
of the Takiyya belong to the original sixteenth-century tilework: the
two tile panels of Type 3 and the two tile panels of Type 4. The tiles
of the two lunettes of Type 3 have different sizes, the designs are more
refined and have more details, the tiles have slightly different colours and
the turquoise often turned out discoloured. This discolouration links
these tiles to the slightly later tiles of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya, some of
which also suffer from the same imperfection. This probably explains
why the tilemakers in later projects (i.e. after the Takiyya, beginning
with the Madrasa al-Salimiyya) no longer applied turquoise to larger
surfaces, but restricted their use of this colour to smaller details and
borders. It also explains why during the renovation of 1916–1918 these
tile lunettes were replaced with new panels. It is thus likely that originally
part of the tile lunettes had a similar design and were painted using the
same colour palette. The tiles of the two lunettes of Type 4 use exactly
the same colour palette, though sometimes in different nuances. The
aubergine purple, for instance, is much darker. These two tile panels
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Figure 9.18 Cuerda seca tile lunette of the Sultan Selim Mosque in Istanbul
(1520s). Photograph by the author.
closely resemble tile lunettes in other sixteenth-century buildings in
Damascus. The combination of two different types of design (Types 3 and
4) in one building is not unique. Exactly the same two types of design
(one with stylized vegetative and floral motifs and one with religious
epigraphy)⁴⁷ are also combined in the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque which
was built in 1586–1591, some 30 years after the completion of the Takiyya.
The tile designs of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque were thus most likely
inspired by those of the Takiyya. Like the two tile panels of Type 3 in the
Takiyya, the resembling tile panels in the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque are
painted less schematically, and are more refined and with more details
than the tile panels of Type 1 in the Takiyya which were made in the years
1916–1918. The colour palettes of the sixteenth-century tiles of the Takiyya
and the Koca Sinan PashaMosque are also comparable although, as in the
other sixteenth-century buildings with tiles in Damascus, the tilemakers
of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque also avoided using turquoise for large
surfaces. The sixteenth-century decorative programme of the Takiyya
al-Sulaymaniyya (like that of the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque) was thus
based on a combination of two different tile designs (Types 3 and 4). The
source of inspiration for the design of the tile lunettes of Type 3 was most
likely formed by cuerda seca tile panels from the 1520s–1550s in mosques
and other buildings in Istanbul. This further strengthens the hypothesis
that tilemakers – some of whom may originally have worked in the royal
ceramics workshop in Istanbul – moved to Damascus after finishing
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their work on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. The sixteenth-century
tilework of the Takiyyawas characterized by the use of threemain colours:
cobalt blue, green and turquoise, and three supporting colours: black,
white and aubergine purple. This is confirmed by a nineteenth-century
description of the tiles of the Takiyya:
The ogee pediments over the doorways and grated windows of these
apartments were fitted with exquisitely designed tiles, made expressly
for their places. The colours were rich dark blue, delicate green, and
turquoise blue, all outlined in black.⁴⁸
All other 40 tile lunettes weremade in the years 1916–1918 as part of Cemal
Pasha’s renovation. Interestingly, Wulzinger and Watzinger, who studied
the complex in early 1917 as members of the Denkmalschutzkommando⁴⁹
and published the first description of the complex after the war, only
indirectly refer to the renovation⁵⁰ and describe tile panels without
red.⁵¹ Von Kiesling, who visited the complex in the same period,⁵² also
still describes the old situation.⁵³ This suggests that the tile lunettes
of the Takiyya were replaced later in 1917 or in 1918. None of the
subsequent studies dealing with the Takiyya mentions the renovation
project and the replacement of the tiles. Consequently, the present
tile lunettes are generally accepted as the original sixteenth-century
tilework.⁵⁴
However, the refurbishment profoundly changed the visual message
of the Takiyya. Instead of a decorative programme based upon a
combination of tile lunettes with religious epigraphy and stylized
vegetative and floral decorations in the same colour palette, the new
tilework created a visual hierarchy with different designs and colour
palettes for lunettes above windows and entrances of the guest rooms,
above windows and entrances of the hospice and in the interior of the
mosque. Highest in the visual hierarchy are the tile lunettes with red
above the main entrance of the hospice and in the interior of the mosque.
The use of the colour red in these last tile lunettes suggests a conscious
attempt to upgrade the status of Süleyman’s Takiyya from a complex
using a – in late Ottoman eyes – provincial visual language to a complex
expressing an imperial Ottoman visual identity by copying the colour
palette of classical sixteenth-century Iznik tilework. The tilework of the
Takiyya was made more Ottoman than it had ever been. Thus the link
between the imperial centre and an Ottoman provincial capital was
reinforced by superimposing an idealized state on the provincial past.
This was a case of an invented tradition which could be interpreted as a
visual expression of a process of top-down Ottomanization.
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As in the Takiyya the tile revetments of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya
can also be divided into sixteenth-century tilework and twentieth-
century tilework. Tilework that was still present in 1916 was retained. A
nineteenth-century description of the tiles in the interior suggests that
the present lay-out of the tilework conforms to the original situation:
The walls were covered with glazed tiles; those of the mihrab, the niche
on the south side, were especially beautiful, and the largest I had seen –
much too large to be drawn inmy sketch-book full size. I told the sheikh
that I regretted this. He instantly went to his house on the opposite side
of the court, and brought me some very large well-made Turkish paper,
and I made a careful drawing of a tile which measured fifteen inches
and a quarter by twelve inches and one-eighth, which well represents
the style and character of the tiles throughout the building.⁵⁵
During the renovation of 1916–1918 missing (and possibly also damaged)
tiles were replaced with new tiles. This is confirmed by Von Kiesling who
visited the madrasa during the renovation in late 1916 or early 1917.⁵⁶ Tiles
in the borders (on the façade and in the interior) and the tile panels on
the lower walls of the interior (including the mihrab) with an ivory white
background have a sixteenth-century origin.⁵⁷ Those with a blue-ish,
bright white background and a blue slip have a twentieth-century origin.
Von Kiesling also noticed some of these differences.⁵⁸ The tilework of
the spandrels both on the façade and above the mihrab in the interior
is also of twenthieth-century origin, as are the two lunettes above the
cupboards.⁵⁹ The lunette above the entrance in the north wall of the
prayer hall-class room, however, has a sixteenth-century origin. Most of
the new tiles were no doubt directly inspired by the original tilework,
both in design and in colour palette, because they were used to repair
existing tile panels and had to fit in as perfectly as possible. Nevertheless
there are small but visible and tactile differences. The two tile lunettes
above the cupboards, however, were directly inspired by the new tile
lunettes of the Takiyya.
The tilework of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya (particularly the tile panels
on the lower walls) uses motifs which we also find on underglaze-painted
tilework produced by the royal worskhop of ceramics in Istanbul from
the first half of the sixteenth century. Similar motifs are also present
on part of the Ottoman tilework of the Dome of the Rock which was
most likely the direct predecessor of and source of inspiration for the
tilework of the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. This should not come as a surprise
because the tilemakers for both projects most likely belonged to the
same group of ceramicists. These tilemakers, some of whom may have
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originated from Süleyman’s royal workshop of ceramics in Istanbul,
were familiar with both the designs of the cuerda seca tradition and the
designs of underglaze-painted tilework.⁶⁰ Later Ottoman tilework from
the second half of the sixteenth century in Damascus shows that the
Damascus tilemakers – from a distance and after some delay – followed
developments in design from İznik, but stuck to the typical Damascus
colour palette of cobalt blue, green, turquoise, black, white and aubergine
purple. The tilework of the Derviş Pasha Mosque and tomb (1570s) and
the Koca Sinan Pasha Mosque (late 1580–early 1590s) for instance also
uses elements of the naturalistic floral style (tulips, roses, carnations,
hyacinths, etc.) characteristic of İznik tilework.
The new tilework was most likely made by staff and students of the
School of Applied Arts established by Cemal Pasha in the Missionary
School of the Sœurs de Charité. From 1916 to 1918 this school had a
German director, Karl Stöckle (1872–1931), who was also a member of
Theodor Wiegand’s Deutsch-Türkische Denkmalschutzkommando für
Syrien und Palästina.⁶¹Therewas also aworkshop in the Takiyya-Madrasa
complex itself where new gypsum plaster windows with coloured glass
were made.⁶² The specialist artisans responsible for these new windows
were brought from Istanbul by Mehmed Nihad Bey. Two of them later
died as a consquence of the difficult and unhealthy working conditions
in wartime Damascus. Mehmed Nihad Bey himself was also forced to
abandon his work because of illness (malaria). He returned to Istanbul
in the spring of 1918; in July 1918 he resumed his work for the Ministry
of Pious Foundations. Supervision of the renovation project was taken
over by Reşid Bey who, in October 1918 when British and Sherifial forces
captured Damascus, only narrowly managed to escape leaving behind all
his personal belongings and returned to Istanbul completely destitute.⁶³
Although the renovation project was nearly finished when Mehmed
Nihad Bey left, it is possible that it was actually never fully completed. For
Mehmed Nihad Bey the project resulted in a bitter aftertaste. In 1919 he
was asked critical questions about the “excessive” sum of money he had
“wasted” on the renovation of a complex in a city which was no longer
part of the Ottoman Empire. This incident once again underlines the
political motives behind the renovation project.⁶⁴ As long as Damascus
was Ottoman it was well-spent money; once lost it was wasted money.
The Second Salah al-Din
Another important project of Cemal Pasha’s focused on the environs of
the Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din (Saladin)
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Figure 9.19 The Great (Umayyad) Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din
(Saladin) shortly after World War i (from a postcard in the collection of the
author).
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Figure 9.20 Antique remains before the clearing (from a postcard in the
collection of the author).
to the north of that mosque. On 11 May 1916 Cemal Pasha obtained the
sum of 100,000 kuruş from the Ministry of Pious Foundations for the
expropiation and demolition of buildings that in the course of time had
encroached on the Madrasa al-Kallasa and the Madrasa al-‘Aziziyya and
the adjacent tomb of the Ayyubid ruler Salah al-Din (1137/8–1193).⁶⁵
Although the relevant Ottoman document only mentions the environs
of the two madrasas, in practice Cemal Pasha’s “cleaning up” operation
also aimed at the demolition of buildings encroaching on the Umayyad
Mosque itself. The goal was to clear pre-Islamic remains in the area of
detrimental additions,⁶⁶
accentuate both the Umayyad Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-
Din (by creating more “monumental” entrance-ways) and obtain less
obstructed views of these religiously important monuments by clearing
their immediate surroundings.⁶⁷ The ruinous state of many of the
buildings including the Madrasa al-‘Aziziyya formed a further detraction
and thus motivation for the sanitization of this area.⁶⁸ Although the
concept of “glorification by isolation” originates in Europe, Ottoman
urban modernizers had in the second half of the nineteenth century
already adopted this policy of “selective preservation” of important
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Figure 9.21 Antique remains after the clearing (from a postcard in the collection
of the author).
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monuments.⁶⁹ In this light Cemal Pasha’s project is merely a continuation
of an already well-established Ottoman practice, which however – as
we will see – in the case of Damascus served pan-Islamic wartime
propaganda.
The tomb of Salah al-Din throughout Ottoman times had gained
the attention of Ottoman rulers. A painted Ottoman-Turkish text on
a tile lunette in the interior of the tomb (dated 1027ah/1617–1618ce)





In the same text Sultan Osman ii (1618–1622) is mentioned as “His







smān Han Gāzī”). The newly-enthroned, young and ambitious Sultan
Osman ii apparently wanted to be associated with the Champion of
(Sunni) Islam par excellence who had reconquered Jerusalem from the
European Crusaders in 1187 and whose Arabic title was “al-Sul
˙
tān al-
Ghāzī.” In the second half of the nineteenth century this important
symbolic link between Salah al-Din and the Ottoman sultans gained
new momentum. Ziya Pasha, Ottoman governor of Damascus from
February to June 1877, started a renovation of Salah al-Din’s tomb. This
renovation coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War
in April 1877.⁷⁰ It is likely that the present state of the interior of the
tomb with its partially tiled walls is the result of this renovation.⁷¹ A
year later, in 1878, Sultan ‘Abdülhamid ii commissioned a new, white
marble sarcophagus in Ottoman Baroque-Rococo style for the tomb.
‘Abdülhamid ii thus consciously appropriated Salah al-Din’s reputation
in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman war in order to bolster his status
as caliph and sultan.⁷² In November 1898 the German Kaiser Wilhelm ii
during his tour of the Ottoman Empire also visited Damascus and
the tomb of Salah al-Din. During his stay in Damascus he delivered
a speech on German-Muslim friendship and an eulogy of Salah al-
Din in which he described the Ayyubid ruler as “the greatest hero of
all past rulers, the noble man whose rank increased by teaching his
enemies how heroes ought to be; the fearless fighter, the great Sultan
Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi.”⁷³ In 1900 the Kaiser presented a gilded brass
laurel mourning wreath in remembrance of his visit to Salah al-Din’s
tomb. This wreath was installed in a glass display case at the foot
of ‘Abdülhamid ii’s sarcophagus.⁷⁴ By the beginning of the twentieth
century Salah al-Din’s exemplary role was well established both in the
Ottoman Empire and beyond.⁷⁵ Hence it comes as no surprise that
during World War i Cemal Pasha tried to take advantage of Salah al-
Din’s reputation among the local Muslim population by associating
himself with this Champion of Islam against the European Crusaders and
presenting himself as the leader of an Ottoman-led counter-crusading
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Figure 9.22 The tiled interior of the tomb of Salah al-Din with the white marble
sarcophagus given by Sultan ‘Abdülhamid ii and the lamp with the monograms of
Wilhelm ii and Sultan Mehmed v (Reşad) (from a postcard in the collection of
the author).
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Jihad against the imperialist invaders of the Islamic World. ‘Ali Fu’ad
Erden in his memoirs mentions that wherever and whenever Cemal
Pasha appeared in public he was described in laudatory poems as the
“Second Salah al-Din.”⁷⁶ In this case Cemal Pasha consciously used
pan-Islamic rhetoric in order to rally Syrian support for the Ottoman
cause and fight the “imperialist British and French” and undermine
the “separatist Arabists.”⁷⁷ Cemal Pasha also used Salah al-Din’s name
and fame to counterbalance French and British influence in Syria. In
1915 he confiscated a French Crusader church complex in Jerusalem
and transformed part of the complex into a new Islamic University
named after Salah al-Din. This religious academy had to provide an
Ottoman alternative for French schools in the area and break the
hegemony of Islamic universities under Britisch control in Egypt and
India.⁷⁸
Cemal Pasha’s attempt to profile himself as the Second Salah al-Din
made it necessary to honour the First Salah al-Din by renovating his
tomb and its direct environs. Although the money for the project was
assigned in May 1916 the clearing and renovation operation apparently
made only slow progress because on 8 December 1917 (just before Cemal
Pasha left Damascus) Wiegand wrote to his wife that Cemal Pasha had
recently agreed to plans for the construction of the entrance to the
Umayyad Mosque and clearing of the area around the tomb of Salah
al-Din “after the architect sent by the Ministry of Pious Foundations
had wrecked the site because he only demolished without knowing
how to secure what remained.”⁷⁹ It is possible that this architect of
the Ministry of Pious Foundations was Mehmed Nihad Bey who was
also responsible for the renovation of the Takkiya al-Sulaymaniyya
and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya. This reference corroborates the fact that
Cemal Pasha used mainly Ottoman personnel for the renovation of
religious monuments in Damascus.⁸⁰ Thus not only did the finances
for the projects come from the Ministry of Pious Foundations, but
also some of the supervising personnel and specialist artisans; addi-
tional personnel were hired locally. These religious sites (as religious
foundations) fell under the administration of the Ministry of Religious
Foundations, and this explains why this ministry was directly involved.
However, it is also important to note that Cemal Pasha apparently
carefully avoided too much direct and visible German involvement,
at least in the renovation of “sensitive” religious architecture.⁸¹ He
was no doubt aware of anti-German feelings among the Syrian pop-
ulation who also blamed the Germans for the misery the war had
brought them. Moreover, in the eyes of Cemal Pasha the Germans
were useful political and military allies in the international arena, but
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when it came to internal Ottoman affairs he tried to control German
attempts to get a more direct grip on Ottoman Syria.⁸² This no doubt
included the religious realm, which was the prerogative of the Ottoman
state.
Cemal Pasha’s modernization of Damascus also attracted the attention
of the Francophone press in Europe which, as part of anti-Ottoman
propaganda, severely criticized Cemal Pasha’s urban works. He was
accused of the systematic demolition of Arab monuments, “even Salah
al-Din’s tomb would have been destroyed if the German Kaiser hadn’t just
donated a lamp.”⁸³ This lamp with the monograms of Kaiser Wilhelm ii
and Sultan Mehmed v (Reşad) and dated 1333/1915 symbolized German-
Ottoman brotherhood in arms during World War i.⁸⁴ (Fig. 9.22).
Although the tomb was not demolished, it is not unlikely that this
would indeed have happened in a later phase. Mehmed Nihad Bey’s
personal archive contains two different designs for new tombs in revivalist
styles for Salah al-Din by architect Kemaleddin Bey, the head of the
Directorate for Construction and Restoration of the Ministry of Pious
Foundations in Istanbul. One design has a more Mamluk-Arab revivalist
character; the other design is in the style of the Ottoman revivalist
“National Architecture Renaissance.” This last style was an attempt
to create a patriotic architecture which could refer back to a glorious
Ottoman-Islamic past.⁸⁵ These designs suggest that “sanitization” was
most probably only the first step in a much more extensive renovation
of the area of the Umayyad Mosque and the tomb of Salah al-Din.⁸⁶
The Ottoman renovation of the Umayyad Mosque itself in the years
1895–1910 after the destructive fire of 1893,⁸⁷ which had “punctuated the
incorporation of the ‘Arab’ past into present-day Ottoman identity,”⁸⁸
would thus have been followed up by the cleaning of the area around the
mosque and the construction of a new tomb for Salah al-Din. This tomb
would have formed the nucleus of an Ottoman lieu de mémoire devoted
to Jihad against European Crusaders by consciously linking the final
resting place of Salah al-Din to the graves of the “martyred” Ottoman
airmen who died in plane crashes in 1914 and were buried in the small
cemetery next to the tomb of Salah al-Din.⁸⁹ Although Kemaleddin
Bey’s designs only mention Salah al-Din,⁹⁰ it is not impossible that the
design in Mamluk-Arab revivalist style was a design for a new tomb
for Salah al-Din and that the second design in Ottoman revivalist style
was the design for a martyrium-tomb for the Ottoman pilots. Two of
the “martyrs” were also honoured with a monument at the site of their
crash and all three with a monument in revivalist style in Istanbul.⁹¹
Cemal Pasha’s Salah al-Din project in Damascus, however, never left
the drawing board. After he left the city in December 1917 the clearing
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Figure 9.23 The graves of (from left to right) Rasıd (observer) Sadık Bey,
Tayyareci (pilot) Fethi Bey and Tayyareci (pilot) Nuri Bey. The names of the
airmen are written in Ottoman-Turkish on the small dark name boards in front
of the graves (from a postcard in the collection of the author).
operation must have dragged on without ever being completed, as can
be deduced from Hanauer’s description of the area published after World
War i:
The great columns of the Roman portico at the east end of the
Hamidiyeh Bazaar and the smaller Byzantine colonnade in the former
Booksellers’ Bazaar, were cleared of the masonry built around them,
and set free on all sides. … The buildings in the region north-west
of the Great Mosque and limited on the north by the street running
between the Mausolea of Bibars and Saladin, were also demolished
during the war, Saladin’s tomb alone being spared. The heaps of ruin
extend eastward as far as the street commencing at the eastern foot of
Madinet el Arûs, and running northward, as far as the above-named
street between the Mausolea.⁹²
The Absolute Ruler of Syria
At the point ‘1’ there stood, till the commencement of the Great War, ‘a
huge old plane tree,’ which, according to Murray’s Guide for 1868, had ‘a
custom-house inside it.’This famous tree, as well as the other remarkable
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one, at the northern entrance to the Tentmakers’ and Saddlers’ Bazaar,
was swept away when the roads and streets were widened in 1915 by
order of Jamâl Pasha.
From the point ‘1,’ the road along the south side of the Tekiyeh
Enclosure runs in a straight line due east as far as the new square ‘2,’
in front of the new terminus of the Hedjaz railway. Here a large and
imposing station-house with pillared portico and modern ‘Sarcenic’
façade, arrests our attention. …
From the Hedjaz station square, a short but wide road leads




hiyeh at the iron bridge over the Barada close to the Victoria Hotel.
From the station square, the great Boulevard of Jamâl Pasha, with
its avenues of shady trees, fountains and flower-beds, reaches eastward





hiyeh. At the eastern end of this ‘Boulevard’ we notice on our
right the ‘Mushiriyeh,’ or Military Administration Building, with a
flower garden (marked ‘b’), in front of it, and on our left, just opposite,
another smaller flower-garden, in which, after the retreat of the Allies
from Gallipoli, a very large model, made of cement, etc., representing
the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora,
was especially constructed for propaganda purposes. The depression
representing the great water-way was flooded from the canal ‘Nahr
Banias,’ and three toy ships floated on the surface of ‘the Sea ofMarmora.’
The sense of proportion shown in the construction of this model may
be gathered from the fact that these ships rivalled the mountains on
either side in size, and a fourth vessel would have quite choked up ‘the
sea’!⁹³
Hanauer’s description above adequately summarizes the most important
component of Cemal Pasha’s urban modernization project: the widening
of existing streets and the construction of new straight and wide roads,
an ideal of Ottoman urban modernizers since the second half of the
nineteenth century.⁹⁴ In addition he mentions an interesting example of
war propaganda in the front garden of theMilitaryHeadquarters: amodel
of the 1915 Battle of Çanakkale which must have had special meaning
for Cemal Pasha as Minister of the Navy.⁹⁵ Cemal Pasha’s road building
activities mainly concentrated on the area to the west of Dasmascus intra
muros, where since the second half of the nineteenth century a modern
Ottoman city centre had emerged.⁹⁶
The widening of existing roads and the construction of new ones led
to expropriations and the demolition of existing buildings in the years
1915–1918. For the construction of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard (Cemal
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Figure 9.24 Cemal Pasha Boulevard after World War i (from a postcard in the
collection of the author).
Paşa Caddesi, shortly after the war renamed Nasr Street) part of the old
governor’s Saray, at that moment used as Military Headquarters,⁹⁷ the
Saray Square, and a number of military barracks and depots⁹⁸ along the
existing narrow road (Darb al-Marj) to the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya
were demolished. At the beginning of the new boulevard near the
citadel, the widening of Sanjaqdar and Darwishiyya Streets and the
construction of the new boulevard⁹⁹ resulted in the partial demolition and
modification or complete demolition of four mosques,¹⁰⁰ a madrasa,¹⁰¹
the flea market¹⁰² and numerous houses. Watzinger remarked that “not
only the front halves of many houses but also a revered mosque were
demolished much to the bitterness of the Arabs.”¹⁰³ Although Cemal
Pasha also ordered the demolition of Ottoman buildings, these had
mainly military and administrative functions. It is likely that in the eyes
of Cemal Pasha these buildings were anyhow no longer representative
enough and that he planned to construct new ones either along his
new boulevard or in other parts of the city. However, when it came to
religious buildings he was much more discriminatory. Whereas Arab
mosques were wiped off the map with one stroke of a pen,¹⁰⁴ religious
buildings from the Ottoman period were carefully integrated in his
plans. Both the Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya (Mevlevi Lodge, 1585) and the
Mosque and Tomb of Lutfi Pasha (1520s–1530s) were maintained; the last
building was also modified and renovated in 1917. Part of the complex of
Lutfi Pasha even extended on to the pavement of the new boulevard.¹⁰⁵
(Fig. 9.1)
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Fig. 9.25a–b Cemal Pasha Boulevard with
the Tomb of Lufti Pasha extending on the
sidewalk (from postcards in the collection of
the author).
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Figure 9.26 Cemal Pasha Boulevard with the Ottoman flag-shaped parterres
(from a postcard in the collection of the author).
The ruthless way in which Cemal Pasha proceeded with his project
further contributed to the resentment of the local population towards
Ottoman rule caused by his other policies and acts, and the misery
the war had brought. It also illustrates how Cemal Pasha considered
himself to be the Absolute Ruler of Syria who would suffer no contra-
diction.¹⁰⁶
Work on his boulevard began most likely in 1915,¹⁰⁷ before the arrival
of Zürcher in early 1916. Cemal Pasha in his memoirs writes that the new
street was made by “a Jewish engineer named Wilbuschewitz.”¹⁰⁸ It is thus
not clear whether Cemal Pasha’s architectural consultant Maximilian
Zürcher was actually involved in the planning and designing of the
boulevard itself or whether he later only contributed to the designs for
new buildings along the street. Cemal Pasha was exceedingly proud
of the street which he named after himself. In his memoirs he writes,
“The boulevard I had constructed in Damascus is, I think, not surpassed
in beauty in any city of the east.”¹⁰⁹ The pièce de résistance of Cemal
Pasha’s urban projects was a 650 metre long and 45 metre wide street
consisting of two lanes lined with trees. In the middle of the two lanes
was a promenade also lined with two rows of trees. Between the two
rows of trees were parterres with grass, shrubs and single trees. At three
intervals the parks alternated with circular ponds. At the beginning
of the boulevard near the citadel, the promenade was decorated with
parterres in the shape of the Ottoman flag (crescent moon and star)
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Figure 9.27 The square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station (to the right) and
Cemal Pasha Boulevard (from a postcard in the collection of the author).
and a small fountain. After the war the star of this symbol of Ottoman
rule was replaced by a (similarly symbolic) kiosk in Parisian style and
the crescent-shaped parterre remodelled (Fig. 9.24). At the end of the
boulevard on the square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station Cemal
Pasha wanted a monumental fountain.¹¹⁰ From this square another new
wide road, Sa’d Allah Jabi Street built in 1916–1917,¹¹¹ connected the
Hejaz Railway Station to the Barada river bridge, and from there to the
Marja Square and Salihiyya. Cemal Pasha contacted Wiegand and told
him that he wanted Karl Wulzinger to design the new fountain. In a
letter to his wife (dated 10 January 1917) Wiegand gave the following
description: “[t]he ‘water feature’ should be Oriental, but not a building
with a roof (sebil), it should be a fountain, but it should also have
cascades, it should, however, not obscure the station and thus be low to
the ground. But that will make the cascades difficult then. It should also
have lions and the paws of one of these lions should rest on a Turkish
banner – well all that will propably be hard to realize. But Wulzinger
has made a design and in any case an axonometric perspective will be
made.”¹¹² Like many other of Cemal Pasha’s plans this fountain never
materialized.
In additionCemal Pasha had planned to build along the newboulevard
a complete range of new public buildings such as a new military
headquarters building (replacing the partially demolished complex), a
court of justice, a post and telegraph office and various other government
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Figure 9.28 Construction of Sa’d Allah Jabi Street during World War i (from a
postcard in the collection of the author).
Figure 9.29 The middle part of Cemal Pasha Boulevard with empty plots of
land (to the right of the street) (from a postcard in the collection of the author).
offices such as the municipality.¹¹³ A number of these offices were at
that moment still located in the nearby Marja Square, the centre of late
Ottoman administration. Cemal Pasha’s plans suggest that he wanted to
relocate part of this centre to the new ceremonial axis ofmodernOttoman
Damascus. Among the papers of Kemaleddin Bey in the archive of
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Figure 9.30 The crossroads of modern Ottoman Damascus: Boulevard Cemal
Pasha, the square in front of the Hejaz Railway Station, Sa’d Allah Jabi Street,
and in the upper right corner the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa
al-Salimiyya Complex (from a postcard in the collection of the author).
Mehmed Nihad Bey is also a design for a new six-storey high commercial
building at the beginning of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard opposite the
Citadel and the Military Headquarters.¹¹⁴ Before the construction of
the Cemal Pasha Boulevard and the widening of the Sanjaqdar Street
this area had been occupied by a number of buildings which were either
partially or completely demolished. The plot of land was the property
of the Ministry of Pious Foundations, and head architect Kemaleddin
Bey made a design for the new building which closely resembled his
designs for similar buildings (Vakıf Han) in Istanbul.¹¹⁵ Among the other
commercial buildings Cemal Pasha wanted to construct along his street
were a bank, a hotel and a bathhouse. In 1917 he also began building a
mosque named after himself next to the Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya at the
end of the Cemal Pasha Boulevard opposite the Hejaz Railway Station.
The mosque was apparently never finished.¹¹⁶
The Cemal Pasha Boulevard aimed at creating a straight and wide
connection between the old city intra muros and the modern Ottoman
city centre. This connection would function as a ceremonial axis from
the restored Umayyad Mosque (1895–1910) and renovated (or new?)
tomb of Salah al-Din (1916–1918) via the modern shopping arcade
Suq al-Hamidiyya (1883–1890)¹¹⁷ and the monumental Cemal Pasha
Boulevard (1915–1918) to the new Hejaz Railway Station (1913–1917),¹¹⁸
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and the renovated Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya
(1916–1918) which formed the centre of a developing campus of higher
education and medical services. From there an extension of the Cemal
Pasha Boulevard created a connection with the Hamidiyya baracks.¹¹⁹
Already duringWorldWar i the street was used for various parades which
showcased the (military) presence of the Ottoman state and “allowed”
the local population to express their allegiance to the state during the
war.¹²⁰ The Cemal Pasha Boulevard thus had an important wartime
propaganda function. In addition the promenade soon turned out to be
a favourite location for the inhabitants of Damascus to go gallivanting.¹²¹
Last but not least, the new street redirected the ceremonial hajj route
in Damascus itself which, before the completion of the Hejaz Railway
Station in 1917, was still orientated at (the) Qadam (Station) in Midan to
the south of Damascus intra muros. Although the war had interrupted
the yearly hajj it is likely that the authorities after the war would have
used the Cemal Pasha Boulevard for some of the religious processions
held before the departure of the pilgrims embarking on the last leg
of their journey by train from the new Hejaz Railway Station.¹²² The
plan for a fountain – an important form of Islamic charity – in front of
the station, the construction of the Cemal Pasha Mosque next to the
Takiyya al-Mawlawiyya opposite the station, and the renovation of the
nearby Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya complex
which throughout Ottoman times had played an important role in the
yearly hajj further strengthens the hypothesis that his boulevard also
served pan-Islamic propaganda (Fig. 9.30)
Two documents dated 21 September 1918 deal with the expropriation
by the municipality of all land twenty metres deep on both sides of
the Cemal Pasha Boulevard. These documents corroborate that the
authorities – even after Cemal Pasha had left Syria and shortly before the
capture of the city by British and Sherifial troops in October 1918 – were
still occupied with the creation of the Ottoman ceremonial axis, which,
however, was never completed.¹²³
The restoration of the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-
Salimiyya, the sanitization of the area around the Umayyad Mosque and
the tomb of Salah al-Din, and the modernization of the street network
of Damascus, which included the construction of the Cemal Pasha
Boulevard, all formed part of Cemal Pasha’s comprehensive programme
of Ottomanization. His interest in pre-Islamic antiquities and Islamic
patrimony in combination with modernization policies is emblematic of
late Ottoman modernity.¹²⁴ As such he was a man of his time. However,
in the case of Cemal Pasha’s Damascus World War i provided an extra
impulse selectively to appropriate the Arab-Islamic past into the Ottoman
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present and to focus more than ever before on Ottoman-Islamic heritage
in combination with modernization.¹²⁵ This strategy served top-down
Ottomanization and pan-Islamic wartime propaganda which aimed to
reassert Ottoman state authority in Syria and gain support for the empire
among the localMuslimpopulation duringWorldWar i. Ironically, Cemal
Pasha’s surge of state-led Ottomanization and pan-Islamic propaganda
had an adverse effect. Discriminatory restorations and unscrupulous
urban modernization merely reinforced the resentment caused by his
“reign of terror” and further alienated Syrians from Ottoman rule in
spite of the fact that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they
had become more Ottoman than ever before.¹²⁶
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Kachelreihen, vond enen jedes einzelne Stück die typische Dekorationsord-
nung des persischen Teppichs aufweist, nämlich das Mittelmedaillon und das
Eckmedaillon. Als Füllung ist das Wolkenband verwendet, das die persische oder
besser gesagt zentralasiatische Teppichknüpfkunst aus China übernommen hat.”
 Ibid., p. 79: “Hierbei ist der Unterschied zwischen alten und neuen Fayencen
ganz deutlich erkennbar. Während die alten Arbeiten viel künstlerischer, feiner
in der Linienführung, viel schwungvoller in der Zeichnung der Arabesken sind,
sieht man der modernen Kachel überall das Gezwungene des Handwerks an, das
in der peinlichen Nachahmung einer gegebenen Vorlage seine Stärke sucht. Der
Unterschied zwischen dem Handwerker und dem frei schaffenden Künstler tritt
deutlich zutage. Auch die Technik hat sich trotz aller Bemühungen noch nicht
auf die Höhe der alten erheben können. Es ist noch nicht gelungen, die satte
warme Farbengebung der alten Stücke zu erreichen. Das Weiß alter Fayencen ist
elfenbeinfarben, während neue stets ein kaltes blaues Weiß zeigen; auch der tiefe
Ton von Blau und Grün ist noch nicht erreicht. Die Farbenauftragung bei neuen
Kacheln ist viel plumper und dicker.”
 On two photographs taken during the renovation (see Figs 9.6–7) the spandrels of
the façade are still empty. The new tiles apparently had not yet been inserted. On
one of the photographs the upper row of border tiles is also not yet (re-)installed.
This is also the case on the drawing by Karl Stöckle in Wulzinger & Watzinger,
Damaskus, p. 107.
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 See Gülru Necipoğlu, “From International Timurid to Ottoman: a Change of
Taste in Sixteenth-Century Ceramic Tiles”, Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual
Culture of the Islamic World 7 (1990), pp. 136–170; and idem, “The Dome of
the Rock as Palimpsest: Abd al-Malik’s Grand Narrative and Sultan Süleyman’s
Glosses”, in Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World 25
(2008), pp. 57–65.
 Kiesling, Damaskus, p. 80: “Das ganze altorientalische Kunsthandwerk wurde
dort getrieben, Fayencen gemalt, Gipsfenster hergestellt, Metallarbeiten gemacht,
Gewebe geknüpft.” The drawing of one of the tile lunettes published in Wulzinger
& Watzinger, Damaskus, p. 106, was also made by Karl Stöckle. For this school
see Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 500; and Stefan Weber, “Images of
Imagined Worlds. Self-image and Worldview in Late Ottoman Wall Paintings
of Damascus”, in The Empire in the City. Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late
Ottoman Empire, eds. Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp & Stefan Weber (Beirut:
Orient Institut, 2002), p. 159.
 Kiesling, Damaskus, p. 80.
 Cengizkan, “Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk”, pp. 188–190.
 The costly urban modernization projects also attracted criticism from both
Ottoman andGerman officers. See Çiçek,War and State Formation in Syria, p. 196;
and Erden, Suriye Hatıraları, pp. 174–175. The Syrian journalist Muhammad Kurd
‘Ali later also remembered the Takiyya project as a grotesquely lavish restoration.
See Hudson, Transforming Damascus, p. 122.
 boa dh.fr 63/298 (dated 28 Nisan 1332 Rumi/8 Receb 1334ah/11 May 1916ce):
“Cāmi’-i şerīf-i Emevīye’ye mutta
˙





















kılınmışdır efendim.” For this
area see Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, pp. 62–66; and Abd al-Razzaq Moaz,
“Note sur le mausolée de Saladin à Damas: son fondateur et les circonstances de
sa fondation”, Bulletin d’études orientales 39–40 (1987–1988), pp. 183–189.
 Watzinger, Theodor Wiegand, p. 299: “Als nächste Aufgabe [after the study of
the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya and Madrasa al-Salimiyya in early 1917] kam die
Untersuchung der Omaijadenmoschee und ihrer Umgebung, des antiken Tempel-
und Marktbezirks, in Frage, die dadurch erleichtert war, daß Dschemal befohlen
hatte, die an die Umfassungsmauern des Bezirks angebauten Häusern und
Läden zu enteignen und abzureißen.”; and Kiesling, Damaskus, p. 36: “Seit unter
Leitung des schweizerischen Ingenieurs Hauck die Freilegung erfolgt ist, bildet
sie zusammen mit den byzantinischen Säulen des westlichen Marktdurchgangs
nicht nur ein malerisches Denkmal alter längst entschwundener Zeit, sondern
auch eine reizvolle Unterbrechung des dichten Straßengewirrs der modernen
Stadt.”
 Nineteenth-century European travellers often decribe the dense urban fabric
of the area around the Umayyad Mosque. For instance Burton, The Inner Life
of Syria, Palestine, and the Holy Land, i, pp. 84–85: “I think you would regret
missing the roof of the book bazar, which leads to the west gate of the Mosque.
On its left is a curious flight of steps through private houses. Arriving at the
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head of these stairs you can see four massive columns in a line, and at each end
a square pier of masonry with a semi-column on the inner side. The shafts alone
are visible from the bazar, as the capitals rise over the domed roof. The people
will not mind our scrambling over their roofs, as we are ‘harim,’ and then we
can examine both capitals and superstructure. These pillars formerly formed
part of the magnificent pagan temple, which must have extended some 600 yards
square, for there are columns here and there in situ, all in four straight lines.
They are unnoticed, because the bazars, houses, and mud walls cling to them like
wasps’ nests. They support a rich and beautiful arch, of which only a fragment
remains above the roofs; but if you examine this remnant you will say that it
is one of the finest of ancient art in Syria. This noble gateway must have been
at least 80 feet long and 70 feet high.”; and Porter, Five Years in Damascus, i,
pp. 64–65: “Leaving the mosk by the southern door, called Bab ez-Ziâdeh, we
observe two colonnades running southward parallel to each other. Following
the line of these through the silk-thread bazaar, we enter the silversmiths’ bazaar,
to the roof of which we ascend by a rather difficult staircase, and from it obtain
one of the finest views of the southern side of the mosk. Here we see a long range
of round-arched windows, which, together with the character of the masonry,
seem to indicate that the whole of this wall was erected before the Mohammedan
era. At the south-western angle is a section of masonry with pilasters, of a still
earlier date; and on proceeding to the great windows in the end of the transept
we can trace with ease and accuracy the limits of another ancient fragment. This
latter is of high antiquity, and formed part of a once splendid edifice. It was left
in its present position in order to preserve a spacious doorway whose sides and
top are richly ornamented with sculptured scroll-work and leaves, somewhat
similar in design and execution to those in the great temple at Bâ’albek. On each
side of this door is a smaller one of similar workmanship. The circular top of
that on the east can just be seen above the roof of the bazaar; but by looking
down a little opening to a chamber on the west, its fellow may be perceived
entire.” See also pp. 61–62. For similar descriptions see Kremer, Topographie von
Damaskus i, pp. 34–48, and ii, pp. 10 and 12; and Baedeker, Palästina und Syrien,
pp. 502–506.
 Kiesling, Damaskus, p. 38, describes the area as “düster und verfallen.”
 Zeynep Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul. Portrait of an Ottoman City in the
Nineteenth Century (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California
Press, 1993), pp. 59–63.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 665, dates the renovation by Ziya
Pasha to 1293ah/1876ce. However, it is likely that the year 1293 is not hijri
(ah) but rumi (financial year). Hence the renovation coincides with the short
governorship of Ziya Pasha in 1877 and the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war
which in Turkish is called the ‘93 harbi’ because it coincides with the rumi year
1293 (1877–1878ce).
 The tile lunette from 1618 was most likely already present in 1877. However, most
of the other tiles – among which are seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tiles
made in Damascus – that either complement the tile lunette on the upper wall or
decorate the lower walls and niches were probably added to the interior during
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the renovation of 1877. The earliest known photographs of the interior of the tomb
date from after this renovation and already show the present tile decoration.
 Stefan Heidemann, “Memory and Ideology: Images of Saladin in Syria and in
Iraq”, in Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image, eds.
Christiane Gruber & Sune Haugbolle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2013), pp. 60–61.
 Abdel-Raouf Sinno, “TheEmperor’s Visit to the East as Reflected inContemporary
Arabic Journalism”, in Image and Monument: Baalbek 1898–1998, eds. Hélène
Sader, Thomas Scheffler & Angelika Neuwirth (Beirut: Orient Institut, 1998),
pp. 115–136. Electronic version at http://www.abdelraoufsinno.com/periodicals
.html. Quotation taken from electronic version p. 19.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 665. The wreath is nowadays kept at
the Imperial War Museum. See http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/
30083872.
 Late Ottoman hajj pilgrims often visited the tomb during their stay in Damascus.
See for instance Yusuf Çağlar, “Mahmil-i Şerif ’in Surre-i Hümayun’la İstanbul’dan
Haremeyn’e Hac Yolculuğu”, in Dersaadet’ten Haremeyn’e Surre-i Hümayun,
eds. Yusuf Çağlar & Salih Gülen (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2008),
p. 40.
 Erden, Suriye Hatıraları, p. 231.
 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, pp. 56–58.
 Cemal Paşa, Hatıralar, p. 368; and Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria,
pp. 180–184.
 Wiegand, Halbmond, p. 267.
 Kiesling, Damaskus, p. 36, mentions the Swiss engineer Hauck who was involved
in clearing the antique remains of later additions.
 The only German specialist involved in the renovation activities of religious
architecture seems to have been Karl Stöckle who, as director of the School of
Applied Arts, was involved in the production of new tilework for the Takiyya
al-Sulaymaniyya and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya.
 Çiçek, War and State Formation in Syria, pp. 150–159.
 Wiegand, Halbmond, p. 237.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 665–666. The lamp still hangs above
the white marble sarcophagus given by Sultan ‘Abdülhamid ii in the tomb of
Salah al-Din.
 Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building, pp. 16–34.
 The archive of Mehmed Nihad Bey also contains a design by Kemaleddin Bey
for a new Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The Noble Sanctuary including the Aqsa
Mosque had already been cleared of later additions on the orders of Cemal Pasha.
This may also have been the first step in a much more comprehensive renovation
project which included constructing a new Ottoman-revivalist Aqsa Mosque.
Both Kemaleddin Bey and Mehmed Nihad Bey were in 1922 involved in the
restoration of the monuments of the Noble Sanctuary. See Cengizkan, “Mehmet
Nihat Nigisberk”, pp. 183–184 and 192.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 106–108.
 Çelik, “Defining Empire’s Patrimony”, p. 469.
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 All three airmen died before the outbreak of World War i during flights to
Egypt. Fethi Bey and Sadık Bey crashed their plane on 27 February 1914 near
Lake Tiberias. Nuri Bey died on 11 March 1914 when his plane crashed in the
Mediterranean Sea near Jaffa. His co-pilot İsma’il Hakkı Bey survived the crash.
Subsequently, the bodies of the “martyrs” were brought to Damascus and buried
next to the tomb of Salah al-Din. See Heidemann, “Memory and Ideology”,
pp. 61–62; Nureddin Van, “Journey from Istanbul to Cairo and the First Turkish
Air Martyrs: Fethi, Sadık and Nuri Beys”, Ozean Journal of Social Sciences 5,
no. 3 (2012), pp. 119–129; and Afife Batur, M. Vedad Tek. Kimliğinin İzinde bir
Mimar (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003), p. 121.







 For the monument for Fethi Bey and Sadık Bey at the crash site see Heidemann,
“Memory and Ideology”, pp. 61–62. For the monument in Istanbul see Batur,
M. Vedad Tek, pp. 121–123 and 347–348; and Klaus Kreiser, “Public Monuments
in Turkey and Egypt, 1840–1916”, Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of
the Islamic World 14 (1997), p. 113.
 Hanauer, “Notes on Changes”, pp. 70–71. Photographs in the Creswell Archive
(http://creswell.ashmolean.org/HomePage.html) show the remains of demol-
ished buildings afterWorldWar i (ea.ca.5459; ea.ca.5467–5468; ea.ca.718–720).
Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, Tafel 4c, also shows the “heaps of ruin.”
 Hanauer, “Notes on Changes”, pp. 68–69.
 For these roads see Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 151–153 and
681–690. For this ideal see Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul, pp. 49–81.
 Cf. Wiegand, Halbmond, p. 198: “An der Wand [in the house of Cemal Pasha]
ein scheußliches Ding von Seidenteppich in blau und braun: die Landkarte
der Dardanellen nebst Ortsbezeichnungen, gewidmet von einem Frauenklub.
Donnerwetter! Ich lobe krampfhaft die feine Technik des Gewebes.”
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 1–454; and Stefan Weber, “Der
Marğa-Platz in Damaskus. Die Entstehung eines modernen Stadtzentrum
unter den Osmanen als Ausdruck eines strukturellen Wandels (1808–1918)”,
Damaszener Mitteilungen 10 (1998), pp. 291–344, Tafel 77–88. Weber’s ground-
breaking study of late Ottoman Damascus is published in English as Stefan
Weber, Damascus, Ottoman Modernity and Urban Transformation (1808–
1918)(Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2009).
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 674–675.
 Ibid., pp. 632–634.
 Ibid., pp. 683–684, 687 and 690.
 Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, p. 59; Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen
Wandels”, pp. 465–468 and 657–658; and idem, “Der Marğa-Platz in Damaskus”,
pp. 325 and 335.
 Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, p. 59, mention a “Medrese Kadschmâsîje”;
Weber, “DerMarğa-Platz in Damaskus”, p. 153, footnote 468, mentions aMadrasa
al-Bayramiyya.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 468–469; and idem, “Der Marğa-
Platz in Damaskus”, p. 325.
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 Watzinger, Theodor Wiegand, p. 300: “Er hatte von der Innenstadt aus seinen
breiten ‘Boulevard’ nach dem neuen Bahnhof durchbrechen lassen, wobei
nicht nur die vorderen Hälften vieler Häuser, sondern auch eine altehrwürdige
Moschee zur Erbitterung der Araber hatte fallenmüssen.”; and ibid., p. 319: “Auch
sonst kam es immer wieder aus Gründen der Verkehrserschließung oder wegen
Straßenerweiterungen zu überflüssigen Zerstörungen antiker und altarabischer
Bauten, von denen die Formation meist erst nach der Durchführung Kunde
erhielt – ‘wie denn das Wort “démolir” für die junge Generation etwas
Faszinierendes zu haben scheint’.” Sie also Wiegand, Halbmond, p. 267.
 Cf. Erden, Suriye Hatıraları, p. 114: “Açılacak olan caddeler şehir haritası üzerinde
kırmızı çizgilerle çizilir ve ertesi sabah cadde açılmasına başlanırdı.”
 Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, pp. 58–59: “Jetzt als Durchgang des
n. Bürgersteiges am Boulevard Dschemal Pascha gestaltet, stellt es einen
Neubau mit den alten Werkstücken dar. Die frühere W.-Fassade ist das
Hauptschmuckstück. Großes querliegendes Zierfeld. Schlingbänder teilen zwei
Kreise und ein Quadrat ab. DiesMittelfeld wird von Streifenmit Blattzinnen und
Steinschnittmustern umzogen. Alles in zartestem flachen Relief, wahrscheinlich
zum Teil für Pastenausfüllung vorbereitet und unvollendet geblieben (gerauhter
Grund). Ganz ähnlich f2 (i) und f4 (i) kleine Kuppel, zwölfseitiger Tambur
mit Fenstern renov., darunter das Grab des l. (zur Seite gerückt). Lutfi Pascha
starb 957 (1550).” This Ottoman “anomaly” was demolished not long after World
War i (before 1932 because Sauvaget, Les monuments historiques de Damas, no
longer mentions the building). For the fate of Ottoman architecture in Syria after
World War i see Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, “An Uneasy Historiography:
the Legacy of Ottoman Architecture in the Former Arab Provinces”, Muqarnas:
An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World 24 (2007), pp. 27–43.
 Erden, Suriye Hatıraları, p. 132: “O, resmen değil, ama fiilen Suriye ve Filistin’in
Umumi Valisi ve ‘hakim-i mutlak’ idi.” See also Çiçek, War and State Formation
in Syria, p. 3. Erden also criticizes the construction of Cemal Pasha’s opulent
roads. See Erden, Suriye Hatıraları, p. 114.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 151–153 and 687.
 Cemal Paşa, Hatıralar, p. 365. Gedaliah Wilbuschewitz (1865–1943) was of
Russian-Jewish descent and had migrated to Ottoman Palestine in 1892. He was
amechanical engineer and founded amachine andmetal-casting factory in Jaffa.
During World War i he served as chief engineer to Cemal Pasha in Damascus.
See Yehuda Slutsky, “Wilbuschewitz”, in Encyclopaedia Judaica, eds. Fred Skolnik
and Michael Berenbaum (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2007), 26 vols., xxi, p. 58.
 Cemal Paşa, Hatıralar, p. 366.
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 151–153. Cf. Kiesling, Damaskus,
pp. 92–93: “In diesem Quartier sind auch die neuen Straßenanlagen, die
Dschemal Pascha geschaffen hat und von welchen eine, der Dschemal-Pascha-
Boulevard, seinen Namen trägt. Durch die Niederlegung alter Gebäude, die
Verbreitung bestehender Staßenzüge ist hier eine etwa 800m lange schöne
Promenade entstanden, auf beiden Seiten mit Fahrstraßen und innen mit einer
jungen Anlage geschmückt, in der Wasserbassins in Abständen wiederkehren
und zugeschnittene Boskets den Gangsteig einrahmen.”
war, propaganda and architecture 273
 Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 689.
 Wiegand, Halbmond, pp. 232–233. Cf. Watzinger, Theodor Wiegand, p. 300:
“Er beauftragte Wulzinger mit dem Entwurf eines Brunnens vor dem neuen
Bahnhof nach dem Vorbild des Achmetbrunnens in Konstantinopel.” See also
Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 421.
 Cemal Paşa, Hatıralar, p. 366.
 Cengizkan, “Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk”, pp. 192–193.
 Ibid., pp. 192–193. Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, p. 468, mentions that
in 1933–1934 a new building for the Syrian Administration for Pious Foundations
(Awqaf) was built on this apparently still empty plot of land.
 Wulzinger & Watzinger, Damaskus, p. 57; and Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen
Wandels”, pp. 413 and 646. Sergey Kravtsov, “Reconstruction of the Temple
by Charles Chipiezand Its Applications in Architecture”, Ars Judaica 4 (2008),
p. 37, footnote 42, mentions that the Russian-Jewish architect Joseph Barsky,
who migrated to Jerusalem in 1907 designed “a mosque, a school, and a park in
Damascus under the guidance of [Gedalia] Wilbuschewitz.” It is possible that
this mosque designed by Barsky was Cemal Pasha’s mosque at the beginning of
his boulevard which was built by Wilbuschewitz.
 See Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 209–223.
 Ibid., pp. 421–423 and 487.
 Ibid., pp. 631–632.
 Ibid., pp. 151–153; Hudson, Transforming Damascus, p. 123. Cf. Kiesling,
Damaskus, p. 93: “Hier spielte an kühlen Sommerabenden türkische oder
deutsche Regimentsmusik und alles wanderte auf und ab, um den seltenen
Genuß auf sich wirken zu lassen.”
 Ibid., p. 92.
 For a description of these processions in the late Ottoman period see for instance
Çağlar, “Mahmil-i Şerif ”, pp. 37–43.
 boa dh.umvm 102/52 (dated 21 Eylül 1334 Rumi/15 Zi ‘l-hicce 1336ah/21 Septem-
ber 1918): “… Şām’da kā’in Cemāl Paşa Cāddesiniñ tarafeyninden yigirmişer
metrōnuñ beledīye nāmına istimlāki …”; and boa dh.umvm 155/86 (dated 21
Eylül 1334 Rumi/15 Zi ‘l-hicce 1336ah/21 September 1918): “… Şām’da Cemāl
Paşa Cāddesiniñ
˙
tarafeyninden yigirmişer metrōnuñ beledīye nāmına istimlāki
…”
 See Scramble for the Past. A Story of Archaeology in theOttoman Empire 1753–1914,
eds. Zainab Bahrani, Zeynep Çelik & Edhem Eldem (İstanbul: Salt, 2011).
 Cf. Çelik, “Defining Empire’s Patrimony”, p. 469: “Indeed, attention to Islamic
culture was as central to late-Ottoman thinking as the desire to compete with
Europe for a reputation for modernity.”
 Cem Emrence, Remapping the Ottoman Middle East. Modernity, Imperial
Bureaucracy and the Islamic State (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012),
pp. 55–74; and Weber, “Zeugnisse kulturellen Wandels”, pp. 1–454.

10 The Man Who Would Be Caliph
Sharīfian Propaganda in World War i*
Joshua Teitelbaum
The purpose of Sharīfian propaganda during the war was first and
foremost to gain Muslim, Arab and British recognition of the Hashimite
family as rightful heirs to the Islamic Caliphate in place of the Ottoman
family. To do this, Sharīf Husayn ibn ʿAli had to control as much Arab
territory as possible, since a Caliph who controlled only the Hijaz would
be a laughing stock.
In order to contextualize Sharīfian wwi propaganda, we first need
a clear understanding of the status of the Caliphate on the eve of
the war, British ideas about the Caliphate before the war, and the
Hashimite family’s understanding of their role in Islam. But first, a
look at propaganda itself.
What Is Propaganda and What Was Its Nature in World War i?
Propaganda has been with us from time immemorial, whenever one
side in a conflict wishes to maintain the support of its own population,
gain new adherents to its cause, or demoralize the opposing side. In
modern times we rarely speak of propaganda. Instead we use terms such
as information operations, or psychological operations. In the modern
Middle East we still have ministries that aim to guide public opinion,
such as the ubiquitous “Ministry of Information” (wizārat al-iʿlām).
Propaganda is a “systematic form of purposeful persuasion that
attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions
of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial
purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages
(which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media chan-
nels.”¹ It can also be understood as “the deliberate, systematic attempt
to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagan-
dist.”² Both definitions stress the systematic nature of these efforts to
influence. In World War i the use of propaganda came into its own
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with primarily Britain and Germany realizing its importance and
devoting considerable, methodical and institutional effort to it.³
The Caliphate on the Eve of War: Ottomans, British, Arabs and
Hashemite
Reigning (1876–1909) a few years before the start of the conflict, Sultan
Abdülhamid ii was widely recognized as Caliph. The Ottomans had
claimed the Caliphate for centuries, and this was confirmed by the
swearing of fealty (bayʿa) by all the top civil and religious officials. In
Abdülhamid’s case, the Ottoman constitution, which came into effect at
the end of December 1876, enshrine the link between the Sultanate and
theCaliphate in law. To the bayʿa and the constitution, Abdülhamid added
three other traditionally recognized justifications to buttress his claim to
the august office: hereditary rights, divine will and military power. Divine
will originated with the Ummayad Caliphs who saw themselves as the
Caliphs of God – Abdülhamid needed to add nothing; hereditary rights
were invoked by Suleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), Abdülhamid’s
ancestor, and Abdülhamid told all that the Caliphate was his by virtue
of his being a descendant of the House of Osman. As for power and
dominion, no one could argue that Abdülhamid did not control a vast
empire. The justification of having enough power to protect Muslims is a
long-standing qualification for the Caliphate.⁴
The one criterion lacked by the Ottomans, of course, was that they
were not descended from the tribe of Quraysh. Buzpinar dismisses this
criterion as based on a weak hadith, but admits that it was defended by
the eleventh-century jurist al-Māwardī and that is was popular amongst
Arabs in the nineteenth century.⁵ Nonetheless, it is generally viewed as
true that most Muslims in the empire accepted the Ottoman Caliphate
despite the absence of Qurayshi descent.
Yet as the century crept to a close, there were those within and
without the Ottoman empire who began to call the Caliphate of the
House of Osman into question. There had been military disasters
which demonstrated a lack of Ottoman control; there was nascent
Arab nationalism, which was transitioning through a kind of Islamic
nationalism to a more secular one and which sought to throw off the
Turkish yoke; and there were the British, who sought to weaken the
Ottomans by calling into question their right to the Caliphate.
It was against this background that, when seeking an alternative to
the Ottoman Caliphate, Arab nationalists and the British were wont to
turn towards the Sharif of Mecca, who was indeed widely regarded a
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descendant of the Prophet from the tribe of Quraysh. Yet the Sharif ’s
writ did not extend beyond the Hijaz, and even in the Hijaz itself the
Ottoman Vali limited it at times. To vie for the Caliphate, the Sharif
would need to control more territory.
In the latter years of the nineteenth century and in the first years
of the twentieth, Arab nationalists began to articulate their vision of a
polity that would eventually replace the Ottoman framework. By the time
Sharif Husayn ibn ʿAlī al-Hāshimī assumed the mantle of the Sharifate in
Mekka in 1908, three ideas were in circulation that would have an impact
on Husayn’s vision of the post-Ottoman order, and therefore influence
Sharifian propaganda during the war. These were: the idea of a spiritual
Sharifian or Arabian Caliphate; the importance of the Arabs, and of the
Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula in particular in an Islamic revival; and
the important role the Hijaz should play in a post-Ottoman polity. While
the polity that Husayn envisaged borrowed from previous formulations,
it included ideas developed from his own experience as the leader of an
Arabian chieftaincy. Husayn’s vision was of suzerainty, a riʾāsa. And it
was at this target that he directed his wartime propaganda.
The notion of a Sharifian Caliphate in Mecca has roots that go back to
at least the fifteenth century, and is not solely of European invention,
as suggested or implied by several researchers. C. Snouck Hurgronje
was probably the first scholar to assert so decisively that the idea had
solely European roots. “The idea of a Caliphate of the Shereefs of Mecca
has been ventilated, more than once, by this or that European writer
on Islam, but, in the Moslem world, it has never been broached, and
no one of the Shereefs from the House of Katada – rulers in Mecca and
in varying portions of West Africa ever since the year 1200ad – ever
thought of such a thing.”⁶
Recent research has demonstrated, however, that this is not true.
Richard Mortel has shown that at least three Muslim historians from





hmad al-Fāsi, for example, a fifteenth-century historian
of Mekka, wrote of Sharif Abū Numayy (r. 1254–1301) that, “were it not
for his [Zaydi] madhhab, he would have been [a] suitable [choice] for
the caliphate …”⁷
The idea’s trail can be picked up again in the nineteenth century, and
earlier in that century than has previously been thought. Disappointed
with Ottoman reforms, Muslims in Northern Syria in 1858 were reported
to support the establishment of a “newArabian state under the sovereignty
of the Shereefs of Mecca.”⁸ In 1860, the idea “of using the Grand Sheriff as
a kind of Caliph” to oppose the French in Egypt was discussed in British
government circles.⁹ Buzpinar notes that there was some obscure talk
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in 1876 by Ottoman reformers, of which Abdülhamid was aware, of “sep-
arating the caliphate from the sultanate and transferring it to the former
Amir of Mecca, Sharīf Abdülmuttalib.”¹⁰ And even Abdülhamid himself
told a journalist that “England’s aim is to transfer the Great Caliphate
from Istanbul to Jidda in Arabia or to a place in Egypt and by keeping the
Caliphate under her control to manage all the Muslims as she wishes.”¹¹
It would seem, then, that the idea was already about in the fifteenth
century, and then revived, perhaps in only embryonic form, in the
mid-nineteenth century. Martin Kramer picks up the story about ten
years later in the historical record. The idea of a Sharifian Caliphate in
Mecca began to be propagated in the late 1870s by John Louis Sabunji,
G.C.M. Birdwood, James Zohrab and even Jamāl al-Dīn “al-Afghānī”
al-Asadabādī, although by the last a bit less enthusiastically. The most
active on behalf of the idea – Muslim or European – was Wilfred Scawen
Blunt, who was in contact with all the above.¹² Blunt espoused a solely
spiritual Caliphate, not unlike the papacy.¹³
As we move forward in time, we also see evidence of movement in
about 1880 in Bukhara among Muslims to establish a Muslim federation
with the Sharif of Mekka as the Caliph,¹⁴ and that towards the end of
the century the idea appeared to be quite widespread. British Muslim
Marmaduke Pickthall noted that when in Syria in 1894–1896 he heard
“Muslim Arabs talking more than once” about the Sharif of Mekka
becoming “the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm of El Islam, [and]
the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head.”¹⁵
The idea of an Arabian/Sharifian Caliphate became more widely
known in the Arab world with the serialization of ʿAbd al-Ra
˙
hman al-
Kawākabī’s (c. 1849–1902) book Umm al-Qurā in Rashīd Ri
˙
dā’s al-Manār,
April 1902-February 1903. This work purports to be the minutes of the
meeting of a secret Muslim society in Mekka to work for a spiritual
Qurayshi Caliphate to be headquartered in the holy city. The Caliph
would have political power only in the Hijaz. The existence of the society
and its goals were soon being repeated in diplomatic correspondence,
and even made it into Negib Azoury’s Le Réveil de la nation arabe. As
Sylvia Haim demonstrates most convincingly, Umm al-Qurā was taken
from Blunt’s The Future of Islam.¹⁶
BothAzoury andRashīd Ri
˙
dā advocated a spiritual SharīfianCaliphate
in Mekka. Azoury, who published his book in 1905, suggested that an
Arab sultan with political power would be headquartered in Mekka,




dā elaborated on the idea of a spiritual Caliphate. In 1911 he founded
a secret society called the Society of the Arab Association (Jamʿiyyat
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al-Jamiʿa al- ʿArabiyya), whose aim was to unite the emirs of the Arabian
Peninsula who would then join with the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire. Sharīf ʿAbdallah, Husayn’s son, passed through Egypt three years
later, met Ri
˙
dā, and was inducted into the society. Ri
˙
dā proposed that
Husayn be made president of a union of Arabian rulers, who would




dā gave the British a full explanation of his programme.
Entitled “The General Organic Law of the Arab Empire”, it supported a
spiritual Sharifian Caliphate in Mekka, with temporal rule to be held
by a President and Council of Representatives to be headquartered in
Damascus.¹⁸
It is clear, then, that the idea was afoot.¹⁹ But what did the Hashimites
themselves know of the idea, and, if anything, what did they make of
it? Our first piece of evidence comes from al-Afghani. Blunt wrote in
1885: “Amongst other things, he [Afghani] told me that it was he himself
who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn [Husayn ibn Mu
˙
hammad ibn
ʿAwn] … to claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible
without armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the
name of religion.”²⁰
James Zohrab wrote home extensively, beginning in 1879, of rumours
of the existence of a “secret society” in Mekka whose objective was “to
restore the Khalifate to the Arabs of the Hedjaz.”²¹ Zohrab was in the
Hijaz during the tenure of Sharif Husayn ibn Mu
˙
hammad ibn ʿAwn (and




talib). It is not unreasonable to
surmise that these ideas were already circulating in the Hijaz, and might
even have been mentioned by Sharif Husayn ibn Mu
˙
hammad himself.
Kawākibī (and Blunt) was impressed by the many supposed qualities
of the Arabs of the Peninsula, such as their independence, their freedom
from foreign rule and influence, and their knowledge of Islam and the
observance of its precepts. Moreover, Kawākibī believed, they practised
equity and possessed a strong esprit de corps. The Arabian Peninsula itself
was particularly well suited to be the headquarters of the Caliph, since it
contained the Kaʿba, the Prophet’s Mosque, and was centrally located for
Muslims.²² This argument in favour of the Arabs was to find an echo in
the proclamations of Sharif Husayn’s revolt (see below) and in the writing
of Husayn’s son, ʿAbdallah.²³ Yet both of these elaborated on the idea by
personalizing it. For they were not simply Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula,
and not simply Quraysh: they were of the house of the Prophet.²⁴
All this suggests that upon assuming office, Sharif Husayn was most
probably very well disposed towards the issue of a Sharifian Caliphate,
spiritual or otherwise. The notion resided in the collective historical
280 jihad and islam in world war i
memory of the house of Hāshim, where there were also feelings of
primacy coming from Qurayshī lineage and being of the Prophet’s family.
The issue was also a topic of general discussion, most famously by al-
Kawākibī.
There was no reason, therefore, that an ambitious man such as
Husayn would not have considered the possibilities, should they present
themselves.
It will never be known for certain just when Husayn began to see the
possibility of a Sharifian Caliphate as a realistic one. Although it appears
that the zeitgeist gave ample reason for him to harbour such wishes, it
seems that it was the British who gave him the idea that it might actually
be attainable.²⁵ Elie Kedourie and Ernest Dawn agree that in the initial
contacts between ʿAbdallah, Ronald Storrs (Oriental Secretary in Cairo)
and FieldMarshal LordKitchener (the BritishAgent inCairo) in February
and April 1914, the Sharif was interested primarily in maintaining the
emirate of the Hijaz in his and his family’s name. But upon the Ottomans’
entry into the hostilities on 31 October 1914, Kitchener fired off a message
to ʿAbdallah in which he raised the issue of the Caliphate for the first
time. Kitchener, it has been noted, “had cherished for a long time the
idea of an Arab Caliphate …” The message was sent (after embellishment
by Storrs in Cairo) the next day, 1 November 1914. He asked for the help
of the Arab nation, and added a key phrase: “It may be that an Arab of
true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina and so good may
come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring.”²⁶ The
effect on Husayn of such a statement by a man of Kitchener’s stature
must surely have been electric. These were heady words indeed.
While Snouck Hurgronje, Kedourie and Kramer emphasized that the
notion of a SharifianCaliphate was a European invention and implied that
it waswithoutArab local validity, we have shown that the ideawas actually
local and quite old, and therefore most likely part of Husayn’s primordial
historical memory; it resonated with him. Kitchener’s statement therefore
did not fall on a tabula rasa, as far as Husayn was concerned.
After having read the text, Husayn told Storrs’ messenger of his
reluctance to revolt. The time was simply not right, said Husayn, but
he was fomenting rebellion. He then discussed the Caliphate. He was
cautious, but was considering the issue. He said, “There no longer exists
a Caliphate … for their [the Ottomans’] rule projects … deeds that are
all contrary to religion. The Caliphate means this, that the rule of the
book of God should be enforced, and this they do not do.”²⁷ Kedourie is
right in pointing to Husayn’s hesitation on the subject, for what he was
considering had be been talked about for years, but no real opportunity
had yet presented itself.
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ClearlyHusayn’s interest in theCaliphatewas high, but it was ʿAbdallah
who pushed things along. Kedourie sees ʿAbdallah’s hand behind the
letter of 14 July 1915 which initiated what was to be known as the Husayn-
McMahon correspondence. The letter demanded – apparently for the
first time – that “Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab
Caliphate for Islam.” Although Kitchener, in the 31 October 1914 message,
had been vague and circumspect (“It may be …”), it was most certainly
tantalizing, and there was no reason for Husayn not to hope and believe
that he was the object of Kitchener’s statement. High Commissioner
McMahon twice reiterated Kitchener’s general comment in his letter to
Husayn of 30 August 1915, and went even further to note that Britain
would welcome the Caliphate’s reversion to a “true Arab born of the
blessed stock of the Prophet,” a certain reference to the Quraysh, and
an implied reference to the Hashemites.²⁸ Kitchener was most probably
talking about a spiritual Caliphate à la Blunt (a papacy of Islam), which
was a popularly held Western notion, yet Husayn had no reason to
believe that Kitchener and McMahon were referring to this type of
Caliphate.²⁹
Although there is reason to believe that Husayn by this time was
aware of the idea that there were those who conceived of the modern
Caliphate as involving a separation of spiritual and temporal powers,
Husayn did not subscribe to this notion. There is no reason to believe
that Husayn had in mind any type of Caliphate other than the traditional
Sunni type, involving temporal as well as a form of spiritual/religious
authority or right to lead the umma stemming from his being descended
from the Quraysh and the Prophet.³⁰
Husayn’s ambitions and belief that he could achieve a grand role
as a Muslim Arab leader and Caliph were nurtured by contacts with
Arab nationalists as well. There is evidence of nascent Arab nationalist
support for Husayn as early as 1911, when he received a letter of support
for his activities against the Ottoman Vali from some Arab members
of the Ottoman Parliament. These deputies gave him their blessing for
the religious leadership (riʾāsa dīniyya) of the Arab regions.³¹ In that
same year, ʿAlī Ri
˙




z of Medina, wrote to
Istanbul complaining of Husayn’s anti-Ottoman activities, and noted that
he was assisted by “the revolutionary Society of the Arab Revival” which
aimed to set Husayn up as Caliph.³²
The Arab nationalist societies of al-Fatat and al-ʿAhd were active once
the war began in recruiting the Hashemites to lead them. There were
several approaches by the societies in 1915 both to Husayn in Mekka
and to Faysal when he was in Damascus. These initial contacts led the
Hashimites to believe that they had full Arab support. Husayn’s ambitions
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were thus augmented, as was the possibility of implementing them. At a
family conference in
˙
Taʾif in June 1915, it was decided in principle to start
a revolt and to begin negotiations with Britain.³³
We should not close here without discussing actual, verbalized
Hashemite claims to the Caliphate prior to the Revolt. Given that the
notion was about for hundreds of years, certain statements about the
Caliphate by Husayn and ʿAbdallah cited by Kedourie, yet attacked by
Dawn as inconclusive, can now be given further weight, thus strength-
ening Kedourie’s position that the Caliphate was a consuming desire
for Husayn. In late December 1915 Husayn wrote to the Sudanese
leader ʿAlī al-Mirghānī on the possibility of the former assuming the
Caliphate:
I had not claimed before to be the qualified chief of the Emirs (the
Caliph) but I explained to them more than once that I was ready to
extend my hand to any man who would come forward and take the rein
of authority. I was, however, chosen in every quarter and even forced to
take up the question of their future prospects.³⁴
In a verbal message from ʿAbdallah to McMahon which accompanied
the Sharif ’s letter of 18 February 1916, ʿAbdallah requested 3,000 pounds
sterling “for myself and my scheme”; when queried, the messenger
explained that ʿAbdallah’s scheme was to choose a “powerful Islamic
Committee from the Arab countries to offer his father the Khalifate. The
latter is aware but feigns ignorance of these measures.” In a move that
could only have greatly increased Husayn’s hope of the Caliphate, Storrs
sent the money along.³⁵
Our third example took place in October, a few months after the
Revolt broke out. ʿAbdallah asked Storrs nonchalantly during a meeting
in Jeddah in October 1916 if he would address his father by the title amir
al-muʾminīn, a title most properly attached to the Caliph. Storrs knew
this, and demurred, but it shows the direction of ʿAbdallah’s and Husayn’s
thinking.³⁶
Husayn’s Caliphate and territorial ambitions were influenced, there-
fore, by three factors. First, there was the general idea – current inMuslim
circles from at least the fifteenth century – that the Sharif of Mekka was
the legitimate claimant to the Caliphate. Second, communications from
both the British and Arab nationalists after he assumed the Sharifate
in 1908 augmented his Caliphate ambitions and brought them into the
realm of what he thought might actually be attainable. Third, the British
and the Arab nationalists also influenced Husayn to believe that he had
support for his ambition to achieve Hashimite territorial sovereignty
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over much of the Arab world. It may be assumed, therefore, that these
elements combined to create in Husayn’s mind a powerful mix of personal
aspirations and the perceived ability to implement them.
Husayn aspired to the Caliphate in its traditional meaning, as a
temporal and spiritual office. As to borders, he wished to control the
Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq, but was probably willing to accept
some modifications, and not receive everything at once. In his grand
strategy the Revolt should lead to a fitting, Muslim replacement for the
Ottoman empire, and not simply a truncated Hijazi state controlled by a
secular ruler. Throughout the war and until he actually declared himself
Caliph in 1924, Husayn consistently maintained these aspirations and
gave voice to them in his wartime propaganda.
Sharifian Propaganda in World War i: Text and Action
Meanwhile, in Mekka, Husayn had begun planning those aspects of the
Revolt that would be centred there. He was also trying to form alliances
with the nearby tribes and the townsfolk of Mekka. The latter, because of
their financial dependence on the Ottoman Empire, were reluctant, and
in March 1916 Husayn tried to starve them into “cooperation.” In what
was a form of propaganda, or at the very least an intelligence operation
aimed at getting the support of Hijazis, he actually asked the British
to blockade the Hijazi coast and cut off its trade; the townsfolk could
perhaps be convinced to cooperate in order not to lose their livelihood
and, in fact, their food supply.³⁷ The total blockade went into effect on 15
May 1916, and its announcement was communicated to “the Arab Chiefs
and the Sheikh of Jeddah” by the commander of the British man-of-war
Suva.³⁸
It was a masterstroke – Husayn had calculated correctly. In mid-May
1916, meetings of notables, merchants, heads of guilds, “ulama”, and the
shaykhs of the quarters were held in Mekka, some of which were attended
by ʿAbdallah. Those present bemoaned the calamity of the blockade and
talked about concluding peace with Britain. At some meetings, oaths
of allegiance to the Sharif were sworn. The Ottoman acting governor
and commandant of Mekka, Binbashi Mehmed Zia Bey, wrote that “an
attitude of distrust of the [Ottoman] Government began to appear among
the people, and words to the following effect were current: ‘Let us invite
British protection,’ ‘Let us declare our independence,’ ‘Expel all the Turks
from Hejaz’.” On 17 May the Ottomans deployed troops in Mekka in
anticipation of a revolt. Husayn protested, saying that the comments
made at the meetings had been misinterpreted and that the troops would
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cause unnecessary alarm. By the night of 9 June the Ottomans noticed
suspicious movements by armed men around Mekka, and the first shots
were fired on 10 June soon after morning prayers. Zia Bey telephoned
Husayn: “The Bedouin are revolting against the Government; find a way
out.” Husayn replied sarcastically, “Of course we shall,” and hung up. The
Revolt had begun in Mekka the Revered.³⁹
The empire’s highest religious official, the Şeyhülislam, issued a fatwa
on 7 November 1914, just a week after Kitchener’s message to Husayn. The
official proclaimed a Jihad and called upon the world’s Muslims to take
up arms against the Entente powers who were “enemies of Islam.” The
Sultan himself issued his own proclamation on 11 November, exhorting
his armed forces to throw the infidels out of the Dār al-Islām, the Abode
of Islam. A third proclamation issued by both the Şeyhülislam and the
Sultan-Caliph on 23 November required the people to obey the Koran, as
demanded by the Şeyhülislam, his fatwa, and defend the holy places and
Islam.⁴⁰
Both the Sultan-Caliph and Husayn appealed, as part of their pro-
paganda, to Islamic legitimacy. With secular Arab nationalism only in
its nascent phase, Husayn had to emphasize Islam, yet he did this by
stressing that is was the Arabs who were best suited to lead Islam. As for
the Ottomans, their appeal was to their Arab subjects on the basis of
Islamic solidarity.⁴¹
The Ottoman propaganda was carried in several Arabic-language
papers, such as Jarīdat al-Sharq and al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmī, which appeared in
1916 as part of a concerted Ottoman effort. In these papers, the Ottoman
war effort was presented as duty and opportunity for Muslims to defend
their faith.⁴²
In opposing al-Qibla, the Sharif Husayn’s newspaper, Jarīdat al-
Sharq and al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmī could not play the Arab card. Instead,
their propaganda centred on accusations that it was Husayn who had
caused fitna (internecine fighting). He was a traitor to his faith and to
the Caliph, whom he had abandoned at a time of crisis.⁴³
Husayn was acutely aware that in leading a revolt against the Ottoman
Sultan-Caliph, he had rebelled against the centuries-old Islamic order.
He also knew that the idea of Arabism was not an easy sell. To affirm that
he was not causing fitna, he repeatedly claimed that he was doing his
duty to rebel against a leader who violated the shariʿa. This justification
appears in a series of proclamations and articles published in early issues
of Husayn’s newspaper, al-Qibla.⁴⁴
Al-Qibla was an important vehicle of Sharifian propaganda. Even the
name, al-Qibla (towards Mekka, the direction of prayer), was Islamically
legitimizing and a reminder to Muslims that their religion commanded
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them to turn towards Mekka not just in prayer, but in their hearts, to
their new leaders, to the Sharif of Mekka, Husayn ibn ʿAlī, instead of
the Ottoman Caliph. While we have no independent verification of the
periodical’s circulation, at least an indication may be obtained from
al-Qibla’s claim in 1919 that it had a circulation of 5,000, with most copies
distributed outside the Hijaz.⁴⁵
Al-Qibla was part of both the Hashimite and British propaganda
effort. The idea for publishing al-Qibla originated with Syrians in Cairo,
who proposed it to the British. It won the hearty endorsement of Fuʾād al-
Kha
˙
tīb, who wrote to Clayton that “there is not the least doubt, that it will
always remain loyal to the Allies and particularly to Great Britain.” The
British funded it, supplied the equipment, and endeavoured to furnish
the paper with “favourable and authentic war news.” Dispatches from
Cairo were thoroughly examined before they were sent on to Mekka. As
Clayton wrote, “The first number of the Kibla was naturally read over
rather carefully in the Arab Bureau, as it was an experiment and required
careful checking.”⁴⁶
The first proclamation, published in Egypt on 25 Shaʿban 1334 [26
June 1916]⁴⁷ was primarily a diatribe against the cup; it was guilty,
Husayn insisted, of oppressing the Hijaz economically, murdering Arab
nationalists, and violating the shariʿa. Husayn bemoaned the economic
woes of the Hijaz caused by the entry of the Ottomans into the war,
and by the ensuing British blockade (for which, it will be remembered,
he was greatly responsible): “[t]he middle class,” he proclaimed, “[have
been forced to] sell the doors of their houses, their chests of drawers
and even the wood from the ceilings of their houses after selling all
their furniture and clothes in hunger.” He decried the brutality of the
ruling Ottoman triumvirate of Enver, Talât and Cemal, in the hanging
of 21 Arab nationalists. And he attacked the cup at length for changing
and violating the shariʿa. His proclamation mentioned an article in an
Istanbul paper that was “disrespectful” of the Prophet, and he attacked
the cup for rejecting the sharʿi rules of inheritance which give a man a
portion double that of a woman. The cup was accused of limiting the
power of the Sultan-Caliph. Moreover, the cup had ordered the troops
fighting Husayn not only to break the fast of Ramadan, but also to shell
the Kaʿba.⁴⁸
The second proclamation, dated 21 Dhu al-Qaʿdah 1335 [20 September
1916],⁴⁹ blamed the triumvirate for causing the downfall of the Empire
by alienating Britain and France, and further crimes against the shariʿa
were elucidated, particularly relating to the honour of women. Ottoman
soldiers had taken the young girls (mukhaddarat) of the ʿAwalī bedouin,
near Medina, to the military barracks, an act “condemned by the Islamic
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shariʿah and the Arab [sense of] honor.” Cemal was accused of organizing
a women’s society in Syria, and forcing the society to hold a reception
where the women sang to the men. They had therefore disobeyed the
word of God by violating the honour of women, and the ‘Islamic state’
(dawlat al-Islam) had been sacrificed to the personal ambitions of the
triumvirate. This proclamation embodied Husayn’s idea of the lawful
state: it had to be headed by a Caliph, embrace all the umma, and rule
according to the shariʿa. Ottoman rule, according to Husayn, clearly no
longer fitted the bill.⁵⁰
The third proclamation, dated 4 Safar 1335 [10 December 1916],⁵¹
was the first issued after Husayn assumed the self-proclaimed royal
dignity, and is signed “King of the Arab Countries.” It is an attempt to
transition an Islamic identity into an Islamically informed Arab one.
In this proclamation he elaborated on the link between Arabism and
Islam, declaring that national (qawmiyya) and patriotic (wa
˙
taniyya) duty
was the same as the religious duty of the Muslim, namely, to follow the
shariʿa and to revolt against those who “took the religion of God as an
amusement and as a game.”⁵² The fourth proclamation, dated 10 Jumada
al-Ula 1335 [4 March 1917], was important for announcing the omission
of the Sultan’s name from the khu
˙
tba, a move which Husayn declared
he had previously avoided out of reverence for tradition.⁵³ That it took
nearly a year to take this symbolic crucial step demonstrated his cautious
approach to delegitimizing the Ottoman Caliphate.
The Hijazi “ulama” issued their own statement in March 1917.⁵⁴ It
began by claiming primacy to speak since they were the “ulama” of the
Haramayn, and expressed their outrage at the un-Islamic behaviour in
government, “where Muslim women employed by the Government and
exposed in public places unveiled before men of strange nations.” It is
best to let the statement speak for itself:
We endeavoured to please God and avoid a rebellion so long as it was
possible. We rebelled in order to please God, and He gave us victory
and stood by us in support of His law and religion, and in accordance
with a wisdom known to Him which would lead to the uplifting of this
people.
Every Moslem heart in the Ottoman Empire, even among the Turks
in Anatolia and among the members of the Turkish royal family in the
palaces, prays God for our success, and God always answers the prayers
of the oppressed and the righteous.
There is no doubt about it, that if the inhabitants of those countries
which the Unionists have lost through their alliance with Germany
in this war had revolted against those oppressors, just as we did, they
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would have no more been regarded as belligerents and would thus have
saved their countries for themselves. But if things should continue as
they are, no territory will remain for this empire.
If you keep this in mind and remember what the Indian paper
Mashrek wrote on September 12th and 19th on the subject of the
disqualification of the Beni Osman to be the Caliphs of Islam, you will
understand that we have risen in order to avert these dangers and to
put the Islamic rule on a firm foundation of true civilisation according
to the noble dictates of our religion.
If our revolution were only to preserve the integrity of our country
and to save it from what has befallen other Islamic countries, it is
enough, and we are amply justified.
We have done what we ought to do. We have cleansed our country
from the germs of atheism and evil. The best course for those Moslems
who still side with and defend this notorious gang of Unionists, is to
submit to the will of God before their tongues, hands, and feet give
witness against them.
It is a great mistake to suppose that in rising against this party we
are rising against a legitimate Caliph possessing all the legal or, at least,
some of the conditions qualifying him to be such.
What does the Mohammedan world say of the Beni Osman who
pretend to be Caliphs of Islam, while for many years they were like
puppets in the hands of the Janissaries; tossed about, dethroned,
and killed by them, in a manner contrary to the laws and doctrines
established in the books of religion on the accession and dethronement
of Caliphs – which facts are recorded in their history?
We want those who are present here to tell you who are far away that
we shall confess before Almighty God, on the last day, that today we do
not know of any Moslem ruler more righteous and fearing God than
the son of His Prophet who is now on the throne of the Arab country.
We do not know any one more zealous than he in religion, more
observant of the law of God in words and deeds, and more capable of
managing our affairs in such a way as would please God. The people of
the Holy Land have proclaimed him their King simply because, in so
doing, they would be serving their religion and country.
As to the question of the Caliphate, in spite of all that is known of
the deplorable condition in which it is situated at the present moment,
we have not interfered with it at all and it will remain as it is pending
the final decision of the whole Mohammedan world.





tīb, or Fuʾād al-Kha
˙
tīb, were
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published in early issues of al-Qibla.⁵⁵ The premiere issue of the paper, in
August 1916, for example, had pre-empted anOttoman accusation of fitna:
the Turks had abandoned religion, and this in itself was “fitna in every
sense of the term.”⁵⁶ Husayn was out to save Islam and the Caliphate from
the cup. The Young Turks’ treatment of the Caliph was also attacked: they
had imprisoned him and many “ulama”, thus humiliating the Caliphate
and shaming Islam before the world. Those who behaved in such a
manner, wrote al-Qibla, had “exceeded the divine statutes of God, and
he who transgresses the divine statutes is an oppressor.”⁵⁷ And finally,
expressing the perceived integral link between Arabs and Islam, the
paper attacked the Young Turks for proposing a translation of the Koran
into Turkish, for a “Qur’an not in Arabic is an imperfect Qur’an, and a
copy of it remains jahiliyyah.” An article by Fuʾād al-Kha
˙
tīb exhorted all
Muslims to fight on behalf of the fatherland, and for the cause of Muslims
everywhere.⁵⁸
Thoroughly grounded in Islam, whose message the Arabs had the
most right to convey, the Revolt’s propaganda presented itself to the
Islamic world. But what was Husayn planning?
“King of the Arab Nation”
On 29 October 1916, Colonel Wilson in Jeddah received the following
telegram:
According to wish of public and assembled Ulema the Great Master,
HisMajesty Our Lord and Lord of all el-Hussein Ibn Ali has been
recognised as King of Arab nation and he will be recognised as religious
head until Moslems are of one opinion concerning Islamic Caliphate …
The telegram was signed by ʿAbdallah as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The news was unnerving to British officials, who had seen no indication
that Husayn had intended to make such a move. “This is rather a bomb,”
minuted a Foreign Office official drily.⁵⁹
British astonishment notwithstanding,⁶⁰ Husayn’s move was entirely
consistent with his pretensions. Claiming Kingship of the Arabs was
a direct threat to the Ottomans and their Caliphate, for it asserted
sovereignty over key Ottoman territory. Indeed, the issue had been
raised twice on earlier occasions, but the British had not dealt with it
seriously.⁶¹
The assumption of kingship took place at his palace in Mekka, with
assorted guests in attendance. The event was carefully orchestrated by
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ʿAbdallah as a propagandistic spectacle, on the pretext of celebrating
the Muslim New Year, 1335, which began on 28 October 1916. It was to
seem like a guileless response to a demand made spontaneously by the
notables and “ulama”. A long address and a petition from the “ulama”
and notables recognizing Husayn as King of the Arabs was read by a
religious official, and the reading was frequently corrected by ʿAbdallah,
who knew the text by heart (a sure indication of his authorship). The
head of the French mission in the Hijaz, Colonel Brémond, reported
that his French Muslim officers present at the occasion had difficulty
understanding the address, as it was delivered “in very classical Arabic
with a Syrian accent, no word of which [they] understood.” ʿAbdallah
telegraphed Brémond announcing his father’s new title, and added that
Brémond’s Muslim aide, Lieutenant Colonel Cadi, “as well as all the
members of the French delegation had attended the ceremony.”⁶²
ʿAbdallah had managed to force the merchants, shuyūkh al-
˙
hārāt and
notables of Jeddah into a coalition with Husayn. Several notables who
were close to ʿAbdallah were instructed to spread rumours that Husayn
had been recognized by England, France, Russia and Italy as well as all the
neutral countries. They were also to keep a record of those who decorated
their shops and houses in honour of the event. A committee of some
major figures in town held a reception. And the merchants, shuyūkh
al-
˙
hārāt and notables were ordered to send a boilerplate congratulatory
telegram, whose text had been authored by ʿAbdallah. The head of the
telegraph office was instructed not to send any telegrams which deviated
from the formula. Over 2,500 telegrams of congratulations reached
the Sharif from Jeddah, wrote al-Qibla.⁶³ Even taking exaggeration into
account, ʿAbdallah, it appeared, had done his work well, to the discomfort
of those whom he had coerced. It was the assessment of a British agent
that “the people in Jeddah are not pleased with the Sherif declaring
himself King.” Those who had sent telegrams or who in other ways had
expressed support for Husayn were now bound to him in writing. If
Husayn failed, the Ottomans would not treat them kindly.
The text of articles in al-Qibla and of the announcement of Husayn’s
new title stopped just short of proclaiming him Caliph. The revolt was
aimed, he declared, not at the reigningCaliph but at the cup.Nevertheless,
the language was so suggestive that his intentions were unmistakable.
The petition, read out as a proclamation by ʿAbdallah, reflected the
same theory of the primacy of the Arabs in Islam first articulated by al-
Kawākabī, elaborated upon by Rashid Rida and later echoed by ʿAbdallah
in his memoirs, that “God singled out the children of Isma‘il” and that the
Arabs were the most exalted of nations because they spread the message
of taw
˙
hīd. Quoting Muslim (the compiler of a canonical compilation of
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hadiths), the petition stressed that the Prophet had been chosen because
he was an Arab, of Quraysh, of the Bani Hāshim.The petition then turned
to Husayn, praising his connection to the Prophet, and stating that the
petitioners did not know a more pious and God-fearing emir. He was
the “Saviour of Islam,” and he would lead the Arabs to freedom from
those who had oppressed them. The petition then stated, “We recognise
His Majesty our lord and master al-Husayn ibn ʿAli as our King, we
the Arabs, and he will act amongst us according to the book of God
Almighty and the laws of His Prophet, prayer and peace upon him.” It
concluded with an oath of allegiance to him as their “religious authority
[marjaʿ dīnī] pending the decision of the Islamic world in the matter
of the Islamic Caliphate.”⁶⁴ Although the petition declared him King
of the Arabs and not Caliph, the qualifications specified for the former
included those for the latter.
An account of the event was printed in al-Qibla alongside the text
of the petition; it endeavoured to show that the “ulama” and the notables
had spontaneously come to Husayn. All had gathered, it was reported,
for the purpose of persuading Husayn to assume the mantle of “King
of the Arabs (malik ʿalā al-‘Arab) and [to be] their religious authority
(marjaʿ dīnī) until the Islamic world reached a unanimous opinion
in the matter of the Islamic Caliphate.” Shaykh ‘Abdallah Sarraj, head
(raʾīs) of the “ulama” of Mekka and chief qadi, entered the Hashimite
Palace to inform Husayn that the crowd demanded that he come to
them. The groups submitted the petition to Husayn when he joined
them. He exclaimed, “I have never thought it necessary for you to do
such a thing … I swear to you by Almighty God that this had never
occurred to me.” The audience then insisted that he accept their wishes,
he complied, and a proclamation was read establishing his new title.
Fuʾād al-Kha
˙
tīb then stepped forward to proclaim the loyalty of Syrians
to the new King.⁶⁵
To further his propaganda against the Ottomans, Husayn also caused
a fatwa to be issued and sent to India’s Muslims, where support for
the Ottoman Caliphate was strong.⁶⁶ The text begins with an attack
on the cup who “had evil intentions towards our religion.” One had
only to go to Istanbul, continued the fatwa, to see “Moslem women
employed in the Postal and Finance Administration in the same way
as men are with perfect coquetry and unveiled, meeting men of various
nationalities and going about their business. To obey these people would
be to disobey God; so we chose to invoke their anger, and not that of
God.” An article had appeared in an Indian paper that assessed the
Ottomans as unqualified for Caliphate. The fatwa mentioned this article,
and continued:
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Today we do not know of any Moslem ruler more righteous and fearing
God, than the son of His Prophet, who is now on the throne of the
Arab Country. We do not know anyone more zealous in religion, more
observant of the Laws of God in words and deeds, and more capable of
managing our affairs in what would please God, than he is. The Arabs
have proclaimed him King over them only because in doing so they
would be serving their religion and country. As to the question of the
Khalifat, in spite of all that is known of the deplorable condition in
which it is situated at the present moment, we have not interfered with
it at all and will remain as it is pending the final decision of the whole
Mohammedan world.
The fatwa was signed by all the leading “ulama” of Mekka.⁶⁷ As Ruhi
wrote, the proclamation was “a step towards the Caliphate.”⁶⁸
A few months after the assumption of the kingship al-Qibla printed
the speech of “a representative of Medina” under a banner bismillah
headline. The “representative” addressed the Sharif as “His Highness
[ jalāla] our Master [mawlānā] Amīr al-Muʾmimīn and the Caliph of the
Messenger of the Lord of the Worlds our Lord and Lord of all, Sharīf
al-Husayn bin ʿAli.”⁶⁹ Other numerous articles asserted the illegitimacy
of the Ottoman Caliphate and the qualifications of Quraysh and the
Prophet’s house.⁷⁰
“The Great Applier of God’s Law”
Since Husayn desired to portray himself as a true Islamic ruler, in strong
contradistinction to the Caliph and the other rulers of the empire, he
administered justice in a very different way from the Ottomans.
Before 1916 the shariʿa courts seem to have functioned under the





punishments, the Koranic penalties prescribed for certain crimes, such as
the amputation of a hand or foot for theft.⁷¹ Snouck Hurgronje, writing
of the late nineteenth century Hijaz, hints that the hudūd were used, but
that the religious law, “by its marvellously mild application secures a way
out for all offenders.”⁷² Ochsenwald, who covers the period 1840–1908,
confirms the lax use of the
˙
hudūd. He notes that “[p]unishment for such
crimes as burglary and forgery consisted of flogging and short prison
sentences.”⁷³
When he began the Revolt, Husayn posed as the defender of Islamic
law against the secularizing reforms of the Young Turks. His call was
not a national one, as this would have generated little response, but an
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Islamic call. In his first proclamation, he singled out the changes the
empire had instituted in the sharʿī laws of inheritance (mirāth): it had
established the mirāth ni
˙
zāmī, which gave newfound equality to males
and females in inheritance. In general, all the qawanīn (secular laws)
were applied in the Arab lands, but less so in the Hijaz, and the mirāth
ni
˙
zāmī not at all.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, Husayn cited this ni
˙
zām as one of the
reasons for his revolt, when he accused the Young Turks of having the
gall to mock God’s word in the Koran, where He said that the man’s part







With his pretensions to lead the Arab world, opposition to the mirāth
ni
˙
zāmi was designed to strike a strong cord among traditionally minded
Muslim males in Syria and Iraq.
The Young Turks were perceived all over the empire as anti-sharʿī.
At home in Anatolia, the counter-revolution of April 1909 took up the
slogan “the Şeriat is in danger, we want the Şeriat!”⁷⁶ In February 1910 the
Ministry of Justice wrote to the Ministry of Finance with a proposal to
reorganize the courts in the Hijaz. When ʿAbdallah and the other Hijazi
deputies learned this, they wrote to the Grand Vizier that “the presence of
any courts other than the shariʿa would be unacceptable in the holy cities
of Islam.” Perhaps because of their letter, and the opinion of Talât that the
shariʿa law was better suited than secular law to Hijazi society, the shariʿa
courts of the Hijaz remained under the Şeyhülislam, the top religious
figure in the Empire.⁷⁷ But the threat to the shariʿa remained. In 1913 and
1915 the Young Turks weakened the independence of the shariʿa courts
by placing them under the authority of the secular Ministry of Justice.⁷⁸
Therefore, when the revolt began, Husayn moved rapidly to demon-
strate his commitment to the shariʿa. The Sharīf never ceased to empha-
size that he abided by it, and British observers found his application
of sharʿia law worthy of note. The fourth issue of al-Qibla carried an
announcement that Husayn had ordered the reorganization of the shariʿa
court in Mekka. Good salaries would be paid to all officials, and the court
would be conducted according to religious law. Fees were to be lower
than those set by the Ottomans, and officials who charged more than the
official rate would be fired.⁷⁹
The carrying out of the
˙
hudūd was something of which Husayn was
quite proud. For instance, in 1918, four men imprisoned in Yanbu‘ made
an escape but were caught. The organizer of the escape, who had been
imprisoned on Husayn’s orders, received the
˙
hadd of having both a hand
and a foot amputated. Al-Qibla noted that this was the first time this type
of
˙
hadd had been applied in the Hijaz, and therefore the people were
happy that the shariʿa was being put to use against serious criminals.⁸⁰
The British were shocked, but refrained from making any official protest.
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Wilson, who discussed the incident with Husayn informally, noted that
the act “created a good deal of diverse criticism on the part of the nobles of
Jeddah.” Husayn’s reply was that this
˙
hadd was the punishment laid down
for rebellion or acts against public security or against the government by
the shariʿa.⁸¹
Foreign observers noted that the
˙
hudūd were applied with particular
fervour during the hajj, as Husayn wished to impress the
˙
hujjāj with his
Islamic zeal as part of his propaganda efforts.⁸² An incident was reported
in al-Qibla in 1923 under the headline, “Applying the
˙
Hudūd al-Sharʿīyya.”
The paper said that two pickpockets had been caught working one of the
pilgrimage caravans. They were taken to Mekka, where the
˙
hadd was
applied as the crowd chanted the Koranic passage, “al-sāriq wal-sāriqa
fa-qtaʿū aydiyahumā” (“As for the thief, both male and female, cut off
their hands”).⁸³
In late February 1917, the French mission received a letter from a
Hashimite official stating that the government would no longer tolerate
the importation of alcoholic beverages. The French would, however, be
allowed a small amount for personal use, as long as the customs officials
were informed when it was brought into the Hijaz.⁸⁴ A few days later,
al-Qibla trumpeted the new policy as evidence of the Sharif ’s concern for
the shariʿa. (So as not to upset the merchants, it was announced that all
stocks of alcoholic beverages would be purchased by the government.)⁸⁵
Acts of unlawful intercourse were apparently also a problem addressed
by Husayn to demonstrate his Islamic credentials as opposed to those of
the Ottoman regime … Writing in May 1920, the British agent in Mekka,
Ihsanullah, reported that Husayn was “greatly grieved [about] the daily
spreading of adultery in the holy city, and that during the last month
twenty-three … virgin girls [were] found [to be] pregnant.” Ihsanullah
noted a case wherein an adulterer from the Jiyad quarter of Mekka had
been arrested and jailed. The woman, he added, was sent to jail, “where
she [would] remain forever.” “Indecent women,” of whom Ihsanullah
noted 150 in Mecca, were incarcerated in a special prison.⁸⁶
In another case, al-Qibla reported that a court had sentenced some
wine drinkers to the
˙
hadd of lashes. After the sentence had been carried
out, the offenders were drafted into the army or sent to work on the
railway.⁸⁷ Reporting from Mekka, British representative Captain Ajab
Khan noted the puritanical streak in Mekka’s administration:
Liquors, Music, Gramophones, singing and dancing are prohibited to
the public. A certain Sheikh of a ‘Hara’ [quarter] was recently reported
for illicit distilling of ‘Aruck’ at his house for his own use[.] [O]n search-
ing his house, distilling apparatus was found and captured[,] and with-
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out any further trial, all the distilling pottery was flung at the head of the
defaulting Sheikh and an award of 80 lashes was also inflicted on him.
Historically, some Muslim jurists viewed the use of cannabis as a crime,
but the state’s reaction to it varied, perhaps because, as Rosenthal reasons,
it was not barred by “the authority of express statements creditable to the
very highest religious sources.”⁸⁸ In punishing sellers, however, Husayn
followed the strictest interpretation of the jurists, and outlawed the sale
of hashish in Mekka. Shipments were confiscated, and the dealers were
fined and imprisoned. (This resulted, wrote Ajab Khan, in lowering the
quality of the herb available in the holy city.) Hashish was sometimes
sold by the most well known of the élite: in 1920, for instance, a large
quantity was found in the house of Mu
˙
hammad al-Shayba, of the family
that held the keys to the Kaʿba. Only Shayba’s high status saved him from
being imprisoned.⁸⁹
After the fall of Medina in January 1919, al-Qibla made a point of
warning that sitting in the city’s coffee houses and running shops and
government offices during prayer time would no longer be tolerated.
From now on, said the paper, everyone must go to the mosque.⁹⁰ Captain
Zia, the Turkish officer who had been sent to negotiate the surrender of
Medina, told the British that Husayn was unfit to run “civilized areas,”
“witness his ruthless application of effete Koranic punishments, such as
[the] cutting off of hands and feet for minor offences”; Zia said, “such
action has already gone far to alienate all intelligent Moslem opinion
outside of Hejaz.”⁹¹
Symbols and Spectacle as Propaganda
Husayn gave his state the standard symbols: first a flag, then stamps, and
finally coins in 1923, the last several months before he declared himself
caliph.
The flag of Husayn’s kingdom was a red chevron with three horizontal
stripes: black, white and green. Black was for the ‘Abbasids, white for
the Umayyads, green for the Shi‘a of ʿAlī, and red was for the ashraf
of Mekka. It appears that Mark Sykes himself designed the flag; our
sources are not only Sykes’ biographer, but Husayn himself. During one
of his conversations with Wilson touting his ambitions and his belief that
Britain supported them, he told the British Agent that his national flag
was the Arab national flag, and had been designed by a British official,
Mark Sykes; the flag symbolized Hashimite rule over the Arabs. As a
result, he was entitled to rule over the Arab world.⁹²
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Ami Ayalon notes that stamps are important for conveying messages
for mass domestic and international consumption. “They reflect ide-
ologies, aspirations and values, attesting to political, social and cultural
ideas …”⁹³ It is unclear just on whose initiative Hijazi postage stamps
were printed. According to Storrs it was his idea, although the diplomatic
record shows that McMahon had telegraphed the Foreign Office that
“Shereef requests to be provided with issue of postage stamps.” In either
case, both parties had an interest in showing Sharif ian independence
from the Ottomans, and stamps were an often-used indication of inde-
pendence. Storrs was acutely aware of the propaganda value of stamps:
“[s]hortly after the Arab Revolution, we found that is success was being
denied or blanketed by the Enemy Press (which was of course quoted by
neutrals), and we decided that the best proof that it had taken place would
be provide by the issue of Hejaz postage stamps in Arabic.” This would
be helpful, noted Storrs, in spreading “the Arab propaganda” worldwide.
During the hajj, he observed, letters could be sent from Mekka to the
entire Muslim world, demonstrating that there was now an independent
Arab-led Muslim state and it was not a British invention, but a real polity,
as demonstrated by the stamps.⁹⁴
Husayn’s first designs were rejected by the British as not good enough
(they were of monuments in the Hijaz), and they set T.E. Lawrence, then
an intelligence officer in the Survey Department of Egypt, the task of
redesigning them. The designs finally chosen were of calligraphy and
abstract geometrical motifs based on monuments in Cairo. The central
motif in all the stamps was the calligraphic Makka al-Mukarrama (Mecca
the Revered), and they bore the simple legend “HijazMail” (Barīd
˙
Hijāzī).
Contemporary observers pronounced the stamps beautifully designed
and executed. Husayn was proud of his stamps, and often publicized
international reaction to them.⁹⁵
The stamps were first issued on 26 September 1916. While it is difficult
to assess their actual propaganda value, they did travel across the Atlantic
fairly quickly, where they were reviewed in the Journal of the American
Oriental Society (jaos) quite favourably for their beauty. But for our
purposes, it is important to note that jaos also commented that Husayn’s
postage “proved documentarily” that “the newly formed independent
state of the Hijaz” was “an accomplished fact.”⁹⁶
The above holds true for stamps issued from 1916–1917. There are
no signs of Husayn’s greater ambition in them, and the legend Barīd
˙
Hijāzī was rather limiting for the “King of the Arab Lands.” Terms such
as “government,” “state,” “Arab” and “Hashimite” were conspicuously
absent, no doubt because of British reservations. But after 1921, with
his ambitions clipped by the British, Husayn issued stamps that were
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more in keeping with his far-reaching goals: these stamps carried the
legend “al-
˙
Hukūma al- ʿArabīyya al-Hāshimīyya” (the Hashimite Arab
Government). Finally, in 1924, he issued stamps with a gold overprint,
“Tidhkār al-Khilāfa” (Commemorating the Caliphate), in honour of his
assumption of the title.⁹⁷
Similarly, Husayn began issuing coins by simply overstrikingOttoman,
Egyptian and Austrian Maria Theresa thaler coins with the logo al-
Hijaz. It was not until September 1923, a few months before he assumed
the caliphate, that Husayn actually minted his own coins, with a
decidedlymore royal flavour.These carried, inter alia, the following logos:
“Hashimite Arab Government” (al-
˙
Hukūma al-ʿArabiyya al-Hāshimiyya);
“Struck at Mecca the Revered, Capital of the Arab Government”; and
“Husayn bin ‘Ali, Reviver of the Arab Lands” (Nāhid bil-Bilād al-
ʿArabīyya). Most of the coins were in bronze and silver, while the highest
denomination, one dinar, was gold. They were all dated with the year
of Husayn’s accession, ah 1334, and with the regnal year, 8 (a few were
minted with the ninth regnal year).⁹⁸
Propaganda could be legal, printed or visual. In the Bedouin society
which made up much of the Hijaz, Husayn’s son Faysal was adept at the
spectacle of propaganda. On 4 January 1917, after consolidating his hold
over the tribes along the coast North of Mekka, Faysal put on a show as
he marched to Wajh. Here it is as described by Lawrence. Even allowing
for his hyperbole, the procession of over 10,000 must have been a sight
to see, effective propaganda, and quite the spectacle:
The march became rather splendid and barbaric. First rode Feisal in
white, then Sharraf at his right in red head-cloth and henna-dyed
tunic and cloak, myself on his left in white and scarlet, behind us
three banners of faded crimson silk with gilt spikes, behind them the
drummers playing a march, and behind them against the wild mass of
twelve hundred bouncing camels of the bodyguard, packed as closely
as they could move, the men in every variety of coloured clothes and
the camels nearly as brilliant in their trappings. We filled the valley to
its banks with our flashing stream.⁹⁹
As leaders of an established empire, the Ottomans had proclaimed Jihad
at least six times between 1768 and 1922. Their proclamation this time
around was aimed specifically at mobilizing the empire’s Arab subjects
and securing their allegiance in the face of British incitement.¹⁰⁰ For
them it was not an exceptional occasion. But it most certainly was for
Sharif Husayn. He had to protect his project against accusations of
sedition, arouse still embryonic passions of Arab nationalism against
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a legitimate Islamic sovereign, and demonstrate that he provided a
real alternative to the Ottoman Caliphate. This formed the core of the
Hashimite propaganda efforts during the war as he countered those of
the Ottomans.
We are entitled to ask if Sharif Husayn’s wartime propaganda was
successful. The answer should be no – at least for the most part. Most
of the empire’s Arab subjects remained loyal to the Sublime Porte until
it was all over.¹⁰¹ Certainly, the British did put Hashimites in power in
Transjordan and Iraq, which was something of an imperial achievement,
but Husayn himself achieved little. As for his dear project of achieving
the Caliphate, when the Ottomans abolished it in 1924 he was quick to
claim the office – but no one was really listening.
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11 A German “Illusive Love”
Rashīd Ri
˙
dā’s Perceptions of the First
World War in the Muslim World
Umar Ryad
The inevitable event comes to pass … as enticed by the vanity of the
Great States. It was thought that their politicians due to their shrewdness
were able to hold down the fire in the stove so that its evil will not
extend to its neighboring places. Europe that is filled with gunpowder
and dynamite thought to secure itself from the flame against which
Bismarck had already warned … forgetting God’s general justice in all
nations and peoples.¹
This is what Shaykh Mu
˙
hammad Rashīd Ridā (1865–1935) wrote in early
August 1914, a few days after the Great War broke out in Europe. Linking
its anticipated calamities for humanity with the Koranic description of





(the Minor Disaster) putting it on a scale with al-
˙
tāmma al-kubrā (the
Great Disaster), which is a Koranic allusion to the Last (Judgment) Day.
Ri
˙
dā is no doubt one of the most intriguing figures in modern Islamic
history. As an heir to the Salafiyya reformist movement of his time, his
religious and political views and activism are crystallized in his well-
known journal al-Manār (The Lighthouse, 1898–1935) published in Cairo.
Before World War i, Ri
˙
dā became involved in open and secret political
societies that aimed at the struggle against colonial interventions in the
Muslim World. World War i and its aftermath created a global moment
which influenced many world events and actions. During the war, Ri
˙
dā
not only continued his pre-war activities, but became involved in other
attempts to further the cause of Arab independence which the war had
triggered. Ri
˙
dā aspired to set up an Anglo-Arab alliance that could
guarantee Arab independence and save both the temporal and spiritual
authority of Islam.² In his search for alternative outlooks for the imperial
world order through his political activities, Ri
˙
dā formulated specific
views of the war and the political, military and religious consequences of
the German-Ottoman alliance in it as a “European war”. His views are
remarkable examples of how Muslim reformists of that age perceived
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World War i as a great event in global history. We argue that the war had
many paradoxical influences on Ri
˙
dā’s anti-westernist tone and political
choices.
As the power of the Ottoman empire was vanishing from the politics
of world order, Jihad, pan-Islam, pan-Arabism and the Caliphate became
ideologized terms during the war years. Muslim intellectuals and activists
took their political courses of action according to their preference for one
ideology over another as a remedy for the Muslim political malaise; and
Ri
˙
dā was no exception. He had an “idealized” hope of establishing a sense
of belonging and nationalism among his Muslim and Arab compatriots.
Many of his generation tried to create their own alternative politico-
cultural options. Ri
˙
dā aimed at establishing a political and religious unity
among Muslims to the extent that he was sometimes obliged to call
for British-Arab friendship and an Arab-Zionist entente. In that sense,
Europe’s proclaimed centrality in the world political ordermoulded Ri
˙
dā’s
perceptions of Europe itself in his quest for an imagined Islamic and Arab
unity. As we shall see, his growing pessimism and frustration emanated
from his perception of an unbalanced world order and the unfair rules
of the international political game and rivalries. These troubled relations
in the Weltpolitik had their implications for the scope and shape of his
pan-Islamic nationalist visions even after the war. Ri
˙
dā’s attitudes reflect
the fact that Islamic nationalism, and pan-Islamism in general, was an
ambivalent project containing reactionary and changeable components
in a greater world of politics and pragmatism.³
Early German-Ottoman Alliance
As a religious concept, Jihad became a political instrument to mobilize
public opinion in favour of the political cause of the Sublime Porte. In
different political and military contexts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the Ottomans exploited the term as a rallying cry
seeking support for their national and international policies.Nevertheless,
it was the discourse of the Great War that vigorously revitalized its
validity on both the Ottoman and German sides. The jihadization of the
Ottoman participation on the German side was certainly the product
of a Ottoman-German joint project. Whether it was a “holy war made
in Germany” or not, Jihad was a significant node in politics throughout
the war years.⁴
Besides such religious justifications, many pan-Islamists, national-
ists, intellectuals and religious scholars among Ri
˙
dā’s contemporaries
perceived Germany as the only European Power that had befriended
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Islam without having obvious interests in Muslim territories.⁵ Despite
the global character of this Jihad propaganda in the Muslim world, not
all Muslim religious scholars had accepted the religious justification for
that war. This holds true for Ri
˙
dā, who was an influential spokesman
for the Arab and Muslim nationalism of his age. He did not champion
the idea of joining the German side, nor did he show any sympathy for
the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (cup). Ironically,
as a pan-Arabist seeking “Arab religious nationalism”⁶ during the war
Ri
˙
dā was not involved in this Jihad debate. Unlike other fellow Muslim
ideologues who were drawn into the Ottoman-German propaganda
coalition, Ri
˙
dā was not a proponent of the Ottoman participation in
what he saw as a “European war.” As Ri
˙
dā was an influential pan-Islamic
defender of the Caliphate at a later stage, in the early 1920s, a re-reading
to his writings in al-Manār from the war years therefore adds other
aspects to the Muslim religious and political discourse regarding the
Ottoman decision to enter the Great War on the German side. His lack of
interest in a German coalition and support for Anglo-Arab cooperation
could also be understood against his background as belonging to the
Syrian community in Egypt that did not share the political views of the
local population because of their pro-British stance. Anti-British and
pro-Ottoman Egyptian nationalists even depicted the Syrians, including
Ri
˙
dā, as dukhalā (intruders) and collaborators with the British in Egypt.
The Syrians were much more interested in the Syrian cause than in the
Egyptian nationalist question.⁷
From the start, Ri
˙
dā was cautious about giving full support to the
German-Ottoman alliance. His views were nevertheless inconsistent,
as he constantly tried many political strategies before and during the
war to achieve what he saw as his goal of Arab unity. In his early
career, he considered the Ottomans to be “the representatives of that
Islamic temporal independent power.”⁸ In reaction to Kaiser Wilhelm’s
declaration of himself as a protector of all Muslims during his well-
known visit to the Ottoman empire in 1898, Ri
˙
dā did not object to
the Sublime Porte’s alliance with any European power, but he stressed
that one should not forget that the whole of Europe was “an enemy”
for Muslims. However, since Germany had no “greedy ambition” in
the Ottoman empire the Germans were better allies than all the other
European nations.⁹ Ri
˙
dā also received with great enthusiasm the Kaiser’s
visit to Saladin’s tomb in Damascus when he laid a wreath and hung a
lamp of “solid silver” on the tomb.¹⁰ At this point, Ri
˙
dā moreover saw
the German emperor as the “leader of the best-organized army” whose
admiration for Saladin emanated from his acknowledgment of the latter
as “the greatest warrior” of Islam.¹¹
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Before the war, Ri
˙
dā’s early political responses to the German interests
in the Ottoman empire changed over the course of time. Despite his
early positive attitude towards the Ottoman-German alliance, Ri
˙
dā was
always frustrated about all kinds of colonialism in the Muslim world.
As early as 1904, he became convinced that Germany wanted to disturb
the balance of power in Europe by its alliance with the Russians during
the Russo-Japanese war. Ri
˙
dā expected that the supremacy in the world
would be divided between the Anglo-Saxons and Germans in the end.¹²
However, despite its knowledge and civilization, Germany followed a
policy of “selfishness” in its colony in East Africa. By exhibiting such
behaviour, Germany would gradually lose its status among Muslims,





dā’s understanding of the Great War should be seen in conjunction
with his fluctuating political positions in the pre-war period and during
the war. In the beginning he was an advocate of the integrity of the
Ottoman state and its ability to resist imperialism. For the Caliphate,
the Arabs were more significant for the religious sphere of the empire,
while the Turks were much needed for its supremacy in the field of
political and military power. For him “the Arab is the germ ( jurthūma) of
Islam while the Turk is its piercing sword.”¹⁴ Therefore, in that period he
worked for strong Turkish-Arab relations which might bring prosperity
to the empire. To realize his Arab nationalist ideas, he was ready to
back the Young Turks in their demands for democratic rule and an
anti-corruption programme, but he was anxious about their possible
adoption of a western-style nationalist type that would maximize their
sense of nationalism for the supremacy of the Turkish race above other
ethnicities in the Empire. Therefore, his position was divided between his
hope for democracy brought about by the Young Turks and the necessity
of resisting their Turkish nationalism which he saw as the task of the
Caliph.¹⁵
After the deposing of Sultan Abdulhamid, Ri
˙
dā sided with the
cup. In 1909, he travelled to Istanbul to seek financial support for the
establishment of his future school for training Muslim missionaries, Dār
al-Daʿwā wa al-Irshād (House of Preaching and Guidance). Although he
was much interested in Turkish-Arab reconciliation, he regularly warned
against a racial type of Turkish nationalism.¹⁶ His school plan was initially
accepted on the condition that its language should be Turkish and its
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supervision and finance should be under Shaykh al-Islam’s budget. Ri
˙
dā
objected and after a few months he became frustrated as he had begun
to feel that the cup government wanted to use his school as a tool for
their Turkification policies. Embittered he went to the British Embassy in
Istanbul and declared the cup to be a group of atheists and freemasons
who exploited Islam for their political ends.¹⁷
In 1911 Ri
˙
dā established the “Society of Arab Association” in Cairo
with the aim of achieving unity among the Arab rulers of the Arabian
Peninsula and cooperation with Arab societies in Syria, Iraq and
Istanbul against the cup. He sent emissaries to most of these Arab
rulers in the Arabian Peninsula in an attempt to convince them of the
necessity of establishing a pan-Arab empire covering Syria, Iraq and
the Arabian Peninsula.¹⁸ Ri
˙
dā lost this hope for unity due to the cup’s
Turkification policy in the empire and the violation of Arab rights.
Since Islam and Arabism were almost synonymous in his view, any
attempt to weaken Arabism was therefore an assault against Islam
itself.¹⁹
A German “Illusive” Love
While his attack on the cup government was reaching its peak, Ri
˙
dā
became very outspoken in his reservations about the Ottoman-German
alliance. More than a decade after the Kaiser’s visit to the Sublime Porte,
Ri
˙
dā profoundly reconsidered his position regarding the reality and
meaning of this perceived German friendship with the empire. The
Porte was not supposed to get any benefit from Germany, except in
training and organizing the Ottoman army. For him, it was actually
the leaders of the cup that were harming Muslims because of their
“arrogant” policies.²⁰ The appearance of Germany on the political scene
after the Kaiser’s visit to Istanbul had increased British agitation and
prompted the creation of a new Russian-British coalition against the
Sublime Porte. Almost three years before World War i, due to the
change in European policies in the East, Ri
˙
dā now completely changed
his earlier views regarding the German-Ottoman rapprochement by
saying:
It was of the worst luck for the Muslim world – East or West –, when it
was deceived by the German Kaiser in this new political stage. Istanbul,
Tehran and Fes [Morocco] were misled by his showing of inclination
and love to the Islamic world and his wish to maintain its [Muslim]
states independent, cherished and powerful.²¹
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In Ri
˙
dā’s opinion, the German “illusive” love did not benefit the Islamic
world and “the voice of the Kaiser in greeting … the millions of Muslims
had been foreboding and the beginning of misery.”²²
As World War i was approaching, Ri
˙
dā became suspicious about the
effect of the international diplomatic conferences of his time, since secret
agreements between colonial states always interfered with the outcome of
their resolutions.²³ By then, he was lamenting that Germany had misused
the concept of Ottomanism through the leaders of the cup in order to
achieve its own political interests. An example of that was the German
intervention in the issue of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by
Austria and its facilitating German Zionist Jews to occupy the Holy Land
in Palestine.²⁴ Ri
˙
dā launched a severe attack against the cup leaders
by depicting them as “enemies of Arabs and Islam.” Because of their
Turcification policy andwhat he saw as support for Zionists, Ri
˙
dā attacked
them for their “lack of Islamic feeling,” as contrasted with what he saw
as Bismarck’s deep religiosity. Religion was significant in any military
confrontation, as any combat troops believing in God and the Hereafter
would have much more resolution and endurance in wartime. In that
sense, German leaders built their unity on the “rock of faith,” while the
Ottoman cup leaders built their union on the “sand of atheism.”²⁵
At this juncture, Ri
˙
dā lost his faith in the Ottoman empire. He saw
the Great War as a suitable opportunity for the Arabs to launch a revolt
against the Ottomans and liberate their countries from the empire’s
repression. Therefore, his political opportunism did not inhibit him
from approaching the British Intelligence Department in Cairo, also
responsible for the propaganda section of the Arab Bureau,²⁶ trying
to convince them of the influence which the Arab Association could
exercise on the Arab officers in the Ottoman army and their willingness
to rebel against their Ottoman and German commanders. However, as
will become clear later, Ri
˙
dā also held reserved attitudes towards the
British authorities because of their ambitions in Arab regions.²⁷
By the end of 1912 Ri
˙
dā was organizing the Ottoman Administrative
Decentralization Party (
˙
Hizb al-lā markaziyya al-idāriyya al-ʿuthmānī)
with other pan-Arabists in Cairo; and was elected as its president.
Before the war, the German Consulate reported to Berlin about the
activities of Syrian exiles in Cairo led by Ri
˙
dā. It is reported that he met
the German emissary in Cairo and discussed the dream of establishing
an independent Arab caliphate under the Khedive of Egypt ruling Syria
and Arabia. Ri
˙
dā asked for German diplomatic support in acquiring
armaments against the Anglo-French – a request which was quickly
refused.²⁸ Probably after this failure with the Germans, Ri
˙
dā started to
develop a feeling of antipathy towards what he saw as German colonial
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ambitions in the Muslim world for two reasons, namely due to their
great interest in the Berlin-Baghdad Express (or Baghdad Railway) and
German solidarity with the Young Turks.With this, Germanywas eager to
increase its economic interests in Palestine and to strengthen its colonial
schemes in the Ottoman empire without “shedding a drop of German
blood.”²⁹ If Germany continued to consolidate its supremacy in the same
manner in the coming years, Ri
˙
dā anticipated, British military power
would never be able to “stop the stream of German greed.”³⁰
Meanwhile, Ri
˙
dā also became concerned about the Arab provinces
in the Ottoman empire falling into the hands of imperialist European
powers. This fear strongly increased after the Ottoman defeat by the
Italians in Libya and in the Balkan War. In 1912 he travelled to India on a
lecture tour; and on his way back to Egypt he passed through Kuwait and
Masqat in order to persuade Arab leaders of the necessity to establish an
independent Arab state.³¹ In a pamphlet he warned the Arabs against
the intention of western foreigners to gain control over Syria and the
Arabian Peninsula as a first stage in their plan “to destroy the Kaʿba and
transport the Black Stone and the ashes of the Prophet to the Louvre.”³²
Ri
˙
dā hoped that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War would shake
the cup leaders in Istanbul. For him, Ottoman political rulers were
only concerned with strengthening the power of European states in the
Ottoman empire, while unwisely ignoring the potential opportunities to
cooperate with the Arabs. In order to solve this problem, he proposed
changing Istanbul into a purely military base, and moving the capital




dā’s generally explicit anti-Zionist stance, he later became an
advocate of an Arab-Zionist entente before the war. He saw no problem
in the fact that Syrians would draw on Jewish capital in order to develop
projects in their country, since the Jews, he asserted, controlled European
finance.³⁴ In 1913, an Egyptian Zionist reported to the Zionist Head Office
in Berlin that some representatives of the Decentralization Party, Ri
˙
dā’s
secret society, wanted to conclude an agreement “with us.” This meeting
was supposed to take place during the visit of these decentralizationists to
the First Arab Congress in Paris in 1913. Despite his short-term support
for a Zionist-Arab entente, Ri
˙
dā speculated that the cup was actually
helping the Zionists in Palestine. There were therefore two options open
to the Arabs: either to conclude an agreement with the Zionist leaders or
to oppose Zionists in every way, first by forming competing societies
and companies, and finally by taking up arms and forming armed gangs
against them.³⁵ The objective of his advocacy for a Zionist-Arab entente
was not only to work towards Arab independence fromOttoman rule, but
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it was also meant to frustrate the “plots” of certain Arab Christians who,
he thought, wanted the Great Powers to occupy the Arab provinces.³⁶ In
the beginning of the summer of 1914, Ri
˙
dā withdrew his support for such
an entente; and now he accused the Zionists of seeking a Jewish state
that would stretch from Palestine to Iraq.³⁷
The Ottomans in a “European” War
After the outbreak of the war, Ri
˙
dā thought that there were other reasons
for the Great War than the political official version released by European
states and Russia regarding its causes. The primary reason was the
European and Russian fervour and competition in attaining world
dominance. Russia aimed at increasing its international supremacy
by annexing the Slavic peoples in the Balkans and Austria, whereas
Germany hoped to impose its supreme authority not only on Europe but
worldwide. Therefore, Germany organized its land and sea forces in such
advanced ways according to natural sciences and military techniques.
Britain’s competition with the Germans in building navies was due to
Britain’s keen desire to preserve a supreme sea power in its colonies. On
the other hand, France extended its colonies at the cost of weakening
Muslim North Africa and its treasures by agitating for internal conflict
and wars. The French were shrewd enough to increase the deployment of




dā, such great nations in terms of science, industry, wealth and
civilization were determined to spend hundreds of millions of what they
had “sucked” from the wealth of the colonized peoples. European powers
were going to “shed the blood and destroy the civilization [of those
people …] simply for the sake of their greed, and love for supremacy on
earth despite their camouflage of consolidating peace by means of war
…”³⁹
At that time, Ri
˙
dā was impressed by German power. He belittled the
European anti-German propaganda that blamed the German Emperor
Wilhelm ii (1859–1941) for “flooding” Europe in a “sea of blood.”⁴⁰ But he
was not outspoken in supporting the idea of the Ottoman participation in
that war, unlike some other religious scholars of his age. As he expected
that the war was going to continue for years, the Sublime Porte was too
poorly equipped to fight against such great powers.⁴¹ Disastrous as the
war was, Ri
˙
dā bemoaned that the most civilized nations were amassing
their powers and recruiting other neutral nations to fight on either
side only for the sake of retaliation against each other. In Ri
˙
dā’s words,
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nobody would be safe from this war. Everybody should be troubled about
its nature and the evil that would destroy thousands of one’s “human
brethren.” How great would be the loss to the world every hour in terms




dā’s mind, all European nations were well equipped to launch
war. Their military advance was based on competition in inventing
weapons, but Germany was the best prepared for war. As it was primarily
a war of competition, on the Triple Entente side the French were the
“most intelligent and courageous”, while the Britons were known for
their “sagacity” and “wisdom” in their politics; and for their “justice” in
their colonies. This is why these two countries were capable of stretching
their colonial power over many nations. The sense of comptetion on the
German side, on the other hand, was based on the refining of their skills
in science, military, work, industry and commerce; and consequently
on increasing their national treasures. Other states indulged in the
war merely as subordinates to these nations. For Ri
˙
dā, among all these
nations the Ottoman empire played second fiddle in the war, as the
Porte did not have the mentality to challenge or compete with European
powers in terms of military power, science and technology, except for
the superficial Ottoman imitation of the western external modes of
life.⁴³
In the first months of the war, the British declared a Protectorate over
Egypt by deposing Khedive Abbās
˙
Hilmī ii (1874–1944) and nominating
his nephew
˙
Husayn Kāmil (1853–1917) as the Sultan of Egypt. Ri
˙
dā neither
enthusiastically received the news, nor publicly opposed it. It sufficed for
him to describe it as a direct consequence of the Ottoman declaration of
war.⁴⁴
Due to its dissatisfaction with the French contacts with Syrian
Christian activists, the British administration in Egypt tried to exploit
that party as an opposition movement in the Arab territories during
the war. The anti-Ottoman attitude of Syrian intellectuals in Egypt and
their demand for Arab unity suited the British interests in the Ottoman
empire. Because of their aspirations for Arab unity and Ri
˙
dā’s dream of
establishing an Arab caliphate, Ri
˙
dā and other members of the party
agreed to negotiate cooperation with the British authorities.⁴⁵ Their
agreement included written conditions that had to be conveyed to the
British government. If it was accepted by the government in London,
it should be officially reported by Reuter’s News Agency. In return,
Arab societies would commit themselves to inciting revolts in the Arab
provinces. Ri
˙
dā’s party was given 1,000 Egyptian pounds to finance
sending emissaries into the empire. Among their tasks were to report
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that the British were prepared to supply arms and ammunition for the
revolts and to appeal to Arab soldiers to desert from the Ottoman army.⁴⁶
Ri
˙
dā expected Britain or Germany to have the most decisive influence
during the war. The British were known for their patience and ability to
multiply the number of their professionalmilitary staff. Although they did
not have obligatory military service, the British were deploying workers
which consequently interrupted their national production. However, if
the Germans were going to win the war, he anticipated, Germany would
not hesitate to impose its authority on Europe and unseat other European
powers in the hearts of their colonies.⁴⁷ However, for him, the worst
result of the war was that Europeans had already started to exert more
efforts to increase their military powers and arms, and to amplify their
ability and readiness to launch more wars in the future.⁴⁸
Ri
˙
dā’s perceptions of the war were based on his reading of the news
available to him in the Arabic press.⁴⁹ Like many of his peers, he was
keen to follow the news about the war fronts in Europe and the Middle
East.⁵⁰ However, he was sceptical of the coverage of the war in the press.
Telegrams, political, scientific and historical newspapers were filled with
lies, paradoxes, abuses, misrepresentations and camouflage. Even official
reports were censored and had to be mistrusted.⁵¹
In his analysis of the progress of the war, Ri
˙
dā’s anti-colonial tone
was evident, and he was hoping for a solution to the Eastern Question
after the war. Almost nine months after its start, Ri
˙
dā argued that as
love for authority is intrinsic for the human being, no nation would
succumb to the power of others, despite the fact that the human structure
could only be established on the independence of all nations and races.
Monopoly of power and rule by the victorious side in this war would also
be short-lived. Ri
˙
dā anticipated that, if there had been no firm guarantee
for fulfilling general justice or equality for all nations and races, the
Great War would undoubtedly have been the most unfortunate war for
humanity. The to-be-defeated nations would not give up. They would
persist in lobbying and creating new fronts that would definitely lead to
a similar or even more “evil war” in the future.⁵²
During the war, German and Ottoman workers continued their work
on the Berlin-Baghdad Railway for military purposes. Although Ri
˙
dā
considered this Ottoman-German railway project as one of greatest
good deeds of Sultan Abdulhamīd ii, he strongly criticized the Sultan’s
agreement to give the Germans ownership rights to the strip of land
that extended alongside the railway in the heart of the Ottoman empire.
Ri
˙
dā predicted that this railway, which was primarily established for the
protection of the Ottoman empire, would one day endanger its existence.
This railway that was supposed to be the “heart” of the empire was given
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to foreigners: “how can anybody live while his heart is in the hands of
others?!”⁵³ It was a great opportunity for Germany to manipulate and
consolidate her existence within the empire in the long run. Ri
˙
dā did not
entirely trust the Germans. By way of analogy for the German tactics in
the war, he wrote that some Germans owned pieces of land in France
and Belgium which they had actually used as trenches, basements and
arms caches during the war. It was also reported that a German had
prepared a football ground beside an important Belgian military base
in Belgium, which had been found to conceal an underground store
for heavy German canons once war broke out. Therefore, all German
political and military promises to the empire in return for such privileges
had to be suspected. It was better for the empire to keep its territories




dā was convinced that Germany would never give the Ottoman
empire its full independence in the event of victory. Therefore, the
Ottomans were urged neither to put their army and navy in German
hands, nor to make the German language obligatory in the secondary
educational system. It was a fatal mistake that the Sublime Porte hadmade
it possible for the Germans to act in all the empire’s financial, military,
scientific and technical matters. Besides, it had enabled the Germans
to own thousands of miles of railway track which crossed important
metal mining areas.⁵⁵ Ri
˙
dā again harshly attacked the leaders of the cup
for their unbelief and their aim of undermining the construction of the
umma in order to “establish another building, ‘ornamented’ by the Jews
and ‘designed’ by the Germans.”⁵⁶
For Ri
˙
dā, even such Ottoman-German collaboration in the war would
never result in any integration between the two races, as the Turks, due
to their nationalist keenness in preserving their language, would always
resist their assimilation into the German race or any other nation.⁵⁷
For Ri
˙
dā, the aim of the cup leaders was merely to revive a “Turkish”
a
˙
sabiyya (group solidarity based upon kinship) above Islam by means of
their Turcification of military education and the army.⁵⁸
The First World War: Un-Islamic War
At the beginning of the war Ri
˙
dā did not frankly abandon his loyalty
to the Ottoman empire, but was still confining his criticism to the cup.
However, he was anxious about the politically bad ramifications for non-
Muslim minorities in the empire after the abolition of the Capitulations
during the war and the propaganda of the Jihad declaration. The Jihad
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propaganda incited Muslims to kill British, French or Russian “infidels,”
which endangered unarmed Europeans. Mobs and attack incidents were
also reported in the press.⁵⁹
As has been mentioned, Ri
˙
dā did not take any direct part in the Jihad
ideologization campaigns during the war, but held antipathetic attitudes
to the Ottoman Turkification policy and distrust of the Arabs. At this
time, Ri
˙
dā reassured Syrian Christian minorities in his homeland that
Islam would preserve their rights despite the Ottoman decision to enter
the war.⁶⁰ In the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, he asked Muslims in Syria
not to be deluded by any religious justification provoking them to attack
their non-Muslim compatriots. For him, all these calls to fight non-
Muslims under the motto of “pan-Islam” were baseless and corrupting
to the Koran and its verses. Referring to the Ottoman political leaders
without mentioning the cup explicitly, Ri
˙
dā argued that the proponents
of the war, who depicted it as pan-Islamic by quoting from the Koran
were paradoxically those who were actually ignorant of the Islamic
faith and neglecting their religious duties. Their major objective was
merely power and authority, not religion by any means. For Ri
˙
dā, it was
an excuse to attack Syrian Christians if they became inclined towards
western Christians or acquired any feeling of animosity to Muslims
and the Sublime Porte, since neither love nor hate was a solid criterion
for punishing anybody from an Islamic point of view. Muslims and
Christians were therefore requested to demonstrate their loyality to the
state and to cooperate for the sake of its industrial, economic and social
welfare in conformity with the sharia.⁶¹
Unlike many Muslim religious supporters of the German-Ottoman
Jihad declaration, Ri
˙
dā deemed the Ottoman participation in the Great
War as being against the Islamic percepts of war.Therefore, hewas eager to
search for examples in Muslim history indicating the difference between
the Islamic precepts of war and the nature of the Great War of Europe.
In his view, this war, which Europeans propagated as “civilizational”,
was nothing but a clear-cut indication of the “beastly” and “illusive”
materialist character of European civilization in contrast to their assertion
of loving truth, values, peace and justice.⁶²
In Ri
˙
dā’s metaphoric words, the world of civilization resembled “an
idolatry temple” where a statue of military power was erected: putting
one foot on the truth, while the other rested on values; raising with the
right hand the banner of dominance and authority and with the left the
banner of desire and lust. People were divided between these two poles:
“those prostrating or kneeling to the statue, and those burning incense
or providing offerings [to the idols].”⁶³ Instead of changing science
into a source of human happiness, justice and mercy, the “civilized”
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world of Europe made it a source of cruelty, injustice and misery. As for
Germany, it had exploited its wide knowledge and mastery of arts to
invent “instruments of destruction” and “death.” Ri
˙
dā was shocked by the
news about Germany’s unbelievably destructive canons and submarines,
and the toxic gas producing green smoke that was fatal to human beings.
Ri
˙
dā interpreted these new inventions in the light of the Koranic verse:
“[t]hen watch for the Day when the sky will bring a visible smoke;
covering the people; this is a painful torment” (q. 44: 10–11).⁶⁴
Ri
˙
dā contrasted the behaviour of the European powers in the Great
War with what he saw as the “Islamic merciful ethics” of Arab conquests,
which Islam had primarily stipulated to minimize war disasters.⁶⁵ He
bemoaned that nations and states of his time, including Muslims, were
deceived by what they perceived in that war as “values” of sciences
and techniques for “human civilization”. Giving several examples from
Muslim normative sources, Ri
˙
dā emphatically contrasted this war with
those wars launched by the Companions of the Prophet in early Islam,
whowere, in his view, known for their “mercy,” “compassion” and “justice.”
In comparison, he asserted for instance that Muslims did not impose
heavy taxes on the people of conquered regions, except the “small”
amount of jizya (taxes) on non-Muslims levied in return for Muslims
defending them. On the contrary, one of the ramifications of this war of
the so-called “European civilization” was that European colonial powers
imposed huge amounts of fines and taxes on their colonies and on other
European opponents during the war in order to multiply their wealth and
authority. As an example, Ri
˙
dā gave Belgium which became subject to
heavy war taxes and fines after the German invasion.⁶⁶ If the Belgians had
one day invaded Germany, Ri
˙
dā added, they would also have enforced
upon it “shame” and “humiliation”, the way they had behaved in their
colony in the Congo.⁶⁷
Ri
˙
dā dismissed any religious or sectarian connection with the Great
War as was claimed by some. It was a “war of nations,” but not a
war among religions. Warring European nations spared no effort to
justify and convince their peoples of the need for the war. Apart from
a few philosophers, women, socialists and clergymen who defended
Christianity as a religion of peace, the majority of Europeans supported
the idea of war. Ri
˙
dā argued that there was no European nation that was
going to launch this war against the will of the majority opinion in its
country, except Russia where people had no majority opinion.⁶⁸
The Great War was in Ri
˙
dā’s view an entirely “greedy” materialistic
war which had nothing to do with religion. It was even contrary to
the “peaceful” message of Jesus. If the spirit of Christianity had been
subjected to the authority of materialism in Europe, this war would never
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have happened. Ri
˙
dā’s stripping the war of any religious meaning was a
message against the Ottoman officers and their decision to join Germany
in the war on an Islamic religious basis. Ri
˙
dā did not trust the news that
was spread regarding the fact that theOttoman decision to enter the war
was primarily the result of Enver’s support for it and his influential role in
the cup, since the majority of Ottoman decision-makers in his view were
strongly in favour of the war. Therefore, it was a war launched by the
state, but run by the cup. Even if the Chamber of Deputies (or Meclis-i
Mebusân) had agreed to it, it was not a war of the Ottomans, since it
did not represent the majority of people in the empire.⁶⁹ In sum, these
Ottoman policy-makers were, for Ri
˙
dā, as materialistic as their European
military and political counterparts.⁷⁰
The Arab Question
It is obvious that Ri
˙
dā’s religious and political views of the Great War
were formulated on the basis of his engagement in the Arab Question.
His eagerness to replace the Ottoman Caliphate with an Arab one after
the war pushed him in the direction of negotiating with the British
authorities in Egypt about his readiness to mediate between Britain and
Arab rulers when the war spread in the Middle East. During the first
years of the war, he continued his efforts to persuade British Intelligence
in Cairo of his ability through the Decentralization Party to influence




dā’s outspoken anti-cup stance before and during the war caused
him trouble. As early as 1914, the Ottoman authorities established an
intelligence bureau that was committed to keeping track of Arab anti-
Ottoman activists. In about a year, it received more than 4,000 reports
and files of suspects that contained almost 9,000 dossiers.⁷² After the
outbreak of war, the wave of arrests and executions reached a high level.
Ri
˙
dā, among others, was sentenced to death by a military court in ‘Aleyh
in absentia. He and other convicts were ordered to appear before the
court within ten days, “otherwise they would be declared criminals
whose civil rights would be annulled and whose property had to be
confiscated.”⁷³
After the outbreak of the war, Ri
˙
dā’s political choice quickly became
evident when he became convinced that Great Britain was going to
support the Arabs and Muslims in their independence if the Allies
won the war. He felt that British officials in Egypt and the Sudan were
initially in favour of an Arab caliphate.⁷⁴ In Ri
˙
dā’s nostalgic imagination,
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Mekka should be the seat of this Arab Quraishite caliphate as its religious
centre, whereas Damascus should be the seat of a president and a secular
government.⁷⁵
In a meeting with Ronald Storrs, the Oriental Secretary at the British
residency in Cairo, and Gilbert Clayton, Sudan Agent and Director of
Intelligence for the Egyptian Army, Ri
˙
dā was given assurances that “in
the event of Turkey joining the enemies of England in this war, England
would not associate the Arabs with the Turks and would consider them
as friends and not as enemies.”⁷⁶ These promises gave Ri
˙
dā “pleasure”
and “satisfaction”. Therefore, he believed in Britain as the only alternative
power that would help the Arabs “in every possible way and would
defend them from any aggression.”⁷⁷
Such promises from the British authorities in Cairo were never for-
malized. If the Arabs drove the Turks and the Germans out after the
war, Ri
˙
dā’s proposal of Arab independence included Arabia, Pales-
tine, Syria and Mesopotamia, the countries lying between the Red
Sea, Bahr El-Arab, the Persian Gulf, the frontiers of Persia and Ana-
tolia and the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁸ To the British authorities he fer-
vently stressed the religious significance of the Arab Peninsula and
the Arab eligibility for “the Caliphate which is the highest Islamic
post.”⁷⁹
Believing in such promises, Ri
˙
dā regularly stressed that Britain was
preferable for many Muslims to Russia, Germany and France for her
justice and the religious freedom given to her subjects in the colonies.
But his British-Arab friendship should not connote full British authority
or protection over them, especially the Holy Shrines of Islam in the
Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁰ An Arab Caliphate dependent on British authority
was not acceptable to Ri
˙
dā, as the majority of Muslims were expected
to refuse “an Arab puppet caliphate in the Arab Peninsula.”⁸¹ If the
British were going to support the Arabs in their causes, they would “gain
the friendship and loyalty of more than one hundred million of her
Mohammedan subjects, because they would then be confident that the
precepts of the Koran and the sanctity of the holy places will not be
interfered with.”⁸²
In a conversation with Sir Mark Sykes, Ri
˙
dā was unshakable in his
demand for full Arab independence with no partition or annexation by
any foreign power. He confirmed to Sykes that the Arabs “were more
intelligent than Turks and that they could easily manage their own
affairs.”⁸³ Even so the British were probably not taking Ri
˙
dā seriously.
British authorities in Egypt weremoreover thinking of the idea of sending
Ri
˙
dā into exile in Malta during the war.⁸⁴ Mark Sykes wrote about him a
few months after their meeting in Cairo:
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A leader of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic thought. In conversation he talks
much as he writes. He is a hard uncompromising fanatical Moslem,
the mainspring of whose ideas is the desire to eliminate Christian
influence and to make Islam a political power, in as wide a field as
possible. He said that the fall of Constantinople would mean the end
of Turkish military power, and therefore it was necessary to set up
another Mohammedan state to maintain Mohammedan prestige. I
asked him if the action of the Sultan in accepting the dictation of
the German Emperor was in consonance with the independence of
the Caliph, whether such people as Enver, Talaat, Javid, and Carasso
could be considered as Moslems, whether the Committee of Union
and Progress had not slaughtered Khojas and Ulema without mercy,
whether the whole policy of the young Turks had not been originally
anti-religious in the widest sense. To this he replied that in the eyes of
Islam, Turkey represented Mohammedan independence, and that the
actions of individuals had no influence on this view, and that when he
had criticized the actions of the Committee, he had been subject to
attack and loss of prestige … I understand that Shaykh Reshid Ri
˙
dā has
no great personal following but that his ideas coincide with those of a
considerable number of the Arab Ulema. It will be seen that it is quite
impossible to come to any understanding with people who hold such
views, and it may be suggested that against such a party force is the
only argument that they can understand.⁸⁵
During the war in 1916, Ri
˙
dā discovered the bitter fact that that the British
authorities were not willing to provide the Arabs with any support.
Therefore, he turned to Sharif
˙
Husayn of Mekka, but still confirmed
his allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphate, which he distinguished from
the cup government.⁸⁶ He thought that supporting the Arab Revolt
would therefore lead to the independence of the Hijaz, which was a
“precautionary measure meant to save this holy territory from the
control of the Allied powers.”⁸⁷ Due to this changing course, Ri
˙
dā became
suspected by the French and British intelligence services in Cairo. At this
time, he was satisfied with the manner in which Sharif
˙
Husayn handled
the question of Hijaz independence. He even congratulated him on his
recognition by the Allied powers as “the King of the Hijaz,” wishing
him to become “the King of the Arabs.” Soon Ri
˙
dā regretted his earlier
enthusiasm about Sharif
˙
Husayn when he knew about the latter’s secret
agreements with the British about the independence of Syria and Iraq
after the war.⁸⁸
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A Look forward: War Aftermath
In response to the entry of the us into the war on the side of the Allies
and President Wilson’s call to end all wars in 1917, Ri
˙
dā hoped that the
war would end with full liberation for all “weak” nations.⁸⁹ However, he
lamented the calamities of the war and the loss of tens of thousands of
productive human beings in the fields of industry, agriculture and trade.
For Ri
˙
dā, through its Imperial Navy Germany became the “inventor of
vices of destruction and murder” in the world. Carrying naval guns on
their ships, the Germans were not inhibited from killing humans and
destroying goods and products on armed or unarmed ships, just to cause
Britain and the Allies to lose their naval power.⁹⁰
Ri
˙
dā’s expectation of British victory in the war against the Germans
came true. For him, the British were known for their “political cunning”
and ability to fuel the enmity of other western states against Germany. In
a conversation with an unnamed German orientalist, Ri
˙
dā agreed that
although Germany overpowered England in sciences, arts and works,
it lacked politics. In another conversation with some friends in Cairo
during the war, it was said that Germany was going to have to cooperate
with Russia if they wanted to get the Britons out of Egypt and India.
Ri
˙
dā rejected this as impossible simply because Britain was cleverer than
Germany in “striking” nations with each other, just like “the waterfall
striking a rock with another.”⁹¹
After Germany’s initial phase of power and supremacy in world order,
the German defeat caused its disastrous fate. For Ri
˙
dā, the end of the war
was a result of a political game between “learned and wise” and “ignorant
and fool” counterparts in conflict. Due to their political manoeuvering,
the British were able to convince the Americans to come and rescue
them and the Allies from the possible military “hell” that was supposed
to be caused by Germany. In his words:
England used two ‘amulets’ in order to get the American ‘serpent’ out
of its hole … First of all, its call to rescue the freedom of nations and
peoples from German supremacy that threatened to enslave the world.
Secondly, the cunning of the Jews and their financial authority in that
country, after England had promised them to return the Kingdom
of Israel [and] the Holy Land as a reward … in spite of [of the rights
of] the original possessors of the land, the Arabs: either Christians or
Muslims.⁹²
At this “Wilsonian moment,”⁹³ Ri
˙
dā found that Wilson’s “stunning
speeches” added significant moral support to the military and financial
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power unleashed by the Allies against the Germans. By stipulating such
an “attractive” programme for peace, Wilson’s words had a magic effect
on German socialists and workers, especially his point regarding the
freedom of sea in war and peace. German socialist leaders threatened
their government into yielding to Wilson’s peace conditions; otherwise
they would push German workers to go on strike.⁹⁴ Ri
˙
dā considered the
end of the war a victory for the Americans on the surface, but the real
winner was Britain. Moreover, Germany lost the war merely because of
its “arrogance” and “despising” of the Americans.⁹⁵
As a Muslim religious scholar, Ri
˙
dā tried to analyse the world political
order in religious terms. By referring to the Koranic verses (q. 7:128,
20:132, 28:83) indicating that “the [best] outcome will be for al-mutaqqūn
(the righteous/pious)”, some Muslims wondered how the British people
were victorious in this war when they were not “righteous” in the Muslim
religious sense. Ri
˙
dā disagreed with the views in the classical Muslim
Koranic exegesis confining the meaning of such verses to obedience to
God and fulfilling religious duties. He considered this interpretation
as “narrow-mindedness” and “misunderstanding” of the contents of
the verses, as the term taqwa (piety) has various meanings in the
Koran depending on the change of context. Muslim exegetes lacked
the knowledge that could enable them to deduce such sociological
and political issues from the Koran and Sunna. As the word taqwa
literally means “protect”, Ri
˙
dā notes that the German people might have
exceeded the English in their “military taqwa” for securing their military
power. But the German politicians failed to protect themselves against
internal conflicts with German socialists on the one hand, and were
not clever enough to escape international discontent with their politics
and collaboration with the Turks against the Arabs. The British, on the
other hand, were more skilled in their political and diplomatic “taqwa,”
because they were able to strengthen their political ties with many world
leaders, including Arabs.⁹⁶
Germany’s economic, scientific and military progress was therefore
not enough to win the war. The British politically skilled “deviousness”
was able to vanquish the German colonial ambitions. Many years after the
war in the context of his discussions about the causes of the Palestinian
riots (also known as the Western Wall Uprising) in 1929, Ri
˙
dā again
made it clear that the British were much cleverer than any other nation
in propaganda that was able to twist political realities. He lamented
that the Arabs in their policy against the Jewish settlement in Palestine
did not take any lessons from World War i. For him, all Europeans
denigrated and disparaged the oriental peoples. In their international
relations the Britons, just like all Europeans, had respected the rights and
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promises of powerful nations only. Ri
˙
dā concluded that World War i was
a propaganda war. The Anglo-French propaganda disseminated that the
German state was “a military state with a cruel heart, rude, and lavish in
greed, bloodshed, looting of money … and enslaving humans.”⁹⁷ The
British propaganda portrayed their fight as self-defence and defence of
other “brothers in humanity.”The power of this propaganda had provoked
the American policy and German socialists and workers that finally
obliged Germany to yield and sign a compromise. Ri
˙
dā was convinced
that the Britons were the most “cunning” in breaching their treaties by




dā died in 1935 and he only witnessed the first two years of
the Nazi regime. In his eyes, the Nazi ideology was born out of the
political aftermath of World War i. It was a logical result of the political
competition among European states to gain power. In his later years,
Ri
˙
dā proposed Islam as a solution for the civilizational problems and
political conflicts of Europe and the United States. He argued that since
World War i, Europeans had organized many congresses, but their state
of affairs was like “a mill donkey which goes around while languishing
in one place.”⁹⁹ As “might makes right,” Ri
˙
dā insisted that powerful
European states did not value any rights of weak nations in politics. For
him, the Treaty of Versailles had been primarily entered into in order to
weaken Germany. Its restrictive terms were the reason Nazi Germany
tried to undermine the treaty by rebuilding its armed forces against the
will of Europe. Out of fear of Nazi power, some of the Allies started to
negotiate the conditions of another new treaty with Germany. Ri
˙
dā was
of the view that the Allies had treated Germany unfairly and arrogantly
despite their acknowledgment of its superiority in sciences, industry and
systems. Hitler’s rise in Germany was a new stage in European politics.
In Ri
˙
dā’s words, “[Germany’s] mujaddid (renewing) leader uttered a
shout of violation at this treaty and is rebuilding air and naval forces
of the army. This had terrified them [the Allies], just as the roaring of
a lion that scares a sheep.” Al-Manār believed that European leaders
had now reconsidered their positions because they knew perfectly well
that any decisions about peace or war were in Hitler’s “hands;” and any
destruction or construction of Europe could be uttered from between
his “lips”. Therefore, the Allies were keenly listening to Hitler’s annual
speeches, which regularly gave warnings to his opponents. But despite
this political change in Europe, Islam remained in Ri
˙
dā’s perspective the
only solution for the corruption of all these western states and nations.
Therefore, Muslims should stand shoulder to shoulder with one another
in propagating their religion in Europe.¹⁰⁰




dā’s engagement with World War i was part of his general image of
Europe and world politics. In general, he was influenced by the increasing
flow of information and images in the press across the Muslim world
on the one hand, and by his pragmatic political choices on the other.
As a famous Muslim writer with a global readership across the Muslim
world of his time, his representations certainly played a role in the
popularization of European thought in the Muslim mind.
Remarkably enough, Ri
˙
dā did not involve himself in the Jihad debate
and remained silent about the religious meaning of the Ottoman fatwa
during World War i. As a pan-Arabist Ri
˙
dā was much engaged in
underlining its political causes and the consequences of the war in the
region. Throughout the war years, he was convinced that either Germany
or Great Britain was going to rule the world order after winning the war.
He argued that materialist ideas among Europeans would push Europe
to a wholesale and dreadful war after which the strongest state would
rule the world.¹⁰¹ Due to his dreams of establishing an Arab caliphate, he
was not really enthusiastic about the Ottoman coalition with Germany.
He rode the wave of Arab nationalism in that stage of his career. The cup
alliance with Germany brought a radical imbalance to the world order,




dā regularly praised Germany’s militarism against the
Allies, he knew perfectly well that that country had its ambitions in
the Muslim world as well. In his quest for new pragmatic solutions to
the decline of Islam in the religious and political sense, Ri
˙
dā was ready
to tread any possible political path in the pre-war and war period. But
his ambitions to realize Arab unity reached deadlock when he lost his
hope of finding any “beneficiary” coalition in his political dreams. He
finally came to the bitter conclusion that all liberation and independence
promises made by Europeans were merely lip service. For him, even
German ultra-nationalists were anti-Arab by nature.¹⁰²
Ri
˙
dā attempted to offer alternative civilizational discourses based on
Islamic culture and tradition. In the end, his paradoxal view of Europe
and his disenchantment reflected that of a whole generation of Muslims,
who experienced the World War in the Middle East; his ideas were
rearticulated and re-asserted by the following generation in relation to
the European powers and their ideas in the new world order¹⁰³ in the
years to come after World War i.
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12 John Buchan’s British-Designed
Jihad in Greenmantle
Ahmed K. al-Rawi
John Buchan (1875–1940) was the director of British Intelligence in the
last two years of World War i and a novelist, too. His novel, Greenmantle
(1916), examined the decaying stages of the Ottoman empire with
a specific focus on radical Islamic movements. Greenmantle reveals
Buchan’s Western elitist views and the continuation of his imperialist
conviction of the deterioration in the East and Islam in comparison
to the Christian West. In fact, he presents Muslims as medieval and
superstitious people who can easily be mobilized for Jihad. The chapter
argues that Buchan’s novels can be read as tools to influence the beliefs of
a whole generation and as works that echo the prevalent cultural and
political views and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims in Britain at the
time of World War i.
By 1900 the British empire had spread over five continents and con-
trolled many different regions, hoping to make use of their unexploited
wealth and to “secure to Great Britain the freedom to sell all over the
world the products of her growing interests” (Rose, Newton, and Benians
1940, v). The British politicians and intelligentsia who theorized the
ideologies of the empire played a major role in maintaining, expanding
and strengthening the British empire as well as managing the affairs of
the colonized peoples. John Buchan, a prominent empire commentator
in the Edwardian period, was strongly influenced by the ethos of empire
in his early fiction and polemics (Lownie 1995). In the 1916 “Preface”
to the third edition of A Lodge in the Wilderness (1906), Buchan said
that “our Empire is a mystic whole which no enemy may part asunder,
and our wisest minds are not given to the task of devising a mechanism
of union adequate to this spiritual unity” (Buchan 1922, x). Hence, the
“wisest minds” had a duty towards the empire, impelling them to “devise”
methods and “mechanisms” to strengthen it. This emphasis on a spiritual
dimension to the British people’s “duty” to maintain the empire can be
connected to the other important forces, beside the pursuit of free trade,
that determined the make-up of the British empire. These were “the
impulses of evangelical religion” and the “missionary societies” (Rose,
Newton, and Benians 1940, vi). It was claimed at the time that Britain
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had a divine message that must be achieved because it was God’s will.
In the 1920s Edward Byers made a comparison between the Israelites
and the British, in the sense that both were chosen by God and had “the
temporal blessings” of “the possession of certain land”. Byers argued that
Britain must be “the greatest on earth” and that “the greatest race on
earth is the Anglo-Saxon” (Byers 1922, 8 and 13). In brief, Christianity
and commerce were the decisive factors and forceful motives that shaped
the British empire.
As a result of the empire’s expansion, the British were encountering
various cultures and religions that were different from their own. The
East, and Islam in particular, was seen as exotic, unstable and often
decadent, because the civilizations of the colonized countries did not
match Western and European norms and values. The “imperial attitude
meant thinking of people – encountered in daily business – as being of a
different and inferior kind; thinking of them as agreeable or disagreeable,
but always as different” (Daniel 1962, 154).
At the beginning of World War i, the British government became
more aware of the importance of the psychological warfare to “counter
the detrimental effects of German propaganda upon British interests and
prestige, particularly in neutral countries” (Taylor 1980, 880). In fact, the
director of British special intelligence, Brigadier-General C.R. Cockerill,
suggested on 29 November 1915 that “the war of words should now
demand ‘as much attention as the economic war’” (ibid., 876). This “war
of words” certainly echoed in Buchan’s mind, and it must have further
motivated him to focus on subtle propaganda techniques. As Buchan
was exempted from military service during World War i for medical
reasons, he decided to serve his country in the area of propaganda.
Before the Great War, Buchan had been Thomas Arthur Nelson’s
partner in his publishing company. In his autobiography, he mentioned
the active efforts carried out by this printing house during the Great
War in the way cheap books on a variety of topics and languages were
distributed to various countries:
We were a progressive concern, and in our standardised Edinburgh
factories we began the publication of cheap books in many tongues. On
the eve of the War we must have been one of the largest businesses of
the kind in the world, issuing cheap editions of every kind of literature,
not only in English, but in French, German, Magyar, and Spanish, and
being about to start in Russian. (Buchan 1940, 138)
These activities are regarded as propaganda efforts which reached such
a state during this period that even fiction and literary criticism were
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used as effective tools. For instance, Sir Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe and The
Talisman, which narrated the Crusades “with an Anglicised Richard
Lionheart storming theHoly Land”, were exploited and used as a “defining
episode in the emergence of English nationalism” (Bar-Yosef 2001, 94).
In February 1916, Lord Newton became nominal head of the propaganda
organization, aided by many others like “Miles Lampson (in charge of
film propaganda), the poet Alfred Noyes, John Buchan, J.D. Gregory and
Stephen Gaselee” (Taylor 1980, 884). Also in 1916, Buchan met Ernest
Hodder-Williams, who was then responsible for managing the Hodder
and Stoughton publishing company and was “involved in the publication
of government propaganda” (Smith 1965, 292). Historically speaking,
Greenmantle was the first of Buchan’s novels published by that company.
Having in mind the writer’s strong Christian devotion and upbringing
and following Walter Scott’s examples (Matthew 2004), Buchan clearly
intended to write a modern doctrinal Crusade in Greenmantle.
As for John Buchan’s knowledge of Islam, he did not have direct
contact with Muslims and Easterners, although he frequently depicted
them in his works. To get his information Buchan depended entirely
on books, newspaper coverage, accounts from friends and contacts,
and, during the war, intelligence reports: these were not always accurate
accounts (Al-Rawi 2009b). His single visit to the East was to Turkey in
the spring of 1910. Buchan visited Constantinople with “his wife and
Gerard Craig-Sellar”, and reported taking lunch with the “Sultan’s brother
and dining at embassies” (Lownie 1995, 116), where he found a “pure
Arabian Nights” atmosphere, and visited some places further east near
Erzurum (Buchan 1993, 2). Later, Constantinople was depicted in his
novel Greenmantle (1916), before and during its fictional capture by
the Russians in World War i. Buchan’s view of “the East”, and specif-
ically Muslims, as a medieval and superstitious people, while being also
mysterious and exotic, produces a powerful, subliminal dynamic in his
fiction which uses the East as a touchstone to compare it with the West.
Background to Buchan’s Fiction and Ideology
In his early work on South Africa, The African Colony: Studies in the
Reconstruction (1903), Buchan revealed his ideas on the disparity that
existed between the British people and the other races, and set criteria
for distinguishing between the two:
Between the most ignorant white man and the black man there is fixed
for the present an impassable gulf, not of colour but of mind. The native
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… lives and moves in a mental world incredibly distant from ours. The
medium of his thought, so to speak, is so unique that the results are
out of all relation to ourselves. Mentally he is as crude and naive as
a child, with a child’s curiosity and ingenuity, and a child’s practical
inconsequence. Morally he has none of the traditions of self-discipline
and order, which are implicit … in white people … With all his merits,
this instability of character and intellectual childishness make him
politically far more impossible than even the lowest class of Europeans.
(1903, 289–290)
Buchan depicts South Africa in Prester John (1910) as a response to his
experience working there in 1901–1903 (Lownie 1995, 70–85). Critics have
discussed at length his treatment of Africans in that work,¹ but there is a
religious dimension in the novel. The plot of Prester John has as its basis
the medieval story of Prester John who was believed in the Europe of the
Middle Ages to be a strong oriental king from Ethiopia. He was thought
to possess the ability “to break the power of Islam and restore Jerusalem
to Christendom … The rumour gained so much credence in Europe that
messengers and letters were sent to the East in search of the non-existent
King” (Whitaker 1952, 74–79; Aljubouri 1972, 26). As Buchan himself
noted, Prester John became “a generic name for any supposed Christian
monarch in unknown countries” (Buchan 1903, 21). In fact, Buchan’s use
of this Christian legend came at a time whenmany writers viewed the war
in the East as a new crusade due to the efforts of the British government.
British Orientalists like Sir Mark Sykes and Sir Stephen Gaselee were
influenced by these crusading ideas that were “central to the way in which
the Great War was anticipated, imagined and understood” (Bar-Yosef
2001, 93 and 95). Buchan’s revival of this mythical Christian figure can be
seen as a reminder of the possibility of weakening the Muslim Ottoman
bloc that was manifested in Greenmantle. His Christian sense of duty
was not foreign to him because it was “part of his Calvinist training”
and his observation of the “Free Church” (Mann 1999, 8), although he
himself had no leanings towards missionary activity or to supporting
missionary work.
In fact, Buchan treated Islam as an entity that was entirely different
from the civilized West. In his first attempt at a “novel of Empire”, The
Half-Hearted (1900), Buchan described the East during the “closing years
of the nineteenth century”. Lewis Haystoun has written a book about
Kashmir, and is standing for Parliament. His friend Winterham speaks
in support of Lewis at a public meeting, saying: “I should back Lewis
if he were a Mohammedan or an Anarchist. The man is sound metal, I
tell you, and that’s all I ask” (Buchan 1935, 113). As can be seen from this
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casual assigning of “a Mohammedan or Anarchist” to the most extreme
contrast to a white Scottish laird, Victorian Britain perceived these groups
negatively because they were linked historically with a residual fear of
“the Turk” and were a reminder of the Ottoman threat against Western
interests (Smith 1977, 16).
Finally, in The Half-Hearted, we can see an expression of British
imperialist anxiety over a Russian military threat against its interests in
the region. At Bardur, Lewis speaks with a Scot who says, “It is assumed
that Russia has but to find Britain napping, buy a passage from the more
northerly tribes, and sweep down on the Punjab … It is a mere matter of
time till Persia is the Tsar’s territory, and then they may begin to think
about invasion” (Buchan 1935, 229). Buchan notes that Russia is the “step-
daughter of the East”; therefore, “some day when the leader arrives they
will push beyond their boundaries and sweep down on Western Europe,
as their ancestors did thirteen hundred years ago. And you have no walls
of Rome to resist them, and I do not think you will find a Charlemagne”
(Buchan 1935, 228). In fact, Buchan uses the theme of a foreign invasion
against Britain, or the destruction of its interests abroad, in many of his
novels, particularly in The Thirty-Nine Steps (1915) and later Greenmantle
(1916). For example, Buchan emphasizes in Greenmantle that one has
to remember “the old torrential raids which crumpled the Byzantine
Empire and shook the walls of Vienna” (1916, 7). In these two novels,
Germany, instead of Russia, becomes the disturber of the geopolitical
system dominated by the British. If the system breaks down, a possible
regression to barbarism will occur, which is an expression of Buchan’s
principal theme of the thin line between civilization and chaos.
Buchan’s Greenmantle
When Buchan worked for British Intelligence, he wrote Greenmantle dur-
ing World War i when the Ottomans, with the help of the Germans, were
fighting the British. Hence, the writer used his novel as a work of propa-
ganda that aided the war effort (Al-Rawi 2007). In fact, Buchan may have
been directly influenced by the Dutch orientalist C. Snouck Hurgronje
whose works were translated into English. The titles most relevant to the
period of Greenmantle’s composition include The Holy War: “Made in
Germany” (1915) and Mohammedanism (1916). In Greenmantle’s preface,
Buchan mentioned that the events taking place were not unrealistic:
Let no man or woman call its events improbable. The war has driven
that word from our vocabulary, andmelodrama has become the prosiest
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realism. Things unimagined before happen daily to our friends by sea
and land. The one chance in a thousand is habitually taken, and as often
as not succeeds. (Buchan 1916, vi)
Buchan retained the dream of the ever expanding British empire but
shifted his idea towards Islam and the decaying Ottoman empire so as
to address wider problems that destabilized the status quo, such as the
rise of radical Islamic movements. This chapter argues that Buchan’s
Greenmantle falls into Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism since it
expresses elitist ideas about the East and Muslims (Al-Rawi 2009a). In
this chapter, the novel is analysed as a historical document relative to the
events that occurred before and during World War i. Indeed, the novel’s
historical details, as will be shown, are consciously used to propagate
positive ideas of the British empire and present negative stereotypes of
the German and Ottoman powers. Before the historical discussion, it is
important to highlight the main theme of the novel which is Jihad.
Greenmantle’s Plot
The plot of Greenmantle revolves around the notion that Muslims are
following the orders of the Ottoman sultan in having an utter belief that
a new leader or the Mahdi has arrived and will lead them to their final
destiny.ThisMahdi descends from the family of the ProphetMohammed:
There’s a great stirring in Islam, something moving on the face of the
waters. They make no secret of it. Those religious revivals come in
cycles, and one was due about now. And they are quite clear about the
details. A seer has arisen of the blood of the Prophet, who will restore
the Khalifate to its old glories and Islam to its old purity. His sayings
are everywhere in the Moslem world. All the orthodox believers have
them by heart. That is why they are enduring grinding poverty and
preposterous taxation, and that is why their young men are rolling up to
the armies and dying without complaint in Gallipoli and Transcaucasia.
They believe they are on the eve of a great deliverance. (147)
As there was an actual conflict between the Germans and the British,
Buchan made the Germans and the Ottomans the enemies in the novel,
in view of the Central Powers’ alliance which included the Ottoman and
German empires. The Ottoman Sultan was believed by some Muslims
to be the sole leader of the Islamic world with a supreme religious
authority. “During World War i, when the Ottoman empire was the ally
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of Prussia and Austria-Hungary, the sultan in Istanbul, in his capacity as
Commander of the Faithful, had called upon all Muslim subjects of the
British, French, and Russian empires to wage jihad against their colonial
masters” (Kepel 2002, 44).
Sir Walter, one of the senior British officials, describes in the novel
the political condition of Islam in the East immediately preceding World
War i:
The Sheikh-ul-Islam is neglected, and though the Kaiser proclaims a
Holy War and calls himself Hadji Mohammed Guilliamo, and says the
Hohenzollerns are descended from the Prophet, that seems to have
fallen pretty flat. The ordinary man again will answer that Islam in
Turkey is becoming a back number, and that Krupp guns are the new
gods. Yet – I don’t know. I do not quite believe in Islam becoming a back
number. … But in the provinces, where Islam is strong, there would be
trouble. Many of us counted on that. But we have been disappointed.
The Syrian army is as fanatical as the hordes of the Mahdi. The Senussi
have taken a hand in the game. The Persian Moslems are threatening
trouble. There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched
grasses wait the spark. And that wind is blowing towards the Indian
border. Whence comes that wind, think you? (6)
The British wanted to discover who was manipulating the cause of
religion, since they could use the same tactic and achieve their aim
by following the motto of divide and rule in the sense of dividing
the Muslims’ bloc to weaken the Ottomans’ control. Sir Walter asks,
“Supposing there is some Ark of the Covenant which will madden
the remotest Moslem peasant with dreams of Paradise?” (15). Such
a belief leads to the conclusion that the British, like the Germans,
thought to obtain the secret power to control Muslims by designing and
manipulating a new religious leader. The Ottoman Army and the Muslim
nations as a whole were thought to be easily driven and led as long as
someone knew their weak and sensitive points. Despite the fact that
the Ottoman empire was weak at the time, the British thought of Islam
as being a formidable power. As Major Hannay puts it, “It looks as if
Islam had a bigger hand in the thing than we thought … I fancy religion
is the only thing to knit up such a scattered empire” (15). Therefore,
Muslims should be alienated from the political and religious authority
of the Ottoman sultan. In this sense, a new leader has to be created,
representing the character of the Mahdi.
According to the novel, the Germans used the same tactic, knowing
quite well the sacredness of religious matters for Muslims. Having a
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powerful intelligence force in the region, the British concentrated their
efforts on knowing what really moved the masses, as Sir Walter says:
I have reports from agents everywhere – pedlars in South Russia,
Afghan horse-dealers, Turcoman merchants, pilgrims on the road
to Mecca, sheikhs in North Africa, sailors on the Black Sea coasters,
sheep-skinned Mongols, Hindu fakirs, Greek traders in the Gulf, as well
as respectable Consuls who use cyphers. They tell the same story. The
East is waiting for a revelation. It has been promised one. Some star –
man, prophecy, or trinket – is coming out of the West. The Germans
know, and that is the card with which they are going to astonish the
world. (15–16)
As part of the British plot, Hannay, the British intelligence officer, was
sent to the Germans to find out their secret plans with regard to the
Muslim world. According to Sir Walter, Hannay was chosen because he
had “a nose for finding out what our enemies try to hide”. In addition, he
was “brave and cool and resourceful” (16). Hannay, in disguise, tries to
win over the Germans by praising them in an exaggerated manner and
hinting indirectly at their secret project: “[y]ou are the cleverest people
in the world. You have already half the Mussulman lands in your power.
It is for you to show us how to kindle a holy war, for clearly you have the
secret of it. Never fear but we will carry out your order” (57).
In order to create a proper Mahdi or Muslim leader, the figure has to
be characterized with specific traits to attract themajority of theMuslims.
One of the characters in the novel, Mr. Blenkiron, who is American,
states, “To capture all Islam – and I gather that is what we fear – the man
must be of the Koreish, the tribe of the Prophet himself … Then he’d
have to be rather a wonder on his own account – saintly, eloquent, and
that sort of thing. And i expect he’d have to show a sign, though what
that could be I haven’t a notion” (28–29).
The secret behindGreenmantle lies with amysteriousGermanwoman,
von Einem, whom British Intelligence wanted to locate. But the real
Greenmantle fell ill and died of cancer, leaving the Germans with a
problem since “you can’t have a crusade without a prophet” (182). In
order to show that the Ottomans are fools for believing in a false prophet,
the British officer, Sandy Arbuthnot, shows up afterwards wearing a
green mantle. Ironically, Buchan describes the condition of the Ottoman
soldiers watching the awaited prophet pass by:
As he rode it seemed that the fleeing Turks were stricken still, and sank
by the roadside with eyes strained after his unheeding figure … Then I
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knew that the prophecy had been true, and that their prophet had not
failed them. The long-looked for revelation had come. Greenmantle
had appeared at last to an awaiting people. (271)
In order to depict British supremacy, the German and Ottoman plots to
control Muslims have to fail, whereas the British scheme succeeds. Poetic
justice seems to be the final solution for Buchan to end his novel, where
the military and intelligence strength of Britain prevails. In the following
section, a broader historical background is offered for one further to
understand Buchan’s sources in writing Greenmantle.
Greenmantle and Its Historical Roots
During British colonial rule, most national and religious movements,
whether in the Arab and Muslim world or elsewhere, were viewed as
unjustified and violent. For instance, the Indian Sepoy revolt against the
British rule in 1857 angered the British empire and led to outrageous
massacres against the Indians (Blunt 2000). In the late nineteenth century,
Muhammad Ahmad led a revolution in Sudan and proclaimed himself
the Mahdi in 1881. The Sudanese rebels scored successive victories, like
capturing Khartoum in January 1885 after a battle in which General
Gordon was killed. The Mahdists were able to exert their control over
many parts of Sudan (Holt 1958). Referring to the Sudanese Mahdi, Major
Richard Hannay in Greenmantle advises the Germans not to play with
the religious sentiments of the Africans:
It is waiting for you – theMussulmans of Somaliland and the Abyssinian
border and the Blue and White Nile. They would be like dried grasses to
catch fire if you used the flint and steel of their religion. Look what the
English suffered from a crazy Mullah who ruled only a dozen villages.
Once get the flames going and they will lick up the pagans of the west
and south. This is the way of Africa. How many thousands, think you,
were in the Mahdi’s army who never heard of the Prophet till they saw
the black flags of the Emirs going into battle? (56–57)
Buchan could have been inspired to draw the character of Greenmantle
from Muhammed Ahmed, his “crazy Mullah” of the Sudan. In Green-
mantle, Sir Walter says that “Islam is a fighting creed, and the mullah
still stands in the pulpit with the Koran in one hand and a drawn sword
in the other” (7). This terrifying image suggests that even the religious
man has a duty to fight the “Kaffirs” or the infidels. Islam is shown as
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an uncontrollable force in the British empire, exemplified by historical
events, particularly the Mahdi revolt in the Sudan. If the British tried to
interfere, then Muslims “would be like dried grasses to catch fire … Look
what the English suffered from a crazy Mullah who ruled only a dozen
villages” (55). The Germans played a major role in creating this prophet;
hence, the British wanted to interfere before their enemy gained a serious
advantage with itsMuslim tool. SirWalter says that containing the Islamic
threat is a “life and death” matter. “I can put it no higher and no lower”
(9). The only way to counter the Islamic Jihad is by controlling its leader,
Greenmantle, because “you can’t have a crusade without a prophet” (204).
After the original Greenmantle had died, Sandy Arbuthnot was forced to
agree to impersonate him, and the long-looked for revelation had come.
Greenmantle had appeared at last to an awaiting people (307). This act
suggests that the Turkish Muslims are highly credulous as they have not
questioned the identity of the new prophet. It also shows that a Christian
white man can lead Muslims to their own advantage: an extension of the
empire’s own logic.
As for Sandy Arbuthnot, he is regarded as one of the most important
characters in Greenmantle, who is disguised as the Mahdi by the end
of the novel. He is described as a cultivated traveller having a deep
knowledge of the Muslim world:
If you struck a Mecca pilgrimage the odds are you would meet a dozen
of Sandy’s friends in it. In shepherds’ huts in the Caucasus you will find
bits of his cast-off clothing, for he has a knack of shedding garments as
he goes. In the caravanserais of Bokhara and Samarkand he is known,
and there are shikaris in the Pamirs who still speak of him round their
fires. If you were going to visit Petrograd or Rome or Cairo it would be
no use asking him for introductions; if he gave them, they would lead
you into strange haunts. But if Fate compelled you to go to Llasa or
Yarkand or Seistan he could map out your road for you and pass the
word to potent friends. (26)
Greenmantle Prototypes
A Scot, Sandy played the role of the second Greenmantle, who guided
and led all Muslims. This character was very important because we can
find Buchan’s view on the role the British empire aspired to play in
the Muslim world. Sandy was supposed to stand for Aubrey Herbert
(1880–1923) and to a lesser extent T.E. Lawrence (1888–1935); in both
cases, Sandy was shown as a superior man. In fact, many British people
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were viewed in Britain in this way; for instance, Herbert mentioned in
his second book of memoirs Ben Kendim (1924) that “there is a quality
in some Englishmen that is rarely possessed by men of other nations”
(Herbert n.d., xiv–xv). Further, Buchan’s son, Lord Tweedsmuir, said
that most of his father’s characters were “usually an amalgam of two or
three real people, often going through the adventures of several other
real-life figures” (Master 1987, 22). Many critics assumed that Sandy was
Aubrey Herbert alone because Buchan mentioned in his autobiography
that Sandy was “reminiscent of Aubrey Herbert” (Buchan 1940, 195).
Also, Buchan was Herbert’s Oxford contemporary and, according to
Herbert’s granddaughter, Margaret FitzHerbert, Buchan wrote a letter in
September 1923 to a friend after hearing about Herbert’s death, saying:
I am greatly saddened this week … The most delightful and brilliant
survivor from the days of chivalry … he was the most extraordinary
combination of tenderness and gentleness, with the most insane
gallantry that I have ever known – a sort of survivor from crusading
times. I drew Sandy in Greenmantle from him. (FitzHerbert 1983, 1)
Unlike T.E. Lawrence, Herbert was not directly involved in the Arab
Revolt of 1916 that was hinted at in Greenmantle, and he did not play
a role in agitating Arab Muslims against the Ottomans. Instead, he
worked hard to support the Albanians against the Ottomans after the
Balkan Wars and was actually offered the throne of Albania after the
end of World War i (Waugh 2004). So, Sandy was originally meant to
“commemorate” Herbert, but was “soon altered to fit Lawrence while
Lawrence, perversely, was altered to fit Sandy”. This change happened in
the novel after the capture of Erzurum when Lawrence started to take
“over the person of Sandy and the romantic ideals he represented for
John Buchan” (Buchan 1993, 1–2). In reality, Lawrence, according to his
own claim, played a major role in the capture of Erzurum by the Russians
by secretly coordinating with Arab officers serving in the Turkish army
(Lawrence 1977, 34; Orlans 2002, 27; Hart 1989, 71); therefore, Sandy
appeared at the end of the novel as a liberator of the same city.
Indeed, there were common views shared between Herbert and
Buchan. Herbert, for instance, was appointed in March 1904 as honorary
attaché in the British Embassy in Constantinople; the new post greatly
increased his enthusiasm for the East. Herbert mentioned once that
he was sent to the “never logical” East because he got the experience
out of “travell[ing] widely” together with a “fairly fluent smattering of
several Eastern languages” (Herbert 1919)² that included Turkish, Arabic,
Greek and Albanian. After being released as a prisoner in Mons in 1914,
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Herbert received a letter from Mark Sykes in which he was urged to join
the intelligence work, so in December 1914 he became involved with
the Arab bureau of intelligence in Cairo together with T.E. Lawrence.
Sykes said that “the Turks will not be able to keep the field and the people
will welcome our arrival on the coast say in June or July when Germany
should be on her last legs” (FitzHerbert 1983, 144).
During the Battle of Mons in 1914, Herbert had written the follow-
ing: “[o]ur feelings were more violently moved against Germany as the
disturber of Europe”. Readers could find numerous references in Green-
mantle showing Germany as a vile enemy that was ready to destroy its
friends and enemies alike, and its might expanded due to its manipulation
of the Greenmantle figure. Also, Buchan clearly accused the Germans of
being merciless and treacherous people who were used to back stabbing;
as his character Blenkiron said, “Germany’s like a scorpion: her sting’s in
her tail, and that tail stretches way down into Asia” (160).
During his stay in Egypt, Herbert visited other Muslim lands like
Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia as part of his work. In the beginning of
Greenmantle Buchan describes the character of Sandy who seemed to be
typically applied to Herbert as a man who:
rode through Yemen, which no white man ever did before. The Arabs
let him pass, for they thought him stark mad and argued that the hand
of Allah was heavy enough on him without their efforts. He’s blood-
brother to every kind of Albanian bandit. Also he used to take a hand
in Turkish politics, and got a huge reputation. (12)
Indeed, some of the ideas in Buchan’s Greenmantle were influenced
by Herbert’s views. For instance, the latter mentioned that he saw the
Egyptian Sultan at his palace in Cairo on 8 March 1916. The Sultan said
that the British “did not understand the Moslems or what was their
fraternity”, and Herbert commented by saying that “[w]e English were
bons enfants, but did not understand the East”. In Greenmantle, Buchan
echoedHerbert’s comments when Sandy stated, “TheWest knows nothing
of the true Oriental. It pictures him as lapped in colour and idleness and
luxury and gorgeous dreams. But it is all wrong” (205).
On the other hand, some critics believed that Sandy’s description
closely matched Lawrence of Arabia’s for his active participation in
the Arab Revolt as well as for other historical details, though this is a
weak claim because Lawrence was sent to Hejaz only in 1916. Other
scholars believed that Lawrence took over the character of Sandy only
after the spread of Lawrence’s reputation as a champion of Arab rights.
David Stafford, for instance, mentioned that Buchan used to receive
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Lawrence in the 1920s as a “frequent visitor” to his house at Elsfield near
Oxford, “where Buchan was drawn to him by the sense of adventure
and youthful possibility which he symbolized” (Stafford 1983–1984, 2–
3).
Buchan himself admitted in a radio interview broadcast in 1936 that
he met Lawrence in 1915 and 1918 (Smith 1965, 207). Also, in A Prince of
the Captivity (1933), Buchan clearly referred to Sandy as T.E. Lawrence.
In this novel, the character, Falconet, informed his friend, Adam, that he
had done a “hundred men’s jobs in the war”, but most people were not
aware of these achievements. Otherwise, “you’d have been as famous as
Lawrence – the Arabian fellow” (Buchan 2003a). In fact, this reference
caused Lawrence to write an angry letter to Edward Garnett on 1 August
1933 in which he criticized Buchan who used to take “figures of today
and projects their shadows on to clouds, till they grow surhuman and
grotesque: then describes them … It sounds a filthy technique …” (as
quoted in Smith 1965, 280). Lawrence was against the “filthy technique”
followed by Buchan because it meant creating unbelievable supermen.
Finally, Buchan used Lawrence as Sandy in The Island of Sheep (1936),
observing that he was a man who knew “the Near and Middle East like a
book” (Buchan 2003b, 18).
As a Briton who feels responsible for all Muslims, Sandy visits Egypt
and Palestine in The Three Hostages (1924) to become the organizer of the
holy pilgrimage to Mekka. This time, he talks of preparing aeroplanes to
take Muslim pilgrims to their destination. He says:
I’m a hamelidari on a big scale. I am prepared to bring the rank of
hadji within reach of the poorest and feeblest. I’m going to be the great
benefactor of the democracy of Islam, by means of a fleet of patched-up
’planes and a few kindred spirits that know the East. (Buchan 1924, 137)
As with Greenmantle in which he becomes the chosen prophet, Buchan
sets up a fictional world where Sandy makes possible pilgrimage, the
most important religious act for a Muslim. This implies a colonial
attitude because it suggests such inefficiency and economic dependence
on the part of Muslims that they are unable to take charge of their
affairs and act independently. Sandy’s role in Buchan’s novels is to be a
mediating contrast with the Western and Muslim characters. By inflating
his intellectual abilities and infinite intrigues, Sandy’s character confirms
Buchan’s idea of the superiority of the British, particularly the Scottish,
over other races and indicates the writer’s continuous imperialist belief
that the British are destined to participate in the most intricate matters
of other nations and religions.
342 jihad and islam in world war i
Back in 1915, Lawrence wrote a confidential report in the Arab Bulletin
entitled “Syria, The Raw Material”, in which he pointed to the British
plans of establishing a state in Syria with “really prepared groundwork
or a large body of adherents” as long as it was “a Sunni one, speaking
Arabic, and pretending to revive the Abbasides or Ayubides” (Lawrence
1917).
It was not just the Germans or the Ottomans but also the British who
had in mind the pretentious revival of the Islamic Caliphate in order to
serve their interests.³ Based on this, it is possible that Buchan heard about
the British war schemes as narrated by Lawrence and later documented
them in Greenmantle.
On 9 December 1914, Lawrence was sent to Cairo to work as a
“subaltern attached to the military intelligence department of the
Egyptian expeditionary force” (James, 2004). He said later in The Seven
Pillars of Wisdom (1926) that his mission in Cairo was meant to change
and “build a new people in the East”, clarifying that from their “oriental
railway station”, as Herbert called the intelligence office in Cairo, “we
began to work upon all chiefs, far and near” (Lawrence, 1986, p. 58).
In January 1916, a new section was created in the intelligence bureau
responsible for “manipulating Arab nationalism to frustrate French
imperial ambitions” as well as to destabilize the Ottoman rule in Hijaz
(James 2004). In reality, the aim behind the sending of Lawrence to
Arabia in late 1916 was to stir up a revolution and “set the parched Eastern
grasses afire in a way that the Ottoman Empire did not expect” (Hitchens
2004, 106). In another work, Revolt in Arabia (1927), Lawrence confessed
that he was searching for a leader to agitate Arabs against Turks: “[m]y
visit was mainly to find the yet unknown master-spirit of the affair, and
measure his capacity to carry the revolt to the goal I had conceived for
it”. In another context, Lawrence stated that he travelled to Arabia to find
his “armed prophet” who “succeeded in revolutions” (Lawrence 1927, 13).
As a result of the British support, Sharif Hussein of Mekka, one of
prophet Muhammad’s descendants, started his revolt on 5 June 1916. In
Buchan’s Nelson’s History of the War, the Sharif was described as “the most
powerful prince of Western and Central Arabia. He was the real ruler of
Mecca, and, along with his able sons, exercised a unique authority due
to his temporal possessions and his religious prestige as sprung from
the blood of the Koreish” (Buchan 1915–1919, 117). Thus, Buchan was
aware of the existence of Sharif Hussein, and he used him to embellish
the portrayal of the Greenmantle figure.
But what literary critics ignored was that Buchan could also have
had someone else in mind when he portrayed the character of the first
Greenmantle. This prophet, who was made by “that damned German
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propaganda” (206) and run by Hilda von Einem, died because of cancer
and could not achieve his goals. “Greenmantle is dying – has been
dying for months” (204). The first Greenmantle figure appears to be a
delineation of Wilhelm Wassmuss (1880–1931) who was also known as
the “German Lawrence of Arabia” (Sykes 1936; Olson 2013, 52; Manjapra
2006).
In 1909, Wassmuss was actually made the German Consul to the
Persian Gulf in Bushire and later Shiraz. Major Percy Cox, the British
Consul General at Bushire, in 1910 expressed serious concerns regarding
Wassmuss’ arguments about the German rights in the Persian Gulf
(Henderson 1948, 64). During World War i, Wassmuss was instrumental
as consular official in agitating the Muslim Persian tribes against British
forces. Then, the Government of India felt “uneasy about the internal
situation” because the overall conditions were increasingly deteriorating,
and “Persia, worked upon [by] the intrigues of the enterprising German
emissary Wassmuss” (Cruttwell 1982, 345), was about to enter the war. In
the fictional story of Greenmantle, Buchan wrote the following: “Persian
Moslems are threatening trouble. There is a dry wind blowing through
the East, and the parched grasses wait the spark. And that wind is blowing
towards the Indian border” (6).The revolt against the British was feared to
start in Persia, crossing through Afghanistan to reach India. In reality, the
possibility of an Islamic Jihad against the British in India was “a recurring
nightmare” (Bar-Yosef 2001, 90–91) for Earl Kitchener (1850–1916) and
his British commanders. As Sir Walter exclaimed in Greenmantle, most
of the British interests would be at stake if a Muslim revolt occurred:
“Hell … may spread. Beyond Persia, remember, lies India” (7).
As a matter of fact, the German plan to wage a propaganda war in
India through Afghanistan against the British dated back to 1914. It was
first suggested by a Swedish explorer called Sven Hedin (1865–1952) who
“claimed that the east was ripe for revolt and the Afghans ‘burning with
desire’ to free India from the British”. Such a plan would be achieved
only by agitating the Emir of Afghanistan against British rule (Hughes
2002, 450). In reality, when Wassmuss lost his German Diplomatic Code
Book which included all his encoded secrets, the British forces were
able to decipher his plans and Wassmuss was forced to flee. In an article
published in February 1916, Wassmuss was reported yo be fleeing without
his box that contained “thousands of violently inflammatory pamphlets
printed in English, Urdu, Hindu, Punjabi, and Sikh, and addressed to
the Indian Army, calling on it to take the opportunity presented by the
war of throwing off the hated yoke of England”. There was also “a special
appeal to the Mohammedans in that army, urging them to join in a Holy
War against the infidel English” (Machray 1916, 351). In the fictional story
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of Greenmantle, one of the first agents to report a strange occurrence in
the East was Harry Bullivant, Sir Walter’s son, who worked as a muleteer
between Mosul and the Persian border. Bullivant reached some findings
as he handed over a small paper on which three words were written:
“Kasredin”, “cancer”, and “v. I.”. These codes were later deciphered by the
British. After the death of the first Greenmantle, a new prophet appeared
as Buchan wanted to prove that the British Greenmantle was better than
the German version, as stated above.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Buchan expresses in his treatment of Islam the anxiety of
the British empire by stressing its perceived fearful and uncontrollable
nature as well as its “fanatical” adherents. Any outsiders, whether they
be “fanatic” Muslims or “chauvinist” Germans or Ottomans, were seen
as disturbers of the British world order, so they were consciously and
continuously vilified. Buchan’s novels aimed to enhance the sense of
unity and faith in Great Britain and, as previously stated, he affirmed
that the British empire was “a mystic whole” which relied on the “wisest
minds” to keep its “spiritual unity”. Surely, Buchan viewed himself as one
of those elites and intelligentsia who were responsible for shaping the
philosophical basis of this empire through his work and writings. His
fiction, especially Greenmantle, offers a world where the British organize
and control the affairs of Muslims and clearly shows the aspiration of the
empire by conveying the popular views of British society in the form of
propaganda. Within this framework for an imagined empire, the British
had to remain superior and everything had to be in order so that the
system would continue functioning properly.
Though this was still the period of the early twentieth century,
the British intelligensia viewed Islamic Jihad as a very important
issue, inspiring policy-makers to exploit it in order to encourage Jihad
against Britain’s adversaries and prompting Buchan to use it as a
central theme in Greenmantle. In the two cases, Jihad is used as a
mobilization tool disguised in the form of religion to serve political
objectives.
Notes
 See for instance Robert MacDonald’s The Language of Empire (1994), Patrick
Brantlinger’s Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism (1988), and
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Craig Smith, “Every Man Must Kill the Thing He Loves: Empire, Homoerotics,
and Nationalism in John Buchan’s ‘Prester John’”, novel: A Forum on Fiction
(Winter, 1995).
 I relied on this online edition throughout this study, so only page numbers will
be cited afterwards.
 Buchan himself wrote in The Last Secrets of Final Mysteries of Explorations (1924)
that someone called Thomas Kejth became the governor of Medina, one of the
respected Muslim cities, in 1815. He was “a deserter from the 72nd Highlanders”
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